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1838.

In equity. On bill for injunction.
Bill in equity by Joshua Webb

against

to
Portland Manufacturing Company
restrain the diversion of water from plain
tiff,s mill. On the stream on which the mill
was situated were two dams, the distance
between which was about 40 or 50 rods, oc
cupied by the mill-pond of the lower dam.
Plaintif! owned certain mills and mill privi
leges on the lower dam. Defendants also
owned certain other mills and mill privileges
on the same dam. To supply water to one
of such mills, defendants made a canal from
below the
the pond at a point immediately
upper dam. The water thus withdrawn by
them for that purpose wasabout one-fourth
of the water to which defendants were en
titled as mill-owners on the lower dam, and
was returned into the stream immediately
below that dam. A preliminary question’
suggested by the court, was argued on the bill
the

and answer.
0. S. Daveis, for plaintiff. P. Mellen and
Mr. Longfellow, for defendants.

The question which has been
upon the suggestion of the court is of
vital importance in the cause, and, if de
cided in favor of the plaintiff, it supersedes
many of the inquiries to which our attention
It is on this ac
must otherwise be directed.
count that we thought it proper to be argued
from the general merits of the
separately
cause.
The argument for the defendants, then,
is
presents two distinct questions.
whether, to maintain the present suit, t is es
sential for the plaintiff to establish any actual
damage.
The second is whether, in point of
law, a mill-owner, having a right to a certain
portion of the water of a stream for the
use of his mill at a particular dam, has a
rlght to draw off the same portion or any
less quantity of the water, at a considerable
distance above the dam, without the consent
of the owners of other mills on the same dam.
In connection with these questions. the point
will also incidentally arise whether it makes
any difference that such drawing off of the
water above can be shown to be no sensible
injury to the other mill-owners on the lower
dam.
As to the ﬁrst question,
can very well
understand that no action lies in a case where
absque injuria; that is,
there is damnum
where there is a damage done without any
wrong or violation of any right of the plain
tii1'. But I am not able to understand
how
it can correctly be said, in a legal sense, that
an action will not lie, even in case of a
mug or violation of a right, unless it is

STORY,..J.

argued

Wm

I

3
0

followed by some perceptible damage, which
can be established as a matter of fact; in
other words, that injuria sine damno is not
actionable.
See Mayor of Lynn, etc., v.
Mayor of London, 4 Term R. 130, 141, 143,
144; Com. Dig. “Action on the Case," B 1,
2. On the contrary, from my earliest reading,
I have considered it laid up among the very
ei
nts of the common law that wherever
the
is a wrong there is a remedy to redress
it; and that every injury imports damage in
the nature of it; and, if no other damage is
established, the party injured is entitled to
a verdict for nominal damages. A fortiori
this doctrine applies where there is not only
a violation of a right of the plaintiff, but the

‘act of the defendant, if continued, may be
come the foundation, by lapse of time, of
an adverse right in the defendant; for then
it assumes the character, not merely of a
violation of a right tending to diminish its
value’ but goes to the absolute destruction
and extinguishment of it. Under such cir
cumstances, unless the party injured can pro
tect his right from such a violation by an
action, it is plain that it may be lost or de
re
stroyed, without any possible remedial
dress. In my judgment,
the common law
countianances no such inconsistency,
not to
call it by a stronger name. Actual, percepti
ble damage is not indispensable as the foun
dation of an action.
The law tolerates no
further inquiry than whether there has been
the violation of a right. If so, the party in
jumd is entitled to maintain his action for
nominal damages, in vindication of his right,
if no other damages are ﬁt and proper to
remunerate him. So long ago as the great
case of Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 6
was put
Mod. 45, Holt, 524, the objection
forth by some of the judges, and was an
swered by Lord Holt, with his usual ability
and clear learning; and his judgment was
supported by the house of lords, and that of
By the favor of an
his brethren overturned.
eminent judge, Lord Holfs opinion, apparent
ly copied from his own manuscript.
has
In this last printed
been recently printed.
opinion (page 14) Lord Holt says: “It is im
posible to imagine any such thing as injuria
sine damno. Every injury imports damage
in the nature of it." S. P. 2 Ld. Raym. 955.
And he cites many cases in support of his
Among these is Starling v. Turner,
position.
2 Lev. 50. 2 Vent. 25, where the plaintiff
was a candidate for the ofﬁce of bridge-mas
ter of London bridge, and the lord mayor re
fused. his demand of a poll. and it was de
termined that the action was maintainable
for the refusal of the poll. Although it might
have been that the plaintiff would not have
been elected, the action was nevertheless
maintainable; for the refusal was a viola
tion of the plaintiffs right to be a candidate.
So in the case cited, as from 23 Edw. III. 18,
tit. "Defense," (it is a mistake in the MS.,
and should be 29 Edw. III. 18b: Fitz. Abr.
tit. “Defense," pl. 5,) and 11 Hen. IV. 47,
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where the owner of a market, entitled to toll
upon all cattle
sold within the .market,
brought an action against the defendant for
hindering a person from going to the market
with the intent to sell a horse, it was, on the
like ground, held maintainable; for though
the horse might not have been sold. and no
toll woifid have become due, yet the hindering
the plaidtif! from the possibility of having
toll was such an injury as did import such
damage, for which the plaintillf ought to re
mver.
So in Hunt v. Dowman, Cro. Jac.
478, 2 Roile, 21, where the lessor brought an
action against the lessee for disturbing him
from entering into the house leased, in order
to view it, and to see whether any waste
was committed; and it was held that the
action well lay, though no waste was com
mitted and no actual damage done, for the
lessor had a right so to enter, and the hinder
ing of him was an injury to that right, for
So Her
which he might maintain an action.
ring v. Finch, 2 Lev. 250, where it was held
that a person entitled to vote, who was re
might well
fused his vote at an election,
maintain an action therefor, although the can
didate, for whom he might have voted. might
not have been chosen, and the voter could
not sustain any perceptible or actual damage
by such refusal of his vote. The law gives
the remedy in such case. for there is a clear
violation of the right. And this doctrine, as
to a violation of the right to vote, is now in
controvertibly established; and yet it would
or
to show any temporal
be impracticable
actual damage thereby. See Harman v. Tap
penden, 1 East, 555; Drewe v. Coulton, 1d.
note; Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236;
563,
Lincoin v. Hapgood, 11v Mass. 350; 2 Vin.
Abr. "Action, Case," note c, pl. 3. In the
case of Ashby v. White, as reported by hard

Raymond,

(2

Ld.

Raym.

953,)

Lord

Holt

said: “If the plaintiﬂ? has a right, he must
of necessity have a means to vindicate and
maintain it, and a remedy, if he is injured
in the exercise or enjoyment of it; and. in
deed, it is a vain thing to imagine a right
without a remedy; for want of right and
want of remedy are reciprocal." S. P. 6

Mod. 53.
The principles laid down by Lord Holt are
so strongly commended, not only by authori
ty, but by the common sense and common
justice of mankind, that they seem absolutely,
And they
in a judicial view, incontrovertible.
in many other
have been fully recognized
cases. The note of Mr. Sergeant Williams to
Mellor v. Spateman, 1 Saund. 346a, note 2;
Wells v. Wailing, 2 W. Bl. 1233; and the case
of the Tuubridge Dippers, (Weller v. Bakem
I am
2 Wils. 41-i,—are direct to the purpose.
aware that some of the old cases inculcate a
different doctrine, and perhaps are not recon
cilable with that of Lord Holt. There are
also some modern cases which at ﬁrst view
seem
to the contrary. But they are dis
tinguishable from that now in judgment; and,
lf they were not, ego assentior scazvolcc. The

case of Williams v. lllorland, 2 Barn. & c. 9.
10, seems to have proceeded upon the ground
that there was neither any damage nor any
injury to the right of the plaintiff. Whether
that case can be suppor.ted upon principle it
is not now neeessary‘to say. Some of the
dicta in it have been subsequently impugned.
and the general reasoning of the judges seems
to admit that, if any right of the plaintiff
had been violated,
the action would have
lain. The case of Jackson v. Pesked, 1 Maule
& S. 235, turned upon the supposed defects
of the declaration, as applicable to a mere
reversionary
interest, it not stating any act
in
done to the prejudice of that reversionary
terest.
I do not stop to inquire whether
there was not an overnicety in the applica
tion of the technical principles of pleading
to that case, although, notwithstanding the
elaborate opinion of Lord Ellenborough, one
might be inclined to pause upon it. The case
of Young v. Spencer, 10 Barn. & G. 145, turn
ed also upon the point whether any injury
was done to a reversionary interest.
I cou
fess myself better pleased with the ruling o
the learned judge (\Ir. Justice Bayley) a
the trial than with the decision of the cour
in granting a new trial. But the court ad
mitted that, if there was any injury to th
reverslonary right. the action would lie; am .
although there might be no actual damag
proved, yet, if anything done by the team
would destroy the evidence of title, the a
A fortiori, the actir
tion was maintaiuabl_;.
must have been held maintainable, if ti
act done went to destroy the existing rigt
or to found an adverse right.
On the other hand, Marzettl v. Willian
1 Barn. & Adol. 415, goes the whole leng
of Lord Holt’s doctrine; for there the pla’
notwithstanding no acti J
tif! recovered,
damage was proved at the trial; and .\
Justice Taunton on that occasion
cii4 .
many
authorities to show that where .
wrong is done, by which the right of (v
party may be injured, it is a good cause
action, although no actual damage he s
In Hobson v. Todd, 4 Term R.
tained.
73, the court decided the case upon the v
distinction,which is most material to .=
present case, that if a commoner might I!
maintain an action for an injury, howe
small,
to his right, a mere wrong-(
might, by repeated torts, in the cours‘
time establish evidence of a right of (
mon.
The same principle was afterw:
recognized by Mr. Justice Grose, in Pii
But the
v. Wadsworth, 2 East,‘162.
of Bower v. Hill, 1 Bing. N. G. 549, i
sustains the doctrine for which I cont 1
and, indeed, a stronger case of its apI
There
tion cannot well be imagined.
court held that a permanent obstructh
a navigable drain of the plaintiffs, th .
choked up with mud for 16 years, war
tionable, although the plaintiff receive‘ no
damage thereby; for, if i‘ I
immediate
esced in for 20 years, it would become ('
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dence of ‘a renunciation and abandonment
of the right of way. The case of Blanchard
v. Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 268, recognizes
the
same doctrine in the most full and satisfac
tory manner, and is directly in point; for
it was a case for diverting water from the
plaintiff,s mill. l,should be sorry to have
it supposed for a‘ moment that Tyler v.
Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 39?, Fed. Gas. No. 14,
312, imported a different doctrine.
On the
it as
contrary-, I have.always
considered
proceeding
upon the same doctrine.
Upon the whole, without going further in
to an examination of the authorities on this
isubject,
my judgment is that,
whenever
is
clear violation of a right, it is not
a
§\‘\there
necessary in an action of this sort to show
actual damage;
that every violation im
ports damage; and, if no other he proved,
the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict for nom
inal damages; and a fortiori that this doc
trine applies whenever the act done is of
such a nature as that by its repetition or
continuance it may become the foundation
or evidence of an adverse right. See, also,
.\Iason v. Hill, 3 Barn. & Adol. 304, 5 Barn.
& Adol. 1. But if the doctrine were other
wise, and no action were maintainahle at
law, without proof of actual damage, that
would furnish no ground why a court of
equity should not interfere, and protect such

a right from violation and invasion; for, in
a great variety of cases, the very ground of
the interposition of a c.“-urt of equity is that
the injury done is irremediable at law, and
that the right can only be permanently pre
served or perpetuated by the powers of a
court of equity. And one of the most ordi
nary processes to accomplish this end is by
a writ of injunction, the nature and eﬂlcacy
of which for such purpose I need not state,
as the elementary
treatises fully expound
them. See Eden, 1nj.: 2 Story, Eq. Jur. c.
23, §§ 86-059; Bolivar \Iauuf‘g Co. v. l\‘epon
set .\ianufg Co., 16 Pick. 241. If, then, the
r diversion of water complained of in the
present case is a violation of the right of
‘the plaintiff, and may permanently injure
that right, and become, by lapse of time.
the foundalon of an adverse right in the
defendants, I know of no more ﬁt case for
the interposition of a court of equity, by
way of injunction, to restrain the defend
ants from such an injurious act. If there
be a remedy for the plaintiff at law for dam
ages, still that remedy is inadequate to pre
,\Vent and redress the mischief.
If there be
no such remedy at law, then, a fortiori, a
,.court of equity ought to give its aid to vindi
cate and perpetuate the right of the plain
tiﬂ. A court of equity will not, indeed, en
tertain a bill for an injunction in case of a
mere trespass fully remediable at law. But,
if it might pccasipn irreparable mischief or
permanent injury, or destroy a right, that
is the appropriate case for such a bill. See
,.:. °tory, Eq. Jur. §§ 926-928. and the cases
;.’.0e cited; Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch.
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315; Van Bergen v. Van Bergen, 3 Johns.
Ch. 282; Turnpike Road v. Miller, 5 Johns.
Ch. 101; Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2
Johns. Ch. 162.
0
Let us come, then, to the only remaining
question in the cause, and that is whether
any right of the plaintiff, as mill.owner on
the lower dam, is or will be violated by the
diversion of the water by the canal of the
defendants.
And here it does not seem to
me that, upon the present state of the law,
there is any real ground for controversy, al
though there were formerly many vexed
questions, and much contrariety of opinion.
The true doctrine is laid down in Wright v.
Howard, 1 Sim. 8:. S. 190, by Sir John Leach,
in regard to riparian proprietors, and his
opinion has since been deliberately adopted
by the king’s bench. Mason v. Hill, 3 Barn.
& Adol. 304, 5 Barn. & Adol. 1. See, also,

Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East, 208. “Prima facie,"
says that learned judge, “the proprietor of
each bank of a stream is the proprietor of
half the land covered by the stream; but
there is no property in the water. Every
proprietor has an equal right to use the wa
ter which ﬂows in the stream; and conse
quently no proprietor can have the right to
use the water to the prejudice of any other
proprietor, without the consent of the other
proprietors who may be affected by his oper
ations. \‘1\,o proprietor can either
diminish
the quantity of water which would otherwise
descend to the proprietors below, nor throw
the water back upon the proprietors above.
Every proprietor, who claims a right either
to throw the water back above or to diminish
the quantity of water which is to descend
below, must, in order to maintain his claim,

either prove an actual grant or license from
the proprietors affected by his operations, or
must prove an uninterrupted enjoyment of
twenty years. which term of twenty years
is now adopted upon a principle of general
convenience. as affording conclusive presump
tion of a grant."
The same doctrine was
fully recognized and acted upon in the case
of Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4 Mason, 397, 400
402; and also in the case of Blanchard v.
Baker, 8 Greeni. 253, 266.
In the latter case
the learned judge (Mr. Justice Weston) who
delivered the opinion of the court, used the
following emphatic language:
“The right to
the use of a stream is incident or appurtenant
to the land through which it passes.
It is an
principle that it
ancient and well-established
cannot be lawfully diverted, unless it is returned again to its accustomed channel, be
fore it passes the land of a proprietor below.
Running water is not susceptible of an ap
propriation which will justify the diversion
or unreasonable
detention
of it. The pro
prietor of the water-course
has a right to
avail himself of its momentum as a power,
which may be turned to beneﬁcial purposes."
The case of Mason v. Hill, 5 Barn. & Adol.
1, contains
language of an exactly sim
import, used by Lord Dennzan in delivering"
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law; and certainly it would found no ground
See, also, Gardner
the opinion of the court.
for the interposition of a court of equity by
v. Village of Newburgh' 2 Johns. Ch. 162.
way of injunction.
Mr. Chancellor Kent has also summoned up
But I confess myself wholly unable to com
the same doctrine, with his usual accuracy,
prehend how it can be assumed, in a case
in the brief, but pregnant, text of his Com
mentaries,
like the present, that there is not and cannot
(3 Kent, Com. [3d Ed.] lect. 42,
be an actual damage to the right of the plain
p. 439;) and I scarcely know where else it
tiff. What is that right? It is the right of‘
can be found reduced to so elegant and sat
isfactory
In the old books having the water ﬂow in its natural current
a formulary.
at all times of the year to the plaintiffs
the doctrine is quaintly, though clearly, slat
begins
ed; for it is said that a water-course
mills. Now, the value of the mill privileges
ex jure naturae, and, having taken a certain must essentially depend, not merely upon the
velocity of the stream, but upon the head of
course naturally. it cannot be [lawfully] di
Aqua currit, et debet currere. ut cur
verted.
water which is permanently maintained. The
Shury v. Plggot, 3 Bulst. 339,
necessary result of lowering the head of wa
rere solehat.
Poph. 166.
ter permanently
would seem, therefore, to
to the owners be a direct diminution of the value of the
The same principle applie
They have an un
privileges; and, if so, to that extent it must
of mills on a stream.
be an actual damage.
doubted right to the ﬂow of the water as it
has been accustomed of right and naturally
Again, it is said that the defendants are
The pro
to ﬂow to their respective mills.
mill-owners on the lower dam, and are en
prietor above has no right to divert or un
titled, as such, to their proportion of the
reasonably
to retard this natural ﬂow to‘ water of the stream in its natural ﬂow. Cer
the mills below; and no proprietor below has
tainly they are. But where are they so en
a right to retard .or turn it back upon the
titled to take and use it? At the lower dam;_
mills above to the prejudice of the right
for there is the place where their right at
of the proprietors thereof.
This is clearly taches. and not at any place higher up the
by the authorities already cited;
established
stream.
Suppose they are entitled to use
the only distinction between them being that
for their own mills on the lower dam half
the right of a riparian proprietor arises by
the water which descends to it, what ground
mere operation of law as an incident to his
is there to say that they have a right to draw
ownership of the bank, and that of a mill
off that half at the head of the mill-pond‘),
owuer as an incident to his mill. Bealey v.
Suppose the head of water at the lower dam
Shaw, 6 East, 208; Saunders v. Newman, 1
in ordinary times is two feet high, is it not
Barn. & Aid. 258; Mason v. Hill, 3 Barn. & obvious that, by withdrawing at the head
'
Adol. 304, 5 Barn. & Adol. 1; Blanchard v. of the pond one-half of the water, the wa
Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 268; and Tyler v. Wil
ter at the dam must be proportionally low
kinson, 4 Mason, 39?, 400-405,—are fully in
ered?
It makes no difference that the de
Mr. Chancellor Kent in his Commen
point.
fendants insist upon drawing off only one
taries relies on the same principles and fully
fourth of what they insist they are entitled
supports them by a large survey of the au
to; for, pro tanto, it will operate in the same
thorities.
3 Kent Comm.
lect. 52,
manner;
and, if they have a right to draw
(3d Ed.)
pp. 441-445.
oﬂ! to the extent of one-fourth of their priv
Now, if this be the law on this subject,
ilege, they have an equal right to draw oﬂ!
upon what ground can the defendants insist
The privilege at
to the full extent of it.
upon a diversion of the natural stream from
tached to the mills of the plaintiff is not the
the plalutiffs mills, as it has been of right
privilege of using half, or any other propor
First, it is said
accustomed to ﬂow thereto?
tion merely, of the water in the stream, but
that there is no perceptible damage done to
of having the whole stream;-ndiminished
That suggestion has been al
the plaintiff.
in its natural ﬂow, come to t. ﬂower dam
ready in part answered.
If it were true, it with its full power, and there to use his
could not authorize a diversion, because it QIfull share of the water-power. The plaintiff
impairs the right of the plaintiff to the full,
has a title, not to a half or other proportion
natural ﬂow of the stream, and may become
of the water in the pond, but is, if one may
the foundation of an adverse right in the de
so say, entitled per my et per tout to his
fendants.
In such a case actual damage is proportion of the whole bulk of the stream,
not necessary to be established in proof.
The undivided and indivisible, except at the lower
law presumes it. IThe act imports damage
dam.
This doctrine, in my judgment, irre
to the right. if damage be necessary.
Such
sistibly follows from the general principles
a case is wholly distinguishable from a mere
already stated; and, what alone would be de
fugitive, temporary trespass. by diverting or cisive, it has the express sanction of the su
withdrawing the water a short period with
preme conrt of Maine in the case of Bian
The court
out damage, and without any pretense of
chard v. Baker, 8 Greenl. 253, 270.
right. In such a case, the wrong, if there be there said, in reply to the suggestion that
no sensible damage. and it be transient in its
the owners of the eastern shore had a right
as it does not touch
nature and character.
to half the water, and a right to divert it to
the right, may possibly (for I give no opin
that extent: “It has been seen that, if they
ion upon such a case) be without redress at
had been owners of both sides, they had no
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right to ‘divert the water without again re
turning it to its original channel, (before it
Be
passed the lands of another proprietor.)
sides, it was possible, in the nature of things,
that they could take it from their side only.
An equal portion from the plaintiff,s side
must have been mingled with all that was
diverted."
A suggestion has also been made that the
defendants have fully indemniﬁed the plain
tiff from any injury, and in truth have con
ferred a beneﬁt on him, by securing the wa
ter, by means of a raised dam, higher up
the stream, at Sebago pond, in a reservoir,
so as to be capable of affording a full supply
To this
in the stream in the dryest seasons.
may be given.
suggestion
several answers
In the ﬁrst place. the plaintiff is no party to
the contract for raising the new dam, and has
no interest therein, and cannot. as a matter
of right, insist upon its being kept up, or
upon any advantage to be derived therefrom.
In the next place, the plaintiff is not com
peliable to exchange one right for another,

.
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or to part with a present interest in favor oi
the defendants at the mere election of tin
latter.
Even a supposed beneﬁt cannot be
forced upon him against his will; and, cer
tainly, there is no pretense to say that, it
point of law, the defendants have any righ
to substitute, for a present existing right oi
the plaintiffs, any other which they may
deem to be an equivalent.
The private prop
erty of one man cannot be taken by another
simply because he can substitute an equiva
lent beneﬁt.
Having made these remarks upon the points
raised in the argument, the subject, at least
so far as it is at present open for the con
sideration of the court, appears to me to be
Whether, consistently
exhausted.
with this
opinion, it is practicable for the defendants
de
successfully to establish any substantial
fense to the bill, it is for the defendants, and
not for the court, to consider.
I am author
ized to say that the district judge concurs in
this opinion'
Decree accordingly.
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PAUL

v. SLASON
(22

Vt.

et al.

231.)

Supreme Court of Vermont.
Term, 1850.

Rutland.

Jan.

Trespass for taking two cords of wood,
two baskets, two pitchiorks, two horses.

Plea, the
one harness, and one wagon.
general issue, with notice, that the defend
ant Charles H. Slason attached the prop
erty by virtue of a writ, which he was le
gally deputised to serve, in favor of one
Langdon against the plaintiff, and that the
other defendants aided him in so doing, at
by jury, September
’1‘rial
his request.
On trial
Term, 1848,—HALL, ., presiding.
it appeared, that on the twenty sixth day
of September, 1844, the defendant Francis
Slason commenced a suit in the name of
Benjamin F. Langdon against the plaintiff,
and that the defendant Charles H. Slason,
who was legally deputized to serve the
writ. which was returnable to the county
court, attached the property in question,
except one pitchiork, and that the defend
ant Pelkey assisted in removing the prop
erty. It also appeared, that on the same
day Charles H. Slason and Pelkey made
use of the horse, wagon and harness, part
oiI theproperty attached, in removing grain
and other property, which was attached
at the same time, on the same writ, and
upon the same farm, and continued to use
them for this purpose through the clay;
and that on the next day Charles H. Sla
son was seen driving the same horse and
wagon, with the harness, in the highway
in the vicinity,—but upon what business
did not appear. It also appeared, that the
defendants took a pitchfork belonging to
the plaintiff, and used it during the day, on
which the attachment was made, in remov
ing the grain &c. The defendants offered
in evidence the ﬁles and record of the su
preme court, in the suit in favor of Lang
don against the plaintiff, in which the prop
erty in question was attached, ior the pur
pose of proving, that judgment was ren
dered therein in favor of Langdon ;-—to
which evidence the plaintiff objected; but
it was admitted by the court. ‘1‘he defend
ants then offered in evidence an execution,
purporting to have been issued upon the
judgment in the supreme court above men
tioned,dated February 21,18-i8;—to the ad
mission of which the plaintiff objected, in
sisting, that an exempliﬁed copy of the
judgment should be produced, beiore
the execution could be ‘given in evi- ‘233
dence, and that theexecution, and the
issuing thereof, could be shown only by a.
certiﬁed copy of the record of the judgment;
—but the objection was overruled by the
court.
The defendants then offered in evidence
the return of one Edgerton, as sheriff, upon
the said execution, to show that the wagon
in question was sold thereon End the pro
ceeds applied in payment of the debt. To
the admission of this evidence the plaintiff
objected, upon the ground, that from the
return it appeared, that the property was
sold two days after the sheriff received the
execution for service, as shown by his in
dorsement upon it. The counsel for the de
fendants then suggested, that there was a

J
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mistake in the return, in stating the day
of the sale, and moved the court, that the
sheriff have leave to amend his return in
that particular. To this the plaintiff ob
jected; but the court permitted the sheriff
to amend his return, so as to state the day
of sale to have been one month later than
stated originally in the return. The de
fendants then offered in evidence the re
turn, as amended; to which the plaintiff
objected,—but the objection was overruled
by the court. The defendants then offered
in evidence the return of the sheriff upon the
original writ in favor of Langdon against
the plaintiff, showing an appraisal of the
horse and some other property attached,
and that the plaintiff had furnished secu
rity to the sheriff and received possession of
It appeared,that the money
the property.
had not been paid on the security, and no
application of the property had ever been
made upon the execution by the sheriff, or
by any other person. The defendants also
proved,that oneMcCune had executed a re
ceipt to the sheriff ioraportlon of the prop
erty attached, and that the property, ex
cept the wagon which was sold upon the
execution, went into the possession of the
The plaintiff requested the court
plaintiff.
to charge the jury,—1. That the defend
ants could not justify the taking of the prop
erty in question under the writ in favor of
Langdon, if the property attached, or any
portion thereof, were put to use by the of
ﬁcer who had attached it. 2. That prop
erty attalched must be considered as in the
custody of the law, and the attaching of
ﬁcer has no authority to put it to use; and
if, in this case, they iound, that, upon the
property being attached by Charles H. Sla
son, he put the horse, wagon and harness,
to use, and continued to use them,
during the greater part ‘of the day, '234
in removing the other property at
tached, he rendered himself a trespusser ab
initio, and could not justify taking the
property, or any part thereof, under the
3. Thatiftheofﬁcercouldjus
attachment.
tify the taking of the property under the
attachment, if he so used any part of it, he
could not jutify the taking of the horse,
wagon and harness so used; but, as to the
property so used, the authority was ren
dered void by the abuse. 4. That the use of
the horse, wagon and harness, on the next
day after the attachment, was unjustiﬁa
ble, and rendered the ofﬁcer a trespasscr
ab Initfo. 5. Tlmt the application of the
plaintiff to have the property appraised,
under the statute, in order to regain the
possession of it, and giving security to the
sheriff, was not a waiver of the right of
action against the defendant for the tres
pass; but that the plaintiff was entitled to?
recover the amount thus secured by him.
6. That if a portion of the property were
delivered to the receiptor, the plaintiff was
entitled to recover its value, unless it had
come to his possession. 7. That if thejury
found, that the defendants took the plaintiff,s pitchiork and used it during the day,
without right, he was entitled to recover
its value, unless it were returned,—and
that,lf returned, he was entitled to re
cover nominal damages. 8. That the sale
of the wagon and the application of its
proceeds upon the execution in favor of
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POLAND, J. The ﬁrst question. ar sin,
o
in this case, is in relation to the char
the county court to the jury as to th us
of the horse, wagon and harness by the dc
fendants, in removing the other propert;
of the plaintiff, which was attached at the
same time. The jury were charged, the‘
they were only used in removing thl
other property, and were not injured Ol
lessened in value thereby, such use would
not make the defendants trespassers at
Inltio.

It

was an early doctrine of the commor

8

it

if

law, that when a party was guilty of ar
abuse of authority given by the law, he be
came a trespasser ab inftlo, and lost th.
protection of the authority, under whict
beasts, taker
he originally acted,—as,
damage feasant, or distrained for rent
were killed, or put to work, by the party
taking them, he might be sued in trespasl
as for an original wrongful taking. Thl!
doctrine has fully obtairied in this coun
try, and was acted upon by this court
Vt. 407
the case of Lamb v. Day et al.,
where it was held, that the defendants
who had attached the plaintiff,s mare (om

if

a

a

a

being creditor and the other oﬁlcer) ant
worked her ior several weeks in running
a line of stages, without the plaintiffs con
The
sent, became trespassers ab inftio.
doctrine has, to our knowledge, never been
extended to any case, except where there
has been a clear, substantial violation oi
char
the plaintiff,s rights, and of such
wanton disregard or
acter as to show
duty on the part of the defendants, Wer1"‘
the acts of the defendants, in using tht
horse, wagon and harness under the cir
cumstances and for the purpose mentionet
in this case, such an abuse of the propert;
and of the authorityuuder which it wa
taken, as ought to deprive them of the ben
eﬁt of its protection?
It was the duty of the ofﬂcer to remov
the property, in order to make his attacl
ment effectual, and the expense of such r(
moval must be borne by the debtor; an‘
instead of the plaintiff being injured by th
use of the property, he was really beneﬁtet
by it. The doctrine, for which the plain
tiff contends, goes‘ the extent of saying
that any use of the property makes the of
an ofﬁcer at
ﬁcer trespasser;—so that
tach a horse and wagon, and use the horse
for the purpose of drawing away the
wagon from the possession of the debtor,
We are wholly
he becomes a tort ieasor.
unable to satisfy ourselves, that the law
has ever gone to so unreasonable an
'23? extent, or ‘has ever been applied to
any case, except those where the
property has been injured, or has been used
by the oﬂicer ior his own beneﬁt. or ior the
beneﬁt of some one other than the debtor.
This was the rule laid down by the county
court, and we are fully satisﬁed of its cor
rectness.
The next question arises upon the
charge to the jury in relation to the driv
ing of the horse and wagon by the ofﬁcer
on the next day afterthe attachment. The
case states, that the oﬁicer was seen driv
iug the horse and wagon in the highway,
2.

4

5

1

5

8

3

if

;

if

if

if

ii

if

b

whether the defendants were trespassers a
lnitio depended upon the character of the
use of the property by them, after the at
the use of the horse,
tachment;—that
wagon and harness,in removing and secur
ing otherproperty of the plaintiff, attached
the same day, on the same writ and on the
same farm with the horse, wagon and har
ness,—the use being for a part of the day
only,—would not necessarily be such an
abuse of the oﬁicer’s authority,as to make
the defendants trespassers ab fnltio; but
they iound, either that such use of
that
the property by the defendant was wan
ton, and with a design to injure the plain
tiff, or that the property was injured by
it so as nmterially to diminish its value,
the defendants would he trespassers
'235 ‘in the original taking and be liable
in this action ;—that whether the driv
ing of the horse and wagon by the ofﬁcer,
the next day after the attachment, was an
abuse of his authority depended upon the
purpose and business, for which they were
driven; that
the jury found, that the of
ﬁcer was using the horse and wagon ior
other purposes than that of removing and
securing them in a convenient place for
keeping, under the attachment, the defend
ants would be liable; but for such a pur
pose, they would not be liable. In regard
to damages, the court instructed the jury,
that, the property having either been sold
and applied on the execution, or delivered
to the plaintiff on security furnished by
him, the plaintiff would not be entitled to
recover the full value of it; but that the
measure of damages would be the amount,
which the property had been diminished in
value by the defendants’ abuse of it. In
regard to the pitchiork the court charged
they believed,from the evi
the jury. that
dence, that the defendants took and carried
it away, they should give the plaintiff its
it was used and left upon the
value that
premises, so that the defendant received it
again, and it.was injured by the use, the
plaintiff would be entitled to recover the
they
amount of the injury; but that
found, that it was merely used ior a por
tion of a day in removing the plaintiffs
property, there attached, and was left
where it was iound, so that the plaintiff
had it again, and that it was not injured
by the use,they were not bound o give the
plaintiff damages ior such use.’ The jury
returned a verdict ior the defendants. Ex
ceptions by plaintiff.
M. G. Evarts and Thrall & Smith, ior
Vt. 407;
plaintiff, cited Lamb v. Day
Stark. Ev. 1108; Chit. Pl. 171; Bac. Abr.
161; Strong v. Hobbs, 20 Vt. 185; Hart v.
Vt. 328; Orvis v. Isle La Mott, 12
Hyde,
Vt. 195; Fletcher v. Pratt, Vt. 182,: and
Brainard v. Burton, Vt. 97.
E. Edgerton, for defendants, cited
Greenl.Ev.§ 253; Ib.283,§ 276,n.5; Stark.
33; Mickles et al. v. Ilaskin, 11
Ev. 151,
Vt. 407‘
Wend. 125; Lamb v. Day,

‘The opinion of. the court was de
livered by

if

'

Langoon could have no effect upon the
amount of damages in this suit. But the
court charged the jury, that, from the tes
timony, the attachment and disposition
of the property attached was a justiﬁcation
for the defendants, unless they had been
guilty of such an abuse of the property, as
to make them trespassers ab fnitio,,—that
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out pon what business did not appear.
The ‘jury were charged, that if they iound,
the the ofﬁcer was using the horse and
wa on ior other purposes, than that of re
mo ,ng and securing; them in a place ior
con eniently keeping them, whileunder the
attachment, the defendants would be lla

ble‘—otherwise not.
The ofﬁcer, no doubt, had the right to
drive the horse and wagon for the purpose
suggested in the charge; but the plaintiff
claims, that the legal presumption should
be, in the absence of express proof as to
the object and purpose of driving the horse
and wagon, that it was ior an unlawful
purpose. But in our opinion this would be
contrary to the ordinary rule of legal pre
sumption in relation to all persons, and
especially persons acting under legal au
thority. Omnla praasumuntur rite acta is
a maxim, which is always applied to the
conduct of persons acting under the author
ity of law. Although there was no direct
evidence as to the object and purpose of
driving the horse and wagon, the jury
might well infer the object from the time,
circumstances and direction of the driving;
and we think it was properly left to them
to determine. We think, it was upon the
plaintiff to show the act of the ofﬁcer to
be unlawful; and if he had it left to the jury
to decide, even without any evidence to
prove it, we do not see, that he has any
ground of complaint.
3. Another question is also raised upon
the charge to the jury in relation to the
use of the pitchiork by the defendants.
Under the charge thejury must have iound,
that the pitchiork was used by the defend
ants only in moving the plaintiffs proper
ty, that it was left where they found it,
that the plaintiff received it again, and
that it was in no way or manner injured.
They were told by the court, that if they
found all these facts proved, they were not
obliged to give the plaintiff any damages
for the fork.
It is true, that, by the theory of the
‘238 law, whenever an invasion of ‘a right
is established,though no actual dam
age be shown, the law infers a damage to
the owner of the property and gives nom
inaldamages.
This goes upon the ground,
either that some damage is the probable
result of thedefendant’s act, or that his act
would have effect to injure the other,s
right, and would be evidence in future in
favor of the wrong doer. This last applies
more particularly to unlawful entries upon
real property, and to disturbance of incor
poreal rights, when theunlawful act might
have an effect upon the right of the party
and be evidence in favor of the wrong doer.
if his right ever came in question.
In these
cases an action may be supported, though
there be no actual damage done,—becausc
otherwise the party might lose his right.
So, too, whenever any one wantonly in
vades another’s rights ior the purpose of
injury, an action will lie, though no actual
damage be done; the law presumes dam
age, on account of the unlawful intent.
But it is believed,that no casecanbe iound,
where damages have been given for a tres
pass to personal property, when no unlaw
intent, or disturbance of a right, or pos
fui
00,".l,\-. in 0lQnnIn and uIlmn nnt. nnlv
nil

probable, but all possible, damage is ex
pressly disproved.
The English courts have recently gone
far towards breaking up the whole sys
tem of giving verdicts, when no actual in
jury has been done, unless there be some
right in question, which it was important
to the plaintiff to establish. In the case of
Williams v. Mostyn, 4 M. & W. 145, where
case was brought for the voluntary escape
of one Langiord, taken on mesne process,
and it was admitted, that the plaintiff had
sustained no actual damage, or delay, the
defendant having returned to the custody
of the plaintiff, a verdict; was found for the
plaintiff for nominal damages. But, on
motion, the court directed a nonsuit to be
entered, saying that there had been no
damage in fact or in law. So in a suit
brought by the owner of a house againsta
lessee, ior opening a door without leave.
the premies not being in any way weak
ened, or injured, by the opening, the court
refused to allow nominal damages, and re
mitted the case to the jury to say, whether
the plaintif.f’s reversionary interest had in
point of fact been prejudiced. Young v.
Spencer, i.013. & C. 145, [21 E. C. L. 70.] Mr.
Broome, in his recent work on Legal Max
ims, lays down the law in the iollowing
language,—"' Farther, there are some in
juries of so small and little consideration in
the law, that no action will lie ior them;
for instance, in respect to the pay
ment ‘of tithes, the principle which ‘239
may be extracted from the cases ap
pears to be, that for small quantities of
corn, involuntarily left in the process of
raking, tithe shall not be payable, unless
there be any particular fraud, or intention
to deprive the parson of his full right."
If any farther authority is deemed neces
sary,in support of the ruling of the county
court on this point, we have only to refer
to that ancient and well established maxim ,
—de minimis non curat Ie.r,—which seems
peculiarly applicable in this case, and would
alone have been ample authority upon thisI
part of the case; ior we fully agree with I
Mr. Sedgwick, that the law should hold
out no inducement to useless or vindictive
litigation. Sedgwick on Dam. 62. This
disposes of all the questions raised upon
the charge.
4. The remaining
questions in the case
4
arise upon the admission of the original
ﬁles and record of the case Langdon v.
Paul. Th.1 plaintiff objected to the intro
duction of the original record, and claimed,
that the judgment could only be proved by
an exempliﬁed copy of the record. But we
think the objection not well iounded. If
the clerk of the supreme court were willing
to bring the original record into court, we v
think it might well be used. He probably
could not becompelled to do so, and might
have required the party to procure a copy
of the same; but when the original record
is brought into court, we think it would
be very difﬁcult to give any substantial
reason, why it is not evidence of as high a
character, as a copy of the same record
would be. The practice of receiving orig
inal l‘(3cOI‘ds as evidence has been universal,
as we believe, in this state, and is often
much more convenient than to procure
. conies.
Nve et al. v. Kellam. 18 Vt. 594.

NOMINAL DAMAGES.
In relation to the amendment of the exe
cution by the ofﬁcer, it is very clear. that
the county court had no power to permit
any such amendment; but we cannot per
ceive, that the case was in any way affected
by it. If the oﬂlcer. who held the execu
tion, was guilty oi any irregularity in his
proceedings in the sale o! the wagon upon
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the execution, it could not have the effect
to make these defendants trespassers, who
took the property rightiully, and were in
no way responsible for the act of the sher
iﬂ. who had the execution.
We ﬁnd no error in the proceedings of the
court, and their judgment is ai—
aountg
rme .
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LUCAS
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v.

MICHIGAN

N. VV. 1039,

Supreme Court

Error

CENT.,R.

98 Mich.

of Michigan.

CO.

1.)

Dec. 4, 1893.

to circuit court, Wayne county; Cor

J.

Reilly, Judge.
Action by Calvin Lucas against the Mich
igan Central Railroad Company for damages
for wrongful ejection from defendant,s train.
Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings
error. Reversed.
nelius

Henry Russel, (Ashley Pond, of counsel,)
Dickinson, Thurber & Stev
for appellant.
enson, for appellee.

McGRATH, J.

Plaintiff

purchased

an ex

cursion ticket at Dexter, good to Detroit
and return, and rode to Detroit thereon.
At
about 8 o’clock on the evening of the same
day he took the train at Detroit for Dexter,
taking a seat in the smoking car. When a
few miles out of Detroit, the conductor took
up his ticket. When the train arrived at
Ypsilanti. plaintiff left the smoker, and took
a seat in a regular passenger car.
After the
train left Ypsilanti, the conductor came to
plaintiff, and demanded his fare. Plaintiff
informed him that he had given him his
ticket in the other car. The conductor then
Plaintiff replied
asked him for his check.
The
that he had not been given a check.
conductor threatened to put him oil’, but did
not at that time, but told him that he would
have to pay his fare, or get off at Ann Ar
Plaintiff responded that he had sur
bor.
rendered his ticket, and_ would not pay his
fare. After the train left Ann Arbor, the
returned,
and, plaintiff refusing
conductor
called the
to pay his fare, the conductor
brakcman, and they together pulled plaintiff
from his seat, took him through the car, and
put him off, about one mile west of Ann
Arbor and eight miles east of Dexter. Plain
tiff testiiied that when his ticket was taken
up no check was given him; that when the
conductor came to him the second time, and
again just before he was put off, he told the
conductor that if he would go back with him
into the smoking car he would prove his as
sertions by the man who sat with him, but
that the conductor told him that he had no
time to bother with him; that the conduc
tor insisted that he (plaintiff) had gotten on
at Ypsilanti; that he was ejected from the
car by force at about 10 o,clock at night;
that the night was very dark; that he could
not even see the fences on either side of the
track, and that he was.compelled to walk
home. It was not claimed on the trlalthat
plaintiff had not surrendered a ticket, but
the conductor insisted that he had given him
and all of the excurslonists checks; that he
told plaintiff that if he would bring one
man that know him, that said he came from
Detroit, it would be all right, but he would
not do that; that he used no force in eject
ing him; and denied that plaintiff had re

DAMAGES.
quested him to go into the smoking car for
the purpose of identiﬁcation.
One of plain
tifiT,s
witnesses,
who was in the smoker,
testiﬁed that the conductor gave plaintiff no
check when the ticket was taken up. An
other witness,
who was in the car from.
which plaintiff was ejected, testiﬁed that she
was an excursionist, as were others who
were with her; that no checks were given
to her or the other excursionist with her,
and that she heard plaintiff say to the con
ductor that if he would go into the smoking
car with him (plaintiff) he could prove that
,
he got on at Detroit, and had given up his
refused
to go.
ticket,
and the conductor
Plaintiff had a verdict for $1,200, and de
fendant appeals.
The alleged errors rclatc to the refusal of
requests to charge, and to the instructions
The de
given on the question of damages.
fendant was entitled to have the jury in
structed as to the law applicable to its ver
After the surrender of
sion of the case.
his ticket, plaintiff had left his seat in the
smoking car, and taken a seat in another
If plaintiff received a check from the
car.
conductor, and, when his fare was demand
ed, did not produce the check, and, when re
quested, refused to go into the other car for
The
identiﬁcation, he could not recover.
check, if given, was given him for the very
It was notice to
purpose of identiﬁcation.
him that the conductor would rely upon its
The
production, and not upon recollection.
defendant was entitled to the instruction
that there was no evidence of malicious in
tention on the part of the conductor; but,
under the circumstances of this case, if the
jury believed the testimony introduced on
behalf of plaintiff, the plaintiff was enti
tled to recover, not only those damages,
which are ordinarily termed "actual dam
ages." but for whatever injury to his feel
ings or of indignity, pain, and disgrace such
conduct would tend to produce in vi w of
Con
the time, place, and circumstances.
duct may be so hasty and ill-timed, and so
far disregard proper precaution and the
rights of others, as to be reckless and op
pressive, and the law regards recklessness
as aggravating the injury. \
and oppression
Post Co. v. .\IcArthur, 16 Mich. 453; Josse
lyn v. McAilister, 22 Mich. 310; Kreiter v.
Nichols, 28 Mich. 499; Elliott v. Hcrz, 29v
Mich. 202; Kehrig v. Peters, 41 Mich. 475,
2 N. W. 801; Ross v. Leggett. 61 Mich. 445,
plaintiff,s legal rights were
28 N. W. 695.
violated by the expulsion from the train, it
to consider the injury to his
was for th
feelings tha
onduct would be likely to
of his consciousness that
produce, in
ult, and had a right to re
he was witho
Rail
main upon the train to his destination.
road Co. v. Flagg, 43 Ill. 364; Carsten v.
Railroad Co., 44 Minn. 454, 47 N. W. 49;
Railroad Co. v. Rice, 64 Md. 63, 21 Atl. 97;
Railroad Co. v. Holdridge, 118 Ind. 281, 20
N. E. 837. It was expressly held in Raii4
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road Co. v. Winter’s Adm’r, 143 U. S. 60,
12 Sup. Ct. 356, that if plaintiff was right
fully on the train as a passenger, he had the
right to refuse to be ejected‘ from it, and
to make a suﬂicient resistance to being put
oﬂ! to denote that he was being removed by
compulsion,
and against his will; and the
fact that under such circumstances
he was
put o the train was of itself a good cause
Defendant,s
of act n against the company.
belie! cannot be held to justify unreasonable
or reckless conduct.
Welch v. Ware, 82
ich. 77; Raynor v. Nims, 37 Mich. 34.
court was in error, however, in in
structing the jury that plaintil! was enti
WThe
tled to exemplary damages in the absence
of any explanation as to what was meant
by that term.
Post Co. v. Mt'Arthur, supra.
The court had already instructed the jury
that plaintiﬂ! was entitled to recover as ac
tual damages “for such pain and mortiﬁca
tion and disgrace as the act entailed," and
informed the jury that if plaintiff made
\then
proposition to the conductor to step back
\a
into the other car, and allow him to prove
that he got on at Detroit, and surrendered
his ticket, then he was entitled to recov
er,
in addition to his actual damages,
what the law calls “exemplary damages."
The jury were left free to add to the amount
which they found that plaintiff had suffered
from mortiﬁcation, pain, and disgrace a fur
ther sum as a punishment.
‘he aim of
law which gives redress for pr vate wrongs
is compensation
to the injured, rather than
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the prevention of a recurrence of the wrong.)
The law recognizes the fact that an injury
may be intensiﬁed by the malice or will
tulness or oppressiveness
or recklessness ot
the act, and simply allows damages com
mensurate with the injury when these ele
ments are present.
The added injury in
consequence of their presence is not always
susceptible of proof, hence the matter is left
Courts,
to the sound discretion o! the jury.
however,
should call attention to the ele
ments that should be considered by juries in
this class of cases, and caution them from
acting upon improper theories.
Josselyn v.
McAillster, 22 Mich. 310; Scripps v. Reilly, 38
Mich. 10; Stilson v. Gibbs, 53 Mich. 280, 18
N. W. 815; Wilson v. Bowen, 64 Mich. 133,
31 N. W. 81.
It is urged that the defendant
is not liable in exemplary damages for the
oppressive
or reckless conduct of the con
ductor, and Railroad Co. v. Prentice, 147
U. S. 101, 13 Sup. Ct. 261, is relied upon. In
that case the act was wholly without the
line or scope of the conductor,s authority,
and the court expressly
recognize the rule
that, if any wantonness or mischief on the
part of an agent acting within the scope of
his employment causes additional injury to
the plaintiff in body or mind, the principal
is liable to make compensation for the whole
injury suffered. and a number of cases are
For the
cited in support of the doctrine.
errors mentioned, the judgment is reversed,
and a new trial ordered.
The other justices
concurred.

EXE MPLARY DAMAGES.

14

CHELLIS
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308,
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tiff ior the injury‘ sustained by him. pro

N. Y. 214.):

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan.

13, 1891.

Appeal from
supreme court, general
term, iourth department.
Han
Watson M. Rogers. for appellant.
nibal Smith, ior respondent.

GRAY, J. This plaintiff has recovered a
verdict ior $8,000, as damages ior the
breach by defendant of his promise to
marry her. The proofs abundantly justi
ﬁed the jury in ﬁnding as they did. but the
defendant insists that the trial judge erred
in his rulings upon the evidence, and in
his charge. He does not raise any ques
tion about the fact of his agreement to
marry the plaintiff. and, indeed, he could
not well do so, as it was established out
of his own mouth; but he thinks his case
was prejudiced by theadmission ofcertain
evidence, and by the wayin which the trial
judge submitted the question of the dam
ages to the consideration of the jury, and
that he should. thereiore. have a new trial.
The general term, in afﬁrming the judg
ment, have passed upon various points
raised by the appellant, and we might well
remit the case without further expression
of opinion; but some of the questions still
insisted upon seem to deserve further con
sidera tion from us. Evidence of the defend
ant,s general reputation as to wealth, at
the time of the agreement ofmarriage, was
admitted against the objection to its cor‘
petency upon the subject of damages in
such an action.
The exception to its ad
mission presents an interesting question,
and one which may be deemed
ice,
gether free from difﬁculty.
Such
on ﬁrst consideration, seems to 'couﬂict
with the general rule that in actions ior
a breach of contract evidence as to the de
fendant’s wealth is inadmissible.
The
plaintiff. in such actions, is entitled to re
cover only those damages which she may
prove that she has suffered in consequence
of the defendant,s failure to perform on
his part. The defendant,s solvency, or in
solvency, has nothing to do with the is
sue, and furnishes no measure ior the com
putation of damages. And this rule of ex
clusion as to such evidence has been also
applied to cases where damages are sought
to be recovered for seduction, or ior crim
inal conversation.
James v. Biddington,
6 Car. & P. 589; Dain v. Wycoff, 7 N. Y.
191.
Baron AnnsnsoN, in James v. Did
dington, an action by a husband for crim
inai conversation with his wife, asigned
as the reason ior holding such evidence to
be improper that “the plaintiff is entitled
to as much damages as a jury think is a
compensation for the injury he has sus
tained, and the amount of the defendant’s
property is not a question in the case.”
Judge GARDINI-IR. in Dain v. Wycoff. an
action by a father ior the seduction of his
daughter, reasoned, upon the exclusion of
proof of what defendant was worth, that
the jury should not be allowed “ to go
beyond the issue between the parties liti
gating, and, after indemnlfying the plain

W

t‘Aﬁirming

7

78.

ceed as conservators of the public morals
to punish the defendant in apri vate action
ior an offense against society." The prin

ciple underlying the exclusion of this kind
of evidence. in the latter class of cases, is
that viIid,i(:tlV601,|I)1tniiIlvt!dtiln§§§§_,W0iild
be improper,
as the recovery in them
should be conﬁned to what the jury may
deem to be a sufﬁcient compensation ior
the injury sustained by the plaintiff) But
the present action is quite other in its nat
ure, and constitutes
an exception to that
general rule upon the subject of damages
ior violation oicontract obligations which
has been assented to by the judges of the
courts in this country and in England. it
is apparent that, in such an action as this,
there can be no hard and fast rule of dam
ages, and that they must be left to the
discretion ofthe jury. Of course, that dis
cretion is not so absolute as to be inde
pendent of a consideration of fheevidence.
It is one which is to be exercised with re
gard to all the circumstances of the par
ticular case, and, as it has frequently been
said, where the verdict
has not been
inﬂuenced by prejudice, passion. or cor
ruption, the ver ict will not be disturbed
by the court.
That the amount of the
suitor’s pecuniary means is afactor ofsome.
importance in the case of a de and of
marriage cannot fairly be
It is a
circumstance which very frequen
denied? y must
have its particular inﬂuence upon the mind
of the woman in determining the question
of consent or refusal; and, as I think,i
a proper case, very naturally and properly
so. The ability of the man to support her
in comiort, and the station in life which
marriage with him holds forth, are mat
ters which may be weighed in connection
with an agreement to marry.
In the case at bar the plaintiff was 47
years of age, and the defendant 74. Six
years previously he had smght her ac
quaintance, unsolicited by her, and with
matrimonial views on his pa t. He had
visited her more or less freq ently, and
had twice proposed marriage beiore their
engagement in 1886. She was and had
been supporting herself as ateacher and
superintendent in city schools. He had
never been married, and had lived in the
country as a farmer. He was possessed of
pecuniary means, considerable in amount
in the general estimation of his neighbors,
and not inconsiderable if we take his own
Though pretending to some
estimate.
cultivation of mind, which, among other
ways, if we may judge from this record,
he seemed to delight in displaying by a
versiﬁcation of the homely though not very
inspiring or romantic topies and events of
his farm life and surroundings, be yet was
seemingly lacking in those outward graces
of the person which are not infrequently
deemed a substitute ior more solid posses
sions. Nor does he seem to have had re
course to the adventitious aids of the ward
robe to adorn his exterior person, and
thereby to compensate for personal short
comings.
I think that the jury should be
made aware of all thecircumstances which
in this case, and in every such case, might
be supposed to have presented themselves
to the mind of the plaintiff when asked to
change her position by marriage.
Of

I
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the

home

offered,

which ior its comiorts ‘and case would de
pend upon the more or less ample pecuni
ary means of the defendant, the freedom
from the personal exertions ior daily sup
port, the social position accompanying

the marriage, all these are facts which
have their proper bearing upon the ques
tion of marriage.
The wealth and the rep
utation ior wealth of a man are matters
which, as this world is constituted, often
aid in determining his social positiou,not
withstanding he may have other and more
intelligible rights to it, and despite objec
tionable characteristies or traits. Where,
thereiore, the defendant has demanded an
engagement of marriage, it seems proper
enough that the jury should know what
possible reiniorcement his suit may have
had , and what were the inducements
by his social standing and sur
offered
roundings.
In the case of James v. Bid
dingtnn, supra, Baron Annr:non, while
holding it improper to give evidence of the
amount of defendant,s property in an ac
tion for criminal conversation, said: “In
case of breach of promlse of marriage,
he amount of the defendant's property is
very material, as showing what would
ve been the station of the plaintiff in
society if the defendant had not broken his
promise. n And see Berry v. Da Costa, L. R.
1 t‘. P. 331; Wood v. Hard, 2 Bing. N. C.
166.
It has been so held in this court, and
in the courts of other states, to some of
whose decisions the respondent,s brief has
directed our attention.
Kniffen v. Mc
Connell, 30 N. Y. 285: Lawrence v. Cooke,
56 Me. 187; Bennett v. Beam, 42 Mich. 346,
4N. W. Rep. 8: Allen v. Baker, 86 N. C. 91.
In Mayne, Damages, (Wood,s Ed. § ,77,)
upon the strength of the English authori
ties I have cited, the same rule is given.
I apprehend, however, that the difﬁculty,
in the question beiore us,of theevidom1.e,is
not so much in adducing proof as to defendant,s pecuniary means. as in the mode
of their proof.
But assuming, as I think
we are bound to do under the authorities,
that the amount of defendant,s property
is material in such an action, then evidence
of the reputation which
he enjoys
for
Reputation is
wealth is unobjectionahle.
the common knowledge of the community,
and, if it is exaggerated or incorrect. the
defendant has the opportunity to correct
it,
of giving the exact facts upon the
trioalnd
. The admission
of the evidence is
not to establish an ability to pay, but to
show the social standing which defend
ant’s means did, or might. command.
In
Knlffen v. McConnell, 30 N. Y. 289, which
action
for
promise
was an
a breach of
Judge InonAnAm, deliver
of marriage.
opinion
ing the
of the court, held that “it
my be objectionable to particularize the
wtdant’s property, and such evidence
"l he conﬁned to general reputation
.v he circumstances
of the defendant.
extent I think it admissible."
r.
4d judge does not reason upon
,t I am not aware that this de
[nit
,er been questioned, and I do
well can be. In Kerioot v.
ost. & F. 160, an action ior
,nise of marriage, in 1860,
“
:
You mayask inagener
he defendant,s property,

"
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but you cannot go into particular items
as to his property. " I think we must con
clnde upon authority, as well as upon the
reason of the thing. that evidence of the

reputation of the defendant as to wealth
is admissible in these cases. The belief
of the plaintiff must have been inﬂu
enced by the opinions
or beliefs of the
members of the community in which the
defendant resided. She could not be pre
sumed to have personal cognizance of
a matter. which
is so peculiarly one
within the individual’s exclusive knowl
edge, and what credence she gave to gen
eral report was not without justiﬂcation.
She had some right to rely upon it. The
action is intended as an indemnity ior the
temporal loss which the plaintiff has sus
tained, and that embraces the mortiﬁca
tion to the feelings. the wounded pride,
and all the disappointments from the fail
ure of the marriage, as well in the losses
it has occasioned as in the blow to the
affections.
The appellant insists upon the error of
the trial judge in submitting to the jury
the question of exemplary damages. But
we think, in such a case, that it is the
province of the jury to determine upon
the proof of the facts and of the surround
ing circumstances what damages should
be awarded.
If the conduct of the defend
ant in violating his promise is character
ized by a disregard of the plaintiff,s feel
ings or reputation; if he has placed her,
or induced her to place herself, in a false
position, or to forego temporal advan
tages; if the breach of his promlsels un
justiﬁable; if he spreads upon the record
matters in defense of the action which are
senndalous, and tend to reﬂect discredit
n on the plaintiff, or stain
her reputa
ton.—then these are all circumstances
which may be considered by the jury, and
may be availe
of by them to enhance
the dlimﬁgeB. Here the trial indge (lid
not say in his charge that this was a case
ior the inﬂiction of punitive damages. He
instructed the jury, in substance, th t if
the plaintiff was entitled to damages
they should certainly give compensatory
damages, and that, in the exercise of their
discretion based on the proofs and circum
stances of the case, they might award
exemplary or punitive damages.
Upon
this subject, of when such damages might
be awarded. he read at length from the
opinions of this court in Thorn v. Knapp.
42 N. Y. 474, and Johnson v. Jenkins, 24
N. Y. 252, for the purpose of showing the
rule to be applied. It is clear that he
left it to them to arrive at a decision up
on the propriety of giving exemplary
damages from a consideration of the de
Now,
fendant’s motives and conduct.
there was evidence in the case upon which
a verdict might well include exemplary
damages. The wedding day was agreed
upon, the usual preparations were made
by the plaintiff, and relatives and guests
were hidden to the ceremony. But the de
fendnnt did not appear. He alleged phys
ical ailments in excuse of not fulﬁlling his
marital engagement, but there was evi
dence that he was evading it, and sham
ming iliness. He admits that he had no
fault to ﬁnd with her. She had resigned
her position to marry him. He denies re

.
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questing her to do so; but his attempt at
denial is weakened by his subsequent ad
mission that he expected her to do it.
Then,in his pleading, he charges the plain
tiff with having no affection ior him. but
with entertaining a purpose to procure
money from him, on the pretense of his
.promise to marry her, and his breach
thereof. These were elements in the case
which might properly enter into the de
cision of the jury as to the amount of
damages.
The appellant alleges another error in
the charge, when the trial judge in
structed the jury: “In ﬁxing the amount
[of damages] the plaintiff is entitled at
least to such damages as would place her
in as good pecuniary condition as she
would have been if the contract had been
fulﬁlled.” This was, of course, a careless
use of language, but itcould not have prej
udiced the defendant’s case. It was very
plain from all the charge,in whatpreceded
as in what immediately iollowed the sen
tence picked out ior objection. that the
trial judge intended to and did instruct his
jury that they should compensate the
plaintiff ior what she had lost and was

deprived of by the failure of the marriage.
They might aﬂix to the marriage with
the defendant that pecuniary value which,
in their judgment, upon all the circum
stances of the case’ it would have to tho
plaintlfi. The jury could not reasonably
have understood thejudge otherwise.
It
may often occur in a charge to the jury
that particular words or expressions used,
when taken by themselves, will be objec
tionable or seem to be erroneous; but they
should not be considered independently of
contextual phrases. If, when read in con
nection with the rest oi thecharge, the sense
of language used is made clear, and its
meaning explained, and the instruction is
not uncertain as to the subject-matter, the
result of the trial should not be disturbed
for more inaccuracies or carelessness in
speech.
There is no occasion ior a further
discussion of any questions, and the judg
ment and order appealed from should be
aﬂlrmed, with costs. All concur, except
EARL and PrccxaAn,
who dissent. on
the ground that it was error to receive
proof of the defendant,s wealth by repu

JJ.,

tation.

J udgment

aiﬂrmed.

EXEMPI‘..\RY DAMAG
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SHOLTY,

121

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Error

T.

to appellate
Reeves, Judge.

court,

Ill.

Adm,r.

1887.

Third district;

0.

Blades & Neville, for plaintiff in error.
Kerrick, Lucas & Spencer and Tipton & Bea
ver, for defendant in error.

J. This is an action of tres
by
defendant in error against
brought
pass,
plaintiff in error, in the circuit court of Mc
Lean county, under the “Act requiring com
pensation for causing death by wrongful act,
neglect, or detault;" being chapter 70 of the
Hurd.
Revised Statutes, entitled “Injuries."
Rev. St. 1885, p. 695. Jury was waived by
agreement, and the case was tried without a
jury before the judge of the circuit court,
who gave judgment for the plaintiff for
$2,500. This judgment has been aﬂirmed by
the appellate court, and is brought before us
for review by writ of error to the latter eourt.
Hannah Sholty was the wife of Levi Sholty,
a farmer living in McLean county, near
Bloomington. About February 17, 1886, a
working-man upon Levi Sholty,s farm di
covered a man in the barn, who. to all ap
pearances, had been concealing himself there
for some time. The person so concealed‘ is
proven to have been defendant,s intestate,
Benjamin D. Sholty, a brother of Levi Sholty.
MAGRUDER,
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end of the barn, with a shot..:,un.
He was plainly visible in the light made by
the ﬁre that had broken out. He called upon
Mrs. Sholty and her daughter Mary, who was
with her, to stop. They stopped, turned, and
had advanced a few feet on their way back
towards the house, when David Sholty ffred
at them with the gun in his hand. Both
in
were shot. The daughter was wounded
the wrist, and the mother was killed. This
action is brought by her husband. as admin
istrator of her estate, to recover damages for
her death, against the administrator of the
estate of David Sholty, who is said to have
perished .in the ﬂames of the burning barn.
The defendant introduced no testimony, ex
cept that the examination of one witness was
begun, and abandoned, after a few prelimi
nary questions, on account of the ruling of
The defense
the court as hereafter stated.

the eastern

660.)

Sept. 27,

F.S

proposed to show by the witness on the stand,
and by others there present in court, that de
fendant’s intestate, Benjamin 1). Sholty, was
insane at the time Mrs. Sholty was killed.
The court refused to receive evidence of his
insanity, and exception was taken to the rul1
The question presented relates to theI
ing.
injuries
for
person
liability of an insane
com-''
mitted by him.
it is well settled that, though a lunatic is
not punishable criminally, he is liable in a
lvil action for any tort he may commit
owever justly this doctrine may have been
originally subject to criticism, on the grounds
of reason and principle, it is now too ﬁrmly
supported by the weight of authority to , be
Some efforts seem to have been made on
‘‘
February 17th or 18th to get the oﬂicers of disturbed. It is the outcome of the prin
0
is
not
couch
that in trespass the intent
the law in Bloomington to go out to the farm
Mr. Sedgwick, in his work on Dam
and arrest Benjamin D. Sholty, called by the
(marg. page 456,) says that, on princil
witness David Sholty. This effort, however,
lunatic should not be held liable for his torti
failed. Accordingly. Levi Sholty and his
Opposed to his view, however. is
ous acts.
hired man, and a number of his neighbors,
gbthered at his house on the afternoon of a majority of the decisions and text writers.
There certainly can be nothing wrong or un
February 18, 1886, for the purpose of watch
ing for the intruder, and getting; him out of just in a verdict which merely gives compen
sation for the actual loss resulting from an
The barn was 40 or 50 feet
his hiding-place.
wide, and from S0 to 100 feet long. It was injury inﬂicted by a lunatic. He has proper
situated about 150 or 200 feet north-west ly no will. His acts lack the element of in
Hence it would seem to
tent, or intention.
from the house. The granary was in the
follow that the only proper measure of dam
western end of the barn, and, hence. in the
ages in an action against him for a wrong,
end that was furthest from the house. About
is the mere compensation of the party injur
Sholty
o,clock
evening,
David
was
in the
6
Punishment is not the object of the
ed.
discovered in the granary by his brother Levi
unsound in mind are the
whenvpersons
law
just
on
watch
out
McCoy,
who
were
and one
There is, to be sure, an appear
wrong-doers.
side of the granary door. He shot at them
twice with a pistol, while they were trying to ance of hardship in compelling one to respond
for that which he is unable to avoid, for
prevent his escape, and to capture him. Oth
But the ques
want of the control of reason.
ers who were waiting in the house came to
'
is
one of
cases
liability
in
these
of
tion
obtained,
rope
was
with
A
pub-\ .
their assistance.
lic policy. it an insane person is not held
“‘e intention of tying him, if captured. Pres
his
in
interested
liable for his torts, those
.tly there was a cry of ﬁre, and the ﬂames
otherwise,
might
not
relatives,
or
estate,
as
breaking
the
eastern
out at
are seen to be
have a suﬂicient motive to so take care of
d of the barn, being the end nearest to
as to deprive him of opportunities for in
him
Hannah
Mrs.
this
time
At
house.
irds the
ﬂicting injuries upon others. There is more
lolty, plaintiffs intestate, went from the
injustice in denying to the injured party the
use towards the barn, and had advanced
recovery of damages for the wrong suffered
two,
the
out half of the distance between
by him, than there is in calling upon the rela
ien David Sholty appeared in the door at
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tives or friends of the lunatic to pay the ex
pcnsc of his conﬁnement, if he has an estate
ample enough for that purpose.
The liability
of iunaties for their torts tends to secure a
more eﬁicient custody and guardianship of
Again, if parties can escape
their persons.
the consequences of their injurious acts upon
the plea of lunacy, there will be a strong
temptation to simulate insanity, with a view
of masking the malice and revenge of an evil
heart.
The views here expressed are sus
Cooley,
tained by the following authorities:
Torts, 99-103; 2 Saund. Pi. & Ev. 318; Shear.
& R. Neg. § 57; Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 13-i;
Morse v. Crawford, 17 Vt. 499; Behrens v.
McKenzie, 23 Iowa, 333; Krom v. Schoon
maker, 3 Barb. 6-i7; also cases in note to said
In the light
case, in Email, Lead. Gas. 642.
of the principles thus announced we ﬁnd no
error in the ruling of the circuit court upon
this subject.
Plaintiff in error also contends that there
should have been no recovery in this case be
cause of alleged contributory negligence
on
It is claimed that
the part of Mrs. Sholty.
she knew of her brother-in.law,s madness,

D.\MAGE.S.
and that he was armed, when she started

to

go from the house towards the stable;
and
that by doing so, under the circumstances.
she was guilty of a want of proper care and
prudence.
\\’e forbear to express any opin
ion as to whether or not there could be any
such thing as contributory negligence
in a
case of this kind, and under such circum
stances as are herein disclosed.
It is sufﬁ
cient to say that there is a considerable
amount of evidence in the case bearing upon
this question.
If it could be properly raised,
the facts necessary to do so were fully de
veloped in the testimony
presented to the
Therefore,
court by the plaintiii’ below.
plaintiff in error should have submitted to the
trial court a proposition to be held as law
embodying his theory of cohtributory negli
gence as applicable to the facts of the case,
in accordance with section 41 of the practice
Hurd, Rev. St. 1885, p. 904.
act.
He did
not do so, and hence the question is not prop
erly before us for our consideration.
The judgment of the appellate court is af
ﬁrmed.

Judgment aﬁrmed.
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June 11, ISS4.
from circuit court, Clayton county.
Action for damages on account of slander
ous words spoken of plaintiff by defendant’s
intestate.
There was a verdict and judg
ment for plaintiff for $1,000.
Plaintiff ap
Supreme Court of Ioiva.

Appeal

ocals.

J. W. Rogers & Son, for appellant. Mur
dork & Larkin. Ainsworth & Hobson, Noble &
Updegraff, and Cyrus.Wellington, for appel
lee.

REED, J. The action . was originally
brought against Henry
but during its
pendency he died, and defendant,
Hobson,
administrator of his estate, was substituted
as defendant.
The alleged slanderous words
imputed to plaintiff a want of chastity. They
are alleged to have been spoken in the pres
ence of plaintiffs husband, and were to the
effect that Rush had had sexual intercourse

with plaintiff.
At the trial plaintiff asked the court to give
the following instructions:
"(1) If you ﬁnd that the defendant, Henry
Rush, did publish in substance the words al
leged in petition as the grounds of the action,
and that said publication was made mali
ciously and wantonly, you are instructed that
you may give exemplary
damages.
(2) You
are instructed that if you tind from the evi
dence that the slanderous words were pub
lished, and that the same were dictated or
by malice, oppression, or gross
accompanied
negligence, you can give exemplary damages
in your verdict."
The court refused to give
these instructions, but told the jury that
“damages on account of maliciously speak
ing the words, or, in other words, exemplary
damages, are not to be given."
Error is as
signed hy plaintiff on the giving of this in
struction, and the refusal to give those asked.
\/[The question raised by the assignment is
whether exemplary or punitory damages may
be awarded against the personal representa
tive of a deceased wrong-doer.
There is no
doubt but, at common law, the remedy for
injury such as plaintiff complains of deter
mines upon the death of the wrong-doer.
1

19

Chit. Pl. 89. But under our statute (Code. §
2525) all causes of action survive, “and may
he brought, notwithstanding the death of the
person entitled or liable to the same." Plain
tifi"s position is that, under this section, the
right is preserved to her to have damages of
this character assessed on account of the
wrongful and malicious act by which she has
suffered, notwithstanding the death of the
But we think/'(
one who committed the act.

the position is not sound.
It cannot be said,
in any case,—unless the right is created by
statute,.—that
the person who suffers from
the wrongful or malicious
acts of another,
has the right to have vindictive damages as
Such dam-‘
sessed against the wrong-doer.
ages are awarded as a punishment of the man
who has wickedly or wantonly violated the
rights of another, rather than for the
pensation of the one who suffers fromcom‘
his
wrongful act. It is true, they are awarded
to the one who has been made to suffer, but
not as a matter of right; for, while he is en
titled, under the law, to such sum as will
fully compensate him for the injury sustain
ed, thequestion
whether punitory damages
shall be assessed, and the amount of the as
sessment, is left to the discretion of the jury.
Plaintiff had a right of action, on account of
the slanderous
words spoken by Rush, for
such sum as would compensate her for the
injury.
This was her cause of action, and
this is what was preserved to her by the stat
ute at his death.
But she had no personal in
terest in the question of his punishment.
So
far as he was concerned, the punitory power
of the law ceased when he died. To allow ex
emplary damages now, would be to punish
his legal and personal representatives
for his
wrongful acts; but the civil law never in
ﬂicts vicarious punishment.
Our holding as
to the object of assessing exemplary dmnages
in any case is abundantly sustained by the
authorities, both in this state and elsewhere.
We content ourselves, however, with citing
the following cases in this state: Hendrick
son v. Kingsbury, 21 Iowa, 379; Garland v.
Wholeham, 26 Iowa, 185; Ward v. Ward, 41

Iowa, 686.
.
We think, therefore, that the holding of the
circuit court is correct, and the judgment is
aﬂirmed.
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In error
for

to the circuit court of the United
the northern district of lllinois.
Action by Chalmer M. C. Prentice against
the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Rail
way Company to recover damages for unlaw
ful arrest of plaintiff, while a passenger, by
the conductor of one of the company,s trains.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defrnd
ant brings error.
Reversed.
Statement by Mr. Justice GRAY:
This was an action of trespass on the case.
brought October 19, 1886, in the circuit court
of the United States for the northern district
'o)‘ iilinois, by Prentice, a citizen
of Ohio,
against the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern
ltailway Company, a corporation of Illinois.
to recover damages for the wrongful acts of
the defendant,s servants.
The declaration alleged, and the evidence
introduced at the trial tended to prove. the
following facts:. The plaintiff was a 'physi
clan. The defendant was engaged in operat
ing a railroad, and conducting the business
of
common
carrier of passengers and
freight, through Ohio, Indiana. Illinois, and
other states. On October 12, 1838, the plain
tiff, his wife, and
number of other persons
were passengers, holding excursion
tickets.
regular passenger train of the defend
on
ant’s railroad. from Norwalk. in Ohio, to
Chicago. in Illinois. During the journey the
plaintiff purchased
of several passengers
their return tickets. which had nothing on
them to show that they were not transfera
ble. The conductor
of the train, learning
this, and knowing that the plaintiff had been
guilty of no offense for which he was liable
to arrest, telegraphed for a police oﬂlcer, an
employe of the defendant, who boarded the
tram as
approached
Chicago.
The con
ductor thereupon, in a loud and angry voice,
pointed out the plaintiff to the oﬂieer. and
ordered his arrest: and the oﬂicer, by direc
tion of the conductor. and without any war
rant or authority of law, seized the plaintiff,
and rudely searched him for weapons, in the
presence of the other passengers, hurried him
into another car, and there sat down by him
as a watch, and refused to tell him the cause
of his arrest, or to let him speak to his wife.
While the plaintiff was being removed into
the other car, the conductor, for the purpose
of disgrzu.lug and humiliating him with his fel.
low passengers, openly declared that he was
under arrest, and sneeringly said to the plain
tiff,s wife, “Where,s your doctor now?" On
arrival at Chicago. the conductor refused to
let the plaintiff assist his wife with her par
cels in leaving the train. or to give her the
check for their trunk; and, in the presence
a

a

it

a

house,

and he

was

day, and no one appearing to prosecute him,
he was iinally discharged.
The declaration alleged that all these acts
were done by the defendant,s agents in the
and that the de
line of their employment,
fendant was legally responsible therefor; and
that the plaintiif had been thereby put to
expense, and greatly injured in mind, body,
and reputation.
At the trial, and before the introduction of
any evidence, the defendant, by its counsel,
admitted “that the arrest of the plaintiff was
wrongful, and that he was entitled to recover
therefor;" but afterwards
actual
damages
excepted to each of the following instructions
given by the circuit judge to the jury:
“If you believe the statements which have
been made by the plaintiﬂf and the witnesses
who testiiied in his behalf, (and they are not
dt.uied,) then he is entitled to
verdict which
will fully compensate him for the injuries
which he sustained, and in compensating him
you are authorized to go beyond the amount
that he has actually expended in employing
counsel; you may go beyond the actual out
lay in money which he has made. He was
arrested publicly. without a warrant, and
without cause; and if such conduct as has
been detailed before you occurred, such as
the remark that was addressed by the con
ductor to the wife in the plaintiff,s presence.
in compensating him you have a right to con
sider the humiliation of feeling to which he
was thus publicly subjected. If the com
pauy, without reason, by its unlawful and op
pressive act, subjected him to this public hu
miliation, and thereby outraged his feelings,
he is entitled to compensation for that inju
ry and mental anguish."
“[ am not able to give you any rule by
which you can determine that; but; bear in
mind,
strictly on the line of compensa
tion. The plaintiff is entitled to compensa
tion in money for humiliation of feeling and
spirit, as well as the actual outlay which he
has made in and about this suit."
“And, further, ‘after :ﬁgreeing upon the
which will fairly compensate the
amount
plaintiii for his outlay and injured feelings,
you may add something by way of punith,e
against
damages
the defendant,
which is
money,’ if you are
sometimes called
’sltliart
satisﬁed that the com
uctor’s conduct was iilegal, (and
was illegal,) wanton, and oppress
How much that shall be the court can
ive.
not tell you. You must act as reasonable
men, and not indulge
vindictive feelings
towards the defendant."
"if a public corporation, like an individual.
‘

States.

to the station

fo.rcil)ly‘taken tl\ere._and deia‘ned until the
conductor arrived; and, knowing that the
plaintiff had been guilty of no offense, en
tered a false charge against him of disorder
ly conduct, upon which he gave bail and was
released, and of which, on appearing before
justice of the peace for trial on the next

a

s. 101.]

1893.

States

of the passengers and others. ordered him to
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wantonly, abuses power,
acts oppressively,
and a citizen in that way is injured. the citi
zen. in addition to strict compensation, may
have. the law says, something in the way of
smart money; something as punishment for
the oppressive use of power."
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
in the sum of $10,000.
The defendant moved
for a new trial. for error in law, and for ex
cessive damages. The plaintiff thereupon. by
leave of court, remitted the sum of $4,000,
and asked that judgment be entered for $6,
000.
The court then denied the motion for
a new trial. and gave judgment for the plain
tiff for $6,000. The defendant sued out this
writ of error.

Geo G. Greene, for plaintiff in error.
A. Foster, for defendant in error.

W.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case
delivered the opinion of the court.
The only exceptions taken to the instruc
tions at the trial, which have been argued in
this court, are to those on the subject of puni
as above,

tive damages.
The single question presented for our de
i
‘cision, therefore, is whether a railroad cor
poration can be charged with punitive or ex
emplary damages for the_illcgal, wanton, and
oppressive conduct of a conductor of one of
its trains towards a passenger.
This question, like others affecting the lia
bility of a railroad corporation as a common
carrier of goods or passengers,—such as its
right to contract for exemption from respon
sibility for its own negligence, or its liability
beyond its own line, or its liability to one of
its servants for the act of another person in
its employment,-——is
a question, not of local
law, but of general jurisprudence,
upon
uhich this court, in. the absence of express
statute regulating the subject, will exercise
its own judgment,
uncontrolled by the de
cisions of the courts of the several states.
Railroad (Jo. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 368;
Liverpool & G. W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins.
Co., 129 U. S. 397, 443, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409;
Myrick v. Railroad Co., 107 U. S. 102. 100. 1
Sup. Ct. Rep. 425; Hough v. liailway Co., 100
U. S. 213, 226.
The most distinct suggestion of the doc
trine of exemplary
or punitive damages in
England before the American Revolution is
to be found in the remarks of Chief Justice
Pratt (afterwards Lord Camden) in one of
the actions against the king,s messengers for
trespass and imprisonment,
under general
warrants of the secretary of state. in which,
the plaintiff,s counsel having asserted. and
the defendant,s
counsel having denied. the
right to recover “exemplary damages," the
chief justice instructed the jury as follows:
"I have formerly delivered it as my opinion
on another occasion, and I still continue of
the same mind. that a jury have it in their
power to give damages for more than the
injury received. Damages are des‘gned, not
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only as’ a satisfaction to the injured person.
but likewise as a punishment to the guilty,
to deter from any such proceeding for the fu
ture, and as a proof of the detestationisfthe
jury to the action itself." Wilkes v. Wood,
Lofft, 1, 18, 19, 19 Howell, St. T. 1153, 1167,
See, also. 1Iuckle v. Money, 2 WHs. 205, 207;
Sayer, Dam. 218. 221. The recovery of dam
ages, beyond eompensation for the injury re
ccived, by way of punishing the guilty, and
as an example to deter others from offending
in like manner, is here clearly recognized.
I
in this court the doctrine is well settled
that in actions of tort the jury. in addition to
the sum awarded by way of compensation
for the plaintiff,s injury. may award exem
plary, punitive, or vindictive damages, sometimes called “smart money," if the defend
or oppressively, or
ant has acted wantonly,
with such malice as implies a spirit of mis
chief or criminal indifl’crem;e to civil obliga
tions; but such guilty intention on the part
of the defendant is required in order to
charge him with exemplary or punitive dam
ages.
The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. .146,

Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363,
Railroad Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 202,
‘..‘.13,214; Railway (3o. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 48!),
493. 495; li:tilway Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S.
Barry v. Ed
512, 521, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110;
538.
371;

569;

.

muuds, 116
S. 530, 5 2, 563, 6 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 501; Railway Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S.
Railway
597, 609. 610, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1286;
Co. v. Beckwith,.129 U. S. 26, 36, 9 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 207.
Exemplary or punitive‘ .damages, being
.,
awarded, not by way of compensation to the
sufferer, but by way of punishment of the.
offender, and as a warning to others, can \
only be awarded against one who haspartici-_
pnted in the offense. A principal, therefore,
though of couise liable to make compen-,
sation for injuries done by his agent within .
the scope of his employinent, cannot be held
liable for exemplary or punitive damages, ‘X
merely by reason of wanton. oppressive, or
malicious intent on the part of the agent.
This is clearly shown by the judgment of this
court in the case of The Amiable Nancy, 3
Wheat. 7.46.
In that case. upon a libel in admiralty by
the owner, master, supercargo. and crew of
a neutral vessel agahist the owners
of an
American prlvateer, for ill..‘gally and wanton
ly seizing and plundering the neutral vessel
and maltreating her oﬁicers and crew, Mr.
Justice Story, speaking for the court, in 1818,
laid down the general rule as to the liability
for exemplary or vindictive damages by way
of punishment, as follows: “Upon the facts
disclosed in the evidence, this must be pro
nounccd a case of gross and wanton outrage,
without any just provocation or excuse. Un
der such circumstances.
the honor of the
country‘ and the duty of the court equally
require that u. just compensation should be
made to the unoffending neutrals for all the
injuries and losses actually sustained by

‘
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Though the principal is liable to make com-I
pensation for a libel published or a malicious!
prosecution instituted by his agent, he is not}
liable to be punished by exemplary‘ damagesi
for an intent in which he did not participate.
In Detroit Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, in
Eviston v. Cramer, and in Haines v. Schuliz.
above cited,
was held that the publisher of
newspaper, when sued for a libel published
therein by one of his reporters without his
knowledge, was liable for com pensatory dam
ages only, and not for punitive damages. un
less he approved or ratiﬁed the publication;
and in Haines v. Schultz the supreme court of
New Jersey said of punitive damages: “The
right to award them rests primarily upon the
‘‘It is the
single ground,—wrongful motive."
wrongful personal intention to injure that
To this wrongful in
calls forth the penalty.
tent knowledge is an essential prerequisite."
“Absence of all proof bearing on the essen
tial question, to wit, defendant,s motive, can
not be permitted to take the place of evi
dence, without lcading to
most dangerous
a

t
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can scarcely ever be able to secure to them
selves an adequate indemnity in cases of loss.
They are innocent of the demerit of this
transaction,
having neither directed it, nor
countenanced
nor participated in
in the
slightest degree. Under such circumstances,
we are of the opinion that they are bound
to repair all the real injuries and personal
wrongs sustained by the libclants, but they
are not bound
the extent of vindictive
damages."
Wheat. 558, 559.
The rule thus laid down is not peculiar to
for, as stated by the
courts of admit.alty;
same eminent judge two years later, those
courts proceed, in cases of tort, upon the
same principles as courts of common law, in
allowing exemplary damages, as well as dam
ages by way of compensation
or remunera
tion for expenses incurred, or injuries or loss
is sustained, by the misconduct of the other
Mason,
party.
Manufacturing Co. v. Flskc,
11:), 121.t
La. 26, 33,
In Keene v. Lizardi,
Judge Martin said: “It is true, juries some
tinn.s very properly give what is called ’smart
money.’ They are often warranted in giving
vindictive damages as a punishment inﬂicted
for outrageous conduct; but this is only jus
in an action against the wrongdoer,
nd not_ against persons who. on account of
their relation to the offendcr, are only conse
quentially liable for his acts, as the princi
pal is responsible for the acts of his factor or
,1‘o the same effcct arc The State
agent."
ltighis, Crabbe, 42, 47, 48; The Golden Gate,
Me.‘\ll. 104; Wardrobe v. Stage Co.,
Cal.
118;
Bonlard v. Calhomt. 13 La. Ann. 445;
Detroit Daily Post Co. v. .\IcArthur, 16 Mich.
447;’ Grund v. Van Vleck, 69 ill. 478, 481; Beck
er v. Duprcc, 75 ill. 167; Roscnkrans v. Bar
N. E. Rep. 93; Kirksey v.
ker. 115 11l. 331,
Jones,
Ala. 622, ,20; Pollock v. Gantt, 69
Ala. 1:73, 379; liviston v. Cramer, 57 Wis.
Haines v. Schultz,
570. 15 N. W. Rep. 700;
50 N. J. Law, 481, 14 Atl. Rep. 488; .\icCarlhy
v. Dc ..\rmit, 99 Pa. St. 63, 72; Clark v. New
Exch. 131, 140; Ullssold v. Machell,
sam.
‘.:(i I’. C. Q. B. 422.
The rule has the same application to cor
porations as to individuals. This court has
often, in cases of this class, as well as in
other cases. aﬁinned the doctrine that for
acts done by the agents of a corporation, in
the course of its business and of their em
ploymnut, the corporation
is responsible in
the same manner and to the same extent as

an individual is responsible
under similar
circumstances.
Railroad Co. v. Quigley, 21
How. 202, 210; ‘Bank v. Graham. 100 U. S.
609, 702;
Salt Lake City v. Holl’stor. 118 U.
S. ‘£545, 201,
Sup. Ct. licp. 10.35; ltail\\.‘:’.y
Co. v. I.larris, 122 U. S. 597, 008,
Sup. -Ct.
Rep. 1286.
A corporation is doubtless liable, like an
individual, to make compensation
for any
tort committed by an agent in the course of
his employment,
although
the. act is done
wantonly and recklessly, or against the ex
prcss orders of the pringipal.
Railroad Co.
v. Derby, 14 How. 468; Steamboat
Co. v.
Brockett, 121 U. S. 637,
Sup. Ct. Rep. 1039;
Howe v. Ncwmarch, 12 Allen, 49; Ramsden
v. liailroad Co., 104 Mass. 117.
A corpora
tion may even be held liable for a libel, or
malicious prosecution, by its agent within the
scope of hb) employment;
and the malice
necessary to support either action, if proved
in the agent, may be imputed to the corpora
tion. Railroad Co. v. Quiglcy, 21 How. 202, .
211;
Salt Lake ‘City v. Hollistcr, 118 U. S.
256, 262,
Sup. Ct. Rep. 1055; Reed v. Bank,
130 Mass. 443, 4-i5, and cases cited;
Krule
vitz v. Railroad Co., 140 Mass. 573,
N. E.
Rep. 500;
McDermott v. Journal, 43 N. J.
Law, 458, and 44 N. J. Law, 430; Bank v.
Owston,
But, as well ob
App. Gas. 270.
served by Mr. Justice Field, now chief jus
tice of Massachusetts:
“The logical diﬂiculty
of imputing the actual malice or fraud of an
agent to his principal is perhaps less when
the principal is a person than when
is
corporation; still the foundation of the impu
iatlon is not that it is inferred that the prin
cipal actually participated in the malice or
fraud, but, the act having been done for his
beneiit by his agent acting within the scope
of his employment in his business. it is just
that he should he held responsible for it in
Lothrop v. Adams, 133 Mass. 471,
damages."
4

(st

them; and,
this were a suit against the
original wro gdoers, it’ might be proper to
:o yet farther, and isit upon them, in the
shape of exemplary damages, the proper pun
ishment which belongs to such lawless mis
conduct.
But it is to be considered that this
is a sui against the owners of the privateer,
upon whom the law has, from motives of pol
icy, devolved a responsibility
for the conduct
of the oﬂiccrs and crew employed by them,
and yet. from the nature of the service, they
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of the doctrine respondent supe
J. Law, -'iS4, 485, 14 Atl. Rep.
Whether a principal can be criminai1y
458_
prosecuted for a libel published by his agent
without his participation is a question on
which the authorities are not agreed; and,
where it has been held that he can, it is ad
mitted to be an anomaly in the criminal law.
Com. v. Morgan. 107 \Iass. 199, 203; Reg. v.
liolbrook, 3 Q. B. Div. 60, 63, 64, 70, 4 Q. B.
Div. 42, 51, 60.
No doubt, a corporation, like a natural per
son, may be held liable in exemplary or puni
tive damages for the act of an agent
wlthlm
the scope of his employment,
provided
the
criminal intent, necessary to warrant the im
position of such damages, is brought home to
the corporation.
Railroad Co. v. Quigley,
Railway Co. v. Arms, and Railway Co. v.
Harris, above cited; Caldwell v. Steamboat
-Co., 47 N. Y. 282; Bell v. Railway Co., 10 C.
B. (N. S.) 287, 4 Law T. (N. S.) 293.
Independently of this. in the case of a cor
poration. as of an individual, if any wanton
ness or mischief on the part of the agent,
acting within the scope of his employment,
causes additional injury to the plaintiff in
body or mind, the principal is, of course, lia
ble to make compensation for the whole in
jury suffered.
Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S.
22, :i sup. Ct. Rep. 696; Meagher v. Drlscoll.
99 Mass. 281, 285; Smith v. Holcomb, Id. 552;
Ilawes v. Knowles, 114 Mass. 518; Campbell
7. Car Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 484.
extension

rior.“
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In Railroad Co. v. Derby, which was an ac
tion by a passenger against a railroad cor
injury suffered
poration for a personal
through the negligence of its servants. the
jury were instructed that "the damages, if

any were recoverable, are to be conffned to
s of the
the direct and immediate consequen
injury sustained;" and no except oibwas
14: How. 470, 471.
taken to this instruction.
In Railroad Co. v. Quigley, which was an
action against a railroad corporation for a
libel published by its agents, the jury re
turned a verdict for the plaintiff under an in
‘
struction that "they arc not restricted in giv
ing damages to the actual positive injury
sustained by the plaintlff, but may give such
exemplary damages, if any, as in their opin
ion are called for and justiiied, in view of all
the circumstances
in this case, to render
reparation to the plaintiff, and act as an ade
'
This
quate pnnishment
to the defendant."
court set aside the verdict, because the in
struction given to the jury did not accurately
deﬁne the measure of the defendant,s liabil
ity; and. speaking by Mr. Justice Campbell,
stated the rules applicable to the case in these
words: “For acts done by the agents of the
corporation, either in oontractu or in dellcto,
in the course of its businessand of their em
ployment, the corporation is responsible, as
an individual is responsible under similar cir
cumstances."
“Whenever the injury com
plained of has been indicted maliciously or
wantonly. and with circumstances
of con
tumely or indignity’ the jury are not limited
In the case at bar, the defendant’s counsel
having admitted in open court “that the ar
of a simple compensa
to the ascertainment
rest of the plaintiff was wrongful, and that
tion for the wrong committed against the ag
grieved pcrson.
he was entitled to recover actual damages
But the malice spoken of in
therefor." the jury were rightly instructed
this rule is not merely the doing of an un
lawful or injurious act. The word implies
that he was entitled to a verdict which would
fully compensate him for the injuries sus
that the act complained of was conceived
tained, and that in compensating
in the spirit of mischief. or criminal indifffer
him the
Nothing of this
jury were authorized to go beyond his ont
ence to civil obligations.
lay in and about this suit, and to consider
kind can be imputed to these defendants."
the hnlrdliniion and outrage to which he had
21 How. 210, 213, 214.
been subjected
In liallway Co. v. Arms, which was an ac
by arresting him publicly
without warrant and without cause, and by, tion against a railroad corporation, by a pas
senger injured in a collision caused by the
i the conduct of the conductor, such as his re
l mark to the plaintiff’s wife.
negligence of the servants of the corporation,
But the court, going beyond this, distinctly
the jury were instructed thus: “it you ﬁnd
that the accident was caused by the gross
instructed the jury that, “after agreeing upon
negligence of the defendant,s
servants con
the amount which will fully compensate the
plaintiff for his outlay and injured feelings,"
iroiiim: the train, you may give to the plaintiff
punitive or exemplary damages." This court,
they might “add something by way oi.‘ puni
speaking by Mr. Justice Davis, and approving
tive damages against the defendant, which is
'
and applying the rule of exemplary damages,
sometimes
called ’smart money,"’ if they
conductor,s
(Jase,
as stated in .Quigley’s
held that this
were "satisﬁed that the
conduct
was a misdirection,
and that the failure of
was illegal, wanton, and oppressive."
the cmpioyes to use the care that was re
The jury were thus told, in the plainest
terms, that the corporation was responsible in
quired to avoid the accident, “whether called
or ‘ordinary‘ negligence, did not an
‘gross“
pmiitivc damages for wantonness and‘oppres
thori/.c the jury to visit the company with
sion on the part of the conductor, ailhotrgh
damages beyond the limit of compensation
not actually participated in by the corpora
for the injury actually inﬂicted.
To do this.
tion.
This ruiing appears to us to be iit"on
there must have been some willful miscon
‘t-istent with the principles above stated, un
duct, or that entire want of care which would
supported by any decision of this court, and
raise the presumption of a conscious indiEfer
opposed to the preponderance of wcll.consid
Nothing of this kind
ence to consequences.
.cred precedents.
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Justice Brayton, afterwards chief justice of
Rhodo Island, in the earliest reported case
of the kind, in which a passenger sued
rail
road corporation for his wrongful expulsion
from a train by the conductor, and recovered
verdict, but excepted to an instruction to
the jury that “punitive or vindictive dam
ages, or smart money, were not to be allowed
as against the principal, unless the principal
participated in the wrongful act of the agent,
expressly or implledly, by his conduct an
thorizing
or approving it, either before or

a

a

a

itselé

91 U. B. 495.
v. Harris, the railroad com
pany, as the record showed, by an armed
force of several hundred men, acting as its
agents and empioyes, and organized and com
manded by its vice president and assistant
general manager, attacked with deadly weap
(1n5 the agents and employes of another com
pany in possession of a railroad, and forcibly
drove them out, and in so doing ﬁred upon
and injured one of them, who thereupon
brought an action against the corporation,
and recovered a verdict and judgment under
an instruction that the jury "were not lim
ited to compensatory damages. but could give
punitive or exemplary damages, if it was
found that the defendant acted with bad in
tent, and in pursuance of an unlawful pur
pose to forcibly take possession of the rail
way occupied by the other company, and in
so doing
shot the plaintiff."
This court,
speaking by Mr. Justice Harlan, quoted and
approved the rules laid down in Quigley,s
Case, and aﬂirmed the judgment, not because
any evil intent on the part of the agents of
corporation could of itself
the defendant
make the corporation responsible for exem
plary or punitive damages, but upon the sin
gle ground that the evidence clearly showed
that the corporation, by its governing ofﬁcers,
participated in and dircctcl all that was
. planned and done.
122 U. S. 610, 7 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 1286.
"be president and general manager, or, in
h s absence. the vice president in his place,
actually wielding the whole executive power
of the corporation, may well be treated as so
fa ‘representing the corporation and identi
ﬁt with it that any wanton, malicious, or
oppressive intent of his, in doing wrongful
acts in behalf of the corporation to the in
jury of others, may be rented as the intent
of the corporation
but the conductor
of a train, or other subon inate agent or serv
ant of a railroad corporation, occupies a very
ditferent position, and is no more identiﬁed
with his principal, so as to affect the latter
with his own unlawful and criminal intent,
titan any agent or servant standing in
cor
responding relation to natural persms carry
manufactory, a mine, or a house of
ing on
trade or commerce.
The law applicable to this case has been
vfound nowhere better stated than by Mr.

it

jur ,."
In Railway Co.

rected the

This instruction
was committed."
was held to be right, for the following rea
sons: “In cases where punitive or exemplary
damages have been assessed. it has been
done, upon evidence of such wlllfuiness, reck
lessness, or wickedness. on the part of the
party at fault, as amounted to criminality,
which for the good of society and warning
if
to the individual, ought to be punished.
in such cases, or in any case of
civil nature,
is the policy of the law to visit upon the
offender such exemplary damages as will
operate as punishment, and teach the lesson
repetition of criminal
of caution to prevent
ity, yet we do not see how such damages can
be allowed, where the principal is prosecuted
for the tortious act of his servant, unless
there is proof in the cause to implicate the
principal and make him particeps criminis of
his agent,s act.
No man should be punished
for that of which he is not guilty." “Where
the proof does not implicate the principal,
and, however wicked the servant may have
been, the principal neither expressly nor im
plledly authorizes or ratiﬁes the act. and the
criminality of
is as much against him as
against any other. member of society, we
is quite enough that he shall be liable
think
in compensatory damages for the injury sus
tained in consequence of the wrongful act of
Hagan v.
a person acting as his servant."
83, 91.
R.
Railroad Co.,
The like view was expressed by the court
of appeals of New York, in an action brought
against
railroad corporation by a passenger
for injuries suffered by the neglect of
switchman,
who was intoxicated at the time
of the accident.
It was held that evidence
that the switehman was a man of intent
pcrate habits, which was known to the agent
of the company having the power to employ
and discharge him and other subordinates,
claim for ex
was competent to support
emplary damages, but that a direction to the
jury in general terms that in awarding dam
ages they might add to full compensation for
the injury "such sum for exemplary damages
great
as the case calls for, depending in
measure, of course, upon the conduct of the
defendant," entitled the defendant to
new
trial; and Chief Justice Church, delivering
the unanimous judgment of the court, stated
“For injuries by the
the rule as follows:
negligence of a servant while engaged in the
business of the master, within the scope of his
employment, the latter is liable for compen
satory damages; but for such negligence,
however gross or culpable, he is not liable to
be punished in punitive damages unless he
with gross misconduct.
is also chargeable
Such misconduct may be established by show
ing that the act of the servant was author
ized or ratiﬁed, or that the master employed
or retained the servant, knowing that he was
or, from bad habits, unﬁt for
incompetent,
Something
more
the position he occupied.
must
than ordinary negligence is requisite;
criminal nature, and
be reckless, and of
after

a

edit be ‘imputed to the persons in charge of
the train; and the court. therefore,
misdi

it
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Corporations may incur
established.
this liability as well as private persons.
It a
milroad company, for instance, knowingly
and wantonly employs a drunken engineer
or switchman, or retains one after knowledge
of his habits is clearly brought home to the
t.mnpany, or to a superintending
agent au
thorized to employ and discharge him, and in
_iury occurs by reason of such habits, the
company
may and ought to be amenable
to the severest rule of damages; but I am not
aware of any principle which permits a jury
to award exemplary damages in a case which
does not come up to this st:mdard, or to
graduate
the amount of such damages by
their views of the propriety of the conduct of
the defendant, unless such conduct is of the
character before
speciﬁed."
Clcghorn
v.
Railroad Co., 56 N. Y. 44, 4?. 48.
Similar decisions, denying upon like grounds
the liability of railroad companies and other
corporations,
sought to be charged with puni
tive damages for the wanton'or oppressive
acts of their agents or servants, not partic
ipated in or ratiﬁed by the corporation,
have been made by the courts of New enaey,
ch,\arl_v

J

Pennsylvania. Delaware, lilichigan, Wiscon
sin. California, Louisiana, Alabama, Texas,
and West Virginia.
It must be admitted that there is a wide
divergence in the decisions of the state courts
upon this question,
and that corporations
have been held liable for such damages un
der similar circumstances
in New Hamp
shire, in .\Iaine, and in many of the western
and southern Stzltcs.
But of the three lead
ing cases on that side of the question. Hop
kins v. Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 9, can hardly
be reconciled with the later decisions in Fay
v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342, and Bixby v. Dunlap,
56 N. H. 456; and in Goddard v. Railway Co.,
57 Maine, 202, 228, and Railway Co. v. Dunn,

IO‘\_‘,,\_‘,25‘
IQIOIOvQ.

St. 162, 590. there were
r ng11i§
In many, if not most, of the
senting opinions.
other cases, either corporations
were put
upon dliiferent grounds in this respect from
other principals, or else the distinction be
imputing to the corporation such
tween
wrongful act and intent as would render it
liable to make compensation to the person
injnred, and imputiug to the corporation the
intent necessary to be established in order
to subject it to exemplary damages by way of
punishment, was overlooked
or disregarded.
Most of the cases on both sides of the ques ,
tion, not speciiically cited above, are collected
in 1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) i 380.
In the case at bar, the plnintil! does not ap
pear to have contended at the trial, or to
any evidence tending to
have introduced
show, that the conductor was known to the
defendant to be an unsuitable person in any
respect. or that the defendant in any' way
participated in, approved, or ratiﬁed his treat
ment of the plaintiff; nor did the instructions
given to the jury require them to be satisﬁed
of any such fact; before awarding punitive
damages; but the only fact which they were
required to iiud, in order to support a claim
for punitive damages against the corpora
tion, was that the conductor’s illegal conduct
was wanton and oppressive.
For this error.
as we cannot know how much of the verdict
was intended by the jury as a compensation
for the plaintiffs injury, and.how much by
way of punishing the corporation for an in
tent in which it had no part, the judgment
must be reversed, and the case remanded to
the circuit court, with directions to set aside
the verdict, and to order a new triaL
19 Ohio

Mr. Justice

FIELD,

and Mr. Justice
decision.

Mr. Justice

LAMAR

HARLAN,

took no part in this

202.)

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

1869.

Action against the Grand Trunk Railway of
Canada to recover damages for an assault
made on a passenger by a brakeman

in defend

ant,s employment.
There was a verdict
plaintiff, to which defendant excepted.
G. F. Shepley, for plaintiff.

for

P. Barnes, for

_.defendant.

WALTON, J. Two questions are presented
for our consideration: First, is the common
carrier of passengers responsible for the will
ful misconduct of his servant? or, in other
words, if a passenger who has done nothing
to forfeit his right to civil treatment, is as
.saulted and grossly insulted by one of the
carrler’s servants, can he look to the carrier
for redress? and, secondly, if he can. what is
the measure of relief which the law secures
tohim? These are questions that deeply
concern, not only the numerous railroad and
steamboat companies engaged in the trans
portation of passengers, but also the whole
traveling public; and we have endeavored to
give them . that consideration which their
great importance has seemed to us to de
mand.

,

It appears in
if.“Qf the carri
evidence. that the plaintiff was a passenger
in the defendants’ railway car; that, on re
quest. he surrendered his ticket to a brake
man employed on the train, who, in the ab
sencc of the conductor,
was authorized to
demand and receive it; that the brakeman
afterwards approached the plaintliif, and, in
language coarse, profane. and grossly insult
ing, denied that he had either surrendered or
shown him his ticket; that the brakeman
called the plaintiff a liar, charged him with
attempting to avoid the payment of his fare,
and with having done the same thing before,
and threatened
to split his head open and
spill his brains right there on the spot; that
the brakeman stepped forward and placed
his foot upon the seat on which the plaintiff
was sitting, and, leaning over the plaintiff,
brought his ﬁst close down to his face, and
shaking it violently, told him not to yip, if
he did he would spot him, that he was a
damned liar, that he never handed him his
ticket. that he did not believe he paid his
fare either way; that this assault was con
tinued some ﬁfteen or twenty minutes. and
until the whistle sounded for the next sta
tlon; that there were several passengers
present
in the car. some of whom were
ladies. and that they were all strangers to
the plaintiff;
that the plaintiff was at the
time in feeble health, and had been for
some time under the care of a physician, and
at the time of the assault was reclining lan
guidly in his .4‘.at; that he had neither said
nor done anything to provoke the assault;

lawful act."
The fallacy of this argument, when applied
to the common carrier of passengers, consists
in not discriminating between the obligation
which he is under to his passenger, and the
duty which he owes a stranger. It may be
true that if the carrier’s servant willfully
and maliciously assaults a stranger, the mas
ter will not be liable; but the law is other
wise when he assaults one of his master,s
passengers.
The carrier,s obligation is tq‘
carry his passenger safely and properly, and
to treat him respectfully, and if he intrnsts‘
the performance of this duty to his servants,
the law holds him responsible for the man
ner in which they execute the trust.
The
law seems to be now well settled that
the‘)
carrier is obliged to protect his passenger’
from violence and insult. from
source arising.
He is not regarded whatever)
as an in
surer of his passenger’s safety against every
possible source of danger; but he is bound to use all such reasonable preca,utions as human
judgment and foresight are capable of, to
make his passenger,s journey safe and com
fortable. He must not only protect his pas
senger against the violence and insults of.
strangers and co-passengers, but a fortloI‘i,
against the violence and insults of his own
servants.
If this duty to the passenger is
not performed, if this protection is not fur- \.
nished, but on the contrary, the passenger is
1
assaulted
and insulted, through the negii- .
'
gence or the willful misconduct
of the carrier’s servant, the carrier is necessarily

\

\f

re’

(57 Me.

that, in fact, he had paid his fare, had rct.elv
ed a ticket, and had surrendered it to this
very brakeman who delivered it to the con
ductor only a few minutes before, by whom
it was afterwards produced and identiﬁed;
that the defendants were immediately noti
ﬁed of the misconduct of the brakeman, but,
instead of discharging him, retained him in
his place;
that the brakeman
was still in
the defendants’
employ when the case was
tried and was present in court during the
trial. but was not called as a witness, and no
attempt was made to justify or excuse his
conduct.
Upon this evidence the defendants contend
that they are not liable, because, as they say.
the brakeman,s assault upon the plaintlff
was willful and malicious, and was not di
rectly nor implledly authorized by them.
They say the substance of the whole case is
this, that “the master is not responsible as a.
trespasser, unless by direct or implied au
thority to the’ servant, he consents to the un

sponsible.

And
seems to us
would be cause of
profound regret if the law were otherwise.
The carrier selects his own servants and can
discharge them when he pleases, and
’s
but reasonable that he should be responsible
for the manner in which they execute their
trust. To their care and ﬁdelity are intrust
ed the lives and limbs and comfort and con
venience of the whole traveling public, and

it
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is cortainly as important that these servants
should be trustworthy as it is that they
should be competent.
It is not sufﬁcient that
they are capable of doing well, if in fact
they choose to do ill; that they can be as
if, in their inter
polite as a Chesterﬁeld,
course with the passengers, they choose to
The best sebe coarse, brutal, and profane.
curity the traveler can have that these serv
ants will be selected with care, is to hold
those by whom the selection

is made respon

sible for their conduct.
This liability of the master is very clearly
expressed in a recent case in Massachusetts.
The court say, that wherever there is a con
tract between the master and another per
son, the master is responsible for the acts of
his servant in executing that contract, a1though the act is fraudulent and done with
out his consent.
Howe v. Newmarch, 12 Al
len, 55 (paragraph nearest the bottom of the
And Messrs. Angeli and Ames, in
page).
their work on Corporations ([8th Ed.] p. 404,
§ 38), say: “A distinction exists as to the
of a corporation for the willful tort{
of its servant toward one to whom the corpof
(liability
ration owes no duty except such as each citi_zen owes to every other; and that toward'
one who has entered into some peculiar con
tract with the corporation by which this duty
is increased;
thus it. has been held that a
railroad corporation is liable for the willful
tort of its servants whereby a passenger on
the train is injured."
In Brand v. Railroad Co., 8 Barb. 368, the
court say, a passenger on board a stage-coach
or railroad-car, and a person on foot‘in the
street, do not stand in the same relation to
the carrier.
Toward the one the liability of
the carrier springs
from a contract, express or implied, and upheld by an adequate
consideration. Toward the other he is under
no obligation but that of justice and humanity.
Hence a passenger, who is injured by a
servant of the carrier, may have a right of
action against‘ him when one not a passen
ger, for a similar injury, would not.
In .\10ore v. Railroad Co., 4 Gray, 465, the
plaintiff was forcibly put out of a car for not
giving up his ticket or paying his fare, when
in fact he had already surrendered his ticket
to some one employed on the train. The de
fendants insisted that they were not respon
slble for the misconduct of the conductor;
and further, that an action for an assault
would not lie against a corporation.
But the
court held otherwise, and the plaintiff recov

27.

In Railroad Co. v. Finncy, 10 Wis. 388. the
plaintiff was unlawfully put out of a car by
After stating that it was in
the conductor.
sisted, by the counsel for the railroad, that
in no case could a cause of action arise
against the principal for the willful miscon
' duct of the agent,
thg court went on to say,
v
that after a careful examination of the posi
tion, they were satisﬁed it was not correct;
that where the misconduct of the agent
causes a breach of the principai’s contract,
{ he will be liable whether such misconduct
be willful or merely negligent.
In Railroad Co. v. Vandiver, 42 Pa. St. 365,
a passenger received injuries, of which he
died, by being thrown from the platform of
, a railroad car because he refused to pay his
| fare or show his ticket, he averring he had
The evi
bought one but could not ﬁnd it.
dence showed he was partially intoxicated.
It was urged in defense that if the passen
ger,s death was the result of force and vio
lence, and not the result of negligence, then
. (such force and violence being the act of the
agents alone without any comrnirnd or order
of the company) the company was not re
But the court held oth
. sponsible therefor.
said the
crwise. "A railway company,"
court, “selects its own agents at its own
, pleasure,
and it is bound to employ none
men.
, except capable,,prudent, and humane
'

In

the
agents

present

case

the

company

and

its

for the injury done to

were all liable
I
i the deceased."
‘
In Weed v. Railroad Co., 17 N.
‘
jury found specially that the act
‘

Y. 362, the
of the serv
ant by which the plaintiff was injured, was
i willful.
The court held the willfuiness of
plaintiffs right to
i the act did not defeat the
i. look to the railroad company for
redress.
I
In Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 4(%.
‘
where the servant of a railroad company
i took an engine and run it over the road for
1 his own gratiﬁcation, not only without con
sent, but contrary to express orders, the su
preme ccurt of the United States held that
the railroad company was responsible.
In Railway Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. St. 512, a
‘
, passenger,s
arm was broken in a ﬁght be
tween
some drunken persons that forced
1
v
their way into the car at a station near an
agricultural fair, and the company was held
responsible, because the conductor went on
collecting fares, and did"not stop the train
and expel the rioters, or demonstrate, by an
earnest effort, that it was impossible to do
so.

In Flint v. Transportation Co., 34 Conn.
'
554, where the plaintiff was injured by the
v. Greenwood,
7 iiuri. & N.
354, the plaintiff was assaulted
discharge of a gun dropped by some soldiers
and taken
out of the defendant’s
omnibus by one .if engaged in a scufﬂe, the court held that pas
senger carriers are bound to exercise the ut
his servants.
The defendant insisted that
he was not liable, because it did not appear
most vigilance and care to guard those they
‘
transport from violence from ‘whatever
that be authorized or sanctioned the act of
the servant.
But it was held in the ex
sourcc arising; and the plaintiff recovered a
chequer chamber. aﬂlrmiug the judgment of
verdict for $10,000.
In Landreaux v. Bell, 5 La. 0. S. 275. the
the exchequer court. that the jury did right
in returning a verdict for the plaintiff.
court say, that carriers are responsible for
ered.

In Seymour
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the misconduct of their servants toward pas
sengers to the same extent as for their mis
conduct in regard to merchandise committed
to their care; that no satisfactory distinction
be drawn between the two cases.
(v can
In Chamberlain v. Chandler, 3 Mason, 2422,
;
1 Judge Story declared lg language strong and
emphatic, that a passenger,s contract enti
v ties him to respectful treatment; and he ex
pressed the hope that every violation of this
right would be visited, in the shape of dam
ages, with its appropriate punishment.
In Nieto v. Clark, 1 Cliff. 145, where the
steward of the ship assaulted and grossly in
sulted a female passenger, Judge Clifford de
clares, in language equally emphatic,
that
the contract of all passengers entitles them
respectful treatment and
protection
to
against rudeness and every wanton interfer
ence with their persons from all those in
charge of the ship; that the conduct of the
s"teward disqualiﬁed him for his situation,
and justiiied the master in immediately dis
charging him, although the vessel was then
in a foreign ‘port. And we have his authori
ty for saying that he has recently examined
the question with care, in a case pending
in the Rhode Island district, where the clerk
of a steamboat unjustiﬁably assaulted and
maltreated
a passenger, and that he enter
tains no doubt of the carrier‘s liability to
compensate the passenger for the injury thus
received, whether the carrier previously au
thorized or subsequently ratiﬁed the assault
or not. A report of the case will soon be
published. See 3 Cliff.
And ll, recent and well-considered
case in
Ziiaryland (published since this case has been
pending before the law court, and very much
like it in all respects). fully sustains this
view of the law. Railroad Co. v. Biocher,
\_27
‘
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77.

The grounds of the carrier’s liability may
be brieﬁy stated thus:
The law requires the common carrier of
passengers to exercise the highest degree of
care that human judgment and foresight are
capable of, to make his passenger’s journey
safe.
Whoever engages in the business im
pliedly promises that his passenger
shall
have this degree of care. In other words,
the carrier is conclusively presumed to have
promised to do what, under the circumstan
ces, the law requires him to do.
We say
conclusively presumed, for the law will not
allow the carrier by notice or special con
tract even to deprive his passenger of this
degree of care.
If the passenger does not
have such care, but on the contrary is un
lawfully assaulted and insulted by one of the
very persons to whom his conveyance is in
trusted, the carrier,s implied promise is bro
ken’ and his legal duty is left unperformed,
and he is necessarily responsible to the pas
senger for the damages he thereby sustains.
The passenger,s remedy may be either in
assumpsit or tort, at his election.
In the
one case,

he

relies

upon

a

breach

of the

carrier,s common-law duty in support of his
action; in the other, upon a breach of his
implied promise.
The form of the action is
important only upon the question of dam
ages.
In 3gtions4t3fM8_g§‘ttwt_iip*sit,_the damages
are generally limited to compensation.
In
actions ofIto_rt,‘ the jury atiewaliowed greater
in _[‘)’t.:oper"t.Ulises, may give ex
emplary damages.
II. We now come to the second branch of
the
ase.
What i
.t:eiicf
\viaich th.enlaw securesto the .in-iuregl_p_a_rﬁt-)';
or, in other words, can he recover exemplary
damages?
We hol that b can.
The right
of the jury to give exemplary damages for
injuries wantonly, recklessly, or maliciously
inﬂicted, is as old as the right of trial by
jury itself; and is not, as many seem to su
pose, an innovation upon the rules of tit
common
law. It was settled in England
more than a century ago.
In 1763, Lord Chief Justice Pratt (after
wards Earl of Camden), with whom the oth
er judges concurred, declared that the jury
had done right in giving exemplary damages.
Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 2(i;'>.‘
In another case the same learned judge
declared with emphasis, that damages are
designed not only as a satisfaction to the in
jured person, but likewise as a punishment
to the guilty. 5 Camp. Lives Chan. (Am
.
Ed.) p. 214.
In 1814, the doctrine of punitive damages
was stringently applied in a case where the
defendant, in a state of intoxication, forced
himself into the plaintiffs company, and in
solently persisted
in hunting upon his
grounds.
The plaintiff recovered a verdict
for ﬁve hundred pounds, the full amount of
his ad damnum, and the court refused to
set it aside.
Mr: Justice Heath remarked
in this case that he remembered a case where
the jury gave ﬁve hundred pounds for mere
ly knocking a man,s hat off, and the court
refused a new trial.
It goes, said he, to pre
vent the praciice of dueling,‘ if juries are
permitted to punish insult by exemplary
damages.
Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt. 442.
See. also, to the same effect. Sears v. Lyon,
2 Starkie, 317 (decided in 1818).
In 1844. Lord Chief Baron Pollock said, that
in actions formalicious injuries, juries had
always been allowed to give what are called
vindictive damages. ‘Doe v. Filliter, 13 Mees.
& W. 50.
In 1858, in an action of trespass for tak
ing personal property on a fraudulent bill

latmtiti.
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of sale, the defendant,s
counsel
contended
that it was not a case for the application
of the doctrine of exemplary damages; but
the court held otherwise.
No doubt, said
Pollock, C. B., it was a case in which vin
dictive damages might be given.
Thomas v.
Harris. 3 Iluri. & N. 961.
In 1860, in an action for willful negligence,
the defendant contended that the plaintiffs
declaration was too defective to entitle him
damages;
to exemplary
but the court held .
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and judge of the supreme court of ‘.\Iassachu
setts), m an article published in 3 Am. Jur.
387, in 1830.
The substance of this article
was afterwards inserted in a note to Mr.
Greenleaf‘s
work on Evidence.
Mr. Sedg
wick, in his work on Damages, took the op
posite view, and sustained
.
5i.
his position by
Profes.~;
the citation of numerous authorities.
is now a familiar
“Dann_1ges.exemplary,"
titie’in the best English law reports. See or Greenleaf replied in an article int 9
6 Hurl. & N. 969.
Bost. Law Rep. 529.
Mr. Sedgwick rejoined
in the same periodical (volume 10, ,. 49).
it was the ﬁrmness with which Lord Cam
Essays on different sides of the question
den (then Chief Justice Pratt) maintained and
enforced the right of the jury to punish with i were also published in 3 Am. Law Mag. N.
S. 537. and 4 Am. Law Mag. N. S. 61.
But
exemplary damages the agent of Lord Hal
notwithstanding this formidable
opposition,
ifax (then secretary of state) for the illegal
the doctrine triumphed, and must be regard
arrest of the publishers of the North Briton,
ed as now too ﬁrmly established to be shaken
that made him so immensely popular in Eng
by anything short of legislative enactments.
Nearly or quite twenty of those cases
land.
In fact the decisions of the courts are nearly
appear to have been tried before him, in all
unanimous in its favor.
of which enormous damages were given, and
In a case in the supreme court of the
in not one of them was the verdict set aside.
In one of the cases a verdict for a thousand
United States, .\Ir. Justice Grier, in delivering
the opinion of the court, says, it is a well
pounds was returned for a mere nominal im
prisonment
established principle of the common law, that
at the house of the ofﬁcer mak
ing the arrest, and the court refused to set it in all actions for torts the jury may inﬂict
what are called punitive or exemplary dam
aside. Beilrdmore v. Carrington, 2 Wils.
ages having in view the enormity of the
2-i4.
offense rather than the measure of compensa
“After this," says Lord Campbell, in his
tion to the plaintlff. “We are aware." the
Lives of the Chancellors,
“he became the
idol of the nation.
Grim representations of. judge continues, “that the propriety of this
doctrine has been questioned by some writers;
him laid down the law from sign-posts, many
busts and prints of him were sold not only but if repeated judicial decisions for more
than a century are to be received as the
in the streets of the metropolis. but in the
best exposition of what the law is. the ques
provincial towns; a ﬁne portrait of him, by
tion will not admit of argument."
Day‘ v.
Sir Joshua Reynolds, with the ﬂattering in
\Voodworth, 13 How. 363.
scription, ‘in honor of the zealous asserter
of English liberty by law,‘ was placed in
1n a case in North Carolina. the court refer
the guildhall of the city of London; ad
to the note in Professor Greenleaf’s work on
Evidence, and say that it is very clearly wrong
dresses of thanks to him poured in from all
quarters; and one of the sights of London,
with respect to the authorities; and in their
judgment wrong on principle; that it is fortu
which foreigners went to see, was the great
v
Lord Chief Justice Pratt."
nate that while juries endeavor to give ample
In this country, perhaps Lord Camden is compensation for the injury actually received,
they are also allowed such full discretion as
better known as one of the able English
statesmen who so eloquently defended the
to make verdicts to deter others from ﬂa
American colonies against the unjust claim grunt violations of social duty.
And the
of the mother country to tax them. Lord Camp
same court hold that the wealth lTf"fhe0de
bell says some portions of his peeches upon
fendant isa proper circumstance to be weigh
that subject are still in the mouths of school
ed by the jury. because a thousand
dollars
boys. But in England his immense popularity
may be 1i‘less>punishment
to one man than
originated
in his ﬁrm and vigorous enforce
a hundred dollars to another.
In one case
ment of the doctrine of exemplary damages.
the same court sustained a verdict which in
And we cannot discover that th€1EEaTity of terms assessed the actual damages at $100,
his rulings in this particular was ever seri
and the exemplary damages at $1,000.
The
ously called in question.
On the contrary, court held it was a good verdict for $1,100.
we ﬁnd it admitted by his political opponents
Pendloton v. Davis, 1 Jones (N. C.) ‘J8; .\Ic
Aulay v. Birkhead, 13 Ired. 28; Gilrcath v.
that he was a profound jurist and an able and
upright judge.
His stringent enforcement of Allen, 10 Ired. 67.
the right of the jury to punish ﬂagrant
In fact, Professor Greenleaf is himself an
wrongs with exemplary damages, arrested
authority for the doctrine of exemplary dam
Speaking of the action for assault and
not only great abuses then existing,
ages.
but it
has had a salutary inﬂuence ever since.
It battery, he says the jury are not conﬁned to
won for him the title of the “aserter of the mere corporal injury, but may consider the
English liberty by law."
malice of the defendant, the insulting char
In this country the right of the jury to acter of his conduct, the rank in life of the
several parties. and all the circumstances of
give exemplary damages has been much dis
it seems to have been ﬁrst opposed the outrage, and thereupon award such ex
cussed.
emplary damages as the circumstances may
by .\ir. Theron Metcalf (afterwards reporter

otherwise; and the judge who tried the case
remarked
that he was glad the court had
come to the conclusion that it was competent
for the jury to give exemplary damages, for
he thought the defendant had acted with a
high hand.
Emblen v. Myers, 6 Hurl. & N.
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EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
thorized nor ratiﬁed by the defendant, the
plainti
dam
could not recover exemplary
ages.
confess that
seems to us that
there
no class of cases where the doctrine
of exemplary damages can_b?’E1'5_HeM1eﬁ-.
ciaily applied than to railroad“cbi,ﬁ>’r7i_ons
in their capacity of common earriéi’s"o'f_pas
sengers; and it might a.s well not be applied
to them at all as to limit its application to
cases where the servant is directly
pliedly commanded by the corporation to
passenger, or to cases
maltreat and insult
where such an act is directly or Implied
ly ratiﬁed; for no such cases will ever oci
cur.
A corporation
an imaginary being‘.
It has no mind but the mind of its servants’;
has no voice but the voice of its servants;.‘
and
has no hands with which to act but;
All its schemes off,
the hands of its servants.
mischief, as well as its schemes of public en
terprise, are conceived by human minds and
it

in their judgment require. 2 Gt.eenl. Ev. § 89.
But if the great weight of Professor Green
leafs authority were to be regarded as op
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posed to the doctrine, we have, on the other
hand, the great weight .of Chancellor Kent,s
He mys, surely this
opinion in favor of it.
And after
is the true and salutary doctrine.
reviewing the English cases, he continues by
saying it cannot be necessary to multiply in
stances of its application; that it is too well
settled in practice, and too valuable in prin
Tiilotson v.
ciple to be called in question.
Cheetham, 3 Johns. 56, 64.
This brief review of the doctrine of ex
emplary damages is not .so much for the pur
pose of establishing its existence, as to cor- l
which some
impression
rect the erroneous
members of the legal profession still seem to
entertain, that it is a modern invention, not ‘
sanctioned by the rules of the common law.
person must
We think every candid-minded
executed by human hands; and these minds
admit that it is no new doctrine; that its ex
and hands are its servants’ minds and hands.
istence as a fundamental rule of the common
All attempts, therefore, to distinguish be
law has been recognized in England for more
tween the guilt of the servant and the guilt
than a century; that it has been there strin
which
of the corporation;
or the malice of the serv
gently enforced under circumstances
or the
would not have allowed it to pass.unchal
ant and the malice of the corporation;
punishment of the servant and the punish
lenged, if any pretext could have been found
is sheer nonsense;
for doubting its validity; and that in this
ment of the corporation,
country, notwithstanding an early and.vig
and only tends to confuse the mind and con
it has steadily progressed,
orous opposition,
found the judgment
Neither guilt, malice,‘
predicable of thi ideal ex
and that the decisions of the courts are now
nor suffering
nearly unanimous in its favor. It was sanc
istence, called
corpmation.
And yet under
tioned in this state, after a careful and full
cover of its name and authority, there is in
review of the authorities, in Pike v. Dilling,
fact as much wickedness, and as much that
48 Me. 539, and cannot now be regarded as
is deserving of punishment,
as can be found
an open question.
anywhere else. And since these ideal exist
But it is said that if the doctrine of ex
ences can neither be hung, imprisoned. whipemplary
mu
be reg’gried v as es- 1 ped, or put in the stocks,—since in fact no
damage
tablished
in ‘suits against natural persons
corrective inﬂuence can be brought to bear
for their own ‘willful and malicious torts, it upon them except that of pecuniary loss,—it
ought not to be :iTpii€d"to Hiﬂioraﬂons for
does seem to us that the doctrine of exem
the torts of their servants,’ especially where plary damages is more beneﬁcial in its ap
the tort is committed by a servant of so low
plication to them, than in its application to
a grade as a brakemun on a railway train
persons. If those who are in the
,‘_§_t_tatura1
and the tortious act was not directly nor im
is
terrible hard
habit of thinking that
piiedly authorized nor ratiﬁed by the corpora
ship to punish an innocent corporation for
tion; and several cases are cited by the defend
the wickedness of its agents and servants;
ants‘ counsel, in which the courts seem to
will for a moment reﬂect upon the absurdity
have taken this view of the law; but we
of their own thoughts, their anxiety will be
have carefully examined these cases, and in
can be selected
cured.
Careful engineers
none of them was there any evidence that the
who will not run their trains into open draws:
servant acted wantonly or maliciously; they
and careful baggage men can be secured,.
were simply cases of mistaken
duty; and
who will not handle and smash trunks and
what these same courts would have done if band-boxes as is now the universal cutom;
a case of such gross and outrageous insult had v and conductors
and brakemen
can be had‘
been before them, as is now before us, it is
who will not assault and insult passengers:
impossible
to say; (and long experience has
and if the courts will only let the verdicts
shown that nothing is more dangerous than of upright and intelligent juries alone, and
to rely upon the abstract reasoning of courts,
let the doctrine of exemplary damages have
when the casesbefore them did not call for
its legitimate inﬂuence, we predict these
the application of the doctrines which their
great and growing evils will be very much.
reasoning is intended to establish._7
lessened, if not entirely cured. There is but
We have given to this objection much con
one vuinerable point about these ideal exist
and that is. the
sideration, as it was our duty to do, for the. ences, called corporations;
concealed‘
pocket of the monied power that
presiding judge declined to instruct the jury
behind them; and if that is reached they will‘
that if the acts and words of the defendants’
is thoroughly understood
servant were not directly nor impliedly an '.wince. When
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EXEM PLARY DAMA GES.
that it is not proﬁtable to employ careless
and indifferent agents, or reckless and inso
lent servants, better men will take their pla
ces, and not before.
It is our judgment, therefore, that actions
against corporations, for the willful and ma
licious acts of their agents and servants in
executing
the business of the corporaticn,
should not form exceptions to the rule allow
ing exemplary damages. On the contrary,
we think this is the very class of cases, of
all others, where it will do the most good,
and where it is most needed. And in this
conclusion we are sustained by several of the
ablest courts in the country.
In a case in .\Iississippl, the plaintiff was
carried four hundred yards beyond the sta
he
tion where he had told the conductor
wished to stop; and he requested the con
ductor to run the train back, but the conduct
or refused, and told the plaintiff .to get off
the train or he would carry him to the next
station.
The plaintiff got off and walked
back, carrying his valise in his hand. The
plaintiff testiﬁed that the conductor,s manner
toward him was insolent, and the defendants
having refused to discharge him, the jury re
turned a verdict for four thousand ﬁve hun
dred dollars, and the court refused to set it
They said the right of the jury to
aside.
protect the public by punitive oamages, and
thus prevent
these great public blessings
from being converted into the most danger
ous nuisances, was conclusively settled; and
they hoped the verdict would have a stain
tary inﬂuence upon their future management.
Railroad Co. v. Hurst, 36 Miss. (360.
In New Hampshire, in an action against
gross
this identical road, where, through
carelessness,
there was a collision of the
passenger train with a freight train, and the
plaintiff was thereby injured, the judge at
nisi prius instructed the jury that it was a
proper case for exemplary damages; and the
full court sustained the ruling, saying it
was a subject in which all the traveling pub
lic were deeply interested; that railroads had
practically monopolized
the transportation
of passengers on all the principal lines of
travel, and there ought to be no lax adminis
tration of the law in such cases; and that it
would be diﬁicult to suggest a case more loud
ly calling for an exemplary verdict. (If mere
carelessness, however gross, calls loudly for
an exemplary verdict. what shall be said of
an injury that is willful and grossly insult
ing?) Hopkins v. Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 9.
Judge Redﬁeld, in his very able and useful
work on Railways, expresses the opinion
that there is quite as much necessity for
holding these companies liable to exemplary
damages as their agents.
He says it is diﬂi
cult to perceive why a passenger, who suffers
iDndignity and insult from the conductor of
a train, should be compelled to show an ac
tual ratiﬁcation of the act, in order to sub
ject the company to exemplary damages. 2
Redf. R. R. 231, note. But if such a ratiﬁ
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cation is necessary, he thinks the corpora
tion, which is a mere legal entity, inappre
ciable to sense, should be regarded as always
present in the person of its servant, and as
directing and ratifying the servant’s acts
within the scope of his employment, and thus
be made responsible
for his willful miscon
duct.
1 Redf. R. R. 515 et seq.
And in a recent case in Maryland (publish
ed since this case has been pending before
the law court), a case in all respects very
similar to the one we are now considering,
the presiding judge was requested to instruct
the jury that the plaintiff was not entitled
to recover
vindictive or punitive damages
from the defendants, unless they expressly
or impliedly participated in the tortleus act,
authorizing it before or approving it after it
was committed;
but the presiding justice
refused so to instruct the jury, and the full
court held that the request was properly re
jected;
that it was settled that where the
injury for which compensation in damages
is sought, is accompanied by force or malice,
the injured party is entitled to recover exem
plary damages.
Railroad Co. v.

\Id.

.

277.

.

'
Biocherf7

But the defendants say that the damages
awarded by the jury are excesive, and they
move to have the verdict set aside and a
new trial granted for that reason. That the
verdict in this case is highly punitive, and
was so designed by the jury, cannot be doubt
ed; but by whose judgment is it to be meas
ured to determine whether or not it is ex
cessive?
What standard shall be used? It
is a case of wanton insult and injury to
the plaintiff,s character, and feelings of self
respect, and the damages can be measured
It is a case where
by no property standard.
the judgment will be very much inﬂuenced
by the estimation in which character. self
respect, and freedom from insult are held.
To those who set a very low value on char
acter, and think that pride and self-respect
exist only to become objects of ridicule and
sport, the damages will undoubtedly be con
It would not be strange
sidered excessive.
if some such persons, measuring the sensibil
ities of others by their own low standard,
should view this verdict with envy, and re
gret that somebody will not assault and in
sult them, if such is to be the standard of
While others, who feel that
compensation.
character and self-respect are above all price,
more valuable than life itself even, will re
gard the verdict as none too large.
We re
peat, therefore, that it is a case where men,s

be likely to differ. And sup
pose the court is of opinion that the dam
ages in this case are greater, much greater
even, than they would have awarded.
does
it therefore follow that the judgment of the
court is to be substituted for that of the
jury? By no means. It is the wisdom of theV
law to suppose that the judgment of the jury
is more likely to be right than the judgment
of the court, for it is to the former and not

judgments will
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to the latter that the duty of estimating dam
ages is conﬁdsi. Unless the damages are so
large as to satisfy the court that the verdict
was not the result of an honest exercise of
judgment, they have no right to set it aside.
A careful examination of the case fails to
satisfy us that the jury acted dishonestly, or
that they made any mistake in their appli
cation of the doctrine of exemplary dama
ges. We have no doubt that the highly puni
tive character of their verdict is owing to
the fact that, after Jackson,s misconduct was
known to the defendants, they still retained
him in their service.
The jury undoubtedly
felt that it was due to the plaintiff, and due
to every other traveller upon that road, to
and that to
have him instantly discharged;
retain him in his place, and thus shield and
protect him against the protestation of the
plaintiff, made to the servant himself at the
time of the assault, that he would lose his
place, was a practical ratiﬁcation and ap
proval of the servant,s conduct, and would
be so understood by him and by every other
servant on the road.
And when we consider the violent, long
continued, and grossly insulting character of
the assault; that it was made upon a per
son in feeble health, and was accompanied
by language so coarse, profane, and brutal;
that so far as appears it was wholly unprovoked; we confess we are amazed at the conduct of the defendants in not instantly dis
charging Jackson.
Thus to shield and pro
tect him in his insolence, deeply implicated
It was such indifference
them in his guilt.
to the treatment the plaintiff had received,
such indifference to the treatment that other
travelers might receive, such indifference to
the evil inﬂuence which such an example
would h,ave upon the servants of this and
other lines of public travel, that we are not
prepared to say the jury acted unwiscly in

We see nothing in the rulings or charge of
the presiding judge, of which the defendants
can justly complain.
And there is nothing
to satisfy us that the jury were prejudiced
or unduly biased;
or that they made any
mistake either as to the facts or the law.
Our conclusion, therefore, is, that the excep
tions and motion must be overruled.
Motion and exceptions overruled.
'

APPLETON,
DICKERSON,
C. J., and
BARROWS, and DAN l<‘Oli,1,H,
., concurred.

JJ

TAPLEY, .I., ‘did not concur upon the ques
tion of damages, and gave his opinion as fol
lows:
I
In so much of the opinion of Mr. Justice
1 WALTON.as determines
the question of the
liability of the defendants to answer in dam
ages for the acts of the brakeman Jackson I
concur; but I do not concur in sustaining the
rulings of the court at the trial of the cause
ﬁxing the rule of damage for the jury; and I
‘ regard
it so clearly wrong in principle, in
equitable and unjust in practice, and so en
tirely wanting in precedent, that my duty re
quires something more than a silent dissent.
So much of the opinion as discusses the
right of a jury to give in civil actions puni
tive damages, I do not propose now to re
, view or express any opinion of or concerning,
I but it is to the application of the rule made
in this case by the justice presiding at the
trial of the cause. The rulings upon this
matter are happily so clearly expressed and
positive in terms, that no reasonable doubt
concerning the proposition
involved in them
if by possibility any
can be entertained.
doubt could have arisen concerning them, the
opinion he has drawn in the case sets them
at rest.
The case shows that “on the subject of
damages the presiding justice instructed the
making their verdict highly punitive. We jury as follows: If the plaintiff has proved
cannot help feeling that if we should inter
his case so that he is entitled to recover
fere and set it aside, our action would be‘ some damages, the question arises how much.
most unfortunate and detrimental to the pub
That is a question which you must deter
mine, being guided by the rules of law as I
On the contrary, if we allow it
lic interests.
to stand, we cannot doubt that its iniiuence
shall state them to you. In the ﬁrst place,
will be salutary. It will be an impressive the plaintiff is entitled to such damages as
lesson to these defendants, and to the man
he has actually suffered, and in estimating
agers of other lines of public travel, of the the amount, you will not be limited to what
risk they incur when they retain in their ' he has lost in dollars and cents.
In fact,
service servants known to be reckless, ill
there is no evidence that he has suffered pe
mannered, and unﬁt for their places. And it
cuniarily to any extent. You are to consider
will encourage those who may suffer insult . the injury to his feelings, his wounded pride,
and violence at the hands of such servants,
self-respect,
his mental pain
his wounded
not to retaliate or attempt to become their
and suffering, occasioned by the assault, and
own avengers, as is too often done, but to
the feeling of degradation
that necessarily
trust to the law and to the courts of jus
resulted from it. There are few men proba
tice, for the redress of their grievances.
It bly that would not rather suffer a severe
will say to them, be patient and iaw-abid
pecuniary loss than a personal and insulting
ing, and your redress shall surely come, and
Hence if one man should spit in
assault.
in such measure as will not add insult to ‘ another’:-3 face in public, the jury would not
your previous injury.
be limited to ten cents damages on the
On the whole, we cannot doubt that it is
ground that that sum would pay him for
washing his face. A man,s feelings, self-re
best for all concerned that this verdict be
allowed to stand.
I spect, and pride of charuct»er are as much an
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der the protection of the law in such case as
his property. And in estimating the dam
ages for a personal assault attended with
opprobrious and insulting language, the jury
have a right to consider the character and
standing of the person assaulted, and the in
jury to his feelings, as well as the injury to
his person, and then to give him such dam
ages as, in view of all the circumstances,
will be a just compensation for the injury
actually suffered.
This amount must be left,
in every case, to the sound judgment and
discretion of the jury."
Pausing at this point of the instructions,
we shall notice that they embrace all the el
damages recognized
ements of compensatory
by courts of the most liberal views in these
matters;
and embrace elements which many
courts denominate exemplary; and they are
stated in so clear and concise a manner, and
accmnpanied by so forcible an illustration,
that had they stopped at this point the plain
tiff might well have expected his verdict to
cover the utmost his injuries would war
rule thus far I am content,
v rant. With the
although carrying it to the very verge and
I call attention
utmost limit of precedent.
to it at this point to show that the jury had,
at this time, instructions which covered all
the tangible and intangible elements of as
Instructions which
sessment in such cases
if adhered to and followed by the jury re
store him to the condition in which the as
saulting party found him, so far as money
can do it.
Under these instructions he is to
be made whole in the eyes of the law, just
as if the injury had not been done; in every
particular compensated so far as money can
do it; what is done bevond is not to com
pensate, it is not to meet mere speculative or
intangible injuries, is not to give him any
thing due him. for he has his full desert.
These elements reach everything he, as an
individual, can claim by reason of any in
fringement of his rlglits.
These instructions having been given, so
full, clear, and liberal, the presiding judge
proceeds to give the next element of damage,
which has not for its basis any injury, inva
sion of right or privilege, discomfort, incon
venience, or indeed anything relating to the
plaintiff, or anything in which he has any in
terest above that possessed by every other
It is not act or
member of the community.
deed, word or menaee,—these have all been
adjusted; but it is mere motive, thought, in
Being evil, mor
terest, and secret desire.
ally wrong, somebody must be punished for
their existence, and the judge says:
“There is also another important rule of
law bearing upon the question of damages.
if the injury was wanton, malicious, com
mitted in reckless and willful disregard of
the rights of the injured party, the law ai
iows the jury to give what is called punltory
It blends the inter
or exemplary damages.
ests of the injured party with those of the
public, and permits the jury not only to give
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damages sufﬁcient to, compensate the plain
tiff, but also.to punish the defendants.
I
feel it my duty, however, to say, that you
ought to be very cautious in the application
of this rule.
The law does not require you
to give exemplary damages in any case, and
where the damages which the plaintlff is en
titled to recover in order to compensate him
for the injury he has actually suffered is
suﬁicient to punish the defendants, and serve
as a warning and example to others, the jury
ought not to give more.
But if they think
it is not enough, then the law allows them
to add such further sum as will make it
enough for that purpose.
But they should
be careful in ﬁxing the amount not to allow
more than is just and reasonable,
and not
to allow their judgment to be swerved by
their passions.
Defendants’ counsel request
ed the presiding judge to instruct the jury,
that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover
against the defendant company, any greater
damages
than he might against Jackson
himself, for the same cause of action upon
Upon which request the
similar evidence.
presiding judge stated to the jury:
de
have
cline to give you such instruction.
endeavored to give you the correct rules by
which the damages, if any, are to be as
sessed in this case; and
think you cannot
rightfully be required to enter into ,9, con
sideration of the damages which a party not
now before the court, and has not thereiore
had an opportunity to be heard, ought to
pay, and then measure the damages in this
case which has been heard, by those which
you think ought to be just in another which
has not been heard; we will endeavor to de
cide this case right now, and when Jackson,s
case comes before u~ if it ever does, we will
endeavor to decide that right.
‘Defendants’ counsel. further requested the
presiding judge to instruct the jury, that if
the jury ﬁnd that the acts and words of
Jackson were not directly nor impliedly au
thorized, nor ratiﬁed by the defendants, then
the plaintiff is not in any event entitled to
recover vindictive damages against the de
fendants,
nor damages in the nature of
which request was not com
smart-money,
plied with, the presiding judge having al
ready instructed the jury upon what state
of facts the plaintiff would be entitled to
such damages."
I have copied all the instructions “on the
subject of damages."
it will be seen that
these latter instructions are substantially
that the jury having given full compensa
tory damages, may give others in their dis
cretion to punish these defendants for the

I
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I

wanton, willful. and malicious act of their
al
brakeman in assaulting a passenger,
though they neither direetly nor impliedly au
thorized or ratiﬁed the act.
This proposition must be sustained, if at
all, upon one of two grounds; either that it
is competent to punish one man for the crim
inal intent of another, or that the malice of
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the brakeman in this case was that of the de

fendant corporation.
A brief notice of some of the authorities
touching the liability of the master for the
acts of his servant will, I think, show the
ground of liability, the reason for the rule,
and exhibit a marked distinction between the
ordinary case of master and servant and the
case at bar.
In 2 Dane,

Abr. c. 59, art. 2, it is said:
"The master is not liable for the willful,
voluntary, or furious act of his servant."
“If my servant distrain a horse lawfully by
my order, and then use him, this conversion
is his act, and trover lies against him; for
my order extends only to distraining the
horse, and not to using him; this is his own
act."
"Nor is the .master bound for the volun
tary acts of his servants; i‘or if he be bound,
servants may ruin their masters by willful
acts; nor are willful acts, wrongs author
ized by their masters."
"If i order my servant to do what is law
ful, and he does more, he only is liable; it
is his own act, otherwise he might ruin me,
and in such case there can be no express or
implied command from me for what he does
and whenever the ques
beyond his orders;
tion is how far the master is liable for his
servant,s acts, the material inquiry must be,
how far he expressly or impliedly author
ized it."
"The master is liable for the negligent act
of his servant, but not for his willful wrong;
is liable in 'trover; for which rule several
reasons may be given:
(1) A willful wrong
is the servant,s own act.
(2) To allow him
by his willful tortlous act to bind his master
and subject him to daumges, would be to allow servants a power to ruin their masters.
from
(Ii) In such cases there is no command
the master expressed or implied to do a will
ful wrong."
In 4 Bac. Abr. tit. “Master and Servant,"
it is said:
“The master must also answer
ior torts, and injuries done by his servant
in the execution
of his authority.
But
though a master is answerable for damages
occasioned by the negligence or unskillful
ness of his servant acting in the execution of
his orders, yet he is not answerable in tres
pass for the willful act of his servant done
in his absence, and without his direction or
assent."

Chancellor Kent says: “The master is on
ly answerable for the fraud of his servant
while he is acting in his business, and not
for fraudulent or tortlous acts, or misconduct
in those things which do not concern his duty
to his master, and which when he commits,
he steps out of the course of his service.
But it was considered
in McManus
v.
Cricket, 1 East, 106. to be a question of great
concern and of much doubt and uncertainty,
whether the master was answerable in dam
ages for an injury willfully committed by
his servant while in the performance of his

master,s business, without the direction or
The court of K. B.
assent of the master.
went into an examination of all the authori
ties, and after much discussion and great
consideration, with a view to put the ques
tion at rest, it was decided that the master
was not liable in trespass for the willful act.
of his servant in driving his master,s car
riage against another, without his master,s
The court considered
direction or assent.
that when the servant quitted sight of the
object for which he was employed, and with
out having in view his master,s orders, pur
sued the object which his own malice sug
gested, he no longer acted in pursuance of‘
the authority given him, and it was deemed
so far a willful abandonment of his master,s
business.
This case has received the sanc
tion of the supreme court of Massachusetts
; and New York, on the ground that there was
‘
no authority from the master express or im
‘
plied, and the servant in that act was not in
the employment of his master."
In Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343, Cowen,
J., who gave the opinion of the court, says:
“If the act was willful, the master is no more
liable than if his servant had committed any
All the cases
other assault and battery.
agree that a man is not liable for the willful
1 mischief of his servant, though he be at the
v
time in other respects engaged in the service
of the former."
After citing several cases
“Why is a master chargeable for
he adds:
Because what a man
the act of his servant?
does by another he does by himself.
The act
is not within the scope of his agency." He
says: “The authorities deny that when the
. servant willfully drives over the man, he is
They held it a de
in his master,s business.
'
parture, and going into the servant,s own in
dependent business."
In Turnpike Co. v. Vanderbilt, 1 Hill. 480.
case of a collision of steamboats,
the su
preme court held that if the collision was
willful on the part of the defendant,s serv
ant, the defendant was not liable, referring
to Wright v. Wilcox.
The case afterw:ml
went to the court of appeals (2 Com. 479)
where the doctrine applied in the supreme
court was sanctioned; and it was further
held that the corporation was not liable, al
though the willful act producing the injury
was authorized and sanctioned by the presi
dent and general agent thereof; because a
general or special agent, when he commits or
orders a willful trespass to be committed,
acts without the scope of his authority.
In Hibbard v. Railroad Co., 15 N. Y. 455.
which was “an action against the corpora
' tion for ejecting a passenger
from the cars,
who, having once exhibited his ticket, reby the
, fused so to do when again requested
Brown, J., in giving his opinion
. conductor,"
says, speaking of a requested
instruction
concerning damages, “the object of the re
. quest was, that the court should discriminate
between those acts of the company,s agent
done in the execution of its directions, and‘
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those done in the excess of its instructions
and without authority or approbation. This
I think should have been done. The plaintiff
may have been injured by the use of unnec
essary force to effect what the company had
The conductor and those who
a right to do.
They are
aided him are not the company.
its agents and servants, and, whatever tor
tious acts they commit by its direction, it is
This is upon
responsible for and no other.
the principle that what one does by another
For injuries resulting
he does by himself.
from the carelessness of the servant in the
performance of his master,s business the lat
ter is liable. But for the willful acts of the
servant the master is not responsible, be
cause such willful acts are a departure from
the master’s business;" and cites the case of
Wright v. Wilcox, and cases there cited.

In the same' case Comstock. J., says: “If
the conductor had no right to eject the plain
tiff from the train after he had complied with
the request and produced the ticket, then I
do not see upon what principle the defendants
The reg
can be made liable for the wrong.
ulation and instructions to the conductor, as
we have said, were lawful, and they did not
in their terms or construction profess to jus
tify the trespass and eviction. The result is,
the wrong was done without any authority,
and, thereiore, that those who actually did it
“if he mistook the
are alone unanswerable."
authority conferred upon him both when he
committed the trespass and when he was ex
amined as a witness, it cannot alter the law
or change the rights of the parties. His own
mistake as to the extent of his powers cannot
make the railroad company liable for acts not
These cases are all cited
in fact authorized."
in a subsequent case. Weed v. Railroad Co.,.
17 N. Y. 362.
The rule is thus stated in Story, Ag. § 456:
“But although the principal is liable for the
torts and negligence of his agents, yet we are
to understand the doctrine with its just limi
tations, that the tort or negligence occurs in
the course of the agency.
For the principal
is not liable for the torts or negligences of
his agent in matters beyond the scope of the
adopted
agency unless he has subsequently
them for his use or beneﬁt.
Hence it is that
the principal is never liable for the unauthor
ized, the willful, or the malicious act or tres
pass of his agent."
Mr. Hilliard, in his work on Torts, says:
“In general, a master is liable for the fault
or negligence of his servant; but not for his
willful wrong or trespass. The injury must
arise in the course of the execution of some
s,ervice lawful in itself, but negligently or un
sklilfuily performed, and not be a wanton vio
lation of law by the servant, although occu
pied about the business of his employer."
Hil.
Torts, c. 40.
In Parsons v. Winchell, 5 Cash. 592, Met
“But the act of a servant is
calf, J., says:
not the act of a master even in legal intend
ment or effect unless the master personally di
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rects or subsequently adopts it. In other cas
es, he is liable for the acts of his servant
when liable at all, not as if the act were done
by himself, but because the law makes him
answerable therefor. He is liable, says Lord
Kenyon, ‘to malse compensation for the dam
age consequential for his employing of an un
skillful or negligent servant.’ " 1 East, 108.
Of this latter class of cases, Story says:
“In every such case the principal holds out
his agent as competent and ﬁt to be trusted;
and thereby, in effect, he warrants his ﬁdelity
and good conduct in all the matters of the
agency."
Story, Ag. § 452.
In Southwick v. Estes, 7 Cush. 385, Dewey.
J., instructed the jury “that if the act of the
servant were not done negligently but willful
ly with the intention of disregarding the di
rections of the master, he would not be re
This instruction was held
sponsible therefor."
correct, and the case of Mt.Manus v. Crickett
was cited by the court.
In Railroad Co. v. Langley, 21 How. 202,
Mr. Justice Campbell in delivering the opin
ion of the court says, “the result of the cases
is that for acts done by the agents of a corpo
ration either in contractu or in delicto in the
course of its business and of their employ
ment, the corporation is responsible as an in
dividual is responsible under similar circum
stances."
In Weed v. Railroad Co., 17 N. Y. 362, this
rule was invoked to relieve the defendants
from the consequences of the willful act of the
conductor in the detention of a train whereby a
passenger was made sick and suffered perma
Strong, J., in deliv
nent injury in her health.
ering the opinion of the court says: “The de
fendants insist that they are not liable for the
willful act of the conductor followed by such
a result; and they invoke, in support of their
position, the rule, well sustained by principle
and authority, that a master is not liable for
a willful trespass of his servant."
He then
proceeds to say: “It is important, therefore,
to inquire whether that.ruie extends to a case
like the present, and for that purpose to con
sider the basis on which it is founded. The
reason of the rule clearly appears by the eas
es in which it has been declared and applied."
He then examines many of the cases where
the rule has been stated and applied, and cites
also Story, Ag. § 456, and then says: “All
the cases on the subject, so far as I have ob
served, agree in regard to the principle of the
rule, and also in limiting the rule to that prin
ciple. For acts of an agent within his au
thority, the principal
is liable, but not for
willful acts without his authority."
Railroad
Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468. He then proceeds,
in reference to the case then under considera
tion, to say: “In the light of this examina
tion of the class of cases which has been con
sidered, it cannot fail to be seen that there
is an important difference between those cas
es and the one before the court.
The former
wrongful
are cases of willful, unauthorized,
acts by agents, unapproved by their princi
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pals, occasioning damage, but which do not
involve nor work any omission or violation
of duty by their principals to the persons in
jured; wrongs by the agents only with which
the principals are not legally connected.
In
the present case, by mean! of the wrongful,
willful detention by the conductor, the obli
gation assumed by the defendants, to carry
the wife with proper speed to her destination,
was broken. The real wrong to the wife in
this case, and from which the damage pro
ceeded, was the not carrying her in a reason
able time to Aspinwail as the defendants had
undertaken to do’ and this was a wrong of
the defendants unless the law excused them
for their delay on account of the misconduct
of their agent."
In the conclusion of his dis
cussion he says, the rule of law, relied on by
the defendants to sustain their position, is in
applicable to the case, and that it makes no
differcnce whether the act was willful or neg
ligent as to the liability of the defendants for
a nonfulﬁliment of their contract.
From an
examination
of these authorities,
think it
will be found that the principal is liable for
the act of his agent in three classes'of cases:
I. Where the act is done by the previous
command of the principal, or is subsequently
ratiﬁed or adopted by him.
This command may appear from proof of
speciﬁc directions, or implied from the circum
stances of the case.
II. Where the agent negligently, unskiilful
ly or otherwise improperly performs the du-.
ties pertaining to his employment.
III. Where the act of the agent has caused
the breach of a contract, or prevented the per
formance of an obligation due from, and ex
isting between, the principal and a third. per

I

son.

The liability. in the ﬁrst class of cases, rests
solely upon the maxim, “Qui facit per ailum
facit per se;" and in no other cases is he liable
as an actor. but in those

cases where he has
commanded the act or subsequently ratiﬁed it,
which is regarded in law as a previous com
mand.
The authorities, ancient and modern, are be
lieved to be uniform upon this proposition, and
wherever a liability attaches for an unauthor
ized act, it is founded upon some other rea
son.
In the second clas the agent is held out as
competent and ﬁt to be trusted (by the prin
cipal), and he, in effect, warrants his ﬁdelity
and good conduct in all the matters of the
agency; by reason of this, as Lord Kenyon
says, he becomes liable “to make compensa
tion for the damage consequential for his em
ploying of an unskiliful or negligent servant."
As to whether this warranty covers the willful
tortious acts of the agent while engaged in and
about the master,s business, the authorities do
not all agree. Some hold that as soon as the
act becomes a willful trespass, the master is
no longer liable; others hold that for acts done
in the course of his employment the master
is responsible whatever may be the animus of
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the actor. .A review of the authorities, touch
ing this question, will be found in the case of
Railroad Co. v. Baum, 26 Ind.
The liability, in the third class of cases,
rests not upon the lawfuiness or unlawful
ness of the act done by the agent, but as
grounded
upon the failure of the principal
to perform a contract or fulﬁll an obligation
with the party injured. In this class of
cases it matters not whether the act be a
“willful trespass" or not; whether it was
done in the course of the employment of the
servant is immaterial; if the act produces
the breach of the contract, or causes a fail
ure to fulﬁll the existing obligation, the lia
bility to answer attaches. The gravamen of
the charge is not that the agent has done
this or that act, but that the principal has
not fulﬁlled his agreement.
That the case at bar comes within this
class of cases I think there can be no doubt.
and the liability of the defendants is well
placed upon those grounds, by Mr. Justice
WALTON, and could be sustained upon no
other.
In the light of these authorities and de
cisions, ancient and modern, emanating from
courts of the highest jurisdiction, character,
and ability, what is the true rule of dam
ages in the case at bar? Or, putting the
question in a more pertinent form, were the
defendants liable to punitory damages, such
as “is suﬂlcient to punish the defendants
and serve as a warning and example
to

others."

If the act of Jackson was a willful, wan
ton, and malicious trespass upon his part.
and was neither directly nor impiledly au
thorized or ratiﬁed by the defendants, the
c ,Y

was neither in fact nor legal intendment

the act of the defendants.
This is quite
clear from reason and authority. Although
it may be one which devolved upon them a
liability, it is in no sense their act; so that.
if ordinarily the malice of the acting agent
was so inseparably connected with the act
that it would attach to the principal, nolens
volens, in those cases where, by legal in
tendment, it was his, the principai’s act, in
this case it would not, it being neither in
act or legal inteudment the act of the de

fendants.
The requested instruction clearly present
ed the proposition that unless the act was
authorized directly or implledly, or subse
quently ratiﬁed by the defendants,
they
could not be chargeable with the motive and
intent of the actor. This was refused and
the rule left, that, regardless of authoriza
tion or ratiﬁcation, they might be punished
for the willful, wanton, and malicious acts
of Jackson.
The ruling, it is apparent, extends to cases
not within the ﬁrst class, and the result of
placing it in either of the other classes is to
punish one for the malice of another.
To
relieve the case from this difliculty an ef
fort ls made to make corporations an excep
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tion to the rule, although all the authorities,
whether found in elementary treatises or
judicial decisions, place them upon the same
footing. The idea put forward seems to be,
that the servant is the corporation. In order,
however, that the position may certainly
stand as it is made, and the argument pro
ceed upon no erroneous deductions of mine’
I quote: “A corporation is an imaginary be
ing. It has no mind but the mind of its
servants; it has no voice but the voice of
its servants, and it has no hands with which
to act but the hands of its servants.
All its
schemes of mischief. as well as its schemes
of public enterprise, are conceived by hu
man minds and executed by human hands,
and those minds and hands are its minds
and hands. All attempts, therefore, to dis
tlnguish between the guilt of the servant
and the guilt of the corporation; or the
malice of the servant and the malice of the
corporation; or the punishment of the serv
ant and the punishment of the corporation is
’sheer nonsense,’ and only tends to confuse
the mind and confound the judgment."
In relation to this proposition one inquiry
may be made, viz.: Have these servants no
"minds," no "hands," and no “schemes" ex
cept those of the corporation? Are all their
schemes, all their acts, and all the emana
tions of their minds those of the corporation?
If they have any other, shall the corpora
tion be punished for them?
Does not the argument attach a respon
sibility to the corporation for all the acts of
a person in its employ? If it does not,
where is the dividing line? It is all, or part.
What part? This is the question which law
writers and judges have been answering for
many years, and whether, in the estimation
of any, it be or not “sheer nonsense," they
have distinguished between those acts of
the agent for which the corporation is, and
those for which it is not liable.
‘What its “voice" commands,
what its
"hands" do, and the “schemes_ which it ex
ecutes, it should be and is held responsible
for, whether done by direct or implied au
thority or subsequently ratiﬁed by them;
and when they do this in wanton and will
ful disregard of the rights of others, they
may, under the law as now administered,
be punished by punitive damages.
But when the “voice" which speaks, and
the “hand" which executes, is not that of
the principal, however wanton, willful, and
malicious it may be, the "stones." even, “cry
out" against inﬂicting upon him a punish
ment therefor, and the more wanton and
malicious the act, the more horrible is the
‘
doctrine.
Corporations are but aggregated individ
uals acting through the agency of man.
They may consist of a single individual, or
more, and they are no more ideal beings
when thus acting than the individual th.us
acting.
For certain acts the individual.
though not manually engaged in it, is held
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For the same acts the body of
individuals, denominated
a corporation, are
held responsible.
The principal and agent,
in both cases, are separate and independent
beings.
Agents presuppose
a principal,
somebody to act for. Somebody
whose or
ders they are to execute, and somebody for
whom they are to perform service; some
body who is answerable to them, and who
may be answerable for the acts done under
their direction. Mr. Justice Brown, in Hib
bard v. Railroad Co., before cited, says, "The
conductor and those who aided him are not
the company; they are its agents and serv
ants." If the employee and servant is the
corporation, in fact or legal intendment, it
does not act through agents.
Its acts are
all the direct acts of principals without the
intervention of any other power, and it car
ries us back to a responsibility for all the
acts of a person employed by a corporation,
whether those acts have any .relation to his
particular employment or not, a proposition
too absurd and monstrous in its results to be
entertained at all. Mr. Justice Campbell, in
giving the opinion of the supreme court of
the United States, in the case before cited
(21 How. 202), says, the result of the cases is
that for acts done in the course of its busi
ness and of their employment “the corpora
tion is responsible, as an individual is re
sponsible, under similar circumstances."
I, therefore, come to the conclusion that if
liable at all to be punished for the malice
of Jackson, it must be upon some other
ground than their legal identity with him,
and that in no sense can his malice be said
to be their malice; and there seems to be
strong indications in the charge of the pre
siding judge, that he, at that time, placed it
upon no such grounds.
The defendants, in
view of this assumption by the plaintiff, “re
quested the presiding judge to instruct the
jury that the plaintiff is not entitled to re
cover against the defendant company any.
greater damages than he might recover
against Jackson himself, for the same cause
of action upon similar evidence."
This in
struction the court declined to give, and re
marked to the jury, “I think you cannot
rightfully be required to enter into a consid
eration of the damages which a party, not
now before the court, and has not. therefore,
had an opportunity to be heard, ought to pay,
and then measure the damages in this case
which has been heard by those which you
think might be just in another case which
has not been heard.
We will endeavor to
decide this case right now, and when Jack
responsible.

son,s case comes before us. if it ever does,
we will endeavor to decide that right."
I think the argument is very strong from
this remark, that it was not the malice and
ill-will of Jackson that was designed to be
punished. for he says his case has not been
heard.
The court say, substantially, we
know not what excuses or justiﬁcation he
may offer when heard, if ever, "and when
I
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if.‘ ever it does, we
about the matter, and that there is manifestly
One
endeavor to decide that right."
a distinction between the two, and that there
would suppose that it was some “wanton.
are two to distinguish between, and that
malicious act, committed in reckless and will
when the act is authorized by any previous
ful disregard of the rights of the injured par
command or subsequent adoption, it is not,
ty," by these defendants that was to receive
and cannot in the nature of things be made
such punishment as should “serve a warning
the act of another than the actor. Laws may
and example to others," and not such an not
be made making others responsible’ therefor,
‘
but it is the act of him who does .it, and not
done by Jackson. The argument would seem
of him who neither does nor authorizes it;
to proceed and say Jackson, for his act, may
and no amount of judicial legislation or re
deserve one punishment,
and those defend
ants, for their acts, may deserve another;
ﬁnement can make it so; as before remarked,
and I cannot well forbear the inquiry here,
it is not possible in the nature of things.
Again, if this servant is the corporation,
if there is not here some evidence of an “at
tempt to distinguish between the guilt of
what becomes of the law regulating the lia
bility of the principal for an injury received
the servant and the guilt of the corporation;
by an employee while in the business of the
or the malice of the servant, and the malice
corporation.
of‘the corporation;
or the punishment of the
It is held, that if the injury
servant, and the punishment
of the corpora
was produced by the carelessness or negli
tion?" Was it here that "sheer nonsense"
gence of the master or corporation, they must
was enacted, and “the mind confused," and
respond in damages; but lf produced by the
the "judgment confounded"?
act of a fellow-servant, they are not liable.
If it was the malicious act of the defend Is not here a distinction recognized between
ants that was to be punished, the enormity
the guilt of .the servant and the guilt of the
of Jar.kson’s wrong had indeed nothing to do corporation?
Is not here a manifest distinc
with it. If it was the malicious wrong of tion noted and acted upon between the serv
Jackson that was to be punished, why should
If the servant is the
ant and corporation?
a party, innocent of all wrong in the matter,
corporation,
it is the act of the corporation
be punished more than the wrong-doer
him
when done by the fellow-servant.
But these
self.
If he was the corporation, why would cases say, no. You assume the risks arising
not all the acts of extenuation and justiﬁca
from the acts of your fellow-servants, but
tion surrounding him be also the acts of the
not the acts of your principal, the corpora
tion; when the corporation is negligent you
corporation,
and be proper elements to be
considered in graduating or ﬁxing the pen
may recover, but when it is the servant, you
Again, I ask, how can this be, if the
alty? How could his case come before us, if cannot.
he was the corporation?
Would it be to be servant is the corporation?
This new idea,
punished for the act of the corporation?
it appears to me, has in it more of ingenuity
If we hold both guilty and both liable, it than logic or substance; it is altogether ideal,
and if it ﬁnds place in the law, it will be
must be founded upon the idea of two actors,
among its ﬁctions.
and that the employee is not only the corpo
ration but somebody else, and the nonentity
The learned judge then adds, “And it might
of agent becomes itself a nonentity, and in
as well not be applied to them at all, as to
stead of a mere imaginary thing which swal
limit its application to cases where the serv
lows up and extinguishes all the relations of ant is directly and specially directed by the
corporation to maltreat and insult a passed
principal and agent, and renders any attempt
ger, or to cases where such an act is directly
non
to distinguish between them “sheer
sense," we do have two distinct, independent,
and speciﬁcally ratiﬁed; for no such cases
subjects,
susceptible
accountable
of being
will ever occur."
The instruction requested
brought before the courts to answer and be
and refused, used the term directly or “im
pliedly," and with this sentence so amended,
punished, and we are not left to the ideal ac
Again;
tion of punishing an ideal existence.
have simply to say, that if no such case
if the actor is brought before the court and ever does occur, there is no occasion, right,
or propriety in inﬂicting the punishment.
If
punished, would he be punished for the act
of the corporation or his own act? for the
the act is neither directly nor impliedly author
malice of the corporation, or his own malice?
ized or ratiﬁed, there is in it no wantonness,
If imprisoned, should we say the corporation
no malice, and no ill-will toward the person
injured, and no public wrong by them done
was imprisoned?
If not, and he is (as undoubtedly he may to be redressed or atoned for. Repentance
with them is absolutely impossible.
The ar
be) called to answer for an assault, and pun
gument is simply this: if we do not punish
ished for an assault, when we come to ﬁx the
punishment,
do we not distinguish between
you when you do not directly or impliedly
his guilt and the guilt of the corporation, his
authorize or adopt a wrong, we shall never
malice and the malice of the corporation?
have an opportunity, for you never will thus
or adopt one. The argument is
And when the rule is required that we pun
authorize
clearly stated by the learned judge. and
ish him in the same manner and to the same
extent as the corporation, should we not reply
leave it as he left it, remarking, that if the
very much as did the presiding judge at the
end to be attained is the punishment of rail
trial? 1 think there can be no two opinions
road corporations
whether guilty or innocent,

his case comes before us,

will

I

I
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the rule requiring them ﬁrst to be guilty of
wrong had better be abolished.
That the learned judge meant to state his
think, apparent from the
argument thus, is,
remark which immediately follows: "that if
those who are in the habit of thinking that
it is a terrible hardship to punish an inno
of its
cent corporation
for the wickedness
agents and servants, will for a moment reﬂect
upon the absurdity of their own thoughts,
their anxiety will be cured."
In Railroad Co. v. Baum, 26 Ind. 70, the
court say:
“Nor will sound policy maintain
the application of a rule to railways or cor
porations on this subject, which shall not be
alike applied to others, as has been intimated
in some quarters.
The suggestion is not ﬁt
to be made, much less sanctioned, in any tri
bunal pretending to administer justice impar

I

tially."
I
In another case it is said: "The law lays
down the same rule for all, and we cannot
make a diliterent rule in the case of a serv
ant of a railway company and an ordinary
tradesman;" “and, therefore, treating Phil
lips as the servant, the company are not lia
ble for his tortious act any more than other
individuals would be." Roe v. Railroad Co.,
7 Eng. Law & Eq. 54?.
With the criticism (if it be entitled to that
appellation) of the opinion upon railroads and
their

management

I

have,

in the position

I

now occupy, no occasion to deal. My duty
I consider performed, and best performed,
when I have endeavored to ascertain the law
as it is, and apply it to causes as they are
presented, rather than in making rules for
any real or supposed grievances.
The law
mahing power is ample to afford the neces
sary means of redress where none now ex
ists; and did these great and growing evils
really exist, we might reasonably expect to
ﬁnd the law-makers, the people, those who
must
suffer by their existence, exercising
their corrective powers.
If the evil is not sufﬁcient to induce the
sufferers to provide a remedy, it will hardly
justify the judiciary in leaving the clear path
of the duty of expounding the law, and as
suming the powers and responsibilities
of
law-makers. Perhaps there has been no one
thing that has introduced
into the law so
much

confusion

and

embarrassment

as the

engrafting policy of courts; adding here a lit
tle and there a little, till the original is cover
and not
ed with these judicial excrescences;
unfrequently the jewel is lost in its surround
ings of dross.
The plaintiff, in the printed brief of his ar
gument presented in this case, saysr "it,
therefore, an individual master, perhaps per
sonally innocent of positive evil intent is
liable to punishment by exemplary damages
for the malice of his servant, for a much
stronger reason ought a soulless corporation
to be responsible for the wicked and wanton
acts of its sole representative."
In my judgment, if the premise were right
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in this proposition,
there is no reason why
know
the conclusion
is not right.
But
of no case where the master, innocent of all
wrong upon his own part, has been held to be
liable to punishment for the malice of his
servant.
It is only where he has been a par
ticipator in some manner in the wantonness
and malice displayed
in the act, and it is
his own wanton and malicious act that is
then punished.
The plaintiff says further:
"Besides, if corporations
cannot be reached
in exemplary damages for the malice of
their servants, they escape entirely, and thus
stand inﬁnitely better than citizens who are
liable in punitory damages; not only for their
own personal acts, which latter it is obvious
a corporation can never be guilty of in the
strict sense."
If citizens were liable in puni
tory damages for the malice of their servants,
in nowise participated in by themselves, the
conclusion that corporations would stand bet
ter than citizens, if they escaped a punish
ment for the malice of their servants, is irre
sistible; but again
say,
know of no law,
authority, or reason for holding an innocent
citizen to punishment for the malice of his
servant or agent.
It is quite as much as
one can reconcile with just accountability to
hold him to compensate for injuries malic
iously indicted in the course of his employ
ment, without adding punishment.
The theory of punitive damages is the in
ﬂiction of a punishment for an offense com
mitted.
It presupposes the existence of a
moral wrong, an infraction of the moral code;
it wrong in which the community
has some
interest in the redress, and in securing im
munity from in the future.
It presupposes
also an offender, and designs to punish that
offender.
To punish one not an offender is
against the whole theory, policy, and practice
of the law and its administrators. “It is
better that ten guilty men should escape than
one innocent man should suffer."
Before the
smallest ﬁne can be inﬂicted, evidence, leav
ing no reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
party to be thus punished, must be adduced.
Evidence that he possessed the evil intent.
wicked and depraved spirit; that it was he
that was regardless of social duty.
The idea
of punishing one who is not particeps criminis
in the wrong done is so entirely devoid of
the ﬁrst principles and fundamental elements
of law, that it can never ﬁnd place among the
rules of action in an intelligent and virtuous
community.
There is no parallel,
for it is
in the administration of the law, and courts
of the highest repute have, whenever the
question has arisen, declared it unsound in
principle and inequitable in practice.
In Hagan v. Railroad Co., 3 R. I. 188.
Broughton, J., in delivering the opinion of
the court says: “in cases where punitive
damages have been assessed,
or exemplary
it has been done upon evidence of such will
fuiness, recklessness,
or wickedness
on the
part of the party at fault as amounted to
criminality, which for the good of society and

I

I

I
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security to the individual ought to be pun
if, in such cases, or in any case of
ished.
a civil nature, it is the policy of the law to
visit upon the offender such exemplary dam
ages as will operate as a punishment,
and
teach the lesson of caution to prevent repeti
tion of such criminality, yet we do not see
how such damages can be allowed, when a
principal is prosecuted for the tortious act
of a servant, unless there is proof in the case
to implicate the principal, and make him
particeps
criminis of his agent,s act. No
man shall be punished for that of which he
is not guilty.
Cases may arise in which
the principal is deeply implicated in the serv
ant,s guilt or fault,—cases in which the con
duct of the principal is such as to amount
to a ratiﬁcation.
In all such cases. the prin
cipal is particeps criminis, if not the princi
pal offender; and whatever damages might
properly be visited upon him who commits
the act, might be very properly inﬂicted upon
him who thus criminally participates
in it.
But where the proof does not implicate the
principal, and however wicked the servant
may have been, the principal neither express
ly nor impiledly authorizes or ratiﬁes the act,
and the criminality of it is as much against
him as against any other member of society,
we think it is quite enough that he shall be
liable in compensatory damages for the injury
sustained in consequence of the wrong of a
person acting as his servant."
In Railroad v. Finney, 10 Wis. 388, which
was a case for putting a passenger off the
cars before reaching the end of the route to
which his ticket entitled him, the court be
low instructed the jury that “in this-case,
if you ﬁnd the complaint sustained by evi
dence, you may give such damages as shall
compensate the plaintiff for his loss by the
act of the defendant, and also such exempla
ry damages as you may ﬁnd proper under
the circumstances."
The defendants request
ed an instruction “that they should give the
plaintiff such damages only as would com
piensate him for his loss by reason of putting
off the cars; that they could not give vindictive
or punitory damages, called sma rt-money."
This
instruction was refused.
The court, in giv
ing their opinion, say: “The judge improp
erly refused to instruct the jury as requested
by defendants‘ counsel, that the plaintiff was
only entitled to recover such sum as would
compensate him for his actual loss by being
put off the cars, and that he was not entitled
to vindictive damages or smart-money.
If
it be admitted that the action of the con
ductor in expelling the plaintiff from the cars
was willful and malicious, or so grossly neg
ligent. oppresive, or insulting as to bring the
case within the rule authorizing exemplary
damages. if the suit had been brought against
him; yet there was not one word of testi
mony offered showing, or tending to show,
that such conduct on his part was either pre
viously directed, or subsequently ratiﬁed or
although they may
adopted by the company;
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liable in this action to indemnify the
plaintiff for the actual loss or damage which
he sustained by reason of the misconduct of
the conductor, because it occasioned a breach
of their duty or obligation to carry him from
Madison to Edgerton.
Still it does not fol
low that they may be visited with damages
by way of punishment,
without proof that
be

they directed the act, or subsequently
con
ﬁrmed it.
Defendants are not to be visited
with damages by way of punishment, with
out proof that they directed the act to be
done, or subsequently
conﬁrmed
it.
Such
damages are given by way of punishing the
malice or oppression, and are graduated by
the intent of the party committing the wrong.
But how can such damages be assessed
against a principal with such intent? Sure
ly they cannot be. But in an action against
the principal for the act of the agent, how
can the question of their assessment be prop
erly submitted to the jury when there is no
evidence connecting the principal with such
intent on the part of the agent?
Clearly it
cannot."
The damages in this case were
$175, and the judgment of the court below
was reversed.
Turner v. Railroad Co., 34 Cal. 594, was
an action for unlawfully ejecting the plaintiff
from a car by the conductor.
The court be
low ruled “that the injury, if committed, and
if a willful one on the part of the defendants
in their servant the conductor, and accom
panied by malice or such acts as in their
nature tended to show a purpose of resent
ment or ill-will, or a disposition to degrade
the plaintiff, entitled her to what is called
exemplary damages."
After some comment,
and citing Story, Ag. § 456, 19 Wend. 343.
and 14 How. 486, before referred to, the
court say: “Tested by these principles, it is
obvious that in this case the defendant was
not liable for any malicious and wanton con
duct of the conductor.
If liable at all, its
liability must be conﬁned to the actual dam
ages which the plaintiff suffered.
To render
the defendant liable to punitive damages, it
was incumbent on the plaintiﬂ! to show that
the act complained
of was done with the
authority either express or implied of the
defendant,
or was subsequently
adopted by
the company."
“If her expulsion resulted
from the malice of the conductor, or was ac
companied by violence or personal indignity,
the conductor alone is responsible
for such
damages as she may be entitled to for this
cause beyond the actual damages resulting
from her exclusion from the car, unless as
before stated the company expressly or tacit
ly participated in the malice and violent con
In other words. if
duct of the conductor.
the act of the conductor was wholly unau
thorized, the company is liable for the actual‘
damage, and the conductor alone for the puni
tive damages. if any."
There is another case in the same volume
v. Railroad Co.), and
(34 Cal. 58tl,—Plcasants
decided upon the same grounds.

,
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In (‘lark V. Newsou. 1 Exch. 131. and 1 ders of the switch at which the accident oc
Welsh. H. & G. (a case of joint trespass by
curred.
No care or caution, required for the
two), Pollock, O. B., said: “I think it would
safety of the passengers, had been omitted
by the company.
Through the carelessness
be very wrong to make the malignant motive
of one party a ground of aggravation of dam
and disobedience of their agents the acci
ages against the other party who were al
dent happened."
"In fact, the only fault or
together free from any improper motive.
negligence
complained
In
of was that of the
such case the plaintiff ought to select the
employees of the company.
Where a rail
party against whom he means to get ag
road company adopts all rules and regula
gravated damages."
tions ncedful for the safety of passengers,
In relation to the views thus expressed, it and employs competent agents, whose duty it
is said by Mr. Justice WALTON, in his opin
is to see that these rules and regulations are
ion, that: "In none of them was there any
observed, 1 do not think that the company,
in case of injury to the passengers happen
evidence that the servant acted wantonly or
ing by reason of the failure of the agent to
maliciously; they were simply cases of mis
perform his duty, can be held liable for puni
And what these same courts
taken duty.
If, however, the company, as
would have done if a case of such gross and
tive damages.
outrageous insult had been before them. as
such, is in fault, a different rule applies.
The company, for its own carelessness, may
is now before us, it is impossible to say; and
long experience has shown that nothing is
be justly held liable for smart-money.
This
rule does not prevail where the carelessness
more dangerous
than to rely upon the ab
is only that of a subordinate agent.
stract reasoning of courts, when the cases be
There is
no justice in punishing the company after it
fore them did not call for the application of
has done all in its power to prevent an in
the doctrines which their reasoning is intend
jury. The agent, if guilty of negligence, may,
Waiving, for the present,
ed to establish"
in certain cases, be proceeded against by in
the question of fact as to whether they were
I cannot yield to the argument so
or not simply cases of mistaken duty, we
dictment.
earnestly urged by the counsel of the plain
ﬁnd in each of them the question of puni
tiff, that by construction of law the compa
tive damages legitimately and clearly raised
ny is guilty of gross negligence whenever its
and discussed, and the reasoning, such as it
agent is, and is, therefore, to be treated the
is, is before the profession.
The cases are
same as if through its own negligence the in
not cited as mere authority by reason of
jury happened.
think the verdict was
their being decided cases by courts of com
against the charge of the court in that it is,
petent jurisdiction, but because the reason
ing is believed to support the decision.
If the to some extent at least, for punitive dam
ages.
Full compensation to the plaintiff for
reasoning
is bad, fallacious, inconclusive,
all real loss, present and prospective, was the
some would adopt the plan of exhibiting
measure of damages."
these facts by a course of reasoning of their
I,0rter v. Railway 01., 32 N. J. Law, 261,
own, rather than by promulgating a general
proposition that it is unsafe to rely upon ‘ argued at the same time, was determined up
If the reasoning is sound on the rules announced in this case.
their reasoning.
and applicable to case at bar, it does not
These cases well indicate the views of the
court in New Jersey. McKeon v. Railway
matter that it was, or was not necessarily
Co., 42 Mo. 79, was an action for an injury
called out in the case into which it has been
done to a passenger.
introduced,
and it requires some other an
The court, in giving
their opinion, say: “If the conduct of this
swer than mere criticism upon course of pro
ceeding by the judges in those cases.
driver was willful and malicious with intent
to injure the plaintiff, he might be liable to
That the gentlemen, composing the several
courts alluded to, supposed the cases called
indictment for assault with intent to kill, or
for the decisions and reasonings they made,
some other crimmal offense; but his em
ployer, was not responsible
cannot well be doubted, and an examination
for his crimes,
nor liable for his acts of willful and mali
of the cases as reported in the printed vol
cious trespas.
umes of the reports referred to, will, I think,
The company was answera
ble only for his negligence, or his incapacity,
leave the reader in no doubt concerning that
or unskillfuiness in the performance of the
question.
duties assigned .to him.
In such cases we
There are some other cases to be found in
have no hesitation in saying, that punitory
the books not referred to on the defendant,s
damages, or any damages beyond a full com
brief to which I will advert as indicating the
pensation for the injury sustained, cannot be
views of some of the courts in other states.
allowed."
Ackerson v. Railway Co., 32 N. J. Law,
Railroad Co. v, Smith, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 556,
for
254, was an action to recover damages
injuries sustained while traveling in their
was a case where the evidence tended to
show that the car of the plaintiffs was upset
cars by reason of the carelessness and diso
by the carelessness of their driver, and de
bedience of the employees of the road.
The
fendant injured thereby.
court say: “It appeared on trial that the de
The instruction
was, “That if the car was thrown from the
fendants had adopted all needful rules and
regulations for the running of their trains,
track by the fast and careless driving of the
plaintiffs‘) agent, they
defendants’
and had employed competent [)t‘lsv.‘ns as ten
(now
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amount of express malice in his employees
should aggravate damages against him,when
he has thus purged himself from blame."
“While, therefore, in the present case the re
porters were guilty of carelessness in receiv
ing hearsay talk of legal charges, which
could only be lawfully published in accord
ance with the documentary facts, and while
there could be no justiﬁcation for publishing
outside scandal against an individual from
any source whatever, yet the defendants
were only responsible beyond the damages
for
recoverable
under any circumstances,
such a libel to the extent of their own con
duct in the case, or want of care used in
guarding their columns against the insertion
of such articles."
In the case of Railroad Co. v. Baum, before
cited, the court sav: “But when the act is
unnecessary to the performance of the mas
ter,s service, and not really intended for that
purpose, but is done by the servant to grat
ify his own malice, though, under pretense
of executing his employment, it is not done
to serve the master, and is not, in fact, with
in the scope of the employment, and the mas
ter is not, therefore, liable." "Under these
circumstances, last enumerated, it is not easy
to perceive, in the nature of things, any just
reason for holding the master responsible.
_It will not do to say he shall answer in dam
ages, because by employing the servant he
gives him opportunity to maltreat those with
whom he comes in contact in discharging his
duties, that reason would hold the shop-keep
er for any outrage committed by his clerk up
on a customer;
the merchant for the like
conduct of his journeyman; and, indeed, it
would be equally applicable to almost every
of business in the conduct of
department
which it is necessary or convenient to em
ploy assistants to deal with the public. Even
the inn-keeper, whose cook feloniously min
gles poison with the food of a guest, must
then respond in damages."
In Kleen v. Railroad Co., 37 Cal. 400, the
court say: “As to the general rule upon that
subject there can be no doubt.
If the act
of the conductor, in pulling the plaintiff oil?
the cars was a wanton and malicious act,
committed out of the course of his agency,
the defendant cannot be held responsible for
unless, how
the manner in which he did
ever, the defendant expressly authorized the‘
act."
In the case of The Amiable Nancy,3 Wheat.
suit for
546, which was
marine trespass,
Mr. Justice Story, in delivering the opinion
of the court, among other things says: "Up
on the facts disclosed in the evidence, this
must be pronounced
case of gross and
wanton outrage without any just provoca
tion or excuse; under such circumstances, the
honor ‘of the country and the duty of the
court equaily require that a just compensa
tion should be made to the unoffending neu
trals for all the injuries and losses actually
sustained by them. And if this were
suit
it,

a

should ﬁnd for plaintiff (now defendant), and
that the jury are not necessarily restricted to
actual damages, but may, in their discre
tion, award such exemplary damages as they
.deem just and proper in view of all the facts
in the case." The court say, the facts did
not authorize a punishment of the defend
ants, and the court below should have re
stricted them to compensatory damages, and
for this reason the judgment was reversed.
In the case of Hill v. Railroad Co., 11 La.
Ann. 292. the court used the following lan
guage: “In actions of this kind, it is not
within the province of the jury, although
is clearly proven, to give vindic
negligence
tive damages, as is sometimes allowed in
The
case of willful and malicious injuries.
in such cases, is not to be pun
company,
ished for the negligence of its agents as a
crime."
Keene v. Lizardi, 8 La. 27, was an action
brought to recover damages of defendants,
for injuries to plaintiffs wife,
ship-owners,
at the hands of a master of a vessel on which
The evidence showed
she was a passenger.
gross neglect and wanton outrage on the part
of the master against the lady. In deliver
ing the opinion of the court, the judge said:
“It is true, juries sometimes give what is
They are often war
called smart-money.
ranted in giving vindictive damages as a
punishment inﬂicted for outrageous conduct.
But this is only justiﬁable in an action
against the wrong-doer, and not against per
sons who, on account of their relation to the
offender, are only consequentially liable for
his acts, as the principal is liable for the
acts of his factor or agent."
In Railroad Co. v. Rogers. 28 Ind. 1, it is
said: "Whatever rule of damages would ap
ply in a suit against a natural person, ought
Any
to apply in a suit against a corporation.
discrimination in that regard would shock
the public sense of impartial justice, and
,l‘he instruc
would be an unjust innovation.
tions. governing subordinate employees and
agents. may be devised in such utter disre
gard of the rights of others, that obedience
to them will result in palpable wrong to in
dividuals; whether it was so here was a
for the jury,"—thus putting the
question
question whether the acts are done in obedi
of
.ence to instructions that the execution
would result in palpable wrong.
Post Co. v. McArthur, 16 Mich. 447, was an
action by .\lcArthur for publishing an al
lr;:ml libel.
The court say: “The employ
editors, the supervision,
nu..nt of competent
by proper persons, of all that is to be insert
ed, and the establishment and habitual en
forcement of such rules as would probably
exclude improper items, would reduce the
blame-worthiness of a publisher to a mini
mum for any libel inserted without his priv
ity or approval, and should conﬁne his lia
bility to such damages as include no redress
for wounded feeling, beyond what is inevita
ble from the nature of the libel. And no
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against the original wrong-doers. it might be
proper to go yet further and visit upon them,
in the shape of exemplary damages the prop
.er punishment which belongs to such lawless
misconduct.
But it is to be considered that
this is a suit against the owners of a priva
teer upon whom the law has, from motives of
policy, devolved a responsibility for the con
duct of the oﬁicers and crew employed by
them, and yet from the nature of the service
they can scarcely ever be able to secure to
themselves an adequate indemnity in cases
of loss. They are innocent of the demcrit of
this transaction, having neither directed it,
nor countenanced, nor participated in it in
the slightest degree. Under such circum
stances, we nre of opinion that they are
bound to repair all real injuries and personal
wrongs sustained by the libellants, but they
are not bound to the extent of vindictive
damage%."

In Wardrobe

v.

Stage

Co., 7 Cal. 118, the
dam
exemplary

jury found for actual and

ages in the sum of $2,500.
The chief jus
tice, in delivering the opinion of the court,
quoted with approval the opinion of Judge
Story in The Amiable Nancy, and said:
"When it appears that the coach at the time
of the accident was driven by a servant or
agent of the owner, the rule in such case is,
that the principal is liable only for simple
negligence, and that exemplary damages can
not be enforced against him."
In the case of Moody v. McDonald, 4 Cal.
_ 7, the facts were similar to the above, and
in the action brought against the principal
for tortious acts of his servant, where the
jury gave $2,500 damages, and $2,500 smart
money, the court disallowed the verdict for
the smart-money, holding the principal liable
only for compensatory damages.
In .\IcLellan v. Bank, 24 Me. 566, the court
say: "The ﬁrst question obviously presented
by the case is, can a corporation aggregate
with malice?
Such corpora
be chargeable
tions have been held answerable in trover;
and might, perhaps, in other actions s0unding
in tort for all acts done by their oﬂicers un
der circumstances implying authority to do
them.
But it may well be doubted if such
corporations can be implicated by the acts of
their servants in transactions in which mal
ice would be necessary to be found in order
to the sustaining an action against them

therefor."

Two cases are cited by Mr. Justice WAL
TON as sustaining the rulings of the presid
ing judge;

one in New Hampshire, and one

in Mississippi.
In the case in New Hampshire (Hopkins

v.

Railroad Co., 36 N. H. 1) the ruling com
plained of was, “That if the jury should ﬁnd
the defendants guilty of gross negligence at
the time of the collision, and the plaintiffs
injury was occasioned by such negligence,
they might in their discretion give exemplary
damages."

‘

DAMAGES.
“To

this

instruction

two objections

43
are

made:
(1) That it is not a case for exemplary
which is
damages, because the negligence,
the foundation of the suit, was the negligence
of the defendant’s servants;
(2) Because the facts of the case disclose
no fraud, malice, violence, cruelty, or the like,
nor any turpitude or moral wrong."
Upon the last point, the court hold that
“gross carelessness in such case implies a
heedless disregard
for human life, and for
the safety of passengers who intrust them
selves to the care of the road, which brings
the case very strongly within the rule that
of, to warrant exem
the wrong complained
plary damages, must have something of a

criminal character.’’_
In relation to the ﬁrst objection the court
say: “The defendants are a corporation, and
can act in no way but by their oﬂiccrs,
agents. and servants; and when their oﬂi
cers, agents, or servants act within the scope
of their authority and employment, it is the
and their negligence
act of the corporation,
is the negligence of the corporation;" and
they cite Aug. & A. Priv. Corp, 386, and
Chestnut Hill Turnpike v. Rutter, -I Serg. &
R. 6.

It will be noticed that the learned chief
justice, who drew this opinion, makes only
such acts of the agent, as are authorized by
It is such as are
the corporation, their acts.
within the scope of their authority as well
as employment.
He does not say that un
authorized acts by the agent become the acts
of the principal. His proposition conforms
to the rules which we have before deduced
from the authorities. A recurrence to the au
thorities, cited by him, will show this. Sec
tion 386, Ang.&A. Priv. Corp, which is cited,
reads as follows: “Yet it is somewhat re
markableihat the question whether an action
of trespass would be against a corporation
should not. until within a very late period,
have been the subject of express judicial‘de
In the case of Maud v. Canal Co. it
cision.
was expressly decided by the English court
of common pleas, in 1842, that trespass will
lie against a corporation.
The action was
brought for breaking and entering locks on
a canal, and seizing and carrying away bar
ges and coal. The trespasses, it was proved,
had been committed by an agent of the com
pany, which was incorporated by an act of
parliament, and the barges and coal, it ap
peared, had been seized for tolls claimed to
be due them.
The only question
being
whether trespass would lie against a corpo
ration aggregate for an act done by their
agent within the scope of their authority.
The court held, that when it is established
that trover will lie against a corporation,
there could be no reason why trespass should
not also lie against them; that it was impos
sible to see any distinction between the two
actions."
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This section which is cited relates alone to
the question whether or not trespass can be
maintained when the act done was within
the scope of their authority; that is the au
thority conferred by the corporation, and it
is held, when the act is done by the author
ity of the corporation, it is the act of the cor
poration, and trespass will lie.
The next section. save one, which follows
"it is of importance, however, to
(388) says:
be observed, that an action of trespass can
not be sustained against a private corpora
tion for an act done by one of its agents un
consilio, or. in other
less done communicato
words, unless the act has been directed, suf
A cor
fered, or ratiﬁed by the corporation.
poration is liable for an injury done by one
of its servants in the same manner and to
the same extent only as a natural individual
would be liable under like circumstances.
The well-known rule of law is, that if the
cause of an injury to a person be immediate,
though it happens accidentally, the author of
it is answerable in trespass as well as in
case; but a master, whether a natural indi
vidual or an artiﬁcial one, is not liable for a
willful act of trespass of his servant."
With these authorities before him we can
not well suppose he meant to include any
He was too
unauthorized act of the agent.
good a lawyer to say that an act done‘
against the master’s orders and directions
Did these, how
was the act of the master.
ever, leave us in doubt, what follows upon
the same page of his opinion would seem to
put the matter at rest, for he proceeds to
say: "Corporations may be sued in trespass
for the authorized acts of their servants;
and if the trespass is committed by their au
thority, with circumstances of violence and
outrage such as would authorize exemplary
damages against an individual defendant, it
is not easy to discover any ground for a dif
ferent ruie of damages against the corpora
tion which the law charges with the conse
quences of the act as the responsible party.
If a corporation like this is guilty of an act
or default such as, in case of an individual,
would subject him to exemplary damages,
we think the same rule must be applied to
the corporation."
This we understand to be in harmony with
all the authorities, and comes within the
ﬁrst class of cases to which 1 have referred.
The act is theirs, because done by their au
thority. Being theirs, they are held as would
If unauthor
be an individual defendant.
ized, it is not their act, although they may,
upon other principles, be liable to compen
sate for the injury done.
The ground upon which exemplary dam
ages is allowed is, that the trespass is com
mitted by their authority with such circum
stances of violence and outrage as would an
thorize exemplary damages against an indi
I regard the law, as stat
vidual defendant.
ed by the chief justice, as directly sustain

ing the views that I present. viz.: that to be
chargeable with the animus of the transac
tion, it must be theirs by previous authority,
direct or implied, or subsequently adopted or
ratiﬁed by them.
The instruction in the
court below required the defendants to be
guilty of gross negligence to subject them to
exemplary damages; and the sum total of
the decision was that this was right, and
that if the act was done by the authority of
the defendants. it was the act of the princi
pal.
What evidence there was, if any, that
the defendants participated in the act which
produced the injury, does not appear; nor
does it appear that the jury found the defendants were guilty of gross carelessness.
All the remarks of the chief justice are made
upon the hypothetical case of an injury hap
pening through the gross carelessness of the
defendant corporation.
.
The case in Mississippi came before the
court on a motion to set aside the verdict.
The discussion in the opinion is upon the pro
priety and authority of the court to set aside
verdicts on account of the amount of dam
ages in those cases where there is no ﬁxed
rule of computation. and the authorities cit
ed are almost all of them upon this point.
There was no ruling excepted to, and no
question of law presented.
Upon the matter
of punitive damages, referred to by Judge
lValton in his opinion, they say: “The case
is much stronger for the defendant in error,
than were the facts in the case of Heirn v.
McCaughan, 32 Miss. 18. The decison in that
case was conclusive in this, as to the form of
action as well as the right of the jury, in such
cases, to protect the public, by punitive dam
ages, against the negligence, folly. or wick
edness which might otherwise convert these
great public blessings into the most danger
ous nuisances."
It will be perceived that this case. so far
as any consideration of punitive damages
was concerned, was regarded as settled by
the cae in 32 Miss.
Looking at that case I ﬁnd it was an action
brought for an act done by a partner. Ileirn
with others were owners of a vessel. Grant,
one of the owners, Wits the captain.
The
court say, by Hand, .].: “There was testi
mony tending to show that the captain in
charge of the boat, which was published to
stop at Pascagouia at the time speciﬁed, will
fully and capriciously disregarded the obli
gation incurred by the publication, and that.
the failure occasioned great bodily exposure,
and mental suffering and disappointment to
the plaintiffs (now defendants);
these circum
stances were properly submitted to the jury,
to be considered by them, with the circum
.stances of excuse or extenuation relied upon
by the defendants; and it was their province
to determine whether there was such fraud
or willful neglect of duty causing oppression
to the plaintiffs, and under such circumstan
ces of aggravation as to warrant exemplary
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damages.
This was the substance of the rui
ings of the court upon this point, and we per
ceive no error in them."
This is the case which decided all that was
said in 36 Miss. about punitive damages, and
was an action brought against several part
The value
ners for the act of one of them.
of this case, in support of the principle that
a railroad corporation may be punished for
ihe malice of an employee, cannot, I think,
he considered great, especially when, in the
“It
case in the litith, we ﬁnd this remark:
is not enough that, in the opinion of the
court, the damages are too high.
It may not,
rightfully, substitute its own sense of what
would be a reasonable compensation for the
Since the opin
injury, for that of the jury."
ion in this case was drawn. and since writ
ing this opinion, my attention has been di
rected bv Mr. Justice WALTON to the case
of Railroad Co. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277, as
a case sustaining the ruling of the court in
the case at bar.
Upon an examination of that case, it will be
found that a diﬁiculty arose between the con
ductor of train upon the appellant,s road and
appellee about his ticket; the one contend
ing it had been surrendered to the conductor,
and the other averring it had not, and to
prevent being put oflf the train, the appellee
paid his fare; it subsequently appeared that
his
he was right, and properly surrendered
ticket when called upon so to do. He alleged
that the conduct of the conductor was vio

lent and insulting.
At the tria! of the ease, the appellants re
the court to instruct the jury as
quested
follows:
If the jury believe the conductor
“[7)
caught the appellee violently, etc., by the
collar and dragged him from his seat, while
a passenger in the train, the appellee is not
entitled to recover for the same in this action
against the appellants, unless they believe
the appellants authorized the act. and adopt
ed and jnstiﬂed it since its committal.
“(8) That if the jury believe the conductor
wrongfully extorted from the appellee the
fare from Martinsburg to Baltimore, after
the appeilee had surrendered his ticket, etc.,
the appeliee was not entitled to recover vin
dictive or punitive damages from the appel
lants, unless they expressly or impliedly par
ticipated in the tortlous act authorizing it before, or approving it after, it was com
mitted."
Concerning these two requests, the court
say: "The conductors and employees of the
corporation represent them in the discharge
of these functions, and being in the line of
their duty in collecting the fare or taking up
tickets, the corporation is liable for any
abuse of their authority, whether of omission
Vide Redt. R. R. 381, note
or commission.
ti, and
The court
authorities
there cited.
was. therefore. right in rejecting so much oi.’
the defendants‘ prayers, as limited their lia
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bility to such tortlous acts of their agents as
they had either personally authorized or sub
v
sequently approved."
The seventh and eighth prayers, requiring
the plaintiff to prove either previous author
ity or subsequent approval of the acts of the
conductor to. render the defendant liable,
were rejected for reasons before assigned
“The prayer of the ap
(those above copied).
pellee claims compensatioE'Ior injury to his
feelings and degradation of character.
The
appellant,s eighth prayer aﬂirms he is not
entitled
to recover vindictive or punitory
damages against the company, unless they
expressly or impliedly participated in the
tort, by authorizing it before, or approving it
after. We have already declared our opinion
on the latter branch of this proposition.
This court, in the case of Gaither v. Blowers,
11 Md. 552, said, that where the injury was
accompanied
with force or malice, the in
jured party might recover exemplary dam
ages.
The action being vi et armis, or in
that character, the jury were authorized to
give whatever damages the evidence showed
the immediate
consequence
of the wrong
warranted. and which necessarily resulted
from the act complained of. 2 Greenl. Ev.
ii 80, 254; McNamara v. King, 2 Gilman,
436; .\lc’l‘avish v. Carroll, 13 Md. 439."
This is all that is said upon this question.
I have quoted the requested instructions, and
the remarks of the court upon them.
The
conclusion of the court, and the law of that
case, is found in these words: “The action
being vi et armis, or in that character. the
jury were authorized to give whatever dam
ages the evidence showed
the immediate
consequences of the wrong warranted, and
which necessarily resulted from the act com

plained of."
A careful examination of that case will dis
close the fact that the question of damage
raised and decided, was whether the plain
tlff had a right in such case to recover "for
injury to his feelings, and degradation
of
character." This was the prayer of the ap
pellee, and he asked no more, and no other
instruction was given.
These were treated
as exemplary damages by the appellants, and
they sought, by their request, to limit the
damages to the actual physical and pecunia
ry injuries. An examination of the authori
ties cited by the court in their opinion will
lead to the conclusion
that they regarded
that as the question. and considered such
damages exemplary damages.
They cite Mr.
Greeuleat for the rule they lay down, and I
hazard the opinion that Mr. Greenleat never
expected to be quoted as an authority for
punitive damages in civil actions.
(See his
note to section 253. volume 2, on Evidence.)
The case of Gaither v. Blowers, referred to,
goes no further than Mr. Greenleat, and his
language, totidem verbls, is used as the au
thority for the doctrine advanced.
in the note referred to,
Mr. Greenleaf.
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compaint not embraced in this declaration.
speaking of the term “exemplary damages."
If, however, the theory which is now ad
as used by the courts in a case he is review
vanced is not only novel but unsound, and
ing, says: “From this and other expressions
that previous command or subsequent ap
it may well be inferred, that by actual dam
proval was necessary to warrant the inﬂic
ages the court meant those which were sus
tion of punishment, the matter was of vital
ceptible of computation, and that by exem
importance,
plary damages or smart-money they intended
and the defendants should have
had the advantage of the instruction.
it is
those damages which were given to the plain
think, to now assume that
not quite right,
tiff for the circumstances of aggravation at
tending the injury he had received, and go
the jury regarded
as a ratiﬁcation. Possi
ing to enhance its amount, but which were
bly the gentlemen composing that jury were
not quite prepared to ﬁnd that the gentle
left to the discretion of the jury, not being
men composing
susceptible of any other rule."
the administrative and ex
- The rulings, in the case at bar, covered all
ecutive departments of that corporation were
so lost to all that is decent and honorable
these intangible matters before reaching the
point of punishing the defendant corporation.
among men, and so blind to their own inter
They had been told “to consider the injury to
ests that they would justify an act con
Giving full force to
his feelings, his wounded pride, his wounded demned by everybody.
the encomiums bestowed in the opinion upon
self.respect, his mental pain and suffering oc
juries, might we not conclude
casioned by the assault, and the feeling of
that they
degradation that necessarily resulted from it."
would be more likely to infer, from the cir
cumstances, that such amends had been made
This was going as far as the court in Mary
land went or was asked to go, and does not
as honorable gentlemen would require, rather
reach the ground of complaint in the case at
than convict them of .an act that any prison
bar.
ﬁnd no evidence in it of a design togo .convict would cry out against?
beyond this; the rule was declared in plain
Will
do to shield the verdict with that
terms to be such damages as "the evidence
which the jury were substantially told was
showed the immediate consequence of the
immaterial?
wrong warranted, and which necessarily re
have not considered this case upon the
sulted from the act complained of."
This
motion, or upon any facts supposed to be
certainly does not include damages by way
proved by the evidence reported, nor have
of punishing the defendants.
Such damages
considered the question whether, under the
would not be the immediate consequence of
plaintii\"s declaration' he can recover upon
the wrong, and necessarily resulting from it.
the grounds set forth in the opinion.
have
Some comment is made concerning the re- . only considered the rule advanced by the in
tention of Jackson in the defendant,s
em
structions. Under this rule
railroad corpo
All that I ﬁnd, in the report of the ration may exercise all possible care in the '
ploy.
case concerning
the matter, is a statement,
selection of servants, and strictly enjoin them
made by the plaintiff in his testimony, that . from day to day against any irregularity of
he had seen him several times since, in per
conduct; yet if one of them. unmindfui of
formance of duties upon the train.
his duty, regardless of his master,s interest,
So far as any question arises upon the rule
and bent on exercising some private malice
of damages laid down in the instruction, it is
against a person who happened to be a trav
quite apparent this is perfectly immaterial,
eler, assaults him, the corporation
must not
and could be regarded, in any event, only as
only make full compensation for all the in
remote evidence of ratiﬁcation.
If he was jury, under the most liberal rules, but may
retained in their employ, we do not know un
be punished for an act they have used every
der what circumstances; possibly they were
endeavor within the reach of human power
such as would have furnished to the mind of
by another,
to prevent.
One committed
any reasonable man a perfect justiﬁcation;
against their wishes, interest, and positive
sitting here. we must take the report as we
commands;
and
is to be such a punish
ﬁnd it.
The opinion states that the jury un
warning and exam
ment as will "serve as
doubtedly regarded it as “a practical ratiﬁ
ple to others."
cation and approval of his conduct." Could
If we were punishing the actor himself, we
they have done so if they had been correctly
given
should consider the probable effect of
instructed in the theory now advanced?
punishment upon him; but when, for his of
What was there to ratify? Yea, more, who
fense, we punish another, how can we form
was there to ratify? if the servant is the
any idea of the inﬂuence of a punishment he
corporation,
and the act of commission was
cannot feel. The master may discharge him
the act of the corporation, was there any
from his employment, and he thus feel the
thing to ratify? Was it not an original act punishment another suffers indirectly, and to
of the corporation? Did they ratify their
that extent.
It will be perceived, however,
own act
if the act of commission was orig that this is the extent for all classes, kinds,
inally theirs, the act of retention was a sub
and degrees of offense.
It is the only chan
sequent act, having no relation to the ﬁrst.
nel through which he can be made to feel it.
Did that infringe any right of his? 1t’
But suppose
were otherwise. is the punish
did,
was a new and substantive cause of
ment which is inﬂicted upon the innocent
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case is not only punishing one for the act of
another, but it is doing this in an action ox
that in any degree affected by the man
contractu, for this declaration must be con
ner in which the offender receives the intelli
Again;
strued to be such to meet,the law of the opin
gence of its inﬂiction upon another?
how shall the corporation avoid the constant
ion.
for the offenses of
Ail consideration of the matter tends to
recurrence of penalties
others?
Can they, when they select another show the fundamental error in holding an in
In all
servant, exercise any more care or be more
nocent party liable to punishment.
of the
watchful over him? Can they change the
these acts, done by the command
passions of men? What is their fault if they
principal (whether the authority appears by
direct command or by fair implication from
have exercised all the care, wisdom, and pru
\Iust the proceedings of the party charged), there
dence with which men are invested?
is propriety in punishing if the act be wrong
they be punished for not being omnipotent?
If the idea and design of punishment is to and an infraction of the moral code;' but
restrain the offender and make the punish
in those cases where the act is unauthor
ized, and the principal is‘ in nowise con
ment serve as a warning to others, how can
it better be done than by making it personal;
nected with the animus of the ‘actor, and
inﬂicting it upon the offender?
How can its becomes liable to compensate upon grounds
inﬂuence upon others be made more restrain
other than that the act was done by his
connnand, it appears to me that all punishing than by the reﬂection that they must per
sonaily suffer the same punishment if they
ment inﬂicted, or rather all suffering impos
t-ffend? Is the reﬂection that others will suf
is ﬂag
ed under the name of punishment,
fer it, more potent with that class of individ- 1 rant injustice; it is not punisinnent, for it
of men led to
unis? Has the observation
has not its necessary antecedent, wrong: both
this conclusion?
And if it has, have all the
reason and authority are opposed to it, and
principles of reason, right, and justice yield
no case can be found, where the question has
ed to it and made it right?
, been presented and discussed, in which such
If the punishment, thus inﬂicted, is to serve doctrines are not denounced as unsound and
as a warning to others, who must take warn
unjust. In addition to the.cases which i
ing? Evidently the innocent as well as guilty.
have cited, there is the pregnant fact that
The innocent are to be the greatest suffer
or
no case can be found in Massachusetts
crs by reason of the offense, and punished
New York where it has ,ever had any sanc
It is to serve as a warning tion, even in the inferior courts; and no case
alone directly.
to all innocent persons, that they may be pun
can be found, that I am aware of, where any
ished for the offenses of others, after having
party hassought to establish any such rule
fully compensated the injury done.
by an appeal to the superior courts or courts
barely suggest.
One other consideration
of last resort in those states.
Yet these
The liability in this case is based upon a con
states are a net-work of railroads, an" ques
tract; purely so.
No liability could, under
tions of liability are constantly arising and.
the proof, arise by the rules of law applica
being settled by the courts of those states.
Had the plaintiff
ble to master and servant.
It appears to me the fact has some sign‘ﬁ
been a stranger to the defendants, and had no
cance.
claims upon them, except such as each citizen
The rule established in this case is so im
owes to the other, no liability of any kind portant, and fraught with such results under
would have attached to these defendants for
the ordinary modes of administering law.
the willful trespass of their servant.
Not that I have felt impelled to enter my dissent
only would they be saved punishment, but at length, and regret that the pressure of
even.
Now it being a case other duties has prevented me from giving
compensation
where no liability would attach, but for the a more extended examination of the authori
contract, and the liability which does attach
ties, and the compression of them and my
being for breach of contract, the rule in this own views into a narrower compass.

party any the less keen, unjust, and onerous?
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JOHNSTON, J. This is a proceeding to
reverse a judgment rendered in an action
for false imprisonment, brought by Jacob F.
Boyce against the Wheeler &. Wilson .\lanu
facturing Company, C. S. Baker, and J. W.
Hughes. Hughes was dismissed from the
action, and the judgment went only against
the plaintiffs in error. The facts upon which
the case was disposed of are substantially
these: The Wheeler & Wilson Manufactur
ing Company, a corporation organized for
the manufacture and sale of sewing-ma
chines, was engaged in business at Topeka,
Kansas, and C. S. Baker was its general
agent at that place.
The company had sold
a sewing-machine to Mary Hatﬁeld, who
subsequently married Jacob iv‘. Boyce, the
defendant in error. She paid a part of the
purchase money, and signed a contract, in
substance that the title to the machine
should remain in the company until the bal
ance of the purchase money was paid.
In
November,
1881,
the company directed
its
general agent to bring an action of replevin
against Mary Boyce to recover the machine,
claiming that there was a balance due there
on, a claim which she denied.
An action
of replevin was begun before a justice of
the peace, and a writ was issued and placed
in the hands of Constable Hughes, who re
ported that he had made search for the ma
chine, and was unable to obtain possession
of it. C. S. Baker, the agent of the com
pany. then directed Hughes to make and ﬁle
an aﬂidavit before the justice of the peace,
alleging that Mary Boyce and her husband,
Jacob F. Boyce, were in possession of the
machine, and had refused to deliver it to
him, and thus obtain a warrant for their ar
rest.
This was done, and the justice issued
a warrant to the constable commanding him
to arrest Boyce and his wife, and commit
them to the Shawnee county jail, there to
remain until they should deliver the ma
chine.
Under this warrant, Jacob F. Boyce
was arrested and placed in jail without be
ing taken before the justice, and without
any examination, hearing, or trial. The con
stable informed the general agent of the
company that he had arrested Boyce, and
placed him in the county jail as requested,
and Baker replied: “Now, I guess he. will
give up the machine." The replevin action
resulted in a judgment in favor of Mary
Boyce.
Jacob F. Boyce was held in the
county jail for 10 days, and was never
taken before any court or otﬁcer for exam
ination or trial, and was ﬁnally discharged

at the instance of the plaintiffs in error, and
he became sick in consequence
of his con
ﬁnement.
He at once instituted this action,
and the jury awarded him damages in the
sum of $1.000, and the verdict was approved
by the trial court.
The plaintiffs in error complain chieﬂy of the
rulings of the court in' the matter of charging
the jury. The jury were instructed that. if the
evidence justiﬁed it, they could ﬁnd c’xgmp_lag'
against the defend
damages or smart-money

ants.
Kfter the jury had been out some
time, and had practically agreed upon their
verdict, the court recalled them, and advis
ed them that he was in error in giving the
instruction that they might in their discre
tion assess exemplary damages, and with
drew it from the jury, telling them that in
their deliberati n th
should not consider
Objection was
r wn.
the instruction
made to the wi hdrawai of the instruction,
and an application of plaintiffs in error for
leave to address the jury after the :nodiﬁca
tion had.been made was denied, and this
ruling is assigned as error. This decision
affords the plaintiffs in error no ground for
complaint. The action of the court was fa
vorable rather than prejudicial to their in
terests.
The instruction given was predi
cated upon suiiiclent facts, was warranted
under the law, and the defendant in error
alone Ihad reason to complain of its .with
drawal.
It is a well-established principle of

jurisprudence that corporations may be_“h_el;l
n n
liable for torts involving a wron
tiW'shFh as false imprisonment; and\e§
Tinplary damages _may be recovered agilili§_Q/
them for the wrongful acts of their serx-0
ants and agents done in the course of thit
and to the Mme ex‘
e1n‘ploytrren‘t,11i"aTi‘ct'ises
tent that natural persons committing like
wrongs would be held liable. In such cases
the mafiice and fraud of the authorized
agents are lmputabie to the corporations for
This principle is too well
which they acted.
settled to require argument, and the authori
ties sustaining it are numerous and well
nigh unanimous. Railroad Co. v. Slusser,
19 Ohio St. 157; Railroad Co. v. Dunn, 19
Ohio St. 162; Goddard v. Railway. 57 Me.
202; Railroad Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. 213;
Railroad Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489; Rail
road Co. v. Bailey, 40 Miss. 395; Railroad
Co.v v. Blocher. 27 Md. J7: Hopkins v. Rail
road Co., 36 N. H. 9; Railroad Co. v. Ham
mer, 72 Ill. 353; Reed v. Bank. 130 .\lass.
443; Fenton v. Machine Co., 9 Phila. 189;
Goodspeed v. Bank, 22 Conn. .130; Boogher
v. Association, 75 Mo. 319; “,heless v. Bank,
1
Baxt. 469; Jordan v. Railroad Co., 7-!
Ala. 85; Williams v. Insurance Co., 57 Miss.
759; Vance v. Railway Co0 32 N. J. Law.
334; Cooley, Torts, 119: 3 Suth. Dam. 270.
and cases cited; 2 Wait, Act. & Def. 447,
The same doctrine has
and cases cited.
been fully recognized on several occasions by
Railroad Co. v. Rice, 10 Kan.
this court.
-i37; Railway Co. v. Weaver, -16 Kan. -L36:

EXEMPLARY
Railway Co. v. Kcssler, 18 Kan. 523; Ball
way Co. v. Little, 19 Kan. 269; News Co. v.
Wilmarth, 33 Kan. 510, 6 Pac. 786.
The
withdrawal of the instruction, although er
roneous, was beneﬁcial to the plaintiffs in er
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or indirectly with him through the instru
mentaiity of agents."
Story, Ag. §'-£52.
They complain, further, of an instruction
in which the court stated that the warrant
under which Boyce was taken and held in
ror, and there can be no reversal unless the
custody was illegal and void, and insufﬁcient
in law to justify his arrest and imprison
erroneous ruling is injurious to the party
complaining.
ment.
The warrant, as we have seen, was
issued upon an aﬂidavit charging Boyce with
It is next contended that the company can
having control of the property replevied,'and
not be held liable for the wrongful acts of
of refusing to deliver it to the oﬁicer who
Baker and the constable, and an instruction
had the writ.
is challenged which holds that, if the agent
There was no process issued
except the warrant, and it commanded that
of the company caused and procured the ille
he be committed at once to the county jail
gal arrest and detention of the defendant in
until he should deliver the property to the
error as charged, the company and its agents
ofﬁcer.
No notice was given to him that the
were both liable.
Baker was the managing
charge stated in the aﬂidavit had been made
agent of the company;
his authority was
against him, nor was an opportunity given
general, and the constable acted wholly un
him to refute it. The order of commitment
der his direction and sanction.
He had not
was not based upon any examination, hear
only authority to sell machines, and collect’
ing, or trial, but was arbitrarily made, in
the money due for the same, but it is con
the absence of Boyce, upon ex parte state
ceded that he had authority to institute le
ment. The plaintiffs in error attempt to jus
gal proceedings to recover possession of the
tify this action, though not seriously, we
machines conditionally sold, and for which
think, under section 69 of the Justices‘ Code,
payment had not been made in accordance
already referred to, which reads as follows:
with the terms of sale. The arrest and de
“Whenever it shall be made to appear, to the
tention of Boyce was incidental to the re
satisfaction of the justice, by the aﬂidavit
plevin action, and was made, as alleged, to
of the plaintiff or otherwise, that the defend
compel the delivery of the machine under a
ant, or any other person, knowingly conceals
provision of the Justices‘ Code relating to
the property sought to be recovered, or, hav
repievin, which provides that where the de
ing control thereof, refuses to deliver the
fendants, or any other persons, knowingly
same to the oﬂlcer, the justice may commit
conceal the property rcplevied, or, having the
such defendant or other person until he or
control thereof, refuse to deliver the same
they disciose where such property is, or de
to the oﬂicer, they may be committed until
liver the same to the oiiicer." The proceed
they disclose where the property is, or de
ing authorized by this statute is virtually one
liver the same to the oﬂicer.
Comp. Laws
for the punishment of contempt.
He had full authority to
1879, c. 81, § 69.
Whether/'
represent the company, and whatever was: a party is to be brought before the justice
of the peace upon a notice or by attachment,
done by him was done for the beneﬁt of
or what the initial proceeding shall be, is not
company, and for the accomplishment of the]
its
purpose.
His act, although wrongful, was in expressly provided.
The section quoted does
provide what punishment hall ﬁnally be vis
the line of his employment, was done in the
ited upon a party; but this punishment is
execution
of the authority conferred upon
him, and must be regarded as the act of the
not to be administered until the guilt of the
party is “made to appear to the satisfaction
company.
To make the corporation respon
of the justice."
sible, it is not necessary, as plaintiffs in er
This language implies that
ror contend, that the principal should have there is to be a hearing and an adjudication
of the charge upon its merits.
directly authorized the particular wrongful
When 8. con
tempt is committed in facie curiae, the pun
act of the agent, or should have subsequently
ishment is generally summary, and no ini
ratiﬁed it. Judge Story, in treating of the
tial proceeding is required; but, when it is
liability of principals for the acts of their
not committed in the view of the court, the
agents, says that “the principal is held liable
initial proceedings are necessary, and the
to third persons in a civil suit for the frauds,
party must have notice and opportunity to
deceits,
concealments,
misrepresentations,
defend.
The most common initial process
tortsi negligences, and other maifeasances or
is a rule or order to show cause why an at
misfeasances
and omissions of duty of his
agent in the course of his employment, al
iachment or warrant for contempt should not
issue, of which service should be made; and,
though the principal did not authorize or jus
in a proceeding to punish for criminal con
tify or participate in, or, indeed, know of
tempt, personal notice of the accusation
is
such misconduct.
or even if he forbade or
indispensable.
Whatever procedure may be
disapproved of them," and to sustain this he
adopted, it is certain that a party cannot be
cites numerous
authorities. “In all such
condemned without notice; and a ﬁnal judg
cases," he says, “the rule applies, respondeat
ment rendered, as was done in this case,
superior, and it is founded upon public policy
without a hearing or an opportunity to do
and convenience, for in no other way could
fend, is void.
While
Rap. Contempt, § 96.
there be any safety to third persons in their
the language of the statute is not very ex
dealings, either directly with the principal,
LAW nam.—4
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plicit, it does not require the interpretation
contended for, and, if it did, it would neces
sarily be held void.
The ﬁnal error assigned is that the dam
This assign
ages awarded are excessive.
ment is as groundless as those already con
sidered.
The case is an aggravated one, and
the conduct of the plaintiffs in error exhibit
ed a wanton and reckless disregard of the
rights of the defendant in error.
He was
not a party to the replevin action, and the
testimony is that the machine in controversy
was purchased long before he was married
to the plaintiff in that action, and that he
had no interest in or control over it. He was
thrust into jail, without warning or trial,
when there was no civil or criminal suit
pending against him, and kept there for 10
days with 17 or 18 prisoners who were ei
ther charged with or convicted of crimes.
The sewing-machine sought to be recovered
from his wife had been paid for, and belong
ed absolutely to her; and plaintiffs in error,
with knowledge of this fact, undertook to

compel the payment of money not due, or
the recovery of property which they did not
own, by the arrest and incarceration of the
defendant in error, without cause, and in a

manner that was clearly illegal.

Apart from

the logs of time and interruption to his Ensi
ness, as well as .tﬁhe“hnmii.iat.io.n.andJ.n”Qigni
“lEy‘su'ffered by him by being thrust into jail
upon a false charge, itappears that .t.hQ.(_!(_)_lk
ﬂnement resulted in.-l1is“s.i.cl§I_1.eSs;1.8-Ilfl when

we consider the malicious and oppressixe.
conduct of the plaintiffs‘ in error, and.that
the case is one whlcliciills for the inﬂiction
of exeinpiaryﬂor piinlTﬁ"§ ‘damages, we can
only conclude tli5‘t'the1rerdict of $1,000 in
favor of the defendant was fully justiﬂed,
if not too small. We can say without hesita
tlon that an award of a larger amount would
not have been disturbed on the ground that
,
\it was excessive.
It follows that the assignments of error
must be overruled, and the judgment of the
district court afﬁrmed.
All the justices concurring.
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Wm. Lindsay and Rountree & Lisle, for
Hill & Rives, for appellee.

appellant.

a
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HOLT, J. The appellee, Lou. E. Ballard,
after purchasing a proper ticket, took pas
station to an
sage from one intermediate
other, upon a passenger train of the Louisville
Nashville Railroad. It failed to stop at
the platform at her place of destination, which
ﬂag station.
It was a down grade at
was
that point, and there is some evidence tend
ing to show that the car brakes did not op
erate well, in consequence of which the train
'ran some 50 or 60 yards beyond the platform,
where it was stopped, and the station then
by the proper person, but the
announced
Upon the
appellee did not get off the train.
other hand. there is testimony

tending to show

a

that this stop was not made, and that no
etfort was made to stop the train, until it
was done at the request of the appellee, at
point between her destination and the next
station.
The weight of the evidence shows
that the conductor then informed her that
she could either go on to the next station, or
he would stop the train and she could get oﬂ!
there; and that, upon his so telling her the
second time, he did stop it. and she got off
at that point, which was a lonely place, and
about a mile beyond her station.

a

a

She says that the conductor “seemed very
and his tone was rather rough
impatient,
gentleman;"
for
that he did not assist her
in getting off with her baggage, which con
sisted of a valise and bundle;
and that, as
she jumped from the lower step of the plat
form to the ground, he stood upon the plat
forID, while a brakeman of the train, who
was standing by, looked at her and “gt.inned."
Upon the other hand, there is evidence to
the effect that the conductor did assist her
out of the car, and was altogether kind and
polite in his manner.
There was no request
upon her part that the train should be back
ed to her station, but this should have been
done, under the circumstances.
The appel
lee was compelled to walk back to her sta
tion, and from thence, three-quarters
of a
mile, to her home, in consequence of which
she was conﬁned to her bed the most of the
time for three or four days, and unable to
teach her school for a week.
The jury in
this action by her for damages returned

it

it

verdict
for $3,000.
Manlfestly it cannot be sustained upon the
ground that
did not include exemplary
damages, and was compensatory
only, for a
breach of the con
for transportation.
If
upheld,
must be.
the ground that she
ry damages, and that
was entitled to ex
this question was submitted to the jury by

put her off? at her station, and were in‘Qcorous
or insulting, either in words, tone, or man
ner, they should ﬁnd for the plaintiff, and
award her damages in their discretion, not
exceeding ﬁve thousand dollars, the amount
claimed in the petition."
A corporation can act only through nat
It of necessity commits its
ural persons.
They
to their charge.
business absolutely
In the case of
are, however. selected by it.
a railroad, the safety and comfort of pas
to them.
committed
sengers is necessarily
They act for it. Its entire power, pro hac
vice, is vested in them. and as to passengers
in transitu they should be considered as the
It is therefore as respon
corporation itself.
sible for their acts in the conduct of the train,
and the treatment of the passengers, as the
oﬂlcers of the train would be for theIDsBIvt‘.~‘,
if they were the owners of it. Public inter
They also demand
ests require this rule.
that the corporation should be and it is lia
ble for exemplary damages in case of an
injury to
passenger resulting from a viola
tion of duty by one of its employtis in the
conduct of the train, if it be accompanied by
oppression, fraud, malice, insult, or other will
ful misconduct, evincing a reckless disregard
of consequences.
Dawson v. Louisville & N.
Ky. Law Rep. 668.
R. Co.,
As to female passengers the rule goes
Their contract of passage em
still farther.
braces an implied stipulation that the cor
poration will protect them against general
obscenity, immodest conduct, or wanton ap
Metc. (Mass) 596;
Com. v. Power,
proach.
Craker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis. 657; Nieto
Cliff. 145, Fed. Gas. No. 10,262;
v. Clark,
Mason, 242, Fed.
Chamberlain v. Chandler,
Gas. No. 2,575.
It was improper, however, to instruct the
jury, as was in effect done in this instance,
conduct alone is suﬂicient
that “indecorous"
The term
to authorize exemplary damages.
too broad.
It may embrace conduct which
would not authorize their inﬂiction. It is
true that the peculiar element which, enter
ing into the commission of wrongful acts,
justiﬁes the imposition of such damages, can
not be so deﬁnitely deﬁned, perhaps, as to
It has been
meet every case that may arise.
said that they are allowable where the wrong
ful act has been accompanied with “circum
stances of aggravation," (Chiles v. Drake,
Metc. [Ky.] 146;) or if a trespass be "commit
ted in a high-handed
and threatening
man
ner," (Jennings v. Maddox,
B. \Ion. 430;)
or where the tort is “accompanied by oppres
sion, fraud, malice, or negligence so great as
to raise
presumption of malice," (Parker v.
Jenkins,
Bush, 587;) or, as was said in

2

5, 1887.

8

March

Marlon county.

7

Appeal from circuit court,

3

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

30?.)

a

Ky.

instructions.

6

85

They were told: “If
from the evidence that the
defendant,s
agents or employes, or any of
them, in charge of defendant,s train, carried
the plaintiff beyond the station for which
she had purchased a ticket, and refused to
proper

the jury believe

1
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Dawson v. Railroad Co., supra, where the
wrongful act is accompanied by “insult, indig
nity, oppression, or inhumanity."
It would, however, be extending the rule
unwarrantably to hold that they could be
imposed provided
the conduct was merely
“indecorous."
This. as deﬁned by Webster,
and as commonly understood, means impolite,
or proper
or a violation of good manners
breeding.
It is broad enough to cover the
slightest
departure
from the most polished
politeness to conduct which is vulgar and
insulting. It does not necessarily; or, indeed,
involve an insult. The latter as
generally,
sumes superiority, and offends the self-re
spect of the person to whom it is offered,
while the former excites pity or contempt for
the one guilty of it.
A word or act may be
and insulting, but yet it
both indecorous
often lacks the essential elements of an in
suit.
In. the case now under consideration
the
jury may have believed it was indecorous in
the conductor
not to stop the train at the
platform, or not to carry her valise for her
when she was leaving the train. or to let
her get off between stations, although she
chose to do so rather than suffer inconveni
ence by being carried to the next one, or in
merely telling her ‘that she could walk back
to her station; yet none of these things
amounted to “insult, indignity, oppression, or

inhumanity."
The lower court properly refused the re
quest as made for special ffndings.
The in
ter1-ogatories offered merely required the jury

to say what amount they found as compensato
ry, and what sum as exemplary damages. They
involved mixed questions of law and of fact.

Upon a retrial the question of limiting the
ﬁnding to compensatory damages should be
presented to the jury under proper instruc
tions. and the difference between them and
those which are exemplary dciined.
The evidence as to the conduct of the brake
man was competent.
It is true that it was
not speciﬁcally complained of in the petition,
but only that of the conductor.
The brake
man was, however, one of the agents of the
railroad company in the management of the
train upon which the appellee was a passen
ger. It is not necessary that a petition should
enumerate speciiically that this or that per
son connected with the management of the
train was guilty of improper conduct in order .
to authorize the admission of evidence as to
this or that particular party. It is sufﬂcient
to aver the breach of duty upon the part oi?
those in control of the train.
Besides, in this
instance, the conduct of the brakeman com
plained of was in the immediate presence of
the conductor, and occurred at the time of
the other alleged acts of which the appellee
complains.
We do not mean to say whether
he was guilty of improper conduct or not.
but it was a part of the res gestae, and there
Any circumstances attending
fore admissible.
the commission of 0. trespass or a wrong, al
though not set forth in the declaration, may
be given in evidence, with a view of aﬂEect
ing the question
of damages, save where
they within themselves
constitute
an inde
pendent cause of action.
Sedg. Dam. side p.
538, note 3.
For the reason indicated, the judgment be
low is reversed, and cause remanded for a
new trial and further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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SOUTHERN KANSAS R.

CO. v.

RICE.

(16 Pac. 817, 38 Kan. 398.)
Supreme Court of Kansas.

Feb. 11, 1888.

Error to district court, Johnson county; J.
P. Hindman, Judge.
Action brought by Benjamin Rice against
the Southern Kansas Railroad Company on
October 31, 1885, to recover as damages the
sum of $1,000 for being unlawfully assaulted
and ejected from a passenger car by the con
ductor thereof while returning from Kansas
City, Missouri, to Olathe, in this state; the
plaintiff at the time having a ticket to ride as
a passenger in the car. Subsequently the rail
road company ﬁled an answer containing a
general denial. Trial had at the March term,
1886.
The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff, and assessed his damages at $117.
46, and also made the following special ﬁnd
ings of facts: “(1) Did the conductor act
willfully, and in a grossly negligent manner,
in putting the defendant off the train? An
swer. He willfully put him off the train.
(2) Did the conductor act with a reckless dis
regard of the plaintiffs rights? A. Yes. (3)
Did the plaintiff state to the conductorthat he
had purchased his ticket the day before, and
could the conductor have easily ascertained
that fact from the passengers who were ac
quainted with plaintiff ! A. In this case he
could.
(4) How much do you allow piaintiff
as exemplary damages?
A. £571.75." “First.
How much do you allow plaintiff for pe
cuniary loss? A. $.71.
Second. Was plain
tiff injured in person by the conductor? A.
No.
Third. How much do you allow plain
tiff for injury to his person? A. Nothing.
Fourth. Did plaintiff loe any time by reason,
of defendant,s conductor refusing to honor
his ticket, and. if so, how much? A. No.
Fifth. How much do you allow plaintiff for
loss of time? A. Nothing. Sixth. How much
do you allow plaintiff for inconvenience in
going from his seat to the platform and back
again? A. Nothing.
Seventh. Was plaintiff’
treated in an insulting or brutal manner by
And, if so, state fully how.
the conductor?
Eighth. How much,
A. An insulting manner.
if anything, do you allow plaintiff for injury
to his feelings?
A. $10.00.
Ninth. How
much, if anything, do you allow plaintiff for
expenses, attorney,s fees, or time in prosecut
ing this case?
A. $35.( ." The defendant
ﬁled a motion to set aside the verdict of the
jury, and for a new trial, which was over
Subsequently, judgment was entered
ruled.
upon the verdict.
The railroad company ex
cepted, and brings the case here.
Geo. R. Peck, A. A. Hurd, and Robert Dun
lap, for plaintiff in error.
John ’1‘. Little
and Samuel T. Seaton, for defendant in error.

HORTON, C. J. (after stating the facts as
On October 29, 1885, Benjamin Rice,
above).
a colored man, purchased of the ticket agent
of the Southern Kansas Railroad Company
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at Olathe, in this state, for 50 cents, 0. lim
ited railroad ticket to Kansas City, Missouri,
and return, good for three days; the date of
issue being stamped on the back.
On that
day he was carried as a passenger by the
railroad company upon one of its passenger
trains from Olathe to Kansas City. The
“going coupon" of the ticket was torn off,
and taken up by the conductor of the train.
On the next day, October 30th, Rice, desiring
to return to Olathe, boarded one of the pas
senger trains of the company,
which left
Kansas City about 10 o‘clock p. m., and,
when the conductor called upon him for his
‘fare, presented the “return coupon" of the
ticket, which he had purchased the day be
fore.
The conductor took it to the light,
and, after examining it, handed it back to
Rice, saying it was not good, and informed
him that he could not honor it. Rice insisted
that the ticket was good, and said to the con
ductor that he had purchased the ticket the
day before, and that he (the conductor) had
carried him upon the ticket to Kansas City
on that day.
Another passenger also stated
to the conductor, at the time, that he had
seen Rice purchase the ticket on the 29th.
The conductor replied that he could not honor
the ticket, and subsequently took hold of
.Rice,s coat-collar, and led him out of the car.
Rice had no money to pay any extra fare;
and when he was oﬂ! the car, or about to get
off,a friend gave him 75 cents, which he gave
to the conductor, who returned him 5 cents,
punched a receipt for his fare, and permitted.
him to ride to Olathe.
On the part of Rice, it is contended that the
ticket he presented showed plainly on its
back that it was stamped at Olathe on the
29th of October; that he told the conductor
that he did not have any money to pay any
more fare; that he was quietly in his seat
as a passenger when ordered by the conduct
or to leave the train; that he did not make
any forcible resistance to the orders of the
conductor; but that the conductor took him
out of the car, and off upon the steps of the
platform.
On the part of the railroad com
pany, it is claimed that the ticket had been
folded up and creased at the date; that the
conductor took it to the light, and examined
it carefully; that the date was obliterated;
that the ticket looked so old and worn that
the conductor believed it had expired; that
he informed Rice that the ticket was not
good, and that he could not ride upon it, but
would have to pay fare; that, when the train
reached Holliday, the conductor inquired of
Rice what he was going to do; that Rice
then refused to pay fare or get oﬂ! the train;
that the conductor then took hold of Rice,s
coat-collar, and led him to the platform of
the station, or to the last step of the car;
that then a friend told Rice to come back,
and he would give him money to pay his
fare; and the conductor permitted Rice to
take his seat and ride to his destination;
that, when Rice was informed that he would
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16 Kan. 456; Railway
Co. v. Kessier, 18
have to pay his fare or leave the car, it was
Kan. 523.
We fully concede that no one has
his duty to do one or the other; that he
a right to resort to force to compel the per
should have paid his fare, and relied upon
formance of a contract made with him by
his remedy to recover it back; that, if he
another; and a passenger about to be wrong
could not do thi, he should have quietly
fully expelled from a railroad train need not
left the train, and not provoked or made nec
require force to be exerted to secure his
essary an assault; that therefore he should
For any
rights, or increase his damages.
have recovered only 71 cents, that amount be
ing the sum assessed by the jury for his pe
breach of contract or gross negligence on the
part of the conductor, or the other empioyes
cuniary loss.
of a railroad company,
redress
must be
The railroad company asked instructions
v
sought in the courts, rather than by the
which tended to limit the anmnt, of dam
strong arm of the person who thinks himself
ages that Rice was entitled to recover to_the
about to be deprived of his rights. A pas
exact fare paid by him, with interest thereon.
senger should not be permitted to invite a
The court refused to give these instructions,
‘ but directed the jury, among other things, as
wrong, and then complain of it. Hail v.
follows:
“I instruct you that if you ﬁnd the Railroad Co., 15 Fed. 57; Townsend v. Rail
plaintiff presented to the conductor for his
road Co., 56 N. Y. 301; Bradshaw v. Railroad
Co., 135 Mass. 409; Railroad Co. v. Connell,
passage a limited ticket, good only for three
112 Ill. 296; Car Co. v. Reed, 75 Ill. 125; 3
days from the date of its sale; and that the
Wood, By. Law, § 364.
conductor, from the mutilated and worn con
Of course, a party
upon a train may resist when, under the cir
dition of the ticket, was unable to read the
cumstances,
date on the ticket, and honestly believed that
resistance is necessary for the
protection of his life, or to prevent probable
the ticket was an old one. and not good;
serious injury; nor can a party be lawfully
and for this reason, and without any unnec
essary force or indignity to the plaintiff. re
ejected from a train while in motion, so that
quired him to pay his fare or get off, and i his being put off would subject him to great
did, upon refusal and failure to pay fare. re
peril. In this case Rice made no unreason
move said piaintiii? without any unnecessary
able resistance.
He did not resort to force
force, and without injury to his person, to
or violence.
Having a good ticket, and be
ing entitled to ride, he refused to pay fare
the platform of the car, or to the platform or
ground at a regular station; and then plain
or get off the train. The conductor had no
difliculty in leading him off, and about all
tiff paid his fare, and continued his journey
on the same train, and without delay,—then,
that Rice did was merely to assert his lawful
right to ride upon the train. Where a pas
if you ﬁnd as a fact that the ticket presented
‘by plaintiff was a good and valid ticket, and
senger with a clear right and a clean ticket
that the conductor had no right to collect
is entitled to ride on that trip and train,
this fare from the plaintiff, you must ﬁnd a and is wrongfully ejected without forcible
verdict for the piaintiff, and the mea.sure of
resistance upon his part. the jury are, and
ought to be, allowed great latitude in assess
his damages would be the amount of fare
paid by him, with interest at seven per cent.
ing damages.
They shouid award liberal
per annum from October 30th, 1885, and ac
damages in full compensation for the injuries
tual compensation for the injury and outrage,
received.
The quiet and peaceabie behavior
if any, suffered by plaintiﬂi from the alleged
of a passenger is to his advantage, rather
assault." We perceive no error in this in
than to his detriment.
Complaint is also made of other instruc
struction. Inactions for the recovery of dam
ages for the wrongful expulsion of a passen
tions of the court regarding the measure of
ger fl.oina train, the passenger may recover
damages.
Among other things, the court
for his time. inconvenience, the necessary ex
said to the jury that if “the assault was
penses to which he is subjected, and if treat
malicious, and without cause or_provo9ation,
hyacts of gross insult,
ed with violence, or in an insulting manner,
o.r_ was.acc.6t_npanie.d
for the injuries to his person and feelings.
outrage, or oppression,
you may award:f.he
If the ex l i
plainiiffexemplary or vindictive damages."
be malicious, oL“ti1.1;o_t1gh
negiigeiicglhich is gr(Y1s_and wanton. then Kiso;"tIiafTn esthnating damages they miEit
exemplary
take into consideration the indignity, insult,
damages
be
may
award\5d.'
4“There is“a special duty on the carrier-'t_o
and injury to plaintiff,s feelings by being
publicly expelled."
protect its passengers, not only against the
Further, that, if they
violence and insults of strangers and co-pas
found “there was on the part of the conduct
sengers,
but, a fortiori,
against the vio
or either malice, gross negligence, or oppres
sion, they would not be conﬁned in ﬁxing
lence and
own servants; and
that for a breach of that duty he ought to
damages to the actual damages received, but
be compelled to make the amplest reparation.
were justiﬁed in giving exemplary danulges.,r
The law wisely and justly holds him to a i It is said that these instructions were mis
leading and erroneous, because there was no
strict and rigorous accountability. We would
not relax in the slightest degree this strict
evidence
whatever to show that the con
accountability.
We know that upon it, in no
ductor acted with malice or gross negligence.
Upon the evidence of Rice, corroborated by
small degree, depends the safety and com
Railway Co. v. Wcaver,
fort of passengers."
McCulioch, another passenger, who said that

insums

i

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.

55

Kan. 426. Whether the conductor was gross
he saw Rice purchase the ticket on October
29th, there was evidence before the jury up
ly negligent, amounting to wantonness,
or
on which to found these instructions.
Huf
actuated by malice, were matters before the
jury, for their determination upon the evi
ford v. Railroad Co. (Mich.) 31 N. W. 544.
The forcible expulsion of Rice from the car deuce. Under the authority of Titus v. Cor
kins, 21 Kan. 722, Rice was entitled to re
where he was rightfully seated was such a
wrong as is inevitably accompanied
with
cover the expenses incurred by him in the
litigation, if entitled to exemplary damages.
more or less outrage and insult. There was
no excuse for the act of expulsion, except the
Hall v. Railroad Co., 15 Fed. ‘J5—97.
The
honest mistake or the gross negligence of
amount of the verdict in this case was only
If that mistakg_ wa§._<'1ue‘_to $117.46; therefore the damages are not so ex
the conductor.
such reckless indifference to the rights of a
cessive as to indicate passion or prejudice on
as . the part of the jury.
The other matters sub
pasSl§ﬁg’t§r__()n_.the_o.I~.tlie'“cobductor
mitted are immaterial.
“est§bTished gross negl_i_gencé.,‘amoii'ntin5’“to
The judgment of the district court will be
‘Wa'n‘f'onness, andthe jury so found, tiey
Ynight ﬁ'ii(I_”exem'piary damages. Railroad Co.
aﬂirmed.
ﬁ.*K€§§Yer, supra;‘Railroad C6. v. Rice, 10
All the justices concurring.
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WOLFE.

(27

N. E.

606,

128

RY.

CO. v.

Ind. 34?.)

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May

23, 1891.

Appeal from circuit court, Harrison county;
W. T. Zenor, Judge.
C. L. Jewett, H. E. Jewett, E. C. Field, D.
J. Wile, and S. O. Pickens, for appellant. A.
Dowling, for appellee.
OLDS, C. J. This is an action by the ap
pellee against the appellant for being wrong
fully expelled from the appellant,s train by
its servants, with force and violence, under
humiliating circumstances.
Issues were join
ed on the complaint by a general denial and
answers in justiﬂcation,—one alleging the
non-payment of fare, and the other non-pay
ment of fare, and the use of profane and in
decent language, and that he was guilty of
disorderly conduct. The appellee replied in
denial to the answers in justiﬁcation. There
was a trial by jury, and a verdict in favor of
The jury
the appellee for $1,500 damages.
also returned answers to special interrogato
ries. Appellant moved for judgment on the
interrogatories and answers, also for a new
trial, and to modify the Judgment; all of
which motions were overruled, and judgment
rendered on the verdict. Appellant,s counsel
discuss three propositions: First, that appel
lee, by his conduct and language, forfeited
Mhis right to be carried as a passenger, and
appellant had the lawful right to eject. him
from the train; second, that the damages are
excessive;
and, third, that the court erred
in the instruction given in relation to dam
ages.
The jury by their answers to inter
rogatories ﬁnd that appellee, on August 29,
1
7, purchased
a ticket at New Albany for
passage on appellant,s train from New Al
bany to .Mitchell, Ind., and on said day he
took passage on appellant,s n.ain for Mitchell,
and, on demand of the conductor, surrender
ed his ticket.
That the conductor demanded
fare or a ticket twice befoIe stopping the
train to put appellee off, and the train was
stopped not at a regular station or stopping
plaee to put him off.
That the train was
stopped before any effort was made to eject
appellee, and before he was put off the train
he said to the conductor:
“If you say did
not give you a ticket, you are a God damned
lying son of a bitch." That the words were
spoken in a loud voice, and there were ladies
in the car at the time. That when the train
men
to put the appellee off the train
undgyrtook
he resis
struggled, and attemptou to
hold ontoed,.hand
.\e seats in the car, and while so
resisting he was injured about the arms and
hands, and this was all the physical injuries
It is insisted that these facts
he received.
entitled
the appellant to a judgment, not
withstanding the general verdict, on the the
ory that the appellee, by the use of the pro
fane and improper language in a loud tone in
the presence of the lady passengers, forfeited

I

D-\\1AGES.
his right

to be carried
as a passenger, and
the conductor had the right to stop the train
It is assumed in the argu
and put him off.
ment that this ﬁnding of fact shows the ap
pellee to have used this improper language
before the train was stopped for the purpose
of putting him off, but this assumption is not
warranted by the ﬁnding. The ﬁnding is that
“just before he was
he used this language
put off of defendant,s
train." We do not
think it presents the proposition discussed by
counsel, viz., that if a passenger delivers to
a conductor a ticket or pays his fare, and.
afterwards the conductor calls upon him to
again pay his fare, and disputes the ﬁrst
payment, and a dispute arises, in which the
conductor demands fare, and the passenger
refuses to pay it on the ground that he has
once paid, but in his refusal he becomes
boisterous, and is guilty of unbecoming
con
duct, or the use of vulgar, obscene, and pro
fane language. he forfeits his right to be car
ried further, notwithstanding he has paid his
fare; and the conductor may stop the train,
and expel him without liability.
For aught
that appears in the ﬁnding in this case, the
appellee may have conducted himself in a

perfectly civil and gentlemanly manner until

the train was stopped,and the employes of the
appellant had taken hold of him, and a strug
gle ensued, and the appellee taken from his
seat; and that it was.just as he was about
to be ﬁnally ejected from .he car when he
used the language.
If such were the facts,——
and they may have been, for aught that ap
pears from the ﬁnding,—it would present a
very different case than if the language was
used in the ﬁrst instance;
for in such a case
as we have put it would be clear that the
language used had nothing to do with the
ejectuieut from the train. it would be clear
ly apparent, under such a state of facts, that
he would have been ejected without regard
to the use of the language;
but, conceding
that the language was used before the train
was stopped, it does not appear that he was
ejected on account of the vile language used.
It is undoubtedly true that a passenger, by
a breach of decorum,
either by his acts or
his language, may forfeit his right to be car
ried as a passenger, and may be expelled
from the train, notwithstanding he has paid
his fare; and this may be true even if he be
led to such breach by reason of an insult of
fered him by an employfa of the company.
A
wanton insult or false accusation often causes
a sudden outburst of temper, and the use of
language which one in an instant after re
grets, and feels the mortiiication more keenly
than do those in whose presence it is uttered.
One who utters language in a heat of pas
slon, caused by a sudden and wanton insult
and unexpected charge against his truthful
ness and honesty,
must be dealt with
more leniently than if the language is used
deliberately,
without provocation,
or after
reasonable time for second thought, and op
portunity to bridle and control his passion.

EXEMPLARY DAAIAGES.
The fact that a false and slanderous charge
is made in the heat of passion may be proven
in mitigation of damages.
If a conductor,
after having received a ticket for fare from
a passenger, should return to him, and falsely
deny having collected his fare or received
a ticket, and demand pay again, and it is
refused,

and

the

conductor

should

abandon

any further effort to collect again the fare
or refrain from making any threats of put
ting him off the train, and the passenger, aft
er having reasonable time to control himself,
should persist in the use of profane or indecent language, to the annoyance of other pas
sengers, he would no doubt violate his right
to be carried; at least, if the unearned fare
was tendered back to him; but the company
camtot justify the act of the conductor in‘
expelling a passenger who has paid his fare
on account of his having, in the heat of pas
sion, when he was falsely charged with the.
failure to pay, used improper language, such
as was used in this case, in response to such
false charge, even though it was heard by
the wrong committed by
other passengers;
the passenger was provoked by the conductor.
It does not lie in the mouth of the appellant
to say: ‘"13-ue, you paid your fare. You had
the right to be carried.
But when the con
ductor falsely charged you, in the presence
of the other passengers, with not having paid
your fare, and demanded that you again pay
fare or he would stop the train and put you
off, you became angry; you used improper
language to the conductor in the presence of
If the theory contended
lady passengers."
for by the appellant be the true one, then it
would be an inducement for the employee of
railroad companies, under such circumstan
ces, to wantonly and purposely address the
passenger in such a manner as to provoke
him to the use of bad language or bad con
duct as affording an excuse, in case he refus
ed to pay a second time, to eject him from
the train.
The damages sued for accrue on
account of an injury on thepart of the em
ploye of the appellant to the appellee.
The
offense committed by the appellee is against
He was provoked to
the other passengers.
the commission of it by the act of the em
in falsely accusing
ploye of the appellant
him, in the presence of the other passengers,
Certainly the
of not having paid his fare.
company ought not to defend against the un
lawful act of their agent on account of such
unlawful act having provoked a breach of
decorum, or even a breach of the peace, on
It is true the lan
the part of the appeliee.
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guage used was unjustiﬁable, and was an in
sult to those in whose presence it was utter
ed; but it is evidently the fact that this
breach of decorum was provoked and caused
by an insult offered by the conductor to the
appellee in the presence of the passengers;
and we see no just reason why, under such
circumstances,
it should operate as a defense
right of action, and bar him
to appellee’s
from a recovery.
It is next contended that the verdict is ex
cessive, for the reason that the jury ﬁnd
that all the physical injuries inﬂicted were
caused by the appeilee resisting,
and that
he cannot recover for the injury caused by
his resistance.
There is nothing to show
that the jury did include any damages for
the injury occurring by reason of appellee,s
resistance;
but, the appellee being lawfully
in the car, and having paid his fare, he had
the right to be carried, and had the right to
make reasonable
resistance,
as he did by
holding onto the seats; and he was forced.
loose and taken from the car; and for such
damages as he sustained on account of such
removal from the car the appellant is liable.
English v. Canal Co., 66 N. Y. 454; Railroad
Co. v. Rice, 38 Kan. $8, 16 Pac. 817; Rail
way Co. v. Acres, 108 Ind. 548, 9 N. E. 453;
Railroad Co. v. Hoidridge, 118 Ind. 281, 20
N. E. 837.
Some objection is made to the giving of the
seventh instruction, and the refusal to give
instruction 7 asked by appellant.
We have
examined these instructions, and think there
is no available error in the instruction given.
It is evident the jury was not misled by any
technical error in the language used, even if
it is erroneous.
The instruction relates to
the right to give exemplary
damages, and
there was some evidence which, if true, au
thorized the assessment of exemplary dam
ages.
Railroad Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind. 116.
When the offense is not punishable by the
criminal law, and malice or oppression wtlgh
in the controversy, exemplary or vindictive
damages may be assessed.
What we have
said as to the other alleged errors disposes
of the question presented by the instruction
refused.
It is further contended that a new trial
should have been granted by reason of acci
dent and surprise on account of an absent
witness.
There is no diligence shown. no ap
plication for a continuance, and the evidence
is merely cumulative.
There is no error in
Judgment aﬂirmed, at costs of‘
the record.
appellant.
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STEVENSON

v.

(28 Cal.

SMITH

et al.

103.)

April, 1865.
Appeal from district court, Second judicial
.
district, Tehama county.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the
Supreme Court of California.

Court.
George Cadwalader, for appellant.
Long, for respondents.

SAWYER, J. This is an action
eized by the
a mare and colt
(sheriff of Tehama county) under
damages
for their
ment,
and

to recover

defendant
an attach

detention.
Plaintiff
the property.
recovered
moved for a new trial on the ground that cer
tain special damages, claimed to have been
The mo
proved, were not found for him.
tion was denied, and the plaintiff appeals
from the order denying a new trial.
The appellant claims that the evidence
shows that the animals were placed by de
fendants in ﬁelds where the pasturage was
poor, and that in consequence of this act
they lost iieh and depreciated in value to the
extent of ﬁve hundred dollars. Also that the
mare was a valuable brood mare, taken to
Tehama county for the purpose of being bred
to a particular horse, and that by reason of
the taking and detention by defendants the
breeding season was lost, whereby a further
damage was shown to have been sustained
to the amount of live hundred dollars, and
that the court should upon the evidence have
found these items of damage for plaintiff.
On examination of the pleadings, we ﬁnd
no averments in the complaint that would an
thorize the recovery of the items claimed.
These damages are special, and the facts out
of which they arise must be averred, or they
cannot be recovered.
Mr. Chitty says: “Damages are either gen
eral or special. General damages are such as
the law implies, or presumes to have accrued
from the wrong complained of. Special dams
ages are such as really took place, and are
not implied by law. and are either sup_er
added to g‘eneral damages arising from an
act injurious in itself,—as when some partic
ular damage arises from the uttering of
slanderous words actionable in themselves,—
or are such as arise from an act indifferent,
and not actionable in itself, but only injuri
ous in its consequences," etc. 1 Chit. Pl. 395.
Again: “It does not appear necessary to
state the former description of the damages
in the declaration.
because presumptions of
law are not in general to he pleaded or aver
red as facts, etc. "‘
But when the law
does not necessarily imply that the plaintiff
sustained the damages by the act complained
of. it is essential to the validity of the dec
laration that the resulting damage should be

Plaintiff

,

W. S.

' '

' ' ' And
shown with particularity.
whenever the damages sustained have not
necessarily accrued from the act complained
of, and consequently are not implied by law,
then, in order to prevent surprise on the de
fendant, which might otherwise ensue at the
trial, the plaintiff must in general state the
particular damage which he has sustained, or
he will not be permitted to give evidence o
it.
Thus in an action of trespass and false
imprisonment, where the plaintiff offered to
give in evidence that during the imprison
ment
was stinted in his allowance of food.
he
he was not permitted to do so, because the
fact was not, as it should have been, stated
in the declaration; and in a similar action it
was held that the plaintiff could not give ev
1 idencc of his health being injured, unless spe
cially stated.
So in trespass ‘for taking a
T
'
horse,‘ nothing can be given in evidence
'which is not expressed in the declaration, l
and if money was paid over in order to re
gain possession, such payment should be al
leged as special damages."
Id. 390,.
The complaint in this case only alleges the
ownership of the animals, the value, the
wrongful taking and detention, the demand,
and that plaintiff “has sustained damages by
reason of such wrongful taking and detention
of said chattels and property in the sum of
one thousand dollars.“
From these facts alone the law does not
imply either of the items of damages claimed
to have been proved.
The iirst item is not
upon any of the facts al
even consequential
leged, but results from other acts of defend
ants while the animals were in his posses
sion.
And the second item of damages
would not necessarily r. suit from a mere tak
ing and detention.
These damages depend
upon an extraordinary value of the animal
for a particular purpose, and upon the spe
cial use to which she was capable of being
applied.
The facts out of which these items
of special damages arise must be alleged in
‘the complaint, or they cannot be recovered.
They are notaileged, and are, therefore, not
embraced within the issues to be tried.
For
this reason, if for no other, the plaintiff is
not entitled to judgment for such items of
damages.
There was, then, no.error in not
ﬁnding for plaintiff on these points.
The only other point made by appellant is.
that the court erred in not giving plaintiﬂ.’
costs.
There is no doubt in our minds that
the plaintiff was entitled to costs.
But this
error in no way affects the ﬁnding, and is not
a ground for new trial.
The error cannot,
therefore, be corrected on appeal from an or
der denying a new trial.
The proper mode
of reviewing and correcting this error is on
appeal from the judgment, but no such ap
peal has been taken in this case.
Judgment aiiirmed.
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Appeal from appellate court, First district.
Action by Oscar J. Friedman against the
Wabash Western Railway Company to recov
Plaintiff
er damages for personal injuries.
by
obtained judgment, which was aﬂirmed
Re
the appellate court. Defendant appeals.
versed.‘
George B. Burnett (Black & Fitzgerald, of
Page, Eliel & Rosen
counsel), for appellant.
thal (J. W. Duncan, of counsel), for appellee.

CRAIG, J. This was an action brought by
Oscar J. Friedman against the Wabash West
to recover damages
ern Railway Company
for a personal injury received on the 1st day
of May, 1888, while plaintiff was a passenger
on the defendant,s line of road, running from
Moberly, .\Io., to Ottumwa, Iowa. The fol
lowing map shows .the line of defendant,s
road. The accident which resulted in the in
jury complained of occurred in the state of
Missouri, between Kirksville and Glenwood
Junction, two stations indicated on the map.
/ Oﬁuuwg
.v Bmomrizm

$1‘. }. '5
Distance from Centrslia to Moberly, 24 miles.
Distance from Moberly to Ottumwa t31 miles.
Distance from Kirksvilie to Glenwood Junction
25 miles.

The declaration contained ﬁve counts, but
In the second
they are all substantially alike.
was on
count, it is averred that defendant
May 1, 1888, operating a railroad from Klrks
ville, Mo., to Gienwood Junction, Mo0 and
operating trains for the conveyance of pas
sengers for reward; “and the said plaintiff,
then became and was a
at said Kirksville,
passenger in a certain train of the said de
fendant on the said railroad, to be carried,
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and was accordingly then being carried, in
the said train, from Kirksville to said Glen
for reward, etc.; that it
wood Junction,"
became and was the duty of the said defend
ant to properly and safely construct and
maintain the track and road-bed of said rail
way, but the defendant so negligently con
the same that the
structed and maintained
same were not then safe for the use of pas
sengers on defendant’s trains, “and the rails
of said track of said ralhoad were‘ then and
there in bad repair and condition, and a cer
tain rail in the said track had become broken
by reason of the said negligence of the said
defendant, and thereby a certain car then be
ing in the said train, and of a sort commonly
was then and there
called ’sleeping-cars,‘
thrown with great force and violence from

and 146 Ill. 583.)

March

DAMAGES.

.

audcff thesaid track;"and plaintiﬂ!,heingthen
and there asleep and in the exercise of due
care0 was thrown from the berth in said car,
in
hich he was sleeping, with great force

and violence, across the car, and into the op
posite berth, "by means whereof, then and
there, the spine and spinal column, including
the spinal cord, of the said plaintiff. became
and were greatly bruised, hurt, and injured,
and the said plaintiff suffered and incurred
an injury of the kind known as ‘concussion
of the spine,’ " wherelw he incurred expendi
tures, in endeavoring to be healed, amounting
to $5,000, and became sick, lame, etc.,‘ “from
thence hitherto," suffering great pain and be
ing prevented from attending to his business,
and thereby losing proﬁts, etc. In the con
clusion of the declaration the plaintiff claimed
damages amounting to $50,000.
The defend
ant pleaded the general issue, and on a trial
before a jury the plaintiﬂ! recovered $30,000.
and the judgment, on appeal to the appellate
v
court, was aﬁirmed.
it will be observed that in each count of
the declaration the plaintiff, in stating where
the relation of passenger and common carrier
commenced, and where such relation existed
between the plaintiff and the defendant.
averred as follows: “And the said plaintiff.
at said Kirksville, then became and was a
passenger on a certain train of the said de
fendant on the said railroad, to be carried,
and was accordingly then being carried, in
the said train, from Kirksville to said Glen
wood Junction," for reward, etc. No evidence
was introduced on the trial that the plain
tiff became a passenger at Kirksville for
Glenwood Junction; but the plaintiff testiﬁed
that he took the sleeper at Moberly to go in
Ottumwa, and that he had a ticket which
read, from Moberly to Ottumwa, which he
had purchased at Moberly in the fall of 1867'
The testimony offered for the purpose of
proving the averment of the declaration was
objected to on the ground of a variance be
tween the evidence and the declaration; but
the court overruled the objection, and allow
Upon the
ed the evidence to be introduced.
asked
the defendant
of variance
question
the court to instruct the jury as follows:
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“The averment in plaintiff,s declaration that fatal." Chit. Pl. 382. The same author also
says: “In an action on the case founded on
he became a passenger in the train of defend
an express or implied contract, as against an
ant at Kirksville, Mo., to be carried from
attorney, agent, carrier, innkeeper, or other
said Kirksvilie to Glenwood Junction, is
bailee, for negligence,
material, and must be proved as alleged;
the declaration
etc.,
and if the jury believe from the evidence
must correctly state the contract or the par
ticular duty or consideration from which the
that said plaintiff did not at the time in ques
liability results. and on which it is founded;
tion become a passenger in said train of de
and a variance in the description
fendant at said Kirksville, to be carried to
of a con
said Glenwood Junction, then the jury will . tract, though in an action ex delicto, may be
‘
fatal, as in an action ex contractu.
ﬁnd for defendant, regardless of all other
The dec
laration in such case usually begins with a
questions in the case." But the court refused
statement
of the particular profession or
to give the instruction as prayed, but quali
situation of the defendant and his retainer,
ﬁed it by adding as follows, to-wit: “But if
it appear from the evidence that plaintiff was and consequent duty or liability. The decla
ration will be defective if it does not show
a passenger on the train of the defendant
that by express contract or by implication
between the points mentioned, traveling from
of law, in respect to the defendant,s particu
a point south of said Kirksville to a point
lar character or situation, etc., stated by the
beyond Glenwood Junction, then the aver
plaintiff, the defendant was bound to do or
declaration is suﬂi
ment in the plaintit’f’s
ciently made out." It may be said that the omit the act in reference to which he is
charged."
Chit. Pl. p. 38-}.
involved is a technical one, and
question
It may, however, be said that the state
hence not entitled to that consideration which
give to a question which ment in the declarationof the point from
a court should
The plaintiff
which and to which the plaintiff was be
goes to the merits of an action.
ing carried was mere inducement, and need
had the right, when the question was raised,
Upon a question of
not be proved as laid.
to amend his declaration, and thus obviate
this character, Chitty on Pleading (page 292)
the diﬂiculty;
but he saw proper to take
says:
“In general, however, every allega
another course, and he occupies no position
tion in an inducement which is material, and
should the rules of law
now to complain.
not impertinent and foreign to the cause,
that control in such cases be strictly en
and which, consequently, cannot be rejected
forced against him. But, while the ques
urplusage,
as
must be proved as alleged,
tion involved may be regarded somewhat
technical,
still it will be remembered that and a variance would be fatal; and conse
quently great attention to the facts is neces
the plaintiff is seeking to recover a large
sary in framing the inducement, and care
sum of money, and the defendant has the
right to demand and insist that the grounds
must be taken not to insert any unnecessary
allegation." If, therefore, the allegation is
upon which the plaintiff claims a right of
recovery
should
be clearly and concisely
to be regarded as inducement,
it was neces
And at page 3.5
stated, and that the case made on the declara
sary to prove it as alleged.
“It is also a rule
tion should be proven as laid. If a plaintiff
the author further says:
may allege in his declaration one ground of that if a necessary inducement of the plain
tiff,s right, etc., even in actions for torts, rerecovery, and on the trial prove another, a
late to and describe and be founded on a
ldefendant never could be prepared for trial.
matter of contract. it is necessary to be
'One great object of a declaration is to notify
of the nature and character strictly correct in stating uch contract; it
ithe defendant
Thus, even in
\of the plaintiffs demand. so that he may be being matter of description.
but if one case against a carrier, if the termini of the
able to prepare for a defense;
groundof action may be alleged, and another journey which was to be undertaken be mis
stated, the variance will be fatal
proven, a declaration would be a delusion,
Here the
allegation in the inducement relates to mat
and, instead of affording a defendant notice
of what he was called upon to meet, it would
ter of description." Harris v. Rayner, 8
Here the plaintiff claimed
be a deception.
Pick. 541, isa case in point.
The action was
brought to recover for an injury sustained
that the relation of passenger and common
by the oversetting of a stage-coach.
carrier existed between him and the defend
The
ant, and that the defendant owed him a duty
plaintiff alleged in his declaration that he
growing out of that relation. In speaking of paid defendants,
for his passage in their
a declaration
in such a case Chltty on
stage from Albany to Boston, $10. the usual
Pleading says: “When the plaintiff,s right fee for said passage, and defendants, in con
consists in an obligation on the defendant to
sideration thereof, undertook and promised
observe some particular duty, the declaration
carefully to transport plaintiff in said pass
must state the nature of such duty, which
age from Albany to Boston.
In support of
we have seen may be founded either upon a
"mintiff proved that he was
the declar . .,
contract between the parties or on the obli
com Worcester to Boston,
in a stag
gation of law arising out of the defendant,s
and that‘
he arrived at Boston the
particular character or situation, and the de
. c by the carelessness
coach n .
of the
driver, .
fendant must prove such duty as laid; and
.as thereby injured. It was
a variance will, as in actions on contract, be
r
held t
.-vidence did not prove the
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.contract set out in the declaration, and in
passing upon this point the court said: “We
think there was no suﬂlclent proof at the
trial of the contract as alleged in the declara
tion.
The declaration alleges a contract on
the part of the defendants
to transport the
plaintiff from Albany to Boston.
The proof
was that the plaintiff rode in defendants‘
stage from Worcester to Boston; and. al
though this is part of the route from Albany
to Boston, yet it is part, also, of many other
lines of travel. So that the contract as al
leged remains
without proof." In Tucker
v. Cracklin, 2 Starkie, 385, and in Railroad
& Banking Co. v. Tucker, 79 Ga. 128, 4 S. E.
5, actions were brought against carriers for
the loss of goods; and in each case it was
held that a variance between the proof and
allegation as to the termini of the carriage

was fatal.
In Phillips, Ev. (volume 3, p.
268,) the author says:
“The plaintiff 'will be
nonsuited if the termini of the journey are
not correctly set forth." In Railroad Co. v.
Sutton, 53 Ill. 398, the point was made that
an averment
in the declaration
of defend
a.nt’s undertaking to convey the plaintiff
from West Urbano. to Tolono is not sustained
by proof of an undertaking to convey from
Champaign City to Tolono.
In disposing of
the question of variance, it is said: “It

would appear from the testimony that West
Urbana and Champaign City are one and the
there was no vari
same place; consequently,
once." The averment in plaintiff’s declara
tion that he became and was a passenger at
Klrksville, to be carried to Glenwood Junc
tion, for reward, was, in effect, a statement
that he took the defendant,s train at Kirks
ville for Glenwood Junction, and that he had
paid or was ready to pay his fare from one
point to the other when called upon, where
upon there was an implied contract
on
the part of the railway company to safely
.carry him from one point to the other. We
think it plain that the averment in plaintiff’s
declaration was not sustained by proof that
he became a passenger at .\ioberly for Ot
tumwa. It may be true that plaintiff stat
.ed more in his declaration than he might
have stated; that he might have relied upon
an allegation that he was a passenger upon
defendant,s cars, being carried for reward,
without stating deﬁnitely the termini of his
But,
journey on defendant,s line of road.
having gone into detail in his allegation, the
law requires him to prove them as laid.
What is said in Bell v. Senneff, 83 Ill. 125,
is in point here:
“As a general rule a party
is required to prove the averments of his
pleadings as he makes them.
He may aver
more than is required; but, as a general
rule, he must prove them, although unneces
In Derragon v. Rutland, 58
sarily made."
Vt. 128, 3 Atl. 332, it was held that every
averment which the pleadings make material
as a descriptive part of the cause of action
must be proved as alleged; and any vari
the legal identity of
.ance which destroys
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the matter or thing averred with the matter
or thing proved is fatal.
In State v. Copp,
15 N. ‘H. 212, it is said:
“It is a most gen
eral rule that no allegation which is descrip
tive of the identity of that which is legally
essential to the claim or charge can be re
jected." See, also, 1 Phillips, Ev. pp. 709.
710; Steph. Pl. p. 124, appendix.
Here the
plaintiff was bound to allege that he was a
passenger on defendant,s train of cars for
reward. This was material, and the further
averment
that he became a passenger at
Kirksville for Glenwood Junction was descrip
tive of the identity of that which was legally
essential.
It could not be rejected or disreL
garded.
In conclusion, we think it plain,
under the authorities, that there was a vari
ance between the proof and the declaration;
and the court erred in the admission of the
evidence, and in the modiﬁcation of defend
ant,s instruction.
On the trial the plaintiff was permitted,
against the objection of the defendant, to
introduce evidence tending to prove that
the plaintiff at the time of the injury was
receiving a compensation
for his services
as a traveling salesman of $3,000 per annum.
The declaration contained no allegation of
any special contract or engagement of the
plaintiff with any person under which he
might earn money for his services.
In Rail
way Co. v. Klauber, 9 Ill. App. 613, in dis
cussing a question of this character it is
said: “Neither of these allegations points
to any damages growing out of or depending
upon the peculiar circumstances
or business
of the defendant.
In Tomlinson v. Derby,
43 Conn. 562, the plaintiff was injured by
means of a defective highway, and his allega
tion was that he was thereby ‘prevented from
transacting his ordinary business;’
and it
was held that, under such allegation, he
could not show that he was earning $100 a
month in carting and sawing timber.
So,
in Taylor v. Munroe, 43 Conn. 36, under a
similar allegation, it was held that the plain
tiff could not show that she was a button
maker, and what wages she earned in that
business.
In City of Chicago v. O,Brennan,
65 Ill. 160, the plaintiff brought suit for an
injury caused by the falling of a portion of
the brick and plastering in the common coun
cil chamber in the city.
The allegation in
the declaration was that ‘the plaintiff, who
was pursuing his occupation as journalist,’
was injured, etc., ‘and thereby the plaintiff,
as lawyer, lecturer, and journalist, became
and was sick, sore, and incapacitated
from
attending to his business, and so continued
for a long time, to-wit, for two months; and,
as regards plaintiffs profession as a lecturer,
he has been almost wholly, ever since, dis
abled from pursuing it.’
It was held that
under these allegations the plaintiff could
not give in evidence the fact of a particular
engagement to lecture in Virginia. and the
probable gains thereof.
The court say: ‘In
order to subserve the ends of good pleading,
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which are to apprise the opposite party of
the nature of the claim, and prevent surprise,
it was necessary that these special damages,
and the facts on which they were based,
"
should have been set out in the declaration.’
Baldwin v. Railroad Corp. 4 Gray, 333. City
of Bloomington v. Chamberlain, 104 Ill. 21".’,
There the admitted
is also a case in point.
evidence was held not to be erroneous, but
the ruling was placed on the express ground
that the evidence was not as to the loss of
proﬁts of a particular engagement.
Had the
evidence gone to that extent, as is the case
here, it is plainly laid down that the evidence
would have been erroneous, as held in City
This
of Chicago v. O‘Brennan, 65 ill. 160.
is apparent from what is said in the opinion
of the court on page 27 . We think the rule
established in the cases cited is the correct
one, and the court erred in the admission of
the evidence.
It cannot be said that the
error was a harmless one, as the evidence
was of a character calculated to produce on
the minds of the jury an impression that the
plaintiff, on account of his capacity to earn
a large salary before the injury, which he
had lost by the accident, and hence should
recover large damages.
It may, however, be said that the error
was cured by an instruction given by the
court as follows:
“The court permitted the
testimony of what plaintiff was earning at
the time of the injury charged.
This testi
mony was admitted for no other purpose
than to show plaintiffs capacity to earn
‘money. and must not be considered in any
respect as a measure of damages.“
It is not
entirely clear what the instruction means.
While the court directed the jury that the
evidence was not to be considered as a meas
ure of damage the court failed to point out
what use they should make of the evidence.
The court ruled, when the evidence was
offered. that it was competent for the con
sideration of the jury.
That ruling was
never changed.
The evidence was allowed
to remain with the jury for their considera
tion, and it could have no other effect than
to swell the damages.
Had the court, when
it was ascertained that an error had been

committed in admitting it, excluded the evi
dence entirely from the consideration
of the
jury, the error would in a great measure
have been removed; but that course was not
pursued.
The instruction did not, in our
judgment, cure the error.
For the errors
indicated the judgment of the appellate and
circuit courts will be reversed, and the cause
remanded.
(Oct. 23, 1893.)

MAGRIJDER,

It seems to
.T., (dissenting.)
me that the petition for rehearing in this
case has demonstrated
beyond question the
First,
right of the appellee to a rehearing.
the declaration is suﬂicient as a declaration
upon the common-law liability of the carrier;
second, the declaration alleges that the plain
tiff “was hindered and prevented from trans
acting and attending to his business and
affairs, and lost and was deprived of divers
great gains,
proﬁts,
and compensations,
which he might and otherwise would have
This was a sufﬁcient
made and acquired."
allegation of special damage to justify the
admission of evidence that plaintiff at the
time of the injury was receiving a compensa
tion for his services as a traveling salesman
of $3,000 per annum, under the decision made
in City of Bloomington v. Chamberlain, 104
Ill. 268. In the latter case the allegation in
the ﬁrst count of the declaration was that
“plaintiff was hindered from transacting her
business and affairs and deprived of large
gains and proﬁts, which she otherwise would
have earned," and, in the second count, “that
she had been rendered unable to earn or make
for herself a living, and had been depriv
ed of large gains and proﬁts which she other
wise would have earned."
Under these al
legations the plaintiﬂ! was there permitted
to testify that she had taught school at
If the law is a science of
$50 per month.
precedents, no instance can be found where
a precedent so exactly ﬁts a subsequent state
of facts as the Chamberlain Case ﬁts the
facts disclosed by the record in the case at
bar upon the second point here designated.

BAILEY,

C.

J.,

and

BAKER. J.,

concur.
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COOLEY, C. J. This is an action of tres
pass.
The following is a statement of the
case, as made for the plaintiff, for the argu
ment in this court:
“The plaintiff and defendant are corpora
tions, which for 25 years and more have been
engaged in copper mining in Ontonagon coun
Each
each other.
ty.
Their‘ mines adjoin
owns ‘the land in fee on which its mine is situ
ated.
The plaintlff, in carrying on its mining
operations, left a wall of rock, from 15 to 18
feet thick, next to the boundary line of de
fendant,s mine.
This was left as a barrier
and protection to its mine against water or
The
other encroachments from the Minnesota.
Minnesota left no such barrier; it not only
line, but broke
worked up to the boundary
mine.
About the
through
into defendant’s
year 1866 the plaintiff, at about 40 feet above
its fourth level, and from 20 to 25 feet from the
bmmdary line, drilled a hole, of the ordinary
size, about one and one-half inches in diameter,
and when the blast was ﬁred it blew through
into the opening which had been previously
made by the defendant into the plaintlffs ter
ritory. The driil-hole was left through from
two to two and one-half feet of solid rock.
then the agent of plaintiff,
Capt. Chynoweth,
examined this hole and the surroundings, and
immediately gave orders to cease work there.
This was done as a further protection against
the defendant.
No work was done at this
point after that until the winter of 1883—1.
The plaintiff had no knowledge of any fur
ther trespass at this point until February, 1884,
under the circumstances related hereafter.
The
pump of the defendant was stopped in 1870,,
and that of the plaintiff in 1871 or 1872.
Plain
tiffs mine ﬂlled up to the adit level in about
ﬁve years.
has
Since 1870 the defendant
worked its mine more or less upon tribute, and
so did the plaintiff, until May, 1880, when it
resumed work. In order to avoid liability for
the trespass committed by it at the plaintiffs
fourth level. (being the defendant’s ﬁfth level,)
the defendant sought to show, and did show,
another hole at the ﬁrst level, between the two
A continuation of the inquiry showed
mines.
that this hole also was about 20 feet from the
boundary line, on the plaintiffs side, and that
had here trespassed 20 feet upon
defendant
plaintiffs land.
We do not think that the his
tory of mining upon Lake Superior will dis
close another instance of such reckless disre
gard of the rights of an adjoining mine-owner.
This encroachment and trespass by the de

fendant at the defendant,s ﬁfth level occurred
about the year 1859.
“In Hay, 1880, the plaintiff resumed mining
operations and commenced to pump the water
from its mine.
The six-inch pump, formerly
used by the mine, and which had always been
adequate to keep the mine unwatered, proved
wholly inadequate, and it was compelled to get;
a 12-inch pump, and even this was not suﬂicieut
in the spring; and in 1882 the water gained
on them 120 feet, and in 1883, 222 feet, with
Capt. Par
the pump working night and day.
nell, the agent of the plaintiff,s mine, was
thoroughly acquainted with it, having worked
in the mine years before; he soon became con
vinced that the bulk of the water came from
the defendant,s mine.
He found that the wa
ter came from the fourth level.
He cleaned
out the level, and, on reaching the point where
the drill-hole had been made years before, he
found that the rock had been all blasted away
from the .\Iiune§sota side, and that the water
was rushing through an opening from 20 to 25
When discovered
feet high and 12 feet wide.
there was a volume of water seven feet wide
ﬂowing from the Minnesota into the National.
When the defendant made its second encroach
ment at this point does not clearly appear;
according to the defendant’s witness Spargo it
This witness was an
was in 1871 or 1872.
employe of the defendant, and one of its tribu
ters. He says he saw the hole from the Min
nesota side, and it was then six to eight feet
Wil
high, and from four to ﬁve feet wide.
liam George, a witness for defendant. last saw
It was then about a
the hole in 1870 or 1871.
The witness was then work
foot in diameter.
ing for the defendant as tributer and captain.
Thomas James was in charge of the mine.
He admits that the defendant’s tributers were
This same Capt. James
then mining there.
has been in charge of the defendant,s mine as
agent ever since.
“It was not denied in the court below, and
we presume will not be in this court, that the
defendant committed these several acts of tres
But, in proof of the fact, we refer to
pass.
the admission of the agent Harris, the evidence
that the track of a tram-road, sollars, and a
system of timbering were found constructed
from the ﬁfth level of defendant’s mine into
this opening, and the testimony of plaintiff,s
Furthermore,
already referred to.
witnesse
it is beyond dispute that the defendant know
ingly and willfully committed these acts of
trespass, and broke down the barrier which
the plaintiff had so carefully left to protect its
mine for all future time, and against all possi
ble dangers.
“About 1870 the defendant concluded to
abandon regular mining, stopped its pumps.
and commenced what is known among miners
It placed its tributers
as robbing the mine.
at work at the bottom of the mine, took out
all the copper ground that could be found, took
out the supports of the roof of the mine, and
allowed it to settle or cave in. This was all
done under the direction of the defendant,s
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for the ﬂowage of water into the plaintiff,s
agent, James.
The deiendant’s mine is situ
The result
mine until the ﬂowage actually took place, but
ated upon a hill or mountain side.
when the ﬁowage occurred as a result of de
was that the surface of the ground became de
De
fendant’s wrongful act it was a trespass, and
pressed, and openings were made in it.
fendant,s agent, James, testlﬁed to openings of
if it continued from day to day there was a
continuous trespass for which repeated actions
this character on the surface of the Minnesota,
mignt be maintained.
amounting in all to over 500 feet in length;
Upon these positions the plaintiff plants its
Into these open
some were 3 or 4 feet wide.
case, and unless they are sound in law the re
ings the water from rains and melting snow
All right of re
ran into the defendant,s mine, and from thence covery cannot be supported.
covery for the original trespass, which consist
ﬂowed into the plaintilT’s mine, through the
ed in breaking through into the plaintiff,s urine,
opening at its fourth level. But for these open
was long since barred, and it is not claimed
ings the water would have run down the hill
that there was, from the time of the ﬁrst
side.
As one of defendant,s own witnesses ex
wrong, a continuous trespass which can give a ,
pressed it, ‘There has been a general falling
right of action now.
away of the bluff.‘
The merely leaving an
There were no such open
opening between the two mines is not the
In fact,
ings on the surface of the National.
wrong for which suit is brought, but it is the
we everywhere ﬁnd the plaintiff conductmg its
ﬂowing of water through the opening which is
mining operations with due regard to the
rights of adjoining owners; while we ﬁnd
complained of as a new trespass;
the original
in wrongful act of the defendant in breaking
its operations
the defendant conducting
through being the cause, and the injurious con
the most reckless disregard of such rights."
The above is a suﬂicient statement of the sequence when it happened, connecting itself
facts for a discussion of the principal question
with the cause to complete the right of action.
in the case, viz: Is the piaintiffs right of ac
In support of its contention that the case
tion barred by the statute of limitations?
before us may be regarded as one of con
The count in the declaration on which the
tinuous trespass from the ﬁrst, several au
parties went to trial alleged that the defend
thorities are cited for the plaintiff, which
ant, on March 15, 1882, and on divers days
Among them is
may be brieﬂy noticed.
and times between that day and the com
Holmes v. Wilson, 10 Adol. & E. 503. It ap
peared in that case that a turnpike company
mencement of suit, with force and arms broke
down the partition wall between the mine of
had built buttresses on the plaintiff,s land for
the plaintiff and the mine of the defendant,
the support of its road. The act was a tres
damages
and let the water from its said mine into the
pass, and the plaintiff recovered
therefor; but this. it was held, did not pre
mine of the plaintiff, and then and there ﬁlled
the mine of the plaintiff with water, greatly
clude its maintaining a subsequent action for
damaging its timbering, workings, walls, and
the continuance of the buttresses where they
machinery, hindered and prevented the plain
had been wrongfully placed.
’l‘he ground of
tiff from carrying on and transacting its law
the decision was that in the ﬁrst suit dam
ful and necessary affairs and business, caused ages could be recovered only for the con
the plaintiff great damage and expense in re
tinuance of the trespass to the time of its
moving water from its mine. etc.
institution. There could be no legal pre
The defendant pleaded the general issue,
sumption that the turnpike company would
with notice that the statute of limitations persist in its wrongful conduct, and conse
would be relied upon. The plaintiff recovered
quently, prospective damages, which would
a large judgment.
Konly be recoverable on the ground of such
1. The time limited for the commencement
pe1sistent wrong-doing, would not have been
of suit for trespass upon lands in this state is within the compass of the ﬁrst recovery..
two years from the time the right of action ‘The cases of Bowyer v. Cook, 4 C. B. 236;
accrues.
How. St. § 8714.
This action was
Thompson v. Gibson. 7 Mees. & W. 456;
commenced in May, 1884, and it is not claimed
Russell v. Brown, 63 Me. 203; and Powers
that damages for the original trespass can be
v. Council Bluffs, 45 Iowa, 652, are all de
recovered in it.
The contention of the plain
cided upon the same principle. Cumberland,
tiff may be succinctly stated as follows: (1)
etc., Co. v. Hitchings, (35 Me. 140, was one of
Had the plaintiff instituted suit within two the wrongful ﬁlling up of a canal by a tres
years from the original trespass. the recovery
passer.
it was held that the trespasser was
would.have been limited to such damages as under legal obligation to remove what he
were the direct and immediate result of the
had unlawfully placed on the plaintiffs prem
trespass.
The subsequent ﬁowage of water
ises, and that, so long as he suffered the
through the opening was not the direct, imme
obstruction to remain, he was guilty of a‘
diate, or necessary result of breaking down the
continuous trespass from day to day.
barriers; therefore no damages could have
In Adams v. Railroad Co., 18 Minn. 260
been recovered therefor in an action so brought.
(Gil. 236,) and Troy v. Railroad Co., 23 N.
H. 83, railroad companies which, by tres
(2) Two trespasses may be the result of one
act.
In other words, one trespass may cause pass, had entered upon the lands of indi
., another,
and he who commits the wrongful
viduals and constructed and begun the oper
act in such a case will be responsible for both
ation of railroads. were held liable as tres
trespasses.
passers from day to day so long as the oper
(3) In this case no action accrued
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The prin
ation of the road was continued.
ciple of decision in all these cases is clear
In each of them
and not open to question.
there was an original wrong, but there was
also a persistency in the wrong from day to
day; the plaintiffs possession was continu
ally invaded, and his right to the exclusive
occupation and enjoyment of his freehold
upon and limited.
continually encroached
Each day, therefore, the plaintiff suffered a
new wrong, but no single suit could be made
to embrace prospective damages, for the rea
son that future persistency in the wrong
could not legally be assumed.
To make these cases applicable, it is nec
essary that it should appear that the action
of the defendant has been continuously
wrongful from the ﬁrst. Whether it can be
so regarded will be considered further on.
The plaintiff, however, does not. as we have
seen, rely exclusively upon this view. Its
case is likened by counsel to that of a farmer,
whose fences are thrown down by a tres
passer; the cattle of the trespasser on a
subsequent day entering through the open
ing. In such a case it is said there are two
trespasses:
the one consisting in throwing
down the fences, and the other in the entry
of the cattle: and the right of action for the
latter would accrue at the time the entry was
actually made. The plaintiff also cites and
relies upon a number of cases in which the
act of the party which furnishes the ground
of complaint antedates the injurious conse
quence, as the original trespass in this case
antedated the ﬂowing from which the plain
tiff has suffered damage.
One of these cases is Bank of Hartford Co.
v. Waterman, 26 Conn. 324.
In that case
action was brought against a sheriff for a
false return to a writ of attachment. The
falsity consisted in a misdescription of the
land attached.
When suit was brought, the
period of limitation, if it was to be com
puted from the time the return was made,
had already run; but under the statute the
plaintiff was entitled to bring suit only aft
er he had taken out execution and had a re
turn made upon it, which would show a
necessity for a resort to the attached lands.
It was only after such a return of execution
that the plaintiff would suffer even nominal
damage from the oﬂlcial misfeasance; and
it was therefore a necessary consequence
that the time of limitation must be comput
ed from that time, and not from the time of
the false return.
Another case is that of McGuire v. Grant,
25 N. J. Law, 356, which is to be referred to
the same principle. The defendant removed
the lateral support to the0plaintiff’s land by
an excavation, made within his own bound
_aries. Injury subsequently resulted to the
plaintiff in consequence.
The statute of lim
itations was held to run from the time the
damage occurred; the excavation not being
The
of itself a tort until damage resulted.
case of Bonomi v. Backhousc, El. Bl. & El.
LAw DAM.—5
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was like the last in principle,
and was
v
in the same way.
The plaintiff also, in this connection, likens
its case to that of one who, in consequence
of a ditch dug upon his neighbor’s land, has
water collected and thrown upon his prem
ises to his injury.
It is not the act of dig
ging the ditch that sets the time of limita
tion to running in such a case, but it is the
happening of the injurious consequence.
The case supposed, however, is not a case of
trespass.
The act of digging the ditch was
not in itself a wrongful act. The owner of
land is at liberty to dig as many ditches as
he pleases on his own land, and he becomes
a wrong-doer only when, by means of them,
he causes injury to another.
If he ﬂoods his
neighbor,s land the case is one of nuisance,
and every successive instance of ﬂooding is
a new injury.
But here, as in the case of a
continuous trespass,
prospective
damages
cannot be taken into account, because it
must be presumed that wrongful conduct
will be abandoned rather than persisted in,
and that the party will either ﬁll up his
ditches or in some proper way guard against
the recurrence of injury. Battishill v. Reed,
18 C. B. 696.
Cases of ﬂooding lands by
.dams or other obstructions to running water
are cases of this description. Baldwin v.
Calkins, 10 Wend. 169; Mersereau v. Pear
sall, 19 N. Y. 108; Plate v. Railroad Co., 37
N. Y. 472.
So are cases of diverting water, to
the ﬂow of which upon his premises the plain
tiff is entitled. Langford v. Owsley, 2 Bibb,
215.
So are cases of the wrongful occupation
of a public street, whereby the access of
the plaintiff to his premises is obstructed.
Carl v. Railroad Co., 46 \‘\'is. 625; S. C. 1 N.
W. 295. Other cases cited for the plaintiff,
and resting on the same principle, are They
er v. Brooks, 17 Ohio, 489; Blunt v. McCor
mick, 3 Denio, 283; Winchester v. Stevens
Point, 58 Wis. 350, 17 N. W. 3, 547; Union
Trust Co. v. Guppy, 26 Kan. 75-i; Spilman v.
Navigation Co., 74 N. C. 675; Loweth v.
Smith, 12 Mees. & W. 582.
The case of Whitehouse v. Fellowes, 10 O.
B. (N. S.) 765, was one of nuisance.
A turn
pike company made a covered drain with
gratings at intervals and catchpits. In con
sequence of the insuiiiciency of the catch
pits, or of their not being kept in proper con
dition, the plaintiffs colliery was ﬂooded
every time there was a heavy shower.
In
an action for this ﬂooding it was held that
every damage was a new injury and gave a
new right of action.
The ruling sustained
the position taken for the plaintiff in the
case, which was thus succinctly stated by
counsel arguendo: “The distinction which
pervades the cases is this: Where the plain
tiff complains of a trespass, the statute runs
from the time when the act of trespass was
committed, except in the case of a continuing
trespass.
But where the cause of action is
not in itself a trespass’ as an act done upon
a man’s own land, and the cause of action is
622,

decided
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the consequential injury to the plaintiff,
there the period of limitation runs from the
time the damage is sustained."
The case before us was one of admitted
trespass, from which immediate damage re
sulted.
Had suit been brought at that time,
all the natural and probable damage to re
sult from the wrongful act would have been
taken into account, and the plaintiff would
for it. [_But there was no
have recovered
continuous trespass from that time on. The
defendant had built no structure on the
plaintiffs premises, was occupying no part
of them with anything it had placed there,
and was in no way interrupting the plain
tiff,s
occupation or enjoyment. All it had
left there was a hole in the wall. But there
is no analogy between leaving a hole in a
wall on another’s premises and leaving
houses or other obstructions there to in
cumber or hinder his occupation; the phys
ical hindrances are a continuance of the
original wrongful force, but the hole is only
the consequence of a wrongful force which
ceased to operate the moment it was made.
If, therefore, the plaintiff had brought suit
more than two years after the original tres
pass, and before the ﬂooding of its mine by
water ﬂowing through the opening had be
gun, and if the statute of limitations had
been pleaded, there could have been no re
covery.
The action for the original wrong
would then have been barred, and there had
been no repetition of the injury in the mean
time to give a new cause of action. The
more continuance of the opening in the wall
could not be a continuous damage. Lloyd
v. Wigney, 6 Bing. 489.
The right of action, if any, for which the
plaintiff can complain, must therefore arise
from the ﬂowing itself as a wrongful act;
there being no longer any action for the orig
inal breaking, and no continuous acts of
wrong from that time until the ﬂowing be
gan.
The ﬂowage caused a damage to the
plaintiff; but damage alone does not give a
right of action; there must be a concurrence
of wrong and damage.
The wrong, then,
must he found in leaving the opening uncles
ed and permitting the water to ﬂow through.
It must therefore rest upon an obligation on
the part of the defendant either to close the
opening, because persons for whose acts it
was responsible had made it, or to restrain
water which had collected on its own prem
ises from ﬂowing upon the premises of the
plaintiff to its injury.
The latter seems to be
the ground upon which the Plaintiff chieﬂy re
lies for a recovery.
In the argument made for the plaintiff in
this court stress is laid upon the fact that the
damage which has actually resulted from the
ﬂooding could not have been anticipated at
the time of the original trespass, and there
ore could not then have been recovered

for.

This consideration,
it is urged, ought to be
But, while we agree that it is to be
decisive.
considered in the case for what it is worth, it

is by no means necessarily conclusive) The
plaintiff must ﬁx some distinct wrong upon
the defendant within the period of statutory
limitation, or the action must fail; and there
is no such wrong in this case unless the fail
ure to prevent the. ﬂowing constitutes
one.
The original act of wrong is no more in ques
tion now, after having been barred by the
statute, than it would have been if damages
had been recovered or settled for amicably;
nor do we see that it can be important in a
case like the present, where the wrong must
be found in the injurious ﬂowing, whether
there was or was not a wrong originally. If
there was, it stands altogether apart from the
wrong now sued for, with an interval be
tween them, when no legal wrong could have
been complained of.
The mere fact that.an
opening was made by the defendant between
the two mines, would not of itself have been
a trespass unless the defendant invaded the
plaintiffs premises in making it. Each party
had a right to mine on its own side to the
boundary, (Wilson v. Waddeli, L. R. 2 App.
Cas. 95;) and if the plaintiff had ﬁrst done so,
the defendant might have done the same at
the same point, and in that way have made
rightfully.
an opening
The difference
be
tween the case supposed and this, is that here
the defendant was found to have gone beyond
the boundary and committed a trespass.
But
suppose the defendant had then made com
pensation for the trespass, so far as it was
then damaging; how would the case have
‘
differed from the present?
The opening would
1 remain,
through
made by the defendant,
which, if the water was allowed to collect in
his mine, it must eventually pass; and if he
was under obligation to keep it within the
bounds of his own premises, he would be lia
ble for allowing it to pass; otherwise not.
was not actually
‘ The fact that compensation
made for the breaking away of the plaintiifs
barrier is immaterial when the statute has
. run, as has been already explained.
The case of Clegg v. Dearden, 1‘2 Q. B. 576,
is not unlike in its facts the case before us.
In that case, also, there had been a wrongful
breaking through from one mine to another,
and an injurious ﬂowage of water through
the opening.
The facts were found by special
verdict, and Lord Denman,
in pronouncing
judgment, said: “The gist of the action, as
stated in the declaration, is the keeping open
and unﬁlled up of an aperture and excava
tion made by the defendant into the plain
tiffs’ mine. By the custom the defendant was
entitled to excavate up to the boundary of’
his mine without leaving any barrier; and
the cause of action, therefore, is the not ﬁll
ing up of the excavation made by him on the
plaintiffs’ side of the boundary and within
their mine. It is not, as in the case of Holmes
v. Wilson, 10 Adol. & E. 503, a continuing of
wrongfully placed by the defend
something
ant upon the premises of the plaintiff.
Nor
is it a continuing of something placed upon
the land of a third person to the nuisance of
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the plaintiff, as in the case of Thompson v.
Gibson, 7 .\lces. & W. 456.
There is a legal
obligation to discontinue a trespass or remove
a nuisance;
but no such obligation upon a
trespasser to replace what he has pulled
down or destroyed upon the land of another,
though he is liable in an action of trespass to
compensate in damages for the loss sustained.
The defendant having made an excavation
and aperture in the plaintiffs’ land was liable
to an action of trespass;
but no cause of ac
tion arises from his omitting to re-enter the
plaintiffs‘ land and ﬁll up the excavation.
Such an omission is neither the continuation
of a trespass nor of a nuisance;
nor is it the
breach of any legal duty.
It was, however,
contended on the part of the plaintiffs, that,
admitting this to be so, there nevertheless
was a legal obligation or duty upon the de
fendant to take means to prevent the water
from ﬂowing from his mine into that of the
plaintiffs through the aperture he had made ;"
but “the plaintiﬂ!s have not alleged any such
duty or obligation in their declaration, nor is
their action founded upon the breach of any
such duty, if it exists, but upon the omission
to ﬁll up the aperture made by them in the
plaintiffs’ mine.
It appears to us that the
defendant, upon the facts found by the jury,
is entitled to have the verdict entered for
him upon the plea of not guilty."
If this case was rightly decided, it should
rule the one before us. It has been followed
by the supreme court of Ohio in Williams v.
Coal Co., 37 Ohio St. 583, in a case which also
closely resembles this upon its facts, and is
not distinguishable in principle.
It seems to
us that these cases are sound in law as well
as conclusive.
The only wrongful act with
which the defendant is chargeable, was com
mitted so long before the bringing of suit that
action for it was barred. Had suit been
brought in due time, recovery might have
been had for all damages which could then
have been anticipated as the natural and
probable result of the wrongful act. If the
particular damages which have been suffered
could not then have been anticipated, it is be
cause it could not then be known that the de
fendant would cease mining operations and
the plaintiff would not. There could be no
ﬂowing from one mine into the other while
both were worked; and had the plaintiff
ceased operations and the defendant contin
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ued to work, the defendant would have suf
fered the damage instead of‘ the plaintiff.
But neither party was under obligation to
keep its mine pumped out for the beneﬁt of
its neighbor.
Either was at liberty to discon
tinue its operations and abandon its mine
whenever its interest should seem to require
it.
And had the plaintiff brought an action
within two years from the time of trespass,
its recovery would necessarily have been had
with this undoubted right of abandonment in
view. But a jury could not have awarded
damages for any exercise of a right, and
they could not, therefore, have given dam
ages for a possible injury to ﬂow from such
an abandonment.
This is on the plain prin
ciple that the mere exercise of a right cannot
be a legal wrong to another, and if damage
shall happen, it is damnum absqne injuria.
This view of the case is conclusive;
but
there is another
that is equally so. The
wrong to the plaintiff consisted in breaking
down the wall which had been left by it in its
operations.
If any damage might possibly
result from this which was not then so far
probable that a jury could have taken it into
account in awarding damages, the plaintiff
was not without redress. It would have been
entitled in a suit then brought to recover the
cost of restoring the barrier which had been
taken away; and if it had done so, and made
the restoration, the damage now complained
of could not have happened. It thus appears
that complete redress could have been had in
a suit brought at that time; and, that being
the case, ‘he plaintiﬂ! is not entitled to recov
er now for an injury for which an award of
means of prevention was within the right of
action which was suffered to become
barred)
The right which then existed, being a right to
recover for all the injury which had then been
suffered, including the loss of the dividing
barrier, it would not have been competent for
the plaintiff, had suit then been brought, to
leave the loss of the barrier out of account,
awaiting possible special damages to ﬂow
therefrom as a ground for a new suit. The
wrong which had then been committed was
indivisible; and the bar of the statute must
be as broad as the remedy was which it ex

tinguishes.
The judgment must be set aside and a new
trial ordered.
The other justices concurred.
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JOSEPH SCHLITZ BREWING
(32

COMPTON.
N. E. 693. 142 Ill.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

'

CO.

v.

511.)

Nov. 2, 1892.

Appeal from appellate court, Third dis
trict.
Action on the case by Sophie Compton
against the Joseph Schlitz Brewing Com
pany.
Plaintiff obtained judgment, which
was afﬁrmed by the appellate court.
De
fendant appeals.
Reversed.
The other facts fully appear in the follow
ing statement by MAGRUDICR, J.:
This is an action on the case, begun on
April 17, 1890, in the circuit court of San
gamon county, by the appellee against the
appellant company.
In the trial court the
verdict and judgment were in favor of the
plaintiff, which judgment has been aﬂirmed
by the appellate court.
The declaration
consists of two counts.
The ﬁrst count al
leges that plaintiff was possessed of certain
premises in Springﬁeld, in which she and
her family resided, and that the defendant,
to wit, on April 20, 1885, wrongfully erected
a certain building near said premises in so
careless, negligent, and improper a manner
that on said day and afterwards, “and before the commencement of this suit," large
quantities of rain water ﬂowed upon,
against, and into said premises and the
walls,
roofs,
beams,
papering,
ceilings,
ﬂoors, stairs, doors, cellar, basement,
and
other parts thereof, and weakened, injured,
and damaged the same, by reason whereof
said messuage and premises became and
are damp and less ﬁt for habitation. The
second count alleges that plaintiff was the
possessor, occupier, and owner of
saidm.es
suage and premises, in which she‘and her
family dwelt, and the defendant, to wit, on
said day, caused quantities of water to run
into, against, and upon the same, and the
walls, roofs, ﬂoors, cellars, etc., thereof, and
thereby greatly weakened injured, wetted,
and damaged the same. By reason where
of said premises became and were and are
damp, incommodious,
and less ﬁt for habi
tation. The plea was not guilty. The
proof tends to show that plaintiff’s building
is a two-story brick building, with a cellar
underneath, the front room on the ﬁrst ﬂoor
being used as a butcher,s shop, and the rest
of the building being used as a dwelling;
that her building was erected several years
before that of the defendant; that defend
ant,s building is on the lot west of plain
tiff,s lot, and is about 60 feet long, having
an oﬂice in front and a beer-bottling estab
lishment in the rear, and has one roof,
which slants towards plaintiff,s property;
that there are three windows on the west
side of plaintiff,s house, besides the three
cellar windows; that her wall is a little
over two feet from the west line of her lot;
that when it rains the water ﬂows against
her west wall, and some of it into her win

dows and cellarfrom the roof of defend
ant,s building; that the cave trough is so
far below the cave that the water runs over
it into the windows, etc.
Palmer & Schutt, for appellant.
& Hamilton, for appellee.

MAGRUDER, J. (after stating

Patton

the facts).
was introduced of damage done to
plaintiﬂ!,s property after the commencement
of the suit by reason of rain storms then
occurring. The defendant.asked, and the
court refused to give, the following instruc
tion: “The court instructs the jury that the
suit now being tried was commenced in the
month of April, 1890, and that they are not
to take into consideration the question as to
whether or not any damage has accrued to
plaintiff,s property since the commencement
of this suit." The question
presented
is
whether plaintilI wasentitled to recover
only such damages as accrued before and
up to the beginning of her suit, leaving sub
sequent damages to be sued for in subse
quent suits, or whether she was entitled to
estimate and recover in one action all dam
ages resulting both before and after the
commencement
of this suit.
The rule orig
inally obtaining at common law was, that
in personal actions damages could be recov
ered only up to the time of the commence
ment of the action.
3 Com. Dig. tit. “Dam
ages," D.
The rule subsequently prevail
ing in such actions is that damages accru
ing after the commencement of the suit may
be recovered, if they are the natural and
necessary
result of the act complained of,
and where they do not themselves
consti
tute a new cause of action.
Wood’s Mayne,
Dam. § 103; Birchard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 6"‘;
Slater v. Rink, 18 Ill. 527; Fetter v. Beale,
1 Salk. 11; Howell v. Goodrich, 69 Ill. 556.
In actions of trespass to the realty, it is said
that damages may be recovered up to the
time of the verdict, (Com. Dig. 363, tit.
"Damages," D;) and the reason why, in
such cases, all the damages may he recov
ered in a single action, is that the trespass
is the cause of action, and the injury result
ing is merely the measure of damages.
5
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 16, case cited in
note 2.
But in the case of nuisances or re
peated trespasses
recovery can ordinarily
be had only up to the commencement
of the
suit, because every continuance
or 1,epe1i_
tion of the nuisance gives rise to a new
cause of action, and the plaintiff may bring
successive actions as long as the nuisance
lasts.
McConnel v. Kibbe, 29 Ill. 483, and
33 Ill. 175; Railroad Co. v. Moﬂitt, 75 UL
524; Railroad Co. v. Schaffer, 124 Ill. 112, 16
N. E. 239.
The cause of action, in case my
an ordinary nuisance, is not so much the
act of the defendant as the injurious consequences resulting from his act, and hence
the cause of action does not arise until such
occur; nor can the damages
consequences
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the date of bringing
Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p.

beyond
5

and cases in notes.
It has been held,
however, that where permanent structures
are erected, resulting in injury to adjacent
realty, all damages may be recovered in a
single suit. Id. p. 20, and cases in note.
But there is much confusion among the
authorities which attempt to distinguish be
tween cases where successive
actions lie
and those in which only one action may be
maintained. T
confusion seems to arise
from the
views entertained in re
gard to the
differtt
circ mstances under which the
Injury suffered by the plaintiff from the act
of the defendant shall be regarded as a per
manent injury.
“The chief difﬁculty in this
subject concerns acts which result in what
effects a permanent change in the plaintiffs
land, and is at the same time a nuisance or
trespass." Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 94. Some
cases hold it to be unreasonable to assume
that a nuisance or illegal act will continue
forever, and therefore refuse to give entire
damages as for a permanent injury, but al
low such damages for the continuation of
the wrong as accrue up to the date of the
bringing of the suit Other cases take the
ground that the entire controversy should
be settled in a single suit, and that damages
should be allowed for the whole injury,
past and prospective, if such injury be prov
en with reasonable certainty to be penna
nent in its character. Id. § 94. We think,
upon the whole, that the more correct view
is presented in the former class of cases. 1
Suth. Dam. 199-202; 3 Suth. Dam. 369-399;
1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) ~§§ 91-94;
Uline v.
Railroad Co., 101 N. Y. 98, 4 N. E. 536;
Duryw. v. Mayor, 26 Hun, 120; Blunt v. Mc
Cormick, 3 Denio, 283; Cooke v. England,
92 Am. Dec. 630, notes;
Reed v. State, 108
N. Y. 407, 15 N. E. 735; Hargreaves v. Kim
berly, 26 W. Va. 787; Ottenot v. Railroad
Co., 119 N. ‘Y. 603, 23 N. E. 169; Cobb v.
Smith, 38 Wis. 21; Canal Co. v. Wright, 21
N. J. Law, 469; Wells v. Northampton Co.,
151 Mass. 46, 2'5 N. E. 724; Barrick v. Schif
ferdecker, 123 N. Y. 52, 25 N. E. 365; Silsby
.\1anufg Co. v. State, 104 N. Y. 562, 11 N.
E. 264; Aldworth v. City of Lynn, 153 .\Iass.
53, 26 N. E. 229; Town of Troy v. Railroad
Co., 23 N. H. 83; Cooper v. Randall, 59 Ill.
317; Railroad Co. v. Hoag, 90 ill. 339.
We
do not wish to be understood, however, as
holding that the rule laid down in the sec
ond class of cases is not applicable under
some circumstances, as in the case of per
manent injury caused by lawful public
structures, properly constructed and perma
nent in their character. In Uline v. Rail
road Co., supra, a railroad company raised
the grade of the street in front of the plain
tiff’s lots so as to pour the water therefrom
down over the sidewalk into the basement
of her houses, ﬂooding the same with water,
and rendering them damp. unhealthy, etc.,
and injuring the rental value, etc. In dis
17,
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cussing the question of the damages to
which the plaintiff was entitled the court
say: “The question, however, still remains,
what damages?
All her damages upon the
assumption that the nuisance was to be per
manent, or only such damages as she sus
tained up to the commencement of the ac
tion? ' * ‘ There has never been in this
state before this case the least doubt ex
pressed
in any judicial decision ' ' '
that the plaintiff, in such a case, is entitled
to recover only up to the commencement
of
the action. That such is the rule is as well
settled here as any rule of law can be by repeated and uniform decisions of all the
courts, and it is the prevailing doctrine else
where." Then follows an exhaustive re
view of the authorities, which sustain the
conclusion of the court as above announced.
In Duryea v. Mayor, supra, the action was
brought to recover damages occasioned by
the wrongful acts of one who had dischar
ged water and sewerage upon the land of
another, and it was held that no recovery
could be had for damages occasioned by the
discharge of the water and sewage upon the
land after the commencement of the action.
In Blunt v. McCormick, supra, the action
was brought by a tenant to recover dam
ages against his landlord because of the lat
ter,s erection of buildings adjoining the de
mised premises,
which shut out the light
from the tenant,s windows and doors; and
it was held that damages could only be recovered
for the time which had elaped
when the suit was commenced, and not for
the whole term.
In Hargreaves v. Kimber
ly, supra, the action was case to recover
damages for causing surface water to ﬂow
on plaintiff,s lot, and for injury to his trees
by the use of coke ovens near said lot, and
for injury thereby to his health and com
fort; and it was held to be error to permit
8. witness to answer the following question:
“What will be the future damage to the
property from the acts of the defendant?"
the court saying: “In all those cases where
the cause of the injury is in its nature per
manent,
and a recovery
for such injury
would confer a license on the defendant to
continue the cause, the entire damage may
be recovered in a single action; but where
the cause of the injury is in the nature of a
nuisance, and not permanent in its charac
ter, but of such a character that it may be
supposed that the defendant would remove
it rather than suffer at once the entire dam
age which it may inﬂict if permanent, then
the entire damage cannot be recovered in a
single action; but actions may be maintain
ed from time to time as long as the cause
of the injury continues." In Wells v.
Northampton Co., supra, where 9. railroad
company maintained a culvert under its em
bankment, which injured land by dischar
ging water on it, it was held that the case
fell within the ordinary rule applicable to
continuing nuisances and continuing tres
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till

was intended.
It cannot be said that the
cave trough was a structure vof such a per
manent character that it might not be chau
ged, nor can it be aid that the defendant
would not remove the cause of the injury
rather than submit to a recovery of entire
damages for a permanent injury, or suffer
repeated recoveries during the continuance
of the injury.
The facts in the record tend
to show a continuing nuisance, as the same
is deﬁned in Aldworth v. City of Lynn, su
pra.
There is a legal’ obli tion to remove
a nuisance; and the “law
not presume
the continuance of the wr
g, nor allow a
wrong, or a transfer of
license to continue
title, to result from the recovery of dam
ages for prospective misconduct."
Suth.
Dam. 199, and notes. The question now un
der consideration has been before this court
in Cooper v. Randall, supra.
The action
was for damages to plaintiff,s premises,
by constructing and operating a
caused
ﬂouting mill on a lot near said premises,
whereby chaff, dust, dirt, etc., were thrown
from the mill into plaintiﬁ?’s house.
It was
there held that the trial court committed no
error in refusing to permit the plaintiff to
prove that the dust thrown upon his prem
ises by the mill after the suit was com
menced had seriously impaired the value of
the property, and prevented the renting of
the house; and we there said: “When sub
sequent
damages
are produced by subse
quent acts, then the damages should be
strictly conﬁned to those sustained before

it

suit brought." It is true that the operation
of the mill, causing the dust to ﬂy, was the
act of the defendant; but
cannot be said
that
was not the continuing act of the
present appellant to allow the roof or the
eave trough to remain in such a condition
as to send the water against appellee’s
house upon the occurrence of
rain storm.
Nor is appellant,s house or cave trough any
more permanent than was the mill in the
Cooper Case. In Railroad Co. v. Hoag_ su
pra, a railroad company had turned its
waste water from a tank upon the prem
spread and
ises of the plaintiff, where
froze, and a recovery was allowed for dam
ages suffered
after the commencement
of
the suit; but
there appeared that the ice.
which caused the damage, was upon plain
tiff,s premises before the beginning of the
suit,0and the damage caused resulted from
the melting of the ice after the suit was
brought. It was there said: “The injury
by appellee between
sustained
the com
mencement of the suit and the trial was not
from any wrongful act done by appellant
during that time, but followed from acts
done
before the suit was commenced."
Here, the water, which caused the injury,
was not upon plaintiﬁ?,s premises, either in
congealed or liquid state, before the be
ginning of the suit, but ﬂowed thereon as
the result of rain storms which occurred
after the suit was commenced.
We think
a

it

it

Railroad

it

Reference was made to Uline v.
Co., supra, and the following lan
guage was used by the court: “If the de
fendants act was wrongful at the outset,
as the jury have found, we see no way in
which the continuance of its structure in its
wrongful form could become rightful as
against the plaintiff, unless by release or
grant by prescription or by the payment of
damages.
If originally wrongful, it has not
become rightful merely by being built in an
enduring manner." In Aldworth v. City of
Lynn, supra, where the action was for dam
ages sustained by a landowner through the
improper erection and maintenance of a
dam and reservoir by the city of Lynn on
adjoining land, the supreme court of Massa
chusetts say: “The plaintiff excepted to the
ruling that she was entitled to recover dam
ages only to the date of her writ, and con
tended that the dam and pond were perma
nent, and that she was entitled to damages
for a permanent injury to her property.
Au erection unlawfully maintained on one’s
own land, to the detriment of the land of a
neighbor, is a continuing nuisance, for the
of which an action may be
maintenance
brought at any time, and damages recovered
up to the time of bringing the suit. ' ' "‘
That it is of a permanent character, or that
it has been continued for any length of time
less than what is necessary
to acquire a
prescriptive right, does not make it lawful,
nor deprive the adjacent landowner of his
right to recover damages.
Nor can the ad
jacent landowner, in such a case, who sues
for damage to his property, compel the de
fendant to pay damages for the future.
The defendant may prefer to change his use
of his property so far as to make his con
duct lawful. In the present case we cannot
say that the defendant may not repair or re
construct its dam and reservoir in such a
way as to prevent percolation with much
less expenditure than would be required to
pay damages for a permanent injury to the
plaintiffs land."
In the case at bar the defendant did not
erect the house upon plaintiff,s land, but up
on its own land.
It does not appear that
such change might not be made in the roof.
or in the manner of discharging the water
from the roof. as to avoid the injury com
plained of. The ﬁrst count of the declara
tion, by its express terms, limits the recov
ery for damages arising from the negligent
and improper construction of defendant,s
building to such injuries as were inﬂicted
“before the commencement
of the suit."
The second count was framed in such a
way as to authorize a recovery of damages
for the ﬂow of water upon plaintiff,s prem
ises from some other cause than the wrong
ful construction of defendant,s building;
and accordingly plaintiff’s evidence tends to
show that the eave trough. designed to car
ry off the water from the roof, was so
placed as to fall of the purpose for which it
passes.

a
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the correct rule upon this subject is stated
as follows: “If a private structure or other
work on land is the cause of a nuisance or
other tort to the plaintiff, the law cannot re
gard it as permanent, no matter with what
intention it was built; and da.nages can
therefore be recovered only to the date of
1 Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) § 93.
the action."
It follows from the foregoing observations
that it was error to allow the plaintiff to in
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troduce proof of damage to her property
caused by rain storms occurring after the
commencement
of her suit, and that the in
struction asked by the defendant upon that
subject, as the same is above set forth,
should have been given.
The judgments of
the appellate and circuit courts are revers
ed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit

court.
ndgment reversed.

J
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HADLEY

et al. v.

BAXENDALE

(9 EXCEL

Court

of

Excheqp_e_.r.

et al.

341.)

Hilary Term.

Feb.

23,

1854.

the trial before CRO.\II-‘TON, J., at the
Gloucester assizes it appeared that the
plaintiffs carried on an extensive business as
millers at Gloucester; and that on the 11th
of May their mill was stopped by a breakage
..of the crank shaft, by which the mill was
worked. The steam engine was manufactur
ed by Messrs. Joyce & Co., the engineers, at
Greenwich, and it became necessary to send
the shaft as a pattern for a new one to Green
wich. The fracture was discovered on the
12th, and on the 13th the plaintiffs sent one
of their servants to the oﬂlce of the defend
ants, who are the well-known carriers trad
ing under the name ‘of Pickford & Co., for the
purpose of having the shaft carried to Green
wich. The plaintiffs’ servant told the clerk
that the mill was stopped, and that the shaft
must be sent immediately; and in answer to
the inquiry when the shaft would be taken
the answer was that if it was sent up by
day it would be delivered
twelve o,clock a
at Greenwich on the following day. On the
following day the shaft was taken by the de
fendants, before nobn, for the purpose of be
ing conveyed to Greenwich, and the sum of
£2 4s. was paid for its carriage for the whole
At the same time the defendants’
distance.
clerk was told that a special entry, if requir
ed, should be made, to hasten its delivery.
The delivery of the shaft at Greenwich was
delayed
by some neglect, and the conse
quence was that the plaintiffs did not receive
the new shaft for several days after they
would otherwise have done, and the work
ing of their mill was thereby delayed. and
they thereby lost the proﬁts they would oth
er\'ise have received.
On the part of the defendants it was object
ed that these damages were too remote, and
that the defendants were not liable with re
The learned judge left the
spect to them.
case generally to the jury, who found a ver
dict with £25 damages beyond the amount
paid into court.

At

last

t

‘,

cause.
Keating & Dowdesweli, showed
Whateley, Willes & Phipson, in support of
the rule.

The judgment of the court was now deliv
ered by

ALDERSON, B. We think that thereought

to be a new trial in this case; but in so do
ing we deem it to be expedient and necessary
to state explicitly the rule which the judge,
at the next trial, ought, in our opinion, to di
rect the jury to be governed by when they
estimate the damages.
it is, indeed, of the last importance that
we should do this; for, if the jury are left
without any deﬁnite rule to guide them, it
will, in such cases as these, manifestly lead

to the greatest injustice.
The courts have
done this on several occasions; and in Blake
v. Railway Co., 21 L. J. Q. B. 237, the court
granted a new trial on this very ground, that
the rule had not been deﬁnitely laid down to
the jury by the learned judge at nisi prius.
“There are certain established rules," this
court says, in Alder v. Keighley, 15 Mees. &
W. 117, “according to which the jury ought
to ﬁnd." And the court in that case adds:
clear rule that tin
“And here there is
. been received if
amount which w0l
is the measure of
the contract had lJ(
'
damages if the con
broken." Now,
n such a case as the
we think the proper ru
have"?
present
is this: Where two parties
made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages
which the other party
ought to receive in respect of such breach of
contract should be such as may fairly and“
reasonably be considered either arising nat- /8

I

urally,—i. e., according to the usual course of
things, from such breach of contract itself,—
be supposed to
or suen as may reasonably
of both par
have been in the contemplation
ties at the time they made the contract, as
the probable result of the breach of it. Now,
if the special circumstances under which the
contract was actually made were communi
cated by the plaintiffs to the defendants,
and thus known to both parties, the damages
resulting from the breach of such a con
tract, which they would reasonably contem
plate, would be the amount of injury which
would ordinarily follow from a breach of con
so
tract under these special circumstances
But, on the other
known and communicated.
were
hand, if these special circumstances
wholly unknown to the party breaking the
contract, he, at the most, could only be sup
posed to have had in his contemplation
the
amount of injury which would arise gener
ally, and in the great multitude of cases not
affected by any specialcircumstances, from
For, had the spe-'
such a breach of contract.
cial circumstances
been known, the parties
might have specially provided for the breach
of contract by special terms as to the dam
ages in that case; and of this advantage it
would be very unjust to deprive them. Now,
the above principles are those by which we
think the jury ought to be guided in esti
mating the damages arising out of any breach
of contract.
It is said that other cases, such
as breaches of contract in the nonpayment of
money, or in the not making a good title to
land, are to be treated as exceptions from
this, and as governed by a conventional
rule.
But as, in such cases, both parties must be
supposed to be cognizant of that well-known
rule, these cases may, we think, be more
properly classed under the rule above enunci
ated as to cases under known special circum
stances, because there both parties may rea
sonably be presumed to contemplate the esti
mation of the amount of damages according
rule.
to the conventional
Now. in the pres
ent_case, if we are to apply the principles

/
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above laid down, we ﬁnd that the only cir
by the plain
cumstances here communicated
tiffs 1o the defendants at the time the con
tract was made were that the article to be
carried was the broken shaft of a mill. and
that the plaintiffs were the miilers of that
mill.
But how do these circumstances show
reasonably that the proﬁts of the mill must
delay in the
be stopped by an unreasonable
delivery of the broken shaft by the carrier
to the third person? Suppose the plaintiffs
had another shaft in their possession, put up
or putting up at the time. and that they only
wished to send back the broken shaft to the
engineer who made it, it is clear that this
would be quite consistent with the above cir
cumstances, and yet the unreasonable delay
in the delivery would have no effect upon the
intermediate proﬁts of the mill. Or, again,
suppose that, at the time of the delivery to
the carrier, the machinery of the mill had
been in other respects defective, then, also,
the same results would follow. Here it is
true that the shaft was actually sent back to
serve as a model for a new one, and that the
want of a new one was the only cause of the
stoppage of the mill, and that the loss of
of
its really arose from not sending down he
new shaft in proper time, and that this arose

:3,
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from the delay in delivering the broken one
to serve as a model.
But it is obvious that
in the great multitude of cases of miliers
sending oﬂ! broken shafts to third persons by
a carrier under ordinary circumstances,
such
consequences would not, in all probability,
have occurred;
and these special circum
stances were here nevcr communicated by the
plaintiffs to the defendants.
It follows,
therefore, that the loss of pt:oﬂtsQ1ere-canPgt
reasonably be considered such a consequence
of the breach of contract as could have been
fairly and reasonably contemplated by both
the parties when they made this contract.
For such loss would neither have ﬂowed nat
urally from the breach of this contract in the
great multitude of such cases occurring un
der ordinary circumstances, nor were the spewhich,
ciai circumstances,
perhaps,
would
have made it a reasonable and natural conse
quence of such breach of contract, communi
cated to or known by the defendants.
The
judge ought, therefore, to have told the jury
that upon the facts then before them they
ought not to take the loss of proﬁts into con
sideration at all in estimating the damages.
There must therefore be a new trial in this
.v
case.
Rule absolute.

v
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DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES—IN CONTRACT.
GRIFFIN

v.

COL"ER

et al.

(16 N. 1,. 489.)

Court of Appeals of New York, March Term,
1858.

Action to recover the purchase price of an
Defendants sought to recoup dam
engine.
ages for delay in delivery of the vengine.
There was a judgment for plaintiii’, from
which defendants appealed.
John C. Churchill, forappellants. D. Coats,
for respondent.

'

SELDEN, J. The only point made by the
appellants is that in estimating their dam
ages on account of the plaintiffs failure to
furnish the engine by the time speciﬁed in
the contract, they should have been allowed
what the proof showed they might have
earned by the use of such engine, together
with their other machinery, during the time
lost by the delay. This claim was objected
to, and rejected upon the trial as coming
within the rule which precludes the allow
ance of proﬁts, by way of damages, for the
breach of an executory contract.
To determine whether this rule was cor
rectly applied by the referee, it is necessary
to recur to the reason upon which it is
founded.
It is not a primary rule, but is a
mere deduction from that more general and
fundamental rule which requires that the
damages
claimed should in all cases be
shown. by clear and satisfactory evidence,
to have been actually sustained. It is a
wcll-established rule of the common law
that the damages to be recovered for a
breach of contract must be shown with cer
tainty, and not left to speculation or conjec
ture; and it is under this rule that pullI!
are excluded from the estimate of dam%l,,§;s J
in such cases, and not because there is any
thing in their nature which should per se
prevent their allowance. Proﬁts
which
would certainly have been realized but for
the defendnnt’s default are recoverable; those
which are speculative or contingent are not.
Hence, in an action for the breach of a
contract to transport goods, the difference
between the price. at the point where the
goods are and that to which they were to
be transported, is taken as the measure of
damages;
and in an action against a vendor
for not delivering the chattels sold, the ven
dee is allowed the market price upon the
day ﬁxed for the delivery. Although this,
in both cases, amounts to an allowance of
proﬁts. yet, as those proﬁts do not depend
upon any contingency,
their recovery is per
mitted.
It is regarded as certain that the
goods would have been worth the estab
lished market price at the place and on the
day when and where they should have been
delivered'
On the other hand, in cases of illegal cap
ture, or of the insurance of goods lost at sea,
there can be no recovery for the probable
loss of proﬁts at the port of destination. The

principal reason for the difference between
these cases and that of the failure to trans
port goods upon land is, that in the latter
case the time when the goods should have
that when
been delivered, and consequently
the market price is to be taken, can be as
certained with reasonable certainty; while
in the iormer the fluctuation of the mar
affecting the
kets and the contingencies
length of the voyage render every calcula
tion of proﬁts speculative and unsafe.
There is also an additional rcason,, viz.
the difﬁculty of obtaining reliable evidence
as to the state of the markets in foreign
ports; that these are the true reasons is
shown by the language of Mr. Justice Story
in the case of The Lively, 1 Gail. 315, Fed.
Cas. No. 8,403, which was a case of illegal
capture.
He says: “Independent, however,
of all authority, I am satisﬁed upon principle
that an allowance of damages, upon the basis
of a calculation of proﬁts, is inadmissible.
The rule would be in the highest degree un
favorable to the interests of the community.
The subject would be involved in utter un
certainty. The calculation would proceed
and would require a
upon contingencies,
knowledge of foreign markets to an exact
ness in point of time and value which would
embarrassing obstacles.
present
sometimes
Much would depend upon the length of the
voyage and the season of the arrival; much
upon the vigilance and activity of the master,
and much upon the momeutary demand.
After all, it would be a calculation upon
conjectures and not upon facts."
Similar language is used in thecases of The
Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546, and La Amis
tad de lines. 5 \Vheat. 385. Indeed,
it is
c Qt4.‘jar that whenever proﬁts are rejected as
an item of damages it is because they are
subject to too many contingencies
and are
too dependent upon the ﬂuctuations of mar
kets and the chances of business to consti
tute a safe criterion for an estimate of dam
ages. This is to be inferred from the cases
in our own courts.
The decision in the
case of Blanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 342,
must have proceeded upon this ground, and

can, as I apprehend,
be supported upon no
It is true that Judge Cowen, in giv
other.
ing his opinion, quotes from Pothier the fol
lowing rule of the civil law, viz.: “In gen
eral, the parties are deemed to have con
only the damages and injury
templated
which the creditor might suffer from the
non-performance of the obligations in respect to the particular thing which is the
object of it, and not such as may have been
accidentally occasioned thereby in respect to
his own (other) affairs." But this rule had
no application to the case then before the
court.
It applies only to cases where, by
reason of special circumstances having no
necessary
connection
with the contract
broken, damages are sustained which would
not ordinarily or naturally ﬂow from such
breach: as where a party is prevented by
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the breach of one contract from availing
himself of some other collateral and inde
pendent contract entered into with other par
ties, or from performing some act in rela
tion to his own business not necessarily
An instance
connected with the agreement.
of the latter kind is where a canon of the
church, by rmson of the non-delivery of a
horse pursuant to agreement, was prevented
from arriving at his residence in time to col
lect his tithes.
In such cases the damages sustained are
disallowed, not because they are uncertain,
nor because they are merely consequential
or remote, but because they cannot be fairly
considered
as having been within the con
templation of the parties at the time of
entering into the contract.
Hence the objec
tion is removed, if it is shown that the con
tract was entered into for the express pur
pose of enabling the party to fulﬁll his col
lateral agreement, or perform the act sup
posed.
Sedg. Dam. c. 3.
In Blanchard v. Ely the damages claimed
consisted ‘in the loss of the use of the very
article which the plaintiff had agreed to
construct; and were, therefore, in the plain
est sense, the direct and proximate result of
the breach alleged. Moreover, that use was
contemplated by the parties in entering into
the contract, and constituted the object for
which the steamboat was built. It is clear,
therefore, that the rule of Pothier had noth
ing to do with the case. Those damages
must then have been disallowed, because
they consisted of proﬁts depending, not. as
in the case of a contract to transport goods,
upon a mere question of market value, but
upon the ﬂuctuations of travel and of trade,
and many other contingencies.
The cita
tion, by Cowen, ., of the maritime cases to
which I have referred, tends to conﬁrm this
view. This case, therefore, is a direct au
thority in support of the doctrine that when
ever the proﬁts claimed depend upon cpn
tingencies of the character referred to, they
are not recoverable.
The case of Masterton v. Mayor, etc., of
Brooklyn, 7 Hill, 61, decides nothing in op
position to this doctrine.
It simply goes to
support the other branch of the rule, viz.,
that proﬁts are allowed where they do not
depend upon the chances of trade, but upon
the market value of goods, the price of labor,
the cost of transportation, and other ques
tions of the like nature. which can be ren
dered reasonably certain by evidence.
From these authorities and principles it is
clear that the defendants were not entitled
to measure their dam..ages by estimating what
they might have earned by the use of the
engine and their other machinery had the
contract been complied with. Nearly every
element entering into such a computation
would have been of that uncertain character
which has uniformly prevented a recovery
for speculative proﬁts.
But it by no means follows that no allow
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ance could be made to the defendants for
the loss of the use of their machinery. it is
an error to suppose that “the law does not
for the in
aim at complete compensation
jury sustained," but “seeks rather to divide
than satisfy the loss." Sedg. Dam. c. 3. Th?’
broad, general rule in such cases is, that
the party injured is entitled to recover all
his damages, including gains prevented as
well as losses sustained; and this rule is
subject to but two conditions.
The dam
ages must be such as may fairly be sup
posed to have entered into the contempla
tion of the parties when they made the con
tract; that is, must be such as might natu
rally be expected to follow its violation; and
they must be certain, both in their nature
and in respect to the cause from which
they)
proceed.
The familiar rules on the subject are all
subordinate to these. For instance: That
the damages must ﬂow directly and natur
ally from the breach of contract, is a mere
mode of expressing the ﬁrst; and that they
must be not the remote but proximate con
sequence of such breach, and must not be
speculative or contingent, are different modi
ﬁcations of the last.
These two conditions are entirely separate
and to blend them tends
and independent,
to confusion; thus the damages claimed may
be the ordinary and natural, and even nec
essary result of the breach, and yet, if in
their nature uncertain, they must be re
jected; as in the case of Blanchard v. Ely,
where the loss of the trips was the direct
and necessary consequence of the pla.intiffs
failure to perform. So they may be deﬁnite
and certain, and clearly consequent upon the
breach of contract, and yet if such as would
not naturally ﬂow from such breach, but,
for some special circumstances, collateral to

the contract itself or foreign to its apparent

object, they cannot be recovered;
as in the
case of the loss by the clergyman of hi
tithes by reason of the failure to delivery
the horse.
Cases not unfrequently occur in which
both these conditions are fulﬁlled; where it
is certain that some loss has been sustained
or damage incurred, and that such loss or
damage is the direct. immediate and natural
consequence of the breach of contract, but
where the amount of the damages may be
estimated in a variety of ways. In all such
cases the law, in strict conformity to the
principles
already
advanced,
uniformly
adopts that mode of estimating the damages
which is most deﬁnite and certain.
The
case of l’‘reeman v. Clute, 3 Barb. 424, is a
case of this class, and affords an apt illus
tration of the rule. That case was identical
in many of its features with the present.
The contract there was to construct a steam
engine to be used in the process of manu
facturing oil, and damages were claimed for

delay in furnishing it. It was insisted in
that case, as in this, that the damages were
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to be estimated by ascertaining the amount
of business which could have been done by
the use of the engine, and the proﬁts that
would have thence accrued. This claim was
rejected by .\ir. Justice Harris, before whom
the cause was tried, upon the precise ground
taken here. But he, nevertheless, held that
was to be allowed for the “loss
compensation
of the use of the plaintitfs mill and other
machinery." He did not, it is true, specify
in terms the mode in which the value of
but as he had
such use was to be estimated;
previously rejected the probable proﬁts of
the business as the measure of such value,
no other appropriate data would seem to
have remained but the fair rent or hire of
the mill and machinery; and such I have no
Thus
doubt was the meaning of the judge.
understood,
the decision in that case, and
the reasoning upon which it was based, were,
I think, entirely accurate.
Had the defendants in the case of Blan
chard v. Ely, supra, taken the ground that
they were entitled to recoup, not the uncer
tain and contingent proﬁts of the trips lost,
but such sum as they could have realized by
chartering the boat for those trips, I think
The
their claim must have been sustained.
loss of the trips, which had certainly oc
curred, was not only the direct but the im
mediate and necessary result. oi.’ the breach
of the plaintiffs‘ contract.
The rent of a mill or other similar prop
erty, the price which should be paid for the
charter of a steamboat, or the use of ma
chinery, etc., are not only susceptible
of

CONTRACT.

more exact and deﬁnite proof, but, in a ma
jority of cases would, I think, he found to
be a more accurate measure of the damages
actually sustained in the class of cases referred to, considering the contingencies and
hazards attending the prosecution of most
kinds of business, than any estimate of an
ticipated proﬁts; just as the ordinary rate
of interest is, upon the whole, a more accu
rate measure of the damages sustained in
consequence of the non-payment
of a debt
than any speculative proﬁt which the credit
or might expect to realize from the use of
the money.
It is no answer to this to say
that, in estimating what would be the fair
rent of a mill, we must take into considera
tion all the risks of the business in which it
is to be used. Rents are graduated accord
ing to the value of the property and to an
average of proﬁts arrived at by very ex
tended observation; and so accurate are theresults of experience in this respect that
rents are rendered nearly if not quite as cer
tain as the market value of commodities at
a particular time and place.
The proper rule for estimating this por
tion of the damages in the present case was,
to ascertain what would have been a fair
price to pay for the use of the engine and
machinery,
in view of all the hazards and
chances of the business; and this is the rule‘
which I understand the referee to have
adopted.
There is no error in the other al
lowances made by the referee. The judg
ment should, therefore, be aﬁrmed.
Judgment aﬂirmed.
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factured and delivered, and whether by that
particular machinery or in that mill would
True, the contract
not be deemed material.
speciﬁes the mill as the place, but it neces
sarily has no importance, except as designat
ing the place of delivery. For aught that ap
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Court of Appeals of New York. 1875.
Action against the Spuyten Duyvii Rolling
Mill Company for breach of a contract to
make and deliver by a certain date a quan
tity of steel caps for rails. At the time of
making the contract, defendant was inform
ed that the caps were to be used in making
rails to ﬁll a contract which plaintiff had
made with the New York Central Railroad
Company, but defendant was not informed
as to what price plaintiff was to receive for
the rails. Both parties knew that the caps
could not be procured elsewhere in time to
The caps alone had no
ﬂil the sub.contract.
market value. Defendant,s mill was burned
before the time for furnishing the caps had
expired, and they were never furnished.
There was a judgment for piaintiff, from
which defendant appealed.

CHURCH, C.\J. The point made, that the
destruction of the mill by ﬁre was an excuse
for the non-performance
of the contract by
the defendant, is not‘ tenable. In the ﬁrst
place it does not appear nor is it found as a
fact, that the burning of the mill prevented
such performance.
The contract was made
December

27th, and

the steel caps

were

to

I

‘

. .

be delivered on the 1st of April thereafter.
The mill burned on the 10th of March; and
the proper construction of the ﬁnding is, that
the defendant was prevented after that time
from completing the contract, but there was
ample time prior to that event to have man
ufactured the caps. A party cannot post
pone the performance of such a contract to
the last moment and then interpose an acci
dent to excuse it. The defendant took the
responsibility of the delay. But the case is
not within the principle decided in Dexter v.
Norton, 47 N. Y. 62, and the authorities upon
which it was based. That principle applies
when it is apparent that the parties contem
plated the continued existence of a particular
person or thing which is the subject of the
contract, as in the ease of the Musical Hall
destroyed by ﬁre (Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best
& S. ‘$26); in the case of an apprentice who
became permanently
ill (Boast v. Frith, L.
R. 4 C. P. 1); and of a woman who, from
iliness, was unable to perform as a pianist
(‘Robinson v. Davison, L. it. 6 Exch. 269).
In these and analogous cases a condition is
implied that the person or thing shall con
tinue to exist. In Dexter v. Norton, supra,
this principle was applied to relieve a party
from damages for a failure to deliver prop
erty which was burned without his fault,
but it has no application to a case of this
character.
There was no physical or natural
impossibility, inherent in ‘the nature of the
thing to be performed, upon which a condi
tion that the mill should continue can be
The article was to be manu
predicated.

pears, other machinery couid have been sub
stituted.
The defendant agreed to furnish a
certain manufactured article by a speciﬁed
day, and it cannot be excused by an acci
dent, even if it prevented performance.
If
it sought protection against such a contin
gency it should have been provided for in
Harmony v. Bingham, 12 N.
the contract.
Y. 99; Tompkins v. Dudley. 25 N. Y. 272;
School Dist. v. Dauchy, % Conn. 530.
This
case belongs to a class clearly distinguishable
from those before referred to.
The more important question relates to the
proper rule of damages.
The referee ﬁnds,
that prior to the contract with the defendant,
the plaintiff had contracted
with the New
York Central Railroad Company to sell and
deliver to it by the 1st of June, four hundred
tons of rails to be composed of an iron found
ation and steel caps, for the invention of
which the plaintiff had obtained a,patent;
and that when the contract was made with
the defendant he informed it that he wanted
the caps to perform the contract; that if they
had been delivered by the 1st of April the
his contract;
; plaintiff could have performed
. and he ﬁnds, also, facts showing that the
plaintiff would have realized the amount of
proﬁts for which the recovery was ordered.
The damages for which a party may re
cover for a breach of contract are such as
ordinarily and naturally ﬂow from the non
performance.
They must be proximate and
certain, or capable of certain ascertainment,
and not remote, speculative or contingent.
\‘
is presumed that the parties contemplate
the usual and natural consequences
of a
breach when the contract is made; and if
the contract
made with reference to speﬁxing or affecting the
cial circumstances,
amount
of damages, such special circum
stances are. regarded within the contempla
I
tion of the parties, and damages may be as
‘
sessed accordingly.
Forabreaeh of an exec
utory contract to sell and deliver personal
property the measure of damages is, ordina
rily, the dlfference between the contfact-price
and the market-value of the article at the
time and place of delivery; but if the contract
is made to enable the plaintiff to perform a
sub-contract,
the terms of which the defend
ant knows, he may be held liable for the
difference between the sub-contract-price
and
the principal contract-price,
and this is upon
the ground that the parties have impiledly
ﬁxed the measure of damages themselves, or
rather made the contract upon the basis of a
ﬁxed rule by which they may be assessed.
The authorities cited on both sides recognize
these general rules. Grifﬁn v. Colver, 16 N.
Y. 489; Borries v. Hutchinson, 114 E. C. L.
445; Horner v. Railroad Co., L_ R.
C. P.
7

v.
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587; Hadley v. Baxendale,
26 Law & Eq.
398;
Stockwell v. Phelps, 3-! N. Y. 364;
.\Iessmore v. Lead Co., 40 N. Y. 422; Ran
dall v. Raper, 96 E. C. L. 82; Parks v. Tool
Co., 54 N. Y. 586; Gary v. Iron Works Co.,
L. R. 3 Q. B. 181; Smeed v. Foord, 1 El. &
El. (502; British Col. Co. v. Nettleship, L. R.
3 C. P. 499; Horner v. Railroad Co., L. R.
8 Exch. 131. The diﬂlcuity is in properly ap
plying general rules to the facts of each par
ticular case. Here it is found in substance
that the contract was made to enable the
plaintiff to perform his contract with the rail
road company, and that this was known to
It is insisted however that as
the defendant.
the price which the railroad company was to
pay the plaintiff for the rails was not com
municated to the defendant it cannot be said
that it made the contract with reference to
such price. It is expressly found that there
was no market-price for the steel caps, and
it does not appear that there was any market
price for the completed rail. The presump
tion is, from the facts proved, that there was
not. It was a new article, and the contract
was made to bring it into use. The result of
theable and elaborate argument of the learn
ed counsel for the defendant is, that in such
a case, that is when, although the contract
is made with reference to and to enable the
yet if
plaintiff to perform a sub-contract,
as to price,
the terms of the sub-contract,
are unknown to the vendor, and there is no
market-price
for the article, the latter,1s not
liable for any damages, or what is the same
thing.
for only nominal damages. 1 have
examined all the authorities referred to, and
such
do not ﬁnd any which countenances
a position, and there is no reason for exempt
ing a vendor from all damages in such a
case. It is not because the vendee has not
suffered loss, as he has lost the proﬁts of his
sub-contract;
it is not because such proﬁts
are uncertain, as they are ﬁxed and deﬁnite,
with cer
and capable of being ascertained
tainty; it is not because the parties did not
contract with reference to the sub.contract,
when it appears that the contract was made
for the purpose of enabling the vendee to
perform it. If the article is one which has
although the sub-contract is
a market-price,
contemplated, there is some reason for only
imputiug to the vendor the contemplation of
a subcontract at that price, and that he
should not be held for extravagant or ex
ceptional damages provided for in the sub
that
contract.
But the mere circumstance
the vendor does not know the precise price
speciﬁed in the contract will not exonerate
him entirely. He cannot in any case know
the precise market-price at the time for per
Knowledge of the amount of dam
formance.
ages is impracticable. and is not requisite.
It is only requisite that the parties should
have such a knowledge of special circum
stances, affecting the question of damages.
as that it may be fairly inferred that they
contemplated
a particular rule or standard

I

for estimating them, and entered into the
contract upon that basis. In Hadley v. Bax
endale. 9 Exch. 341, which is a leading case
on the subject in the English com,ts, the
court after speaking of the general rule, says:
“If the special circumstances under which the
contract was actually made were communi
cated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and
thus known to both parties, the damages re
sulting from the breach of such a contract.
contemplate,
which they would reasonably
would he the amount of injury which would
ordinarily follow from a breach of the con
so
tract under the special circumstances,
known and communicated."
This case has been frequently referred to,
and the rule as laid down somewhat
criti
cised;
but the criticism is conffned to the
of
character of the notice, or communication
the special
the
circumstances.
Some of
judges, in commenting
upon it, have held
that a bare notice of special consequences
which might result from a breach of the con
tract, unless under such circumstances
as to
imply that it formed the basis of the agree
I concur with
ment, would not be suﬂlcient.
the views expressed in these cases; and I
do not think the court in Hadley v. Baxen
dale, intended to lay down any different doc
trine. See authorities before cited. Upon the
point involved here, whether the defendant
is exempted from the payment of any dam
ages when there is no market-price,
and the
price in the sub4contract is not known, there
is no conﬂict of authority that
have been
able to discover. In the ﬁrst place, there is
considerable
reason for the position that
where the vendor is distinctly informed that
the purchase is made to enable the vendee
to fulﬁll a sub-contract, and knows that there
is no market.price for the article, he as
sumes the risk of being bound by the price
named in the sub-contract,
whatever that
may be, but it is unnecessary to go to that
extent.
It is suﬂicient to hold, what appears
to me to be clearly just, that he is bound
by the price, unless it is shown that such
price is extravagant, or of an unusual and
exceptional
The presumption is,
character.
that the price at which the property was sold
was its fair value, and that is to be taken as
the market-price for the purpose of adjusting
the damages in the particular case. This
arises here. The proﬁts were
presumption
certainly not extravagant.
not unreasonable,
About ﬁfteen per cent was allowed for proﬁts,
including the use of the patent. and no evi
dence was offered, or claim made. that the
price was not the fair value of the article.
We must assume that it was, and hence
within the contemplation of the parties. The
case of Borries v. Hutchinson, 114 E. O. L.
443, is quite analogous
to this. The article.
caustic soda, was purchased to be sold to a
foreign correspondent, which the defendant
knew.
There were several items of damage
claimed.
The proﬁts on the sub-contract
were conceded, and the money paid into court,
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but the court held, in passing judgment, that
the plaintiff was entitled
to recover such
proﬁts.
Eric, C. J., said: “Here the ven
dor had notice that the vendee was buying
the caustic soda, an article not ordinarily
procurable in the market, for the purpose of

..esale to a sub-vendee, on the continent.
he
made the contract, therefore, with the knowl
edge that the buyers were buying for the
purpose of fulﬁlling a contract
which they
had made with a merchant abroad."
The case of Elbidger v. Armstrong, L. R.
:1 Q. B. 473, also illustrates the rule.
That
was a contract for the purchase of six hun
dred and sixty-six sets of wheels and axles,
which the plaintiff designed to use in the
manufacture of wagons; and which he had
contracted
to sell and deliver to a Russian
company
by a certain day, or forfeit two
roubles a day. The defendant was informed
of‘ the contract,
but not of the amount of
penalties.
in the de
Some delay occurred
livery, in consequence of which the plaintiff
had to pay £100 in penalties, and the action
was brought to recover that sum. There was
no market in which the goods could be ob
tained, and the same point was made there
as here, that the plaintiff was only entitled
to nominal damages;
but the court says:
“When from the nature of the article, there
is no market in which it can be obtained,
this rule (the difference between the contract
and market value) is not applicable, but it
would be very unjust if, in such cases, the
damages must be nominal."
It is true that the court held that the plain
tiﬂ! could not recover the penalties as a mat
ter of right, mainly upon the ground that
such a consequence was not, from the nature
'
of the notice, contemplated by the parties;
and yet the judgment, directing the amount
of the penalties paid. was allowed to stand,
as being a sum which the jury might reason
ably ﬂnd. Cary v. Iron Works Co., L. R. 3
Q. B. 181, decided that when the article pur
chased was designed by the purchaser for a
peculiar and exceptional purpose unknown to
the seller, the latter was nevertheless liable
for the damages which would have been in
curred if used for the purpose which the
seller supposed it would be used for.
The case of Horner v. Railway Co., L. R.
S C. P. 134, is not in conﬂict with the posi
tion of the plaintiff. In that case the article
had a well-known market-value. The sub

7,.)

contract was at an unusual and extravagant
price, of which the defendant
was not in
Besides, the defendant was a car
formed.
rier, and it was seriously doubted by some
of the judges whether the same rule would
apply to a carrier as to a vendor. The ques
tion in all these cases is, what was the con
tract? and a carrier who is bound to take
property offered at current rates would not,
perhaps, be brought within the principle by
a notice of ulterior consequences, unless such
responsibility was sought to be imposed as
a condition,
and he have an opportunity to
refuse the goods; or unless a special contract
at increased rates was shown. The decision
was placed upon the ground that the excep
tional price was not within the contempla
tion of the parties. The authorities in this
1 state support
the doctrine of liability in a
case like this. The cases of Griﬂin v. Coiver
and Messmore v. Lead Co., supra, especially
the latter, decide the same principle. The
defendant in that case was informed of the
price of the sub-contract,
but the decision
This case
. was not put upon that ground.
presents all the elements which have been
v recognized for the application of the rule of
liability. The plaintiff contracted with the
defendant expressly to enable him to perform
his contract with the railroad company, which
the defendant
knew. The goods could not
have been obtained elsewhere in time; and
in consequence of the failure of the defend
ant to perform his contract, the plaintiff
lost the beneﬁt of his sub-contract.
It is not
claimed that the price at which the com
pleted rails were agreed to be sold was ex
travagant or above their value; and as there
was no market-price
for the article, the fact
. that the defendant
was not informed of the
precise price in the sub-contract does not af
fect its liability. Nor does the fact that the
defendant,s
contract does not embrace the
entire article resold, relieve it from the con
sequences
of non-performance.
It was a
i
portion
material
of
rail,
the
without
which it could not be made; and solely by
reason of the failure of the defendant,
the
plaintiff failed to perform hi contract, and
thereby lost the amount for which he has
recovered.
We concur with the opinion oi.’
the referee and court below, in their views.
holding the defendant liable.
The judgment
must be aﬂirmed.
All concur.
Judgment afﬁrmed.
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Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Hampshire.

Nov.

1,

1884.

Action against the American Express Com
pany for breach of a contract to transport a
package containing an architect,s plans for a
house.
There was a ﬁnding for plaintiff, and
defendant excepted.
J. C. Hammond, for plaintiff. D. W.
Bond, for defendant.

FIELD, J. It is not denied that the de
fendant is liable in damages for the reason
able cost of the new plans, and for other ex
penses, if there were any reasonably incurred
in procuring the new plans; but it is denied
that the defendant is liable in damages for
the delay in constructing the house occasion
It is assumed
ed by the loss of the plans,
that the plans had no market value, and
The rule
were only useful to the plaintiff.
of damages then is their value to the plain
tiff. As new plans could not be bought in

the market ready made, some time necessar
must be consumed in making them, and
the plaintiff contends that the value of the
plans for immediate use, or for use at the
time he would have received them from Bos
ton. if the defendant had duly performed its
contract, is their value to him, and that this
value is made up of the cost of procuring the
by
new plans and the damages occasioned
Whatever he calls it, it is dam
the delay.
the house,
ages for the delay in constructing
caused by the loss of the original plans, that
It does not appear that
he seeks to recover.
the defendant had notice of the contents of
the package at the time it was delivered for
transportation, or any notice or knowledge

ily

\

that the plaintiff needed the plans for the
construction of a house which he had begun
The damages caused by the delay
to build.
are not such as usually and naturally arise
solely from a breach of the contract of the
defendant to carry the package safely to its
destination,
nor were they within the rea
of both parties to this
sonable contemplation
such a
contract,
as likely to arise from
breach.
The fact that the plans had a speclai value to the plaintlff, and could not be
purchased, does not touch the question of in
cluding in the damages the injury to the
piaintiﬂi occasioned by reason of other con
tracts which he had made, and of work which
he had undertaken in expectation of having
or after the
the plans for use immediately,
usual delay involved in sending the plans to
Boston, and in having them traced and re
turned to him. Damages for such injury are
not given unless the circumstances are such
as to show that the defendant ought fairly to
be held to have assumed a liability therefor
when it made the contract.
We think that Hadley v. Baxendale, 9
Exch. 341, which ha been cited with ap
proval by this court, governs this case.
The case of Green v. Railroad Co., 193
Mass. 221, on which the plaintiﬁi relies, was
an action to recover the value of an “oil
painting, the portrait of the plaintlffs father."
The opinion attempts to lay down a rule for
determining
the value of such a painting
when the plaintiff had no other portrait of
his father, and when, so far as appears, it
had no market value; but the opinion does
not discuss any question of damages not in
volved in determining the value of the por
trait to the plaintiff. The plaintiff in that
case made no claim for damages occasioned
a loss of a proﬁtable use of the portrait.
Exceptions sustained.
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ABBOTT
(22

Supreme

et al. v.

HAPGOOD

N. E. 907, 150 Mass.

248.)

Nov. 29, 1889.

Report from superior court, Worcester
county; TIAMMOND, Judge.
. This is an action brought to recover damages
for breach of contracts made by the defendants
to furnish the Penn Match Company, Limited,
of Philadelphia, certain machines used in the
manufacture of matches, and certain match
The
splints for themanufacture of matches.
said contracts are the same which were be
fore the supreme judicial court in the case of
Match Co. v. liapgood, 141 Mass. 145, 7 N.
E. Rep. 22. The plaintiffs in this writ are
R. Abbott, Charles
described as “Francis
Kee, and Wm. B. Kempton, all of Philadel
phia, in the state of l’ennsylvania. as they
in
are copartners and associated
together
busine..:s under the ﬁrm name and style of the
‘ Penn Match Company, Limited.’ "
Theda
fendants did not call attention at the trial to
the speciﬁc fact that they made any point in
defense that the use in the writ of the pres
ent tense of the verb in “as they are co-part
ners" described this ﬁrm as it existed at the
It had
date of the writ, viz.. May 12, 1888.
in fact appeared in the plaintiffs’ testimony
that Kempton had been in the business only
a year or two, and was not connected with it
It being
at all when this suit was brought.
agreed that the questions raised by the de
murrer might be raised at the trial with the
other questions, the following evidence ma
terial to the questions raised by the report
The plaintiffs Abbott and Kee,
was put in:
with one William Brown. entered into acou
tract under the act of assembly of Pennsyl
vama approved June 2. 1874. Brown died
about January 13, 1882, and the affairs of
that concern were wound up, and a reh.ase
from the administrator of Brown,s estate was
given February 7, 1882. The defendants had
sold match splints to said concern, and had
received a letter dated January 23, 1882,
signed “PENN Mxrcu Co., Ll.\llTl£D, Fuss
cis R. Annorr, Tr.’" orderingone each of de
fendants‘ “setting" and “rolling-off"
ma
chines, and at the time of t1§e contracts sued
on were making said machines.
About the
middle of February, 1882, the plaintiff hemp
tonagreed verbally to join them in forming
a company, under the said statute of Penn
sylvania, of the same name as the former, to
prosecute the same business of manufactur
The plaintiffs
ing matches’ in Philadelphia.
together agreed that they would organize
said company under said statute, and would
build a factory forlhe purpose of such manu
factory, provided they could get the machin
ery, such as is mentioned in the contracts
sued on.
Thereupon, for the purpose of car
rying out said agreement, and in the name of
.and for the beneﬁt of the projected company,
the plaintiffs applied to the def‘.ndants, who
made the contracts in question, the plain
LA\\’ DA3l.—6
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tiffs made known to the defendants that
would proceed with its
projected company
organization, and would cause a factory to
be built for it only in case they could make a
contract with the defendants to furnish the
machines.
The plaintiffs told the defendants
they would like them to give a written con
tract for the machines already ordered,-that
is, one rolling-off machine and one setting
machine,—and also attach to it an additional
order for four more setting machines and
one rolling-off machine.
After some conver
sation, the defendants signed and delivered
the contracts sued on.
After the contracts
were made, the plaintiffs gave up the idea of
‘building the factory jointly. and Abbott and
Kempton proceeded to build the factory ior
the use of the ﬁrm, with the arrangement
that it should be verbally leased to the Penn
Match Company, Limited, for the purpose of
transacting its business, to-wit, the match
business the plaintiffs had agreed to go into.
The factory was completed about July 15,
1882, and the Penn Match Company paid
rent from that time.
On October 3, 1882,
the plaintiffs made an agreement to carry out
the arrangement entered into in February,
1882, and no business was done until after
July 15th, when the factory was ﬁnished, ex
cept that the plaintiffs made some match
boxes, with a view preparatory to this com
pany (the Penn Match Company) being or
ganized, and so as to have them on hand.
The records required by the statutes of Penn
sylvania, as to limited partnerships. were
duly made. Evidence was offered that in
May, 1882, the defendants, after some letters
stating that the machines would soon he
made. refused to perform said contracts. The
plaintiffs offered evidence of damage to them,
of their memlwr
as individuals, independent
They likewise of
ship of their association.
fered evidence of expenses incurred and dam
in conse
ages sutTered by the association
quence of the defendants’ refusal to deliver
the machines and the match splints.
The
defendants put in the judgment for the de
fendants, which was rendered on the demur
rer after the decision of the supreme judicial
comt in Match (,o. v. Hapgood. 141 Mass.
146’ 7 N. E. Rep. 22.
The defendants asked the court to rule:
(1) There is no evidence to warrant a verdict
for the plaintilfs.
(2) The contracts are in
terms with the Penn Match Company. Lim
ited, and that company was not organized at
the time of the contracts,and there never was
any contract which would bind that company,
and the plaintiffs cannot recover.
(3) The
judgment in the case of Penn Match Com
pany, Limited, v. Hapgood and another is a
a bar to this action.
(4) If. after the death
of Brown, the present plaintiffs agreed to
gether to form a limited partnership, under
the statute of Pennsylvania, which has been
put into the case, for the manufacture of
matches, under the name of the “Penn Mat:h
Company, Limited," and with the pn:'p0sti
and to the end of doing so, and in the name
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was an attempt to recover under the con
tracts now before us, bya suit brought in the
I name of the Penn Match Company, Limited,
against these defendants. In that case the
plaintiff was alleged to be a corporation, and.
i the hearing and decision were upon a demur
l rer which admitted that allegation to be true.
If we assume that the limited partnership
organized under thelaws ofl’enns.vlvania was
so far an entity, separate from the persons
the association
can be assessed, and the
only damages which can be recovered are ‘ who were members of it, that itcould sue.and
be sued in this commonwealth as a corpor
such as the plaintiffs themselves have suf
ation can, it is quite clear that it was not a
of
fered independently of their membership
party to the contracts declared on. Match
the association.
The plaintiffs objected and
145, 7 N. E.
Co. v. llapgood, 141 Mass.
excepted to this ruling, so far as it limit
if a contract is made in the
ed damages.
The court overruled the de-, Rep. 22.
‘
name and for the beneﬁt
of a projected
fendants‘ demurrer, and they appealed; the
the
its
corporation, after
ruling being that the p!aintjfi’s could recover corporation,
cannot become a party to
1 organization,
such damages as they suffered independently
of the association formed under the statute, ‘ the contract, even by adoption or ratiﬁ
' cation of it.
Keiner v. Baxter, L. lt. 2
by reason of the non-performance of the contracts. A verdict was directed for the plain- l C. P. 174; Gunn v. Insurance Co., 12 U. B.
tiffs, with the understanding that the case
(N. S.) 694; Melhado v. Railway Co., L. R. 9
should be reported, and the same is now re
C. P. 503; In re Engineering Co., L. It. 16
Ch. Div. 125. Upon the facts reported in
ported, for the determination of the supreme
the present case, the defendants, as well as
judicial court. If the rulings are correct, the
the plaintiffs, must have understood that the
parties agree that the case shall be sent to an
assessor to assess the damages.
If the de- limited partnership was only projected, and
murrer should have been sustained, or if, up ! that the plaintiffs. acting jointly as individ
uals, or as general partners, constituted the
on the evidence, a verdict should have been
I
ordered ior the defendants, the verdict is to 3 only party who could contract with the (le
fendants in the manner proposed.
be set aside, and judgment for the defendants
It is evi
entered; unless the ground for orderiugjudgdent that both parties intended to enter into
As recitedin the report,
ment is such that it could have been cured I binding contracts.
if it had been pointed out at for the purpose of carrying out their agree
by amendment,
ment to form a limited partnership, “audio
the trial, in which case the court shall enter
the name of and for the beneﬁt of the projectsuch judgment or order as shall seem just.
ed company,
the plaintiffs applied to the de
1f the plaintiffs are entitled to recover such
fendants who made the contracts in question,
damages as were suffered by the association
and the plaintiffs made known to the defend
organized under the agreement of October 3,
‘
1862, the verdict is to be set aside, and a new
ants that the projected company would pro
ceed with its organization and would cause
trial ordered.
W. S. B. Hopkins, for plaintiffs.
F. P. a factory to be built for it, only in case they
could make a contract with the defendants
Goulding, for defendants.
\ to furnish the machines."
KNOWLTON. J. According to the terms ‘ We are of opinion, in view of the facts
of the repmtin this case, if the demurrer
known to both parties, that the plaintiffs
should have been sustained, on grounds which
must be deemed to have been jointly con
could have been removed by amendment, the
tracting in the only way in which they could
lawfully contract, and that they assumed the
plaintiffs are to be permitted toamend. The
defendants have made no point upon the
name “Penn Match Company, Limited," as
use of the present tense instead of the past I‘ that in which they chose to do business, in
tense in the allegation in the writ as to the ‘ reference to the projected limited partnership,
partnership of the plaintiffs, and, if that is
until their organization should be completed,
material, it may be corrected
by amend
and they should turn over the business tofhe
ment. ln each count of the declaration,
new company, which would be colnposed of
after alleging that there was a valuable1 themselves in anew relation. This seems to
consideration for the defendants‘ contract,
be warranted
by the language of the repo
the plaintiffs aver that the contract was
and entirely consistent with their porn .
made known to the defendants, and in t
reduced
to writing,
and set out as the
contract a writing which shows no consider
way only can effect be given to their ac
‘ .
ation nor mutuahty, but merely an undertak
The judgment in the former suit is no I.at
,1‘o
action,
this
for that suit was brou ht b
ing on one side.
state the contract truly,
they should set out in each count their own
different plaintiff.
€
On the subject of damages, the rel rt d
agreement which constituted the considera
tion for the agreement made by the defend
not sufﬁciently state the evidence t ena
ants.
The substantive grounds of defense
us fully to determine the rights of the part
rest upon the rulings, and refusals to rule, in
As we understand the rule laid down by '.1
“
the only dama
regard to the effect of the evidence.
There
presiding justice, that

of and for the beneﬁt of the projected limited
these contracts, the
partnership procured
aforesaid judgment is a bar to recovery in
this case. The court declined to rule as re
quested by the defendants, and ruled that the
association, by the agreement of October 3,
1882, is so far different from the orgauiv.ation of the plaintiffs, as general partners,
that in this case no damages suffered by
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which can be recovered are such as the plain
have suffered independently
oftlieir membership of the association," we
In the
are of opinion that it is too narrow.
view which we take of the agreement, the
plaintiffs contracted for articles to be deliv
They informed the de
ered to themselves.
fendants that they had agreed to organize a
limited partnership, of which they were to
be the sole members, and that they made the
contracts to enable them proﬁtably to carry
By
on business in their new organization.
breach of contract,
reason of the defendants’
the plaintiffs were unable to turn over to the
new company the property which they should
have rr ccived for that purpose, and they have
been unable to establish that company, and
start it in its work under such favorable au
spices, and with such an equipment for the
transaction of a proﬁtable business, as if the
defendants had performed their contracts.
The only damages for which thedefendauts are
liable to any one must be recovered in this
action, and, inasmuch as the machines could
not be procured in the market, we are of
opinion that the parties must be presumed to
have contracted in reference to the declared
purpose for which they were to be furnished,

tiffs themselves
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and that that purpose may be consi:leOQe.l in
Machine Co. v. Ry
assessing the damages.
der, 139 Mass. 366; Manning v. Fitch, 138
Mass. 273; Townsend v. Wharf Co., 117 Mass.
501; Somers v. Wright’ 115 Mass. 292; Cory
v. Iron-Works, L. 1t. 3 Q. B. 181; Portman
v. Middleton, 4 C. B. (N. S.) 322; Mcllose v.
Fulmer, 73 a. St. 365.
We do no intimate that the plaintiffs are
to receive any damages as members of the
limited partnership, but only that the dam
ages which they suﬁered, it any, by reason
of the defendants‘ preventing them from suc
cessfully establishing and ﬁtting out a busi
ness to be conducted by them as a limited
The mere
partnership. may be recovered.
fact that they arranged to conduct their busi
ness by a limited partnership, under the stat
ute of l’ennsylvania, does not deprive them
of the rights which they then had in the busi
ness, nor of the advantages
which properly
belonged to it.
The value of the articles con
tracted for may be estimated in reference to
their intended use in the business for which
the defendants were to furnish them.
The
plaintiffs are to have leave to amend their
writ and declaration as they shall be advised,
and the case is to stand for trial.
So ordered.

J
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soning supporting the rule adopted by the
In considering the question we must
court.
Iowa, 504.)
keep in view the rule, universally recog
(51 N. W. 249, 84
nized, that the damage for breach of con
Feb. 2, 1892.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
tract must be limited to such as would nat
Appeal from superior court of Council
urally come within the contemplation of the
Bluffs; J. E. F. Mt.Gee. Judge.
parties at the time the contract was made.
Action on a contract. in substance as.fol
The plaintiii, when it agreed to. furnish and
lows: “April 12th, 1889. D. Clipman, Esq.,
set the boilers, knew they were to be used
Council Bluffs, Iowa—Dear Sir: We will
in operating the boat; that a breach on its
furnish you one of our Scotch marine boil
part would deprive the plaintiff of its use;
ers, 54 dia., 84 long, made of 60,000 T. S.
it would naturally contemplate the value
' ' ' all the and
marine steel shells. 5-16;
of such use as the injury that would he sus
above delivered and set up, (you to do all
tained; and such is, as a matter of fact, the '5
wood-work,)--for the sum of ten hundred
The appellants cite a numactual damage.
We
and twenty-three dollars, ($1,023.00)
ber of cases, but all ‘except two, we think,
by the court.
will allow you three hundred and sixty dol
support the rule adopted
lars ($360.00) for your two engines. boiler,
Brown v. Foster, 51 Pa. St. 165, is a case
heater, and inspirater, wheels, shafting, and
quite similar to this. Repairs to a boat by
couplings. Hoping to receive your order, we
putting in machinery were to be completed
P. S. We
are, yours truly, Brownell & Co.
by October 1st. The work was not done un
guaranty to deliver above in thirty days from
til December 15th. The trial court gave, as
April 13th. It is understood you are to have
the rule of damage, “that the measure in
90 days’ option on sale of engine and boiler
such a case is the ordinary hire of such a
This
D. Chapman."
“Accepted.
you have."
boat for the time in question. for the time
action is to recover the balance of the con
plaintlff was in default." The complaint in
tract price, after deducting the $360 for the
that case of the rule as given was by the de
defendant,s engines, etc. There was a fail
fendant, who was seeking damage, and the
ure to deliver the boilers, etc., on the part‘ court said his complaint was without reason.
of the plaintiffs for some 18 days after the
The case cited is not authority for the ap
time speciﬁed in the contract: and the de
pellants‘ position. ln Mining Syndicate v.
fendant presents a counter-claim because of
Fraser, 130 U. S. 611, 9 Sup. Ct. 665, the in- f
the failure and for defective workmanship
terest on the investment in a mill that had 3
in putting in the boilers. A reply put in is
been delayed because of defective machinery
sue certain allegations of the counter-claim.
was allowed as the measure of damage, but’ .
and a trial by jury. resulting in a verdict
only in case the jury found there was no
and judgment for the defendant for $31.25.
evidence of the rental value of the mill. The
The plaintiffs appeal.
case clearly recognizes the rule as to rental
value as a‘ correct one. In Grifﬁn v. Colver,
Isaac Adams, for appellants. D. B. Daily.
16 N. Y. 489, is the following syllabus, hav
up
Burke,
for
Ambrose
Emmet Finley, and
ing full support in the opinion: “Upon a
pellee.
breach of a contract to deliver at a certain
day a steam-engine built and purchased for
GRANGER, J.
Manana is a
1. Lake
the purpose of driving a planing.mill and
small lake in the vicinity of Council Bluffs,
other deﬁnite machinery. the ordinary rent
summer
is
a
in Pottawattamie county, and
or hire which could have been obtained for
Boats are used on
and pleasure resort.
the use of the machinery whose operation
visitors,
of
accommodation
the lake for the
was suspended for want of the steam-engine
and among them was one known as the "hi.
In Nye v.
may be regarded as damages."
it‘. Rohrer," belonging to the defendant. The
Works, 51 Iowa, 120, 50 N. W. 988,
Alcohol
season
in
the
boat was operated on the lake
this general principle has support argumen
of 1888, and the boilers and machinery con
tatlvely, but another rule, because of distin
to
parties,
the
known
to
as
tracted for.
were_
The cases of
facts, is sustained.
guishing
reﬁt the boat for use in the season of 1889.
Allis v. McLean, 48 Mich. 4%. 12 N. W. 640.
A breach of the contract on the part of
and Taylor v. Maguire, 12 Mo. 313, are not
plaintiff by a failure to deliver within the
in harmony with this view, but they are
time is not questioned, and the important
clearly overborne by the weight of the other
proper
the
to
is
as
appeal
on
this
question
cases and the current of authority. The lat
The superior court‘ ad
.measnre of damage.
ter case cites. as decisive of the point,
show, and instructed the
to
evidence
,mitted
Blanchard v. Ely, 21 Wend. 312. In Griﬂin
dam
of
the
measure
jury on the theory. that
v. Colver, supra, the Blanchard Case is com
of the boat during
;age was the rental value
and. in effect,
mented upon and explained,
its
of
deprived
was
v
defendant
tthe time the
authority
claimed for it
the
of
is
divested
it
ap
in consequence of the breach. The
in the Missouri case.
{use
pcllants‘ thought is that the measure of dam
question had
But it is said that the boat
in
capital
invested
age is the “interest of the
is
By
this
value.
rental
established
something
no
This latter rule has
the boat."
the boat had never been rented.
that
meant
out
far
it
is
authority.
but
in
of support
But
will not do to say that because an ar
weighed by the number of cases and the rea
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damage in view in making the contract.
it
ticle has never been rented it has no rental
value, any more than it would to say that
will be seen that the cases are different. if
in the case at bar the defendant,s boat had
because .an article had never been sold it
been operated at an additional cost by do
has no market value.
We should assume
ing the same amount of work during the
that an article suitable and adapted for use
delay, it would be reasonable to say the dam
at a time and place has both a market and
age to him was the difference in the cost.
rental value, at least until the contrary ap
But his is an entire loss of use, and the value
pears. In Jemmison v. Gray, 29 Iowa, 537,
of such use is the damage, where it is proxi
this court approved an instruction that “the
fact, if proven,
mate, and not speculative or uncertain.
that 12,213 ties could not
A part of the counter-claim is for loss
have been purchased for immediate delivery
of time by men kept in readiness by defend
in the market at the places where said ties
ant to do the part of the work belonging to
were to be delivered on the 1st day of Oc
tober, 1869, would not, of itself, establish
him in adjusting the boilers and machinery,
as provided by the contract. On this branch
the fact that there was not a market price
of the case the court gave the following in
for such ties at such time and place." The
holding affords a strong presumption in favor
struction: “(5) If you ﬁnd from the evi
dence, and under the third and fourth in
of a market price. A like presumption
structions, that there was a contract, as set
would prevail in favor of an article having a
out, between plaintiffs and defendant,
value for hire at a time and place where such
and
that plaintiffs were in default in carrying
articles are in demand for use. The testi
mony shows that boats varying in size were
out said contract; and if you ﬁnd that, by
reason of such default, defendant was dam
rented on the lake during the season, both
aged; and if you further ﬁnd that defendant
by the day and for trips. This boat had per
haps twice the carrying capacity of any other
was in readiness to carry out his part of
said contract at the time speciﬁed therein;
boat on the lake, and in that respect formed
and that at the time he was in readiness to
an exception; but the rental value of boats
depended on their size and adaptation for
run and operate his boat; and that the boat
use, and it was competent for persons hav
was necessarily idle during the period of
ing knowledge of the business and prices
plaintiffs’ default, by reason of such default,
paid for other boats to give an opinion as to, —then the defendant would be entitled to
the rental value of such a boat as the one in recover the ordinary and reasonable rental
question. It is contended that the method
value of said boat during the time of said
of ascertaining the rental value involves the default, and such reasonable and necessary
uncertainties and facts on which proﬁts are amount (if there be any such amount) as he
may have been required to pay to any men
excluded as a rule of damage; but we think
that he may have employed during said en
not. It is true that rental values are general
ly ﬁxed from a calculation of the proﬁts to forced idleness for the purpose of running
said boat, if he had any such men in his
be derived from the use, but the rental is a
ﬁxed, deﬁnite value, agreed to be paid, and
employ who remained in his employ and idle
by reason of such default; and if you ﬁnd
the bailee assumes the uncertainties as to
that the defendant had placed himself in
the proﬁts.
readiness
The appellants say: “For an analogous
to work upon said boat himself
at the time speciﬁed in the contract for the
case to the one at bar, in there being an at
furnishing of said machinery, and that he
tempt to prove a rental value to property
necessarily remained idle during the time of
when the facts showed that the property in
question had no rental value, the court is
such default, if any, of the plaintiffs, and
used ordinary diligence to ﬁnd other employ
referred to Coal Co. v. Foster, 59 Pa. St. 365."
The case, as we we read it, is without a ment for that time, ybu will then further
bearing on the question.
ﬁnd the fair and reasonable value of his
The defendant
agreed to furnish for the coal company an
services during the period of such default
engine of a particular size and make. There
as part of the damage, if any, which defend
was no other engine of the kind that the ant sustained." Complaint is made of the
instruction, as stating an erroneous rule of
company could use. There was a delay in
damages, but we discover no error.. If, be
the delivery, and the company was compell
ed to transport its coal by horse-power, as it cause of the breach, the defendant lost his
had before done. The trial court gave the or the time of his empioyes, for such time
and expense he should be reimbursed.
rule “that the measure of damage for the de
The
lay was the ordinary hire of a locomotive
rule is recognized in Mining Syndicate v.
Fraser, supra. ‘The instruction fairly pro
during the period of \deiay." The reviewing
tccts the rights of the plaintiffs. A number
court gave the rule as the difference between
the cost of transporting the coal by horse and of other questions are argued, all of which
by locomotive power, but placed its ruling‘ we have examined, and ﬁnd no prejudicial
on the fact that the parties knew there was error. It would serve no good purpose to
no other engine to be operated on the track extend the opinion to present them. The
of the company, and could not have had such judgment is afﬁrmed.
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MASTERTON ET AL. v. MAYOR, ETC.,
OF CITY OF BROOKLYN.
(7 Hill, 61.)
Supreme Court of New York.

J an.
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of this covenant in 1837, and claimed
various items of special damage.
March 7, 1836, the plaintiffs entered into a
covenant with Kain & Morgan. This cove
nant, after referring to the one entered into
with the defendants, and reciting a part of
the same, provided that Kain & Morgan
should furnish from their quarry, in East
chester, all the marble required for erecting.
completing and ﬁnishing the city hall in the
city of Brooklyn, in such blocks, pieces and
proportions, and in such condition for work
ing, as is usual and customary; and deliver
the same to the plaintiffs, free of all ex
pense, on a wharf in the city of Brooklyn,
etc.; the blocks to be delivered so that there
should be suﬂicient time to work and lit the
same for the said superstructure, and equal
in quality to that used for the superstructure
and interior above the basement of the new
custom house in the city of New York, etc.
The remainder of the covenant was as fol
lows: "And the said parties of the ﬁrst
etc.,
part (the plaintiffs), in consideration,
and agree to pay the
do hereby covenant
said parties of the second part (Kain & Mor
gan) in the aggregate the sum of $112,395,
which amount shall be paid in different
sums, from time to time, out of the sum of
$271,600 to be paid by the said mayor, etc.
to the said parties of the
(the defendants),
ﬁrst part, as the same from time to time
may be paid to them, ctc.; that is to say:
The said parties of the ﬁrst part shall and
will make payment to the said parties of the
second part at the same times that they,
the said parties of the ﬁrst part, receive
their payments from the mayor, etc. (the defendants). And the several payments thus
to be made to the said parties of the second
part shall bear the same proportion, respec
tively, to the whole amount they are to re
ceive from the said parties of the ﬁrst part as
the corresponding payment to the said parties
of the ﬁrst part by the mayor, etc., bear to
the whole amount they are to receive under
their contract from the said mayor, etc.
And it is expressly understood and mutually
covenanted and agreed that in no event shall
the parties of the second part look to the
said parties of the ﬁrst part, or hold them.
responsible for any payments, until the said
parties of the ﬁrst part are ﬁrst placed in
sufﬁcient funds by the mayor, etc. (the de
breach
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This was an action of covenant commenc
ed in 184t), and tried at the New York cir
cuit in June, 1843, before Kent, C. J. The
case was this: January 26, 1836, a cove
nant was entered into between the defendaihts
and the plaintiffs, by which the latter agreed
at their own risk, costs and charges, to
furnish, cut, ﬁt, and deliver (properly and
suﬂiciently prepared for setting), at the site
of the city hall in the city of Brooklyn, all
the marble that might be required for build
ing the said city hall, according to certain
plans and speciﬁcations then exhibited and
and in
signed
parties,
by the respective
conformity with such drawings, molds and
patterns as should from time to time be fur
or architect of
nished by the superintendent
the said city hall; all of the said marble to
be of the same quality as that used for the
‘
ornamental and best work on the new custom
house in the city of New York, and of the
best kind of sound white marble from Kain
& Morgan,s quarry, in Eastchester, free from
spaits, cracks, and blemishes, and wrought
of workmanship, and
in the best manner
tooled and rubbed, etc., as should be ordered
by
superintendent.
It was further
the
agreed by the plaintiﬂ!s that they would pro
ceed forthwith to the execution of the work
with all diligence and with a suﬁicieut force;
and that they would commence the delivery
of the marble as soon after the opening of
navigation in the spring as might be re
quired, and continue delivering the same in
such order and at such times and as fast as
They also
the superintendent should direct.
agreed that the marble thus delivered should
be subject to inspection and rejection by the
superintendent,
and remain at the risk of the
plaintiffs until the superintendent inspected
in
and accepted it.
And the defendants,
stipulations,
consideration of the above
agreed to pay the plaintiffs the sum of $271,
600, at the times and in the manner follow
ing, viz. the sum of $10,000 when the base
ment of the said city hall was halt up; the
sum of $15,000 when the whole of the basement was up; the sum of $20,000 when the
ﬁrst story was half up; the sum of $20,000
when the whole of the ﬁrst story was up;
the sum of $20,000 when the second story
was half up; the sum of $20,000 when the
whole of the second story was up; the sum
of $20'000 when one-half of the cornice of
the superstructure was up; the sum of $20,
000 when the whole of the cornice was up;
the sum of $50,001) when the columns and
capitals were up; the sum of $2-3,000 when
the entablature was complete;
the further
sum of $20000 when the interior work was
done; and the remainder when the building
was, ﬁnished.
The declaration alleged a
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fendants). to enable them to make such pay
ment according
to the herein last before
mentioned provisions," etc.
The covenant with Kain & Morgan was
read in evidence by the plaintiffs, subject to
the right of the defendants to raise such ob
jections to its admissibility, during the prog
ress of the cause. as they might think prop
The plaintiffs also proved that they
er.
the delivery of the ma.rble in
commenced
pursuance of the covenant between them and
and continued so to do until
the defendants,
July, 1837, when the defendants suspended
upon the building for want of
operations

i
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funds, and refused to receive any more ma
terials of the plaintiffs, though the latter
were ready and _offered to perform.
The
entire quantity of marble necessary to ful
ﬁll the contract on the part of the plaintiffs,
according to the estimates made at the trial,
was 88,819 feet. At the time the work was
14,
,suspended,
the plaintiffs had delivered
779 feet, for which they were paid the con
tract price.
The plaintiffs then had on
hand. at Kain & Morgan,s quarry, about
3.308 feet, which was suitably ﬁtted and pre
pared for delivery. A witness swore that
this was not of much value for other build
ings. and would not probably bring over
two shillings
per
foot.
Other ‘witnesses
swore that, had the work progressed with
ordinary diligence,
it would have taken
about live years to complete the contract on
the part of the plaintiffs.
Considerable testi
mony was given tending to show the cost
of marble in the quarry, and the expense of
raising, dressing, and transporting it to the
place of delivery.
And the plaintiffs offered
.to show “what would be the difference
be
tween the cost to-them of the marble in the
'
contract, and the price that was to be paid
for it by the contract," which evidence was
objected to, but the circuit judge admitted
it, and the defendants excepted.
The wit
nesses answered that in 1836 the difference
would be about 20 per cent.; in 1837, from
25 to 30 per cent.; in 1838, about 25 per cent.;
in 1839, from 25 to 30 per cent.; and in
1840, from 30 to 40 per cent.
The witnesses
also testiﬁed that the ordinary proﬁt calcu
lated upon by master stone cutters was from
10 to 20 per cent., and that 15 per cent. was
a fair living proﬁt. All this testimony was
objected to, but the circuit judge admitted
it, and the defendants again excepted.
When the plaintiffs rested, the defendants
moved that all the testimony in relation to
the contract of Kain & Morgan with the
plaintiffs, and the contract itself, be exclud
ed from the consideration of the jury as ir
relevant, but the circuit judge overruled the
motion, and the defendants
excepted.
The circuit judge charged the jury, among
other things, that they were to allow the
plaintiffs as much as the performance of the
contract would have beneﬁted them; that
the plaintiffs were entitled to recover for the
unﬁnished marble not accepted, subject to
a deduction
of what should be deemed its
fair market value; that the jury should con
ﬁne the damages to the loss of the plaintiffs;
but that the beneﬁt or proﬁts which they
would have received from the actual per
formance constituted
such loss.
The cir
cuit judge also charged as follows:
“The
defendants ought to be allowed what the
jury should think just as to interest on the
outlays of the plaintiffs; also what the jury
might think just for the risk of transporta
tion, and the reasonable value of the marble
unaccepted and unquarried.
As to damages
on the rough marble to be delivered by Kain
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& Morgan, it appears by the contract with
the defendants that the plaintiffs were ob
liged to procure it from this quarry. The

plaintiffs‘ contract with Kain .& Morgan. if
made in good faith, was entered into as a
reasonable part of the performance by the
plaintiffs of their own contract; and if the
defendants,
by stopping the work, obliged
the plaintiffs to break their contract with
Kain & Morgan, then the damages on the
latter ought to be allowed to the plaintiffs,
who would be responsible to Kain & Mor
gan for the same.
The jury, in respect to
this contract, are to give the difference be
tween the contract price and what it would
cost Kain & Morgan to deliver the article,
deducting the value of it to them, and mak
ing all proper allowances as in the case of
the principal contract.
In ﬁxing the dam
ages to be allowed the plaintiffs, the jury are
to take things as they were at the time the
work was suspended, and not allow for any
increased beneﬁts they would have received
from the subsequent fall of wages or subse
quent circumstances." etc.
The defendants
excepted to the charge,
and requested the circuit judge to instruct
the jury, among other things; that no dam
ages should be allowed on account of any sup
posed proﬁts which the plaintiffs might have
made out of the unﬁnished work; and that
the damages allowed should be conﬁned to
the actual loss which the plaintiffs had sus
tained.
The judge refused to charge fur
ther, and the defendants excepted.
The jury
found a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for
$72,099,
and the defendants now moved for
a new trial on a bill of exceptions.
D. Lord and C. O‘Conor, for plaintiffs.
F. Butler and G. Wood, for defendants.

B.

NELSON, C. J. The damages for the
marble on hand, ready to be delivered, were
not a matter in dispute on the argument.
The true measure of allowance in respect to
that item was conceded to be the difference
between the contract price and the market
value of the article at the place of delivery.
This loss the plaintiffs had actually sustain
ed, regard being bad to their rights as ac- .
qulred under contract.
The contest arises out of the claim for dam
ages in respect to the remainder of the mar
ble which the plaintiffs had agreed to furnish,
but which they were prevented from furnish
ing by the suspension of the work in July,
1837.
This portion was not ready to be de
livered at the time the defendants broke up
the contract,
but the plaintiffs were then
willing and offered to perform in all things
on their part, and the case assumes that they
were possessed of sufﬁcient means and abil
ity to have done so.
The plaintiffs insist that the gains they
would have realized, over and above all ox
penses. in case they had been allowed to per
form the contract, enter into and properly
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into the account in ascertaining the true
measure of damages, they usually have refer
ence to dependent
and collateral engagements entered into on the faith and in ex
pectation of the performance of the principal
contract.
The performance or non-perform
ance of the latter may and often does exert a
material inﬂuence upon the collateral enter
prises of the party; and the same may be
said as to his general affairs and business
transactions.
But the inﬂuence is altogether
too remote and subtile to be reached by legal
proof or judicial investigation.
And besides,
injurious, are as oft
the consequences,‘when
en, perhaps, attributable to the indiscretion
and fault of the party himself as to the con
duct of the delinquent contractor.
His condi
tion, in respect to the measure of damages,
ought not to be worse for having failed in
person whose affairs
his engagement to
than if
had been made
were embarrassed
with one in prosperous or aﬁluent circum
stances.
Dom. bk.
tit.
art. 4.
But proﬁts or advantages which are the di
rect and immediate fruits of the contract en
tered into between the parties stand upon
different footing.
These are part and parcel
of the contract itself, entering into and con
stituting a portion of its very elements; some
thing stipulated for, the right to the enjoy
ment of which is just as clear and plain as to
the fulﬁllment of any other stipulation. They
are presimied to have been taken into consid
eration and deliberated upon before the con
tract was made and formed; perhaps the
only inducement to the arrangement.
The
parties may, indeed, have entertained diﬂ!er
ent opinions concerning the advantages of the
bargain, each supposing and believing that he
had the best of it; but this is mere matter
of judgment going to the formation of the
contract, for which each has shown himself
willing to take the responsibility, and must,
therefore; abide the hazard.
Such being the relative position of the con
tracting parties,
is diﬂienlt to comprehend
why, in case one party has deprived the oth
er of the gains or proﬁts of the contract by
refusing to perform
this loss should not
proper item in estimating the
constitute
damages.
from the general
To separate
los would seem to be doing violence to the
intention and understanding of the parties,
and severing the contract itself.
The civil law writers plainly include the
loss of proﬁts, in cases like the present, with
in the damages to which the complaining
They hold that he is to be
party is entitled.
indemniﬁed for “the loss which the non-per
of the obligation has occasioned
formance
has depriv
him, and for the gain of which
Evans, Poth. 90; .Dom. bk.
tit.
ed him."
And upon looking into
12.
arts.
the common-law authorities bearing upon the
question, especially the later ones, they will
he found to come nearly, if not quite, up to
the rule of the civil law.
Barn. & G. 1-45,
In Boorman v. l\,ash,
9
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constitute a part of the loss and damage oc
and they were ac
casioned by the breach;
cordingly permitted in the course of the trial
tending to show what
to give
evidence
amount of gains they would have realized if
the contract had been carried into execu
tion.
On the other hand, the defendants say that
this claim exceeds the measure of damages
allowed by the common law for the breach
They insist that it
of an executory contract.
is simply a claim for the proﬁts anticipated
from a supposed good bargain, and that these
are too uncertain, speculative, and remote to
form the basis of a recovery.
It is not to be denied that there are proﬁts
or gains derivable from a contract which are
uniformly rejected as too contingent and
speculative in their nature, and too dependent
upon the ﬂuctuation of markets and the
chances of business, to enter into a safe or
Thus any
reasonable estimate of damages.
operation
party
supposed
successful
the
might have made, if he had not been prevent
of the con
ed from realizing the proceeds
tract at the time stipulated, is a considera
tion not to be taken into the estimate. Be
sides the uncertain and contingent
issue of
such an operation in itself considered, it has
no legal or necessary
connection
with the
stipulations between the parties, and cannot,
therefore, be presumed to have entered into
their consideration at the time of contracting.
It has accordingly been held that the loss of
any speculation or enterprise in which a par
ty may have embarked, relying on the pro
ceeds to be derived from the fulﬁllment of
an existing contract, constitutes
no part of
the damages
to be recovered
in case of
breach.
So a good bargain made by a ven
dor, in anticipation of the price of the article
sold, or an advantageous contract of resale
made by a vendee, conﬁding in the vendor,s
promise to deliver the article, are considera
tions always excluded as too remote and con
tingent to affect the question of damages.
(‘lare v. Maynard, 6 Adoi. & E. 519, and Cox
v. Walker, i‘n the note to that case; Walker
416; Gary v. Gru
v' Moore, 10 Barn. &
Hill, 627, 628; Chit. Cont. 458, 870.
man,
The civil law is in accordance with this
rule.
“In general," says Pothier, "the par
ties are deemed to have contemplated
only
the damages and interest which the creditor
might suffer from the nonperformance of the
obligation, in respect to the particular thing
which is the object of it, and not such as may
have been incidentally occasioned thereby in
respect to his other affairs.
The debtor is
therefore not answerable for these, but only
for such as are suffered with respect to the
thing which is the object of the obligation,
"Dalnni et interesse ipsam rem non habitam."
Evans, Poth. 91. And see Dom. bk.
tit.
arts. 3-6.
When the books and cases speak of the
good bargain
proﬁts anticipated from
as
matters L0o remote and uncertain to be taken

§

88

in
appeared that the defendant
contracted
November for a quantity of oil, one.half to
be delivered to him in February following,
and the rest in March; but he refused to re
ceive any part of it.
And the court held that
the plaintiff was entitled to the difference
between the contract price and that which
might have been obtained in market on the
days when the contract ought to have been
See .\i’Lean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722.
completed.
The case of Leigh v. Paterson, S Taunt. 540,
was one in which the vendor was sued for
not delivering goods December 31st, accord
ing to his contract.
It appeared that in the
month of October preceding he had apprised
the vendee that the goods would not be deliv
cred. at which time the market value was
31st. The
, considerably less than December
court held that the veudee had a right to re
gard the contract as subsisting until Decem
ber 31st, if he chose and recover the differ
ence between the contract price, and the mar
ket value on that day. See, also, Gainsford
v. Carroll, 2 Barn. & C. 624.
The above are cases, it will be seen, in
I’ which the proﬁts of a good bargain were re
garded as a legitimate item of damages, and
constituted almost the only ground of recov
ery.
And it appears to me that we have only
o
to apply the principle of these cases to the
one in hand, in order to determine the meas
ure of damages which must govern it.
The
contract here is for the delivery of marble,
.wrought in a paticular manner, so as to be
ﬁtted for use in the erection of a certain build
ing. The plaintiffs‘ claim is substantially
one for not accepting goods bargained and
sold; as much so as if the subject.matter of
the contract had been bricks. rough stone, or
any other article of commerce used in the
process of building.
The only diﬂiculty or
embarrassment
in applying the general rule
grows out of the fact that the article in ques
tion does not appear to have any well-ascer
tained market value.
But this cannot change
the principles which must govern, but only
the mode of ascertaining the actual value of
the article, or rather the cost to the party pro
ducing it. Where the article has no market
value, an investigation into the constituent
elements of the cost to the party who has
contracted to furnish it becomes necessary;
and that, compared with the contract price,
will afford the measure of damages. The
jury will be able to settle this upon evidence
of the outlays, trouble, risk, etc., which enter
into and make up the cost of the article in
the condition required by the contract at the
If the cost equals or ex
place of delivery.
ceeds the contract price, the recovery will of
course be nominal, but, if the contract price
exceeds the cost, the difference will constitute
the measure of damages.
It hhs been argued that inasmuch as the
furnishing of the marble would have run
through a period of ﬁve years,—of which
about one year and a half only had expired at
the time of the suspension,-the
beneﬁts
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which the party might have realized from the
execution of the contract
must necessarily
be speculative and conjectural; the court and
jury having no certain data upon which to
make the estimate.
If it were necessary to
make the estimate upon any such basis, the
argument would be decisive of the presentl
But, in my judgment, no such neces-1
claim.
sity exists.
Where the contract, as in thist
case, is broken before the arrival of the time!
for full performance, and the opposite party
elects to consider it in that light, the market
price on the day of the breach is to govern
in the assessment of damages.
In other

words, the damages are to be settled and as
certained according to the existing state of
the market at the time the cause of action
arose. and not at the time ﬁxed for full per
formance.
The basis upon which to esti
mate the damages, therefore. is just as ﬁxed
and easily ascertained in cases like the pre
ent, as in actions predicated upon a failure to
perform at the day.
It will be seen that we have laid altogether
out of view the subcontract of Kain & Mor
gan. and all others that may have been en
terc:l into by the plaintiffs as preparatory
and subsidiary to the fulﬁllment of the prin
cipal one with the defendants.
Indeed,
am an
able to comprehend how these can be taken in
to the account, or become the subject-matter of
consideration at all, in settling the amount of
damages to be recovered for a breach of the
principal contract.
The defendants had no‘
control over or participation in the making
of the subcontracts, and are certainly not to},
be compelled to assume them if dmprovident
ly entered into.
On the other hand, if they
were made so as to secure great advantages
to the plaintiffs’ surely the defendants are.‘
not entitled to the gains which might be re
alized from them.
In any aspect, therefore,
present a most unﬁt as
these subcontracts
well as unsatisfactory basis upon which to
estimate the real damages and loss occasion
ed by the defamt of the defendants.
The
idea of assuming that the plaintiffs were nec
essarily compelled to break all their subcon
tracts as a consequence of the breach of the
principal one. and that the damages to which
they may be thus subjected ought to enter
into the estimate of the amount recoverable I‘
against the defendants, is too hypothetical
and remote to lead to any safe or equitable
result.
And yet the fact that these subcon
tracts must ordinarily be entered into prepar
atory to the fulﬁllment of the principal one,
shows the injustice of restricting the dam
ages, in cases like the present, to compensa
tion for the work actually done, and the item
of materials on hand. We should thus throw
the whole loss and damage that would or
might arise out of contracts for further mate
rials, etc., entirely upon the party not in

I

fault.

If there was a market value of the article
in this case, the question would be a simple
one. As there is none, however, the parties
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will be obligQd to go into an inquiry as to
the actual cost of furnishing the article at
the place of delivery; and the court and jury
should see that in estimating this amount it
be made upon a substantial basis, and not
be left to rest upon the loose and specula
tive opinions of witnesses.
The constituent
elements of the cost should be ascertained
from sound and reliable sources; from prac
tical men, having experience in the particu
lar department of labor to which the con
tract relates.
It is a very easy matter to
ﬁgure out large proﬁts upon paper;
but it
will be found that these, in a great majority
of the cases, become seriously reduced when
subjected to the contingencies and hazards in
A jury should
cident to actual periormance.
scrutinize with care and watchfuinessany spec
ulative or conjectural account of the cost of
furnishing the article that would result in a
very unequal bargain between the parties, by
which the gains and beneﬁts. or, in other
words, the measure of damages against the
defendants,
unreasonably
are
enhanced.
They should not overlook the risks and con
tingencies which are almost inseparable from
the execution of contracts like the one in
question, and which increase the expense in
dependently of the outlays in labor and cap
.
ital.
Those views, it will be seen, when con
trasted with the law as expounded and ap
plied by the circuit judge, necessarily lead to
the granting of a new trial.

BE.-.\lli)SLEY, J. The circuit judge clearly
erred in that part of his charge to the jury
which related to the contract of the plaintiffs
with Kain & Morgan. No damages are al
lowable on account of this contract, nor am I
able to see how it can be regarded as rele
vant evidence upon any disputed point con
nected with the amount for which the de
fendants are liable.
The main question in the case arises out of
the claim of the plaintiffs in respect to that
portion of their contract with the defendants
which remained wholly unexecuted in July,
1337.
1 think the plaintiffs are entitled
to
recover the amount they would have realized
as prolits had they been allowed fully to
execute their contract.
The defendants are
not to gain by their wrongful act, nor is that
to deprive the plaintiffs of the advantages
they had secured by the contract, and which
would have resulted to them from its per
forlnunce.
The jury must, therefore, ascer
tain what it would probably have cost them
to complete the contract, over and above the
matermls on hand, including the value of the
marble required, the labor of quarrying and
preparinglt for use, the expense of transpor
tation, superintendence, and insurance against
all hazards, together with every other ex
pense incident to the fulﬁllment of the under
taking. The aggregate of these expenditures
is to be deducted from the amount which
would be payable for the performance of this
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part of the contract, according to the prices
therein stipulated, and the balance will be
the damages which the jury should allow for
the item under consideration.
Remote and contingent damages, depending
on the result of successive schemes or in
vestments, are never allowed for the violation
of any contract.
.But proiits to be earned
and made by the faithful execution of a fair
contract are not of this description.
A right
to damages equivalent to such proﬁts results
directly and immediately from the act of the
party who prevents the contract from being
performed.
Where a vendor has agreed to sell and de
liver personal property at a particular day,
and fails to perform his contract, the vendee
may recover in damages the difference be
tween the contract price and the market value
of the property at the time when it should
have been delivered.
Chit. Cont. (3th Am.
Ed.) 445; Dey v. Dox, 9 Wend. 129; Gains
ford v. Carroll, 2 Barn. & C. 624; Shepherd
v. Hampton, 3 Wheat. 200; Quarles v. George,
23 Pick. 400; Shaw v. Nudd, 8 Pick. 9; 2
So, if a person
Phil. Ev. 104.
who has
agreed to purchase goods at a certain price
refuses to receive them, he must pay the dif
ference between their market value and the
enhanced price which he contracted
to pay.
2 Starkie, Ev. (7th Am. Ed.) 1201; Boorman
v. Nash, 9 Barn. & C. 145.
These principles are strictly applicable to
the present case. In reason and justice there v
can be no difference between the damages
which should be recovered for the breach of
an ordinary agreement to buy or sell goods
and one to procure building materials,
ﬁt
them for use, and deliver them in a ﬁnished
state, at a stipulated price.
In neither case
should the wrongdoer be allowed to proﬁt by
his wrongful act. The party who is ready
to perform is entitled to a full indemnity for
the loss of his contract.
He should not be
uffer by the delinquency of the
made to
other party, but ought to recover precisely
what he would have made by performance.
This is as sound in morals as it is in law.
Shannon v. Comstock, 21 Wend. 461; Miller
v. Mariner,s Church, 7 Greenl. 51; Shaw v.
Nudd, 8 Pick. 13; Swift v. Barnes, 16 Pick.
196; Royaiton v. Turnpike Co., 14 Vt. 311.

The plaintiffs were not bound to wait till
the period had elapsed for the complete per
formance of the agreement, nor to make suc
cessive offers of performance,
in order to re
cover all their damages.
They .might re
gard the contract as broken up, so far as to
absolve them from making further efforts to
perform and give them a right to recover full
damages as for a total breach.
am not pre
pared to say that the plaintiffs might not
have brought successive suits on this cove
nant, had they from time to time made im
peated offers to perform on their part. which
were refused by the defendants, but this the
plaiutiffs were not bound to do.
There can be no erious difllculty in as

I

DIRECT AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES—IN CONTRACT.
damages according to the principles
which have been stated.
The contract was
and, according to the testi
made in 1836;
mony, about ﬁve years would have been a
reasonable time for its execution.
That time
has gone by.
The expense of executing the
contract must necessarily depend upon the
If prices ﬂuc
prices of labor and materials.
tuated during the period in question,
that
sessing

may be shown by testimony.
In this respect
there is no need of resorting to conjecture,
for all the data necessary to form a correct
estimate of the entire expenses of executing
the contract can now be furnished by wit
nesses.
If the cause had been brought to trial be
fore the time for completing the contract ex
pired, it would have been impracticable to
make an accurate assessment
of the dam
ages.
This is no reason, however, why the
injured party should not have his damages,
‘although the diﬂiculty in making a just as
sessment in such a case has been deemed a
suﬂicient ground for decreeing speciﬁc per
Adderly v. Dixon, 1 Sim. & S.
formance.
In Royaltou v.
607, and cases there cited.
Turnpike Co., 1i Vt. 311, 324, an action was
brought on a contract which had about twelve
years to run.
And the court held, in grant
ing a new trial, that the rule of damages
"should have been to give the plaintiffs the
difference between what they were to pay
the defendants, and the probable expense of
performing the contract; and thus assess the
for the remaining twelve
entire damages
No rule which will be absolutely
.\‘ears."
certain to do justice between the parties can
Some time
.be laid down for such a case.
must be taken arbitrarily at which prices are
to be ascertained
and estimated;
and the
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day of the breach of the contract. or of the
commencement of the suit. should perhaps be
adopted under such circumstances.
But we
need not, in the present case, express any
No conjectural esti
I opinion on that point.
. mate is required
what would
to ascertain
‘V have been the expense of a complete execu
tion of this contract; but the state of the
market in respect to prices is now susceptible
. of explicit and intelligible pfoof. And where
that is so, it seems to me unsuitable to adopt
an arbitrary period, especially
as the esti
must, in any .event, be
mate of damages
somewhat conjeetural.
I think the defendants are entitled to a new
trial, and that the damages should be assess
ed upon the principles stated.

BRONSON, J. As the marble had no mar
ket value, the question of proﬁts involves an
inquiry into the cost of the rough material in
the quarry, and the expense of raising, dress
ing, and transporting it to the place of deliv
ery.
There may have been ﬂuctuations in
the prices of labor and materials between the
day of the breach and the time when the con
tract wss to have been fully performed; and
this makes the question on which my breth
ren are not agreed.
I concur in opinion with
the chief justice, that such ﬂuctuations in
prices should not be taken into the account
in ascertaining the amount of damages, but
that the court and jury should be governed
entirely by the state of things which existed
at the time the contract was broken.
This
is the most plain and simple rule; it will
best preserve the analogies of the law; and
will be as likely a any other to do substan
tial justice to both parties.
New trial granted.
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SHER.\IA.\‘ CENTER TOWN
ARD.

(26

Supreme

Pac.

Court

71?.

CO. v. LEO1\,-

46 Kan. 354.)

of Kansas.

May

9,

1891.

Error from district court, Sherman
county; Lotus K. PRATT, Judge.
Hardy & Sterling, for plaintiff in error.
Bngley & Andrews, ior defendant in error.

J.

Thomas Y’.l,,eona rd re
for $600 against the
Sherman (‘enter Town Company as dam
age for .the breach oi a contract.
Leon.lOHNS’l‘(lN.

cov,ered

‘

\I

a _iudgment;

nrd owned a hotel in Ita.-sca,and Sherman
Center, which was three miles away, was
a candidate ior county-seat of Sherman
county.
The town company, desiring to
increase the population and inﬂuence of
Sherman Center and strengthen its can
didacy, held out inducements to the citi
zens of the surrounding towns to remove
their buildings and establish themselves
in business in Sherman Center, and unite
in an efiort to make that town the coun
Accordingly
they
ty-seut oi the county.
entered into an agreement with Leonard
by which Leonard was to join them in
building up the town, and remove his
oi
hotel from Itasca, in consideration
which the company was to convey to
him certain lots in Sherman Center. and
provide at its own expense men and ma
chinery to remove the hotel, and place it
over a cellar oi equal size. and on a ioun
dation of a similar kind, as it was then
resting upon in Itasca. The plaintiff ai
lege‘Lthat the company had failed and re
fused to remove the hotel in accordance
with the terms of the contract; that the
other buildings which were then situated
in Itasca have been removed to Sherman
Center, and the town of Itasca has become depopulated, and the business of
hotel keeping oi no value; and that the
hotel now stands alone, with no town
nearer toit than Sherman Center. which is
n‘early three miles distant. He further al
leged that it was a large and well-iur
nished hotel, and that the cost oi its con
struction and the furniture contained
therein was about $4,500. It is alleged
that the cost of removal would be about
the sum oi $500, and that he suffered damages by the refusal oi the company to
comply with the contract in the sum oi
He thereiore asked judgment ior
$1.200.
$2,000. The company
by its answer de
nies the execution oi the contract, or that
it is authorized by its charter to enterin
to the contract alleged tohave been made.
There are several errors assigned by the
company, but only one of them requires
attention. it appears that the company
has conveyed the lots to Leonard. as stip
ulated in the contract, but.the hotel has
removed, and, according
not been
to
plaintiffs testimony. the non-removal is
owing to the reiusaloi the company to
furnish the men and machineryior that
purpose, although frequent demands have
been made upon them. In the course of
the trial the plaintiff testiﬁed that, by
reason oi the removal oi the people and
their buildings from other towns. Sher
man Center became a ﬂourishing place oi
several hundred people, where he could

have proﬁtably carried on the hotel busi
ness, but that the town oi Itasca was
practically abandoned, so that he is with
out business, and simply remains at the
hotel to protect the goods and furniture
therein. In order to prove the extent oi
his iniury, the following question was
asked and allowed by the court over the
“State, as
objection oi the defendant:
near as you can, what would have been'
your proﬁts. or what your damages was,
in other words, by reason of the non-iul
ﬁllment oi this contract,—not moving
your hotel and establishing your business
Another question
. at Sherman Center."
was allowed, over objection, was:
0
' which
“State what the damage was by reason
your hotel to Sher
. oi them not moving
‘
man Center, as they agreed to,in money.”
He answered that the loss or proﬁts
would have been $l-50 a month, and that I
the total damage sustained by reason of
not having the hotel located at Sherman
Center, besides the cost oi moving the
building. was from $1,200 to $1,500, and
that it would cost about $800 to move the
building.
The questions asked were ob
jectionable, and the testimony given was
inadmissible, upon two grounds: First, .
the questions were objectionable because
they did not call for speciﬁc facts, but
permitted the witness to state a mere
opinion. giving in the lump the amount of
damages thought to be sustained.
ltis
the function of the court orjury trying
the case to determine from evidence prop
, erly presented what the amount
oi dam
ages sustained is. and, whiieit might be
very convenient for the plaintiff to per
1 mit him and his witnesses to give the
damages suffered in a lump, it would be a
very unsafe practice to allow them to
state the amount of damages supposed to'
‘ be sustained, without regard to the facts
i or knowledge upon which
their opinions
were based. It is well settled that the
Roberts v.
practice is not permissible.
Commissioners, 21 Kan. 248; Railroad Co.
v. Kuhu,38 Kan. 675, l7 Pac. Rep. 322;
Town (1o. v. MorrisI 39 Kan. 377. 18 Pac.
Ilep. 230; Railway Co. v. .\'eiman, 45 -Knn..
,l‘iu.u.uu'-in, lne prosptci
93$. 2.i Put‘. 2!.
ive proﬁts that he lost by the breach of
the contract are too remote, uncertain,
Who
. and speculative
to be recoverable.
can tell what the future gains of the hotel
business would have been in Sherman
Center. if he had moved there‘! His past
proﬁts in Itasca were not shown, and
there is no testimony of the gains of oth
ers estabiished in the same business at
Sherman Center. How, then, does Leon
ard know that the protits would have
been $150 per month? The gains to be
derived from the business depended upon
many contimzencies other than the mere
removal of his hotel to that place. The,
growth oi the town; the location of the
county-seat there or at another town
near by; the immigration and travel;
the competition in the hotel business; the
price of provisions and the cost ofhelp:
the general reputation of the house; and
the popularity oi the landlord with the
traveling public and the people oi that
comm unity,—are suggested as some of the
that would affect the an
considerations
ticipated beneﬁts. Where the breach of a

I

DIRECT AND CONSEQUl£NTI.\L
contract results in the loss oi deﬁnite

, profits,

which are nscertainable, and were
within the con Lempiation oi the contract
in;r parties. they may generally be recov
ered: but the prospective proﬁts do not
furnish the correct measure of damages in
the present case. Aside from the remote,
conjectnrai. and speculative character of
I the anticipated beneﬁ ts, it cannot be said
that the loss oi them is the direct and un
:\ roidable consequence of
the breach.
The plaintifi could not sit idle an indeﬁ
__ nite length oi time. and safely count on the
recovery of $150 per month as damages.
if there was a breach oi the contract. it
was his duty. upon learning of it, to at
once remove the building. or employ oth
ers to do so. and charge the cost of the re
moval to the town company.
The law
requires that the injured party shall do
whatever be reasonably can, and improve
opportunities
. all rc:1.~4onable
to lessen
the injury. From the testimony it ap
pears that Leonard could have procured
others to move the hotel: and in such a
- case the ordinary measure oi damages is
the cost oi removal, and the reasonable
expenses of avoiding the consequence ot
the defendant,s wrong. Railway Co. v.
Mihiman. 17 Kan. 224; Loker v. Damon.
17 Pick. 284: l Sedg. Dam. 16-3, and cases
cited. Counsel ior plaintiff in error say
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that no more than the cost of removal
was allowed by the court: but the ad
evidence,
mission ol the objectionable
against the opposition oi the plaintiff in
error, would indicate that the court

adopted an incorrect measure of damages,
and did not limit the recovery to the ex
pense oi the removal.
The liability of the
plaintiff in error ior any loss is not con
ceded.
It is shown in the testimony that
soon after the time ior the removal of the
building the people of Sherman (‘enter
abandoned the attempt to obtain
the
county-scat. and all or nearly all of them
moved to another place.
It is claimed
by plainﬁfiin error that Leonard objected
to the removal o! his building until the
question oi the location of the county.scat
was settled. He testiﬁed at the trial that
he did not intend to move the building
to Sherman Center’ and that he would
not move the building at all. until the
county-scat was permanently located. If
the non-removal oi the building was due
to the fault of Leonard, he is not entitled
to recover anything.
This is a disputed
question of fact, which must be settled on
another trial. For the error oi the court
in admitting testimony the judgment of
the court below will be reversed. and
cause remanded ior anew trial. All the
justices concurring.
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BADGLEY & W. .\IANUF,G CO.
WABASH, ST. L. & P. RY. CO.

’1‘HO.\lAS,
v.

(22

N. W.

827,

62

Wis.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

642.)

March

31, 1885.

Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee coun
ty.
Chapin, Dey & Friend, for appellant'
Dyke &. Van Dyke, for respondent.

Van

C. J. On the tenth of November,
the plaintiff, as consignee, caused to be
delivered to the defendant, a common car
circular
rier. at St. Louis, a pipe-machine,
shaft, box of dies, and wrenches accompany
‘ing. and being a part of the pipe-machine,
to be transported over its road and connect
ing lines to Milwaukee. The machine and
its attachments were badly broken and de
stroyed while in the custody of the defend
ant through the negligence of its servants.
The machine was a patented one’ and the
right to make and sell it was vested in the
manufacturer at St. Louis, of whom it was
purchased by the plaintiff. The machine
was devised for cutting pipe and making
nipples, and was ordered by the plaintiff to
in Milwaukee, of
be used in its business
ﬁtting pipe and manufacturing brass goods,
etc. The plaintiff sues to recover damages
for the loss of the machine, and the loss of
its use in its business while another was be
ing procured.
The case was tried by a jury.
which found a special verdict. The plaintiff
had judgment for the value of the machine,
which wa proven to be $275, and for the loss
of its use for 85 days, at the rate of $1.50 per
day, and interest thereon
from the com
mencement of the action.
The questﬁins presented on the appeal are
as to the proper rule of damages.
There
was evidence which tended to show that the
machine, though badly broken and some of
its parts destroyed, might have been repair
ed by the patentee at St. Louis, who was
the manufacturer. The plaintiff refused to
accept the machine at Milwaukee, but left;

COLE,
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it in the possession of the carrier, and or
dcred a new machine of the manufacturer.
One question arlsinglin the record is wheth
er it was the duty of the plaintiff, under the
circumstances, to have received the machine
in its damaged condition, and to have made
proper and reasonable exertions to have it
so as to render the loss to the car
r(4l4tllrP(i.
rier as light as posible. There is a class of
cases which decide that it is not only the
moral but the legal duty of a party who
seeks redress for another,s wrong, to make
use of his opportunities of lessening the dam
age caused by the other’s default. If it had
been within the power of the plaintiff to
have supplied the broken parts of the ma
chine, or to have repaired ‘it with reason
able labor and expense. it might have beem its
duty to have done so within this rule of law.
But the jury found that the machine when

CONTRACT.

delivered was useless; that the cost and ex
pense to the plaintiff to repair it would have
amounted
to the price of a new machine.
This ﬁnding is criticised by the counsel for
the defendant, but we are not inclined to dis
turb it.
As we have said, the machine was a pat
ented one; its parts were not kept for sale
in the open market; and there was evidence
that it would cost any one but the manu
facturer more to make the patterns for the
castings than the price of a new machine.
The plaintiff, therefore, could not have had
the machine repaired in Milwaukee at any
saving to the carrier. But it is said it might
have returned the machine to the manufac
turer in St. Louis, who testiﬁed that it could
have been repaired for $75. True, the manu
facturer, in answer to this hypothetical ques
tion, namely, “Supposing the bottom part of
the machine was broken in two pieces, the
attachments consisting of a box of dies
broken open and contents scattered in the
car, oil-cup on the machine burst, skids on
which machine and attachments were origi
nally placed broken, legs on standard of ma
chine broken, and rods connected with them
bent, what was the damage, in your estima
witness said the
tion, to the machine?"—the
question was a diﬂicult one to answer, but
added, as we understand him, that if the
damages
included all that was
supposed
done to the machine, and none of the parts
were missing. and no other injury was done
to it, then it would cost about $75 to repair
it. But the witness subsequently modiﬁed
his statements upon this point by saying that
with the fragments of the machine which
it would
from the defendant,
he received
cost not less than $2.30 to repair it. It ap
peared that some of the most expensive parts
were mising, and in the state of the proof
the jury might well ﬁnd, as they did, that
the cost and expense to the plaintiff at the
time to have the machine repaired by the
manufacturer, and the broken parts replac
ed, would be as much as the price of a new
machine.
It is very clear that the machine
in its damaged condition was of no value to
the plaintiff. It was not a case of a partial
_but of a total loss, so far as plaintiff was
concerned.
The general rule of damages for
the loss of goods by a carrier, where it is
liable for such loss, is the value of the goods
at the destination to which it undertook to
carry them, with interest on such value from
the time when the goods should have been
delivered.
Nudd r. Webs, 11 Wis. 408; 2
Sedg. Dam. 94, note b; Hutch. Carr. ii 769.
The plaintiff did not claim to recover more
for the machine than it had paid for it at
It appeared that it
St. Louis, to-wit, $275.
had paid the freight, $3.85. which of course
So our con
should be added to the recovery.
clusion upon this branch of the case is that

the court below was right in allowing the
plaintiff to recover upon the verdict the cost
of the machine. There was a stipulation in
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plaintiff would use it; and, of course, did
not know that the plaintiff would sustain
any special damage if the property failed to
be delivered promptly, in good order.
From
the nature of ‘the subject
is difﬁcult to
state an inﬂexible rule of damages which
will apply to all contracts. This court has
often referred to, and has practically acted
upon, the rule laid down in the leading case
of Hadley v. Baxendale,
Exch. 341.
In
that case the plaintiffs, who were owners of
a ﬂour-mill, sent a broken iron shaft to an
oﬂice of the defendant, a common carrier, to
be conveyed
shaft made.

a

i.

a

a

to the consignee, to have
new
The defendant’s clerk was told
that plaintiffs mill was stopped, and that
the broken shaft must be delivered immedi
ately to the consignee, but it was delayed
for an unreasonable time. In consequence
of the delay the plaintiffs did not receive the
new shaft for some days after the time they
ought to have received it, and they were
unable to work their mill for want of the
new shaft, and thereby incurred a loss of
proﬁts.
The court held that under the cir
cumstances such loss could not be recovered
.
in an action against the common carrier,
because the special circumstances
were nev
er communicated to it by the plaintiffs. Al
derson, B., in giving the decision, states the
rule of damages as follows:
contract,
“Where two parties have made
which one of them has broken, the damages
which the other party ought to receive in re
spect of such breach of contract should be
such as may fairly and reasonably be con
e., ac
sidered either arising naturally.
cording to the usual course of things, from
such breach of contract itself, or such as
may reasonably be supposed to have been in
the contemplation of. both parties, at the
time they made the contract, as the prob
able result of the breach of it. Now, if the
special circumstances under which the con
tract was actually made were communicated
by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus
known to both parties, the damages result
ing from the breach of such acontract, which
they would reasonably contemplate,
would
be the amount of injury which would ordi
narily follow from the breach of contract
under these special circumstances so known
But, on the other hand,
and communicated.
if these special circumstances were wholly
unknown to the party breaking the contract,
he, at the most, could only be supposed to
the amount
have had in his contemplation
of injury which would arise generally. and,
in the great multitude of cases, not affected
by any special circumstances from such
breach of contract."
This rule has been sometimes criticised,
and
has been said that, generally, when
parties enter into a contract, they do not
contemplate its breach or the probable result
of a breach, and that the rule might be more
accurately expressed.
See Pailes, C. B0 in
Hamilton v. McGill, 12 1r. Law, 202. But,

it

it

it

a

it
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the bill of lading that in case of loss or dam
age to goods during transportation, whereby
the defendant incurred a responsibility, that
then it should only be liable for the value of
the property computed at the place and time
of shipment.
This was precisely the extent
of the recovery on this item of damages.
The next question is, was the plaintiff en
‘
titled to recover for the loss of the use of
the machine while another was being pro
cured to supply the place of the one destroy
ed? This question, upon the circumstances
in
of this case,
e think must be answered
the ﬁrst place, it is to be ob
the negative.
served that there is no allegation in the com
plaint, and no proof was give on the part of
the plaintiff, which tended to show that the
defendant had notice of the use to which the
machine was to he put, or even knew that the
in its business.
plaintiff intended to use
On the contrary, the agent of the defendant
who made the contract of shipment says he
had no notice of the purpose for which the
machinery was to be used. He said he was
applied to by the manufacturer in St. Louis
about this particular shipment, and gave
pecial rates, less than the regular tariff, on
representation made by the manufacturer
that the goods were not liable to injury, and
that he wanted to introduce the machine,
which was a new one, through the west, and
wished the assistance of the witness in do
ing so. This is all the knowledge the de
fendant had about the property, or the use
to which it was to be put. it is said the
fact that the consignee in the bill of lading
manufacturing company was sufficient
was
notice that the machine was intended to be
We do not think
used by it in its business.
so. The defendant certainly had no notice
of the business in which the plaintiff was
engaged, and did not know that this ma
chine had been procured for ﬁtting pipe and
making nipples. Should we presume—as we
have no right to do—that the defendant had
knowledge of plaintiff,s business, surely we
could not presume that this machine was
for immediate use.
ordered by
This being the state of the evidence, on
what ground can the plaintiff claim dam
ages for loss in the use of the machine? The
president of the plaintiff testiﬁed that his
company was doing business of steam-ﬁtting
and selling pipe at wholesale, and in the fall
of 1882 he was told he would need a ma
chine to cut the pipe. This was the reason
for buying the machine. He says: “We
were. besides, doing some steam-ﬁtting our
selves. and. of course, we have to cut pipe
all the time to get special lengths, and in
stead of using men we paid a man to do
with the machine. The machine would do
the work of one man." This is really all
there is in the case to base a claim for loss
in the use of the machine upon. The de
fendant did not know what the machine was
designed for; did not know the use to which
was to be put; did not even know the
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without reﬁning on the rule, its application
the question we are considering is ob
for here the defendant
vious and decisive;
was not informed by the plaintiff that the
machine was one which it needed for use in
its business of cutting and ﬁtting pipe, and
If
that it was procured for that purpose.
one desires to trace the judicial discussion
of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, he will
ﬁnd a most excellent and accurate analysis
in
.of the English and American decisions
note a, 1 Sedg. Dam. (7th Ed.) top p. 218.
Also see note 2 to section 772, Hutch. Carr.

servants, on a quay at Glasgow. for ship
ment on board the defendants vessel, which
lay along.side, several cases containing ma
chinery, which was intended for the crec
tion of a saw-mill at Vancouver,s island.
The master gave a bill of lading for them,
describing the cases as containing “merchan
dise."
The defendant knew generally of
what the shipment consisted.
On the ar
rival of the vessel at her destination, one of
the cases, which contained machinery with
out which the mill could not be erected,
could not be found on board, and ‘the plain
tiffs were obliged to send to England to re
1). 597.
place the lost article. Held, that the defend
In Brayton v. Chase, 3 Wis 456, which
ant was liable for the loss of the machinery,
was an action by the vendee against the
as delivery to the defendant,s servants along
vendor for failure to deliver a reaper which
side the vessel was equivalent to a delivery
the plaintiff purchased to harvest his crops,
on board. Held, also, that the measure of
the plaintiff sought to prove that he suffered
damages for the breach of the contract was
great loss and damage in his crops, and in
the cost of replacing the lost articles in Van
the extra expense of hiring hands, by rea
couver,s island, with interest at 5 per cent.
son of the non-fulﬁllment of the contract to
upon the amount until judgment, by way of
deliver. ‘The evidence was excluded, and
compensation for the delay."
this court aliirmed the ruling, holding that
But we deem it unnecessary to pursue this
such damages did not result naturally and
directly from the injury complained of. It
discussion further. The case of Brown v.
Railway Co. 54 Wis. 342, S. C. 11 N. W. 356.
may be doubtful whether this decision is
911, i
entirely consistent with Richardson v. Chyno
referred to by plaintiff,s counsel to
weth, 26 Wis. 656; Smeed v. Foord, 1 El. 8;
sustain the claim for damages for loss of the
use of the machine; but that was a case for
El. 602; Gee v. Railway Co. 6 Hurl. & N.
211; Collard v. Railway Co. 7 Hurl. & N. 79;
a personal injury and has no application to
this case. We have already said that the
Eibiriger A("tien-Gesellschafft v. Armstrong,
L. R. 9 Q. B. 473; Wils0n v. Railway Co. 9 . jury found that the machine was so dam
aged, while in the custody of the defendant
vC. B, (N. S.) 632; Griﬂin v. Colver, 16 N. Y.
as carrier, as to be entirely useless to the
490; Vicksburg & M. it. Go. v. Ragsdnle, 46
plaintiff. The plaintiﬂ! is therefore entitled
Miss. -i58;.and cases of that class. For. as
to recover the value of the machine, found
we understand the Brayton Case. the vendor
to be $275, including the freight paid by
knew that the reaper was wanted for the
plaintiff of $3.85, and interest on this amount
purpose of harvesting the plaintiffs crop
from November 22, 1882, the time the prop
that season. If it were not delivered in time
erty reached its destination.
for that purpose the parties might well be
presumed
to have known that the vendee
would be put to additional expense in secur
BY THE COURT. The judgment of the
‘ing his crops_ But still the case is fully sup
circuit court is reversed, and the cause is
retuanded,'with directions to enter judgment
ported by British Columbia Saw.mill Co. v.
L. R. 3 C. P. 499. In this tree
on the verdict in accordance with this opin
l\,ettleshipI
ion.
“the plaintiffs delivered to the defendant,s
.to
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et ttl. v.
(78 Ala.

CARLISLE.

243.)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. Term, 1884.

Appeal from circuit court, Lee county;
Henry D. Clayton, Judge.
Action against Brigham & Co. for breach
of a contract employing plaintiff as a trav
I eling salesman to sell goods on commission.
There was a judgment for plaintiff, from
which defendants appealed.

J. M. Chilton,
Barnes, contra.

.

for

appellants.

W.

H.

CLOPTON, J. It may be conceded that
at common law a defendant can insist upon
.the beneﬁt of the statute of fraud by plea
of the general issue. Under our statute,
which provides that “in all suits where the
defendant relies on a denial of the cause of
action as set forth by the plaintiff he may
plead the general issue, and in all other
cases the defendant must brieﬂy plead spe
cially the matter of defense." The statute of
frauds must he pleaded, or it will be consid
ered as waived. Bitch v. Thornton, (35 Ala.
309; Petty v. Dill, 53 Ala. 641. No plea of the
statute of frauds having been interposed, the
validity of the contract, because not in writ
ing, cannot be raised by a charge.
If the statute had been pleaded, the con
tract, as set out in the bill of exceptions,
it was
does not come within its inhibition.
1881, and, as testiiied
made in September,
by the plaintiff, was to commence on the
1st of October, and continue at least eight
months, and longer if mutually desirable at
the end of that time. By its terms it was
capable of performance within a year. The
statute applies to contracts which, by ex
press stipulation, are not to be performed
within one year from the making thereof,
and not to contracts which by their terms are
determinate within that period, but may be
continued longer at the option of the parties.
Heﬂin v. Milton. 69 Ala. 354.
The third charge requested by the defend
ants based their right to abandon the con
tract on the naked fact, unexplained, that the
plaintiff did not commence the performance
of the contract until January 1, 1882. The
violation of a contract by one of the parties,
or when he is unable to perform the acts or
services stipulated, may be suﬂicient to au
thorize the other party to abandon it. Sick
ness of the plaintiff for a protracted period,
such as would probably have disabled him
from making sales during the appropriate
season, as contemplated
and intended by
the contract, might perhaps have authorized
the defendants to abandon the contract; but
there was no implied condition that the
plaintiff would continue in health. Its
abandonment in such case is at the election
of the defendants; and they will be held to
have -waived their right to renounce the con
tract when. after the delay has terminated,
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they regard and treat it as continuing and
in force. Stewart v. Cross, 66 Ala. 22 The
charge requested by the defendants ignored
the material facts: the detention of the
plaintiff by sickness in New York until near
the end of November; the letter of the de
fendants of December 12th, in reply to one
from the plaintiff, in which they stated
samples would be furnished him during the
week, and cautioning him as to the credit of
certain ﬁrms, and samples having been ac
tually sent to him late in December; which
facts there was evidence tending to prove.
Whilst a party has the right to require an
instruction as to the legal effect of the evi
dence, when, conceding all adverse infer
ences from the conﬂicting evidence, the un
disputed facts establish a legal conclusion
in his favor, a charge is properly refused
which asserts a legal proposition, based
on certain speciﬁed facts, but ignores other
facts, which there is evidence
tending to
prove, showing the incorrectness
of the le
gal conclusion asserted in the charge.
The burden of proof is on the party having
the aﬁirmative of the particular issue. Pleas
of payment and set-off were ﬁled by defend
ants, and the onus
of establishing their
truth was on them. The legal effect of the
second charge requested by the defendants
is to instruct the jury, if they found the evi
dence in equilibrium on any or all the issues
presented, which includes the issues of pay
ment and set-off, to ﬁnd ior the defendants.
Being calculated to mislead, it was properly/
refused.

The material Question is the measure of
damages.
The primary purpose of awarding ,
damages is actual compensation to the party
injured, whether by a tort or by breach of a
contract; though there are exceptional cases
in which exemplary or punitive damages are
allowed. Owing to the ever-occurring diﬂ!er
ences in the circumstances, and in the spe- ,
clal conditions of the contracting parties, it
has been found difﬁcult, if not impossible,
to lay down general and deﬁnite rules as to
the measure of damages, applicable to all
cases of a class.
From a mlsconstruction of
expressions of eminent jurists, not suﬂl
ciently guarded for general use, but adapted
to the case in hand, the applications of rules
commonly recognized have been as wtrious
as the cases. \The proposition that.all dam
ages are recoverable
which are in the con
templation of the parties, is not strictly cor
’
rect.
§The primary rules are, the damages
must be the natural and proximate results
of the wrong complained of, and must not
be merely speculative or conjectural. These
must concur, though founded on different
principles, and are distinct and independ
ent of each other.
The law presumes that
a party foresees tile natural and proximate‘
results of a breach of his contract or tort.
and hence these are presumed to be in his
legal contemplation. For such damages. as
a general rule, the party at fault is liable.
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But there are damages' which are in the
contemplation of the parties at the time of
making the contract, and are the natural and
proximate results of itsbreach which are not
The parties must necessarily
'. recoverable.
contemplate the loss of proﬁts as the direct
and necessary consequence of the breach of
a contract, and yet all proﬁts are not with
There
in the scope of recoverable damages.
are numerous cases, however, in which prof
its constitute, not only an element, but the
measure, of damage.
While the line of de
marcation is often dim and shadowy, the
distinctive features consist in the nature
and character of the proﬁts. When they
orm an elemental
constituent of the con
ract, their loss the natural result of its
breach, and the amount can be estimated
with reasonable certainty,—such certainty as
satisﬁes the mind of a prudent and impa.rtial
person.—they
are allowed. The requisite to
their allowance is some standard, as regular
market values, or other established data, by
reference to which the amount may he sat
isfactorily ascertained.
Illustrations of prof
its recoverable
are found in cases of sales
of personal property at a ﬁxed price, evic
tions of tenants by landlords, articles of part
nership, and many commercial contracts.
On the other hand, “mere speculative prof
its, such as might be conjectured would be
the probable result of an adventure, defeated
by the breach of a contract, the gains from
which are entirely conjectural, and with re
spect to which no means exist of ascertain
ing even approximately the probable results,
cannot, under any circumstances, be brought
\ within the range of recoverable damages."
1 Suth. Dam. 141.
Proﬁts speculative, con
jectural or remote are not, generally, regarded
as an element in estimating the damages.
In
Pollock v. Gantt, 69 Ala. 373, it is said:
“What are termed ’speculative
damages,—
that is, possible, or even probable, gains, that
it is claimed would have been realized but
for the tortlous act or breach of contract
charged against a defendant—are too remote,
and cannot be recovered."
The same rule has
been repeatedly asserted by this court.
Cul
ver v. Hill, 68 Ala. 66; Higgins v. Mansﬁeld,
62 Ala. 26"; Burton v. Holley, 29 Ala. 318;
White v. Miller, 71 N. Y. 118; French v.
Ramge, 2 Neb. 254; 2 Smith, Lead. Gas. 574;
Olmstead v. Burke, 25 Ill. 86. The two fol
lowing cases may serve to illustrate the dif
ference between proﬁts recoverable and not
recoverable.
In Insurance Co. v. Noxson,
84 Ind. 347, an insurance agent,
who had
been discharged without cause before the
expiration of his contract, was allowed to
include in his recovery the probable value of
renewals on policies previously obtained by
him, upon which future premiums would, in
the usual course of business, be received by
the company, on the ground that the amount
of compensation due on such renewals can
be ascertained
with requisite certainty by
the use of actuary’s life tables and compari
sons, and that the basis of the right to dam

and was not to be built in the
future. In Lewis v. Insurance Co., 61 Mo.
with approval in the
534, which is cited
other case, the same rule as to the probable
value of renewals was held; but it was also
held that an estimate of the probable earn
ings of the agent thereafter, derived from
proof of the amount of his collections and
commissions before the breach of the con
tract, in the absence of other proof, is too
speculative to be admissible.
Proﬁts are not excluded from recovery be
cause they are proﬁts; but, when excluded.
it is on the ground that there are no criteria
by which to estimate the amount with the
certainty on which the adjudications of
courts and the ﬁndings of juries should be
based. The amount is not susceptible of
proof. In 3 Suth. Dam. 157, the author dis
criminatingly
observes:
“When it is ad
visedly said that proﬁts are uncertain and
speculative,
and cannot be recovered, when
there is an alleged loss of them, it is not
meant that proﬁts are not recoverable mere
ly because they are such, nor because prof
contingent.
its are necessarily speculative,
and too uncertain to be proved; but they are
rejected when they are so; and it is probable
that the inquiry for them has been generally
proposed when it must end in fruitless un
certainty; and therefore it is more a general
truth than a general principle that a loss of
proﬁts is no ground on which damages can
be given." When not allowed because specu
lative, contingent, and uncertain, their ex
clusion is founded by some on the ground of‘
remoteness, and by others on the presump
tion that they are not in the legal contempla
tion of the parties.
The plaintiff, by the contract, undertook
the business of traveling salesman for the
defendants.
The amount of his commissions
depended, not merely on the number and
amounts of sales he might make, but also on
the proportional quantity of the two classes
of goods sold, his commissions being differ
ent on each. The number and amounts of
ages existed,

sales depended
state of trade,

on many

contingencies,—the

the demand for such goods,
their suitableness to the different markets,
the ﬂuctuations of business, the skill, energy,
and industry with which he prosecuted the
business, the time employed in effecting dif
ferent sales, and upon the acceptance of his
sales by the defendants.
There are no cri
teria, no established data, by reference to
which the proﬁts are capable of any estiniate.
They are purely speculative and conjectural.
Besides, the evidence
is the mere opinion
and conjecture of the plaintiff, without giv
ing any facts on which it was based. The
bare statement, uncorroborated by any facts,
and without a basis, that “the reasonable‘
sales would have been ﬁfteen thousand doi
lars, and that the net proﬁts on that amount
of sales would have been four hundred and
ﬁfty dollars," is too conjectural to be ad
missible.
\Vashburn v. Hubbard, 10 Lans. ii.
Reversed

and remanqted.
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CI-IRISTIANCY, J. When this cause was
formerly before us (Chandler v. Allison, 10
Mich. 400), one of the questions involved
was whether Allison, the plaintiff, was
rightfully in possession of the store at the
time the trespass was committed, or wheth
er his right of possession was dependent up
on Chandler’s election to rebuild, and ceased
when that election was made; and one of
the grounds upon which the judgment in
that case was reversed was the rejection of
evidence tending to show that Allison,s
right of possession was thus qualiﬁed. But
as the case now appears before us upon ex
ceptions taken on the new trial, the ﬁnding
of the jury, whether right 0! wrong,—no ex
ception having been taken to the evidence
or the charge upon this point,—requires us
to treat this question, so far as we are now
to consider the case, as settled in favor of
the plaintiff; and the defendant must be
entering upon
considered
as a trespasser,
the premises and tearing down the store
while in the rightful possession of the plain
tiff, under a lease for a term which would
not expire till the 1st day of May following.
The only question presented by the pres
ent bill of exceptions, and not already dis
posed of by our former decision, is the ques
tion of damages; and in this action of tres
pass (as parties are under no necessity of
protecting themselves
by contract a;:ains
trespasses) the question of damages is to be
treated in all respects as it would have been
had the trespass been committed by a party
between whom and the plaintiff the relation
of landlord and tenant did not exist, except
so far as the good faith of the defendant,
and the absence of malice on his part,
might preclude the plaintiﬂ‘ from the recov
ery of damages of a punitory and exem
plary character, beyond the amount which
Upon
would compensate
the actual loss.
this point (the question of exemplary dam
ages) we think the court below was right in
instructing the jury that, if they should
in tearing down the
tind the defendant,
store. acted in good faith, and under an
honest bclicf that he had a legal right to do
so, then the plaintiff could only recover his
This qualiﬁcation of the
actual damages.
right of a jury to give punitory or exempla
ry damages in actions of trespass is, we
think, in accordance with the principle up
on which such damages are sometimes al
But whether the rulings
lowed to be given.
of the court upon the admission of evidence,
and in the charge to the jury, did not lay
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down too narrow a rule for the estimation
of actual damages, is the main question for
our consideration.
While in many cases the rule of damages
is plain and easy of application, there are
many others in which, from the nature of
the subject-matter, and the peculiar circum
in some
stances, it is very diiiicu1t—and
cases impossible—to lay down any deﬁnite,
ﬂxed rule of law by which the damages ac
tually sustained can be estimated with a
reasonable
or even a
degree of accuracy,
probable approximation to justice; and the
injury must be left wholly, or in great part,
unredressed,
or the question must be left to
the good sense of the jury upon all the facts
and circumstances of the case, aided by
such advice and instruction
from the court
as the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case may seem to require.
But the
strong inclination of the courts to adminis
ter legal redress upon ﬁxed and certain
rules has sometimes led to the adoption of
such rules in cases to which they could not
be consistently or justly applied.
Hence
there is, perhaps, no branch of the law upon
which there is a greater conﬂict of judicial
decisions, and none in which so many mere
ly arbitrary rules have been adopted.
We
have carefully examined all the cases cited
in the very elaborate briefs of the respective
counsel, and the most approved elementary
treatises upon the subject, and, without at
tempting here to compare and analyze them
(which would require a treatise), we are
compelled to say that the line of mere au
thority upon questions of damages like that
here presented,
if any such line can be
traced through the conﬂict of hostile deci
sions, is too confused and tortuous to guide
us to a safe or satisfactory result, without
\,esort to the principles of natural justice
and sound policy which underlie these ques
'ons, and which have sometimes been over
ooked, or obscured by artiﬁcial distinctions
and arbitrary rules.
The principle of compensation for the loss
or injury sustained is, we think, that which,
lies at the basis of the whole question ofi
damages in most actions at common law,i
whether of contract or tort. We do not
here speak of those actions in which puni
tory or exemplary damages may be given,
nor of those whose principal object is the
establishment of a right, where merely nom
inal damages are proper.
But, with these
exceptions, the only just theory of an action
for damages, and its primary object, would
seem to be that the damages to be recover
ed should compensate the loss or injury sus
tained.
We concur entirely with the court
of appeals in New York in Griffin v. Colver,
10 N. Y. 492, in repudiating the doctrine
by Mr. Sedgwick from Domat
adopted
(Sedgw. Dam. 3, 37, 38, etc.), that “the law
aims not at the satisfaction, but the divi
Such, it is true, is often
sion of the loss.“
the result of an action, but never the object
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which tend to limit damages in an action upon
' contract,

a

it

a

a

a

it

it

a

it

a

to those
which have no application
purely of tort.
Contracts are made only by
the mutual consent of the rewective parties;
consideration, thereby
and each party, for
consents that the other shall have certain
rights as against him, which he would not oth
erwise possess.
In entering into the contract
the parties are supposed to understand its le
gal effect, and, consequently, the limitations
which the law, for the sake of certainty, has
ﬁxed for the recovery of damages for its
breach.
If not ‘satisﬁed with the risk which
these rules impose, the parties may decline to
enter into the contract, or may ﬁx their own
rule of damages when, in their nature, the
Hence, when suit
amount must be uncertain.
is found
is brought upon such contract, and
that the entire damages actually sustained can
violation of such
not be recovered without
loss, the risk of which
rules, the deﬁciency is
the party voluntarily assumed on entering into
the contract, for the chance of beneﬁt or ad
vantage which the contract would have given
His position is
him in case of performance.
one in which he has voluntarily contributed to
place himself, and in which, but for his own
consent, he could not have been placed by the
wrongful act of the opposite party alone.
Again, in the majority of cases upon con
tract, there is little diﬂiculty, from the nature
rule by which sub
of the subject, in ﬁnding
stantial compensation may be readily estimat
ed; and
is only in those cases where this
cannot be done, and where, from the nature of
or the subject-matter,
the ac
the stipulation,
tual damages resulting from ‘a breach, are
more or less uncertain in their nature, or diﬂl
cult to be shown with accuracy by the evi
dence, under any deﬁnite rule, that there can
be any great failure of justice by adhering to
such rule as will most nearly approximate the
is precisely in these
And
deshed result.
in their
classes of cases that the parties have
power to protect themselves against any loss
to arise from such uncertainty, ‘by estimating
their own damages in the contract itself, and
providing for themselves the rules by which
the amount shall be measured, in case of a
breach; and if they neglect this, they may be
presumed to have assented to such damages as
may be measured by the rules which the law,
for the sake of certainty, has adopted.
Again, in analogy to the rule that contracts
should be construed as understood and as
part of
sented to by the parties,—if not as
which are the natural,
that rule,—damages
and, under the circumstances, the direct and
necessary result of the breach, are often very
properly rejected, because they cannot fairly
be considered as having been within the con
templation of the respective parties at the time
of entering into the contract.
have
None of these several considerations
any bearing in an action purely of tort. The
injured party has consented to enter into no
relation with the wrongdoer by which any haz
ard of loss should be incurred;
nor has he re
I

it

is

is

is

a

is

it

\it

by a ﬁxed rule, than to
not be estimated
leave the whole matter entirely at large
with the jury, without any rule to govern
their discretion, or to detect or correct er
In such
rors or corruption in the verdict.
cases, therefore, there has been a strong in
(.lination to seize upon such elements of cer
tainty as the case might happen to present,
and as might approximate co\npensation,
and to frame thereon rules of law for the
might
measurement
of damages, though
be evident that further damages must have
been suffered, which however, could only be
estimated
as matter of opinion, and must
therefore be excluded under the rules thus
not to be denied that this
adopted.
And
course of decision has sometimes been ex-‘
tended to actions purely of tort.
But whatever plausibility there may be in
the theory of Mr. Sedgwick when applied to
actions upon contract,—a plausibility which
arises from mistaking the result for the ob
principle, when
ject.—the injustice of such
applied to cases of actual, positive tort, like
that here in question, would be so gross as
to shock all sense of justice.
It has been frequently said that the rule of
no fraud, willful neg
damages, where there
ligence, malice, oppression, etc.,
the same in
actions of tort as in those upon contract.
But
doubtless true in its ap
though the J.emark
plication to those cases of tort where. from the
nature of the case, elements of certainty exist,
may be
compensation
ubstantial
by which
readily estimated, and other cases which are
can
but nominally in tort, we do not think
principle of universal applica
be accepted as
tion; nor, in our opinion, can
be justly ap
plied to any case of actual, aggressive tort,
where, from the nature and circumstances of
the case itself, no such elements of certainty
are found to exist, or none which will apply
substantially to the whole case; nor to any
case where the rule applicable to breaches of
material portion of
contract would exclude
the damages the injured party may have suf
fered, though the amount of the latter may not
be capable of accurate calculation by any ﬁxed
and deﬁnite rule.
are some important
considerations
There
a

TORT.

it

of the law. The law may, and often does,
tail of doing complete justice, from the imperfection of its means of ascertaining
truth, and tracing and apportioning elIects
to their various causes; but it is not liable
of doing positive injustice
to the reproach
Such a doctrine would tend not
by design.
only to make the law itself odious, but to’
corrupt its administration, by fostering a
disregard of the just rights of parties.
In
actions upon contract, especially, and those
nominally in tort, but substantially upon
contract, courts have thought it generally
safer, upon the whole, to adopt certain def
inite rules for the government of the jury
by which the damages could be estimated,
at the risk of falling somewhat short of the
actual damages, by rejecting such as could

i
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in those upon contract.
ceived any consideration. or chance of beneﬁt
Such is quite gener
ally the case in trespass and trover for the
or advantage. for the assumption of such haz
taking or conversion of personal property, if
ard; nor has the wrongdoer given any consid
eration, nor assumed any risk, in consequence
the property [as it generally is) be such as can
The injured par
be readily obtained in the market and has a
of any act or cdnsent of his.
market value.
But shall the injured party in
ty has had no opportunity to protect himself
an action of tort, which may happen to furnish
by (ontract against any uncertainty in the es
no act of his has contrib
no element of certainty, be allowed to recover
timate of damages;
no damages (or merely nominal) because he
uted to the injury; he has yielded nothing by
consent; and, least of all, has he consented
cannot show the exact amount with certainty,
though he is ready to show, to the satisfaction
that the wrongdoer might take or injure his
of the jury, that he has sul'i"ered large damages
property or deprive him of his rights, for such
by the injury?
Certainty,
it is true, would
sum as, by the strict rules which the law has
thus be attained;
established
for the measurement of damages
but it would be the certain
And, though a rule of cer
ty of injustice.
in actions upon contract, he may be able to
show, with certainty. he has sustained by such
tainty may be found which will measure a por
taking or injury. Especially would it be un
tion, and only a portion, of the damages, and
just to presume such consent, and to hold him
exclude a very material portion, which it can
to the recovery of such damages only as may
be rendered morally certain the injured party
be masmved with certainty by ﬁxed and deﬂ
has sustained, though its exact amount cannot
nite rules, when the case is one which, from
be measured by a ﬁxed rule; here to apply
its very nature, affords no elements of cer
any such rule to the whole case. is to misapply
it; and so far as it excludes all damages
tainty by which the loss he has actually suf
fered can be shown with accuracy by any evi
which cannot be measured by it pcrpetrates
Is he positive injustice under the pretense of admin
dence of which the case is susceptible.
istering justice.
to blame because the case happens to be one
of this character?
He has had no choice, no
The law does not require impossibillties,
selection.
The nature of the case is such that
and cannot, therefore, require a higher de
gree of certainty than the nature of the
the wrongdoer has chosen to make it, and upon
every principle of justice he is the party who
And we can see no good reason
case admits.
for requiring any higher degree of certainty
should be made to sustain all the risk of loss
in respect to the amount of damages than
which may arise from the uncertainty pertain
ing to the nature of the case, and the diﬂiculty
in respect to any other branch of the cause.
of accurately estimating the results of his own
Juries are allowed to act upon probable and
wrongful act. Upon what principle of right inferential, as well as direct and positive
And when. from the nature of the case.,
can courts of justice assume, not simply to proof.
the amount of the damages cannot be esti
divide this risk, which would be thus far un
just. but to relieve the wrongdoer from it en
mated with certainty, or only a part of them
tirely, and throw the whole upon the innocent
can be so estimated, we can see no objection
Must not such a comse of to placing before the jury all the' facts and
and injured party?
circumstances
of the case, having any tend
decision tend to encourage trespasses, and op
ency to show damages, or their probable
erate as an inducement for parties to right
amount;v so as to enable them to make the
themselves by violence, in cases like the pres
ent?
inost intelligible and probable estimate which
This
the nature of the case will permit.
Since. from the nature of the case, the dam
ages cannot be estimated with certainty, and
should, of course, be done with such instruc
there is a risk of giving by one course of trial ltions and advice from the court as the cir
‘less, and by the other more than a fair com 'cumstances of the case may require. and as
pensation,—to say nothing of justice,—does not “nay tend to ‘prevent the allowance of such
as may be merely possible, or too remote or
sound policy require that the risk should be
fanciful in their character to be safely con
thrown upon the wrongdoer instead of the in
jtrred party?
However this question may be sidered as the result of the injury.
answered, we cannot resist the conclusion that‘
In the adoption of this course it will sel
dom happen that the court, hearing the evi
it is better to run a slight risk of giving some
dence, will not thereby possess the means of
what more than actual compensation. than to
1 adopt a rule
forming a satisfactory judgment whether
which. under the circumstances of
the damages are unreasonable or exorbitant;
the case, will, in all reasonable probability,
and, if satisﬁed they are so, the court have
preclude the injured party from the recovery
always the power to set aside the verdict
of a large proportion of the damages he has
actually sustained from the injury, though the and grant a new trial.
.
cannot be estimated
amount thus excluded
The justice of the principles we have en
with accuracy by a ﬁxed and certain rule.
deavored to explain will, we think, he sufﬁ
ciently manifest in their application to the
Certainty is doubtless very desirable in esti
mating damages in all cases; and where, from
present case. The evidence strongly tended
to show an ouster of the plaintiff for the
the nature and circumstances1 of the case, a
rule can be discovered by which adequate com- ' balance of the term by the defendant,s art.
pensation can be accurately measured. the rule
should be applied in actions of tort, as well as

This term was the property of the plaintiff:
and, as proprietor. he was entitled to all the
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beneﬁts he could derive from it. He could
not by law be compelled to sell it for such
and.
sum as it might be worth to others;
when tortiously taken from him against his
will, he cannot justly be limited to such sum
—or the difference between the rent he was
paying and the fair rental value of the prem
ises—if the premises were of much greater
and peculiar value to him, on account of the
business he had established in the store, and
the resort of customers to that particular
place, or the good will of the place, in his
His right to the full en
trade or business.
joyment of the use of the premises, in any
manner not forbidden by the lease, was as
clear as that to sell or dispose of it, and
was as much his property as the term itself,
and entitled to the same protection from the
laws. He had used the premises as a jewel
ry store, and place of business for the re
pairing of watches, making gold pens, etc.
This business must be broken up by the
ouster, unless the plaintiff could obtain an
other ﬁt place for it; and if the only place
he could obtain was less ﬁtted and less valu
able to him for that purpose, then such busi
ness would be injured to the extent of this
difference;
and this would be the natural, di
’
rect, and immediate consequence of the injury.
To conﬁne the plainiiff to the difference between the rent. paid and the fair rental value
of the premises to others for the balance of
the term would be but a mockery of justice.
To test this, suppose the plaintiff is actually
paying that full rental value, and has estab
lished a business upon the premises, the clear
gains or proﬁts of which have been an aver
age of one thousand dollars per year, and he
is ousted from the premises, and this busi
ness entirely broken up for the balance of the
term, can he be allowed to recover nothing but
six cents damages for his loss? To ask such
a question is to answer it. The rule which
would conﬁne the plaintiff to the difference
between such rental value and the stipulated
rent can rest only upon the assumption that
the plaintiff might (as in case of personal
property) go at once into the market and ob
tain another building equally well ﬁtted for
the business, and that for the same rent;
and to justify such a rule of damages this
assumption
must be taken as a conclusive
of law. However such a pre
presumption
sumption might be likely to accord with the
fact in the city of New York, in most west
ern clties and towns it would be so obviously
contrary to the common experience of the
facts as to make the injustice of the rule
gross and palpable.
But we need not further
discuss this point, as a denial of any such
presumption
was clearly involved in our
former decision.
The plaintiff in this case did hire another
store. “the best he could obtain, but not
ncarly so good for his business"; “his cus
tomers did not come to the new store, and
there was not so much of a thoroughfare
by
lt,—not one-quarter
of the travel; and he

V

relied much upon chance custom, especially
in the watch-reparing and other mechanical
business."
This injury to the plaintiff,s busi
ness was as clearly a part of his damages as
the loss of the term itself. This point, also,
was decided in the former case, and we there
further held that the declaration was suiﬁ
cient to admit the proof of this species of
loss.
i
Now, if the plaintiff is to be allowed to
recover for this injury to his businms, it
would seem to follow, as a necessary con
sequence, that the value of that business before the injury, as well as after‘, not only
might. but should be shown, as an indis
pensable means of showing the amount of
loss from the injury. If the business were a
losing one to the plaintiff before, his loss
from its being broken up or diminished (if
anything) would certainly be less than if it
were a proﬁtable one. It is not the amount
of business done, but the gain or proﬁt aris
ing from it, which constitutes its value.
But it is insisted that loss of proﬁts con
stitutes no proper ground or element of dam
ages. lf there be any such rule of law it is
1 certainly not a universal, and can hardly be
it is true,
called a general, rule. Decisions,
may be found which seem to take it for
‘
granted that the rule is universal. But there
are numerous cases. even for breach of con
tract, in which proﬁts have been properly
held to constitute not only an element, but
a measure (and sometimes the only measure),
of damages, as in Masterton v. Mayor, 7 Hill,
61; Railroad Co. v. Howard, 13 How. 344.
And in actions for breach of contract in not
'
delivering goods (as wheat or other articles)
having a marketable value, as well as in
i most actions
of trespass or trover for the
taking or conversion of such property,—where
4 ever
the difference
the contract
between
price, or the market value at the time of
taking or conversion, and the higher market
value at any subsequent period, is held to
constitute the damages-in all such cases
this diffcrence of price is but another name
for proﬁts, and is yet very properly held to
be a measure of damages.
There is nothing'
therefore, in the nature of proﬁts, as such,
which prevents their allowance as damages.
But in many, and perhaps the majority, of
cases upon contract in which the question
has arisen, they have been held to,be too
remote or dependent upon too many contin
gencies to be calculated with reasonable cer
tainty, or to have been within the contempla
tion of the parties at the time of entering in
to the contract.
But there are also cases for breach of con
tract where, though the proﬁts were in their
nature somewhat uncertain and contingent
(and in most of them quite as much so as
in the present case). they were yet held to
not strictly a measure. but an
constitute.
element of damages proper for the considera
tion of a jury to enable them to form a judg
ment or probable estimate of the damages;
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as in .\Ic.\‘eill v. Reid, 9 Bing. 68; Bagley
v. Smith, 10 N. Y. 459; Gale v. Leckle, 2
Starkie, 107; Ward v. Smith, 11 Price, 19;
Driggs v. Dwight, 17 Wend. 71. And see
Passenger v. Thorburn, 35 Barb. 17. And
in Waters v. Towers, 20 Eng. Law & Eq.
410, the jury were allowed to take into con
sideration the proﬁts which might have been
made upon a collateral contract, though void
by the statute of frauds (and see .\IcNeiil
v. Reid, supra), while by the American au
thorities proﬁts of this description have been
almost uniformly rejected.
But whatever
may be the rule in actions upon contract,
we think a more liberal rule in regard to
damages
for proﬁts lost should prevail in
actions purely of tort (excepting perhaps the
action of trover).
Not that they should be
allowed in all cases without distinction, for
‘there are some cases where they might, in
their nature, be too entirely remote, specula
tive, or contingent to form any reliable basis
for a probable opinion. And perhaps the
decisions which have excluded the anticipat
ed proﬁts of a voyage broken up by illegal
capture or collision may be properly justiﬁed
upon this ground.
Upon this, however, we
express no opinion. But generally, in an ac
tion purely of tort, where the amount of
proﬁts lost by the injury can be shown with
reasonable certainty, we think they are not
only admissible in evidence, but that they
constitute, thus far, a safe‘ measure of dam
ages; as when they are but another name
for the use of a mill (for example), as in
White v. Moseley, 8 Pick. 356; or for the use
of any other property where the value or
proﬁt of the use can be made to appear with
reasonable certainty by the light of past
as might often be done where
experience,
such proﬁts had been for a considerable
time uniform at the same season of the year,
and there are no circumstances tending to
show a probable diminution, had the injury
And possibly the same view,
not occurred.
subject to the like qualiﬁcations, might have
been taken of the proﬁts of the plaintiff,s
business had it been conﬁned to the me
cbanical trade of repairing watches and mak
ing gold pens, particularly if done purely as
a cash business. ‘But this business seems
to have been carried on with that of the
sale of jewelry./He kept a jewelry store,
and the _proiits‘ of so much of his business as
may be regarded
as mercantile
business
are dependent upon many more contingen
cies, and therefore more uncertain, especially
if sales are made upon credit. Past proﬁts,
therefore, could not safely be taken as the
exact measure of future proﬁts; but all the
various contingencies by which such proﬁts
would probably be affected should be taken
into consideration by the jury, and allowed
such weight as they, in the exercise of good
sense and sound discretion,
should think
them entitled to.
Past proﬁts in such cases,
where the business has been continued
for
some length of time, would constitute a very
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jury in arriving at a fair
of the future proﬁts, had
continued
without inter

.n

Accordingly such past proﬁts have been
allowed for this purpose, both in actions ex
contractu and ex delicto, though more fre
quently in the latter, where from the nature
of the case no element of greater certainty
1 appeared,
and the actual damages must be
more or less a matter of opinion; and where,
as in the present case, though somewhat in
conclusive,
it was the best evidence the
nature of the case admitted.
See Wilkes v.
Hungerford, 2 Bing. N. C. 281; Ingram v.
Lawson, 6 Bing. N. C. 212; Lacour v. Mayor,
4 Duer, 406; and the following in actions
upon contract:
Driggs v. Dwight, 17 Wend.
71; Baglcy v. Smith, 10 N. Y. 489.
But it is urged by the counsel for the de
fendant that damages for the loss of proﬁts
ought not to be allowed, because they could
not have been within the contemplation of
Whether, as matter of fact,
the defendant.
this is likely to have been true, we do not
deem it important to inquire.
It is wholly
immaterial whether the defendant, in com.
mitting the trespass, actually contemplated
this or any other species of damage to the
plaintiff.
This is a consideration which is
conﬁned entirely to cases of contracts, whe .e
is, what was the extent
te question
f
obligation, in this respect, which both parti .
understood
to be created by the contract
But where a party commits a trespass h
must be held to contemplate all the damage
which may legitimately follow from his il
legal act And where a party, though acting
in good faith, yet knowing his right to be
disputed by a party in possession, instead of
resorting to a judicial trial of his right, as
sumes to take the law into his own lnimis,
and by violence to seize the property or right
in dispute, he must be held thereby to as
sume, on the one hand, the risk of being
able to show, when the other party brings
him into court, that the property or right
was his, or that his act was legal; or, on
the other, of paying all the damages the
injured party may have suffered from the
injury; and, if those damages are in their
nature uncertain, then such as, from all the
circumstances, or the best light the nature of
the case affords, a jury, ‘in the exercise of
good sense and sound discretion, may ﬁnd to
be a full compensation.
We are therefore entirely satisﬁed that all
put to the witness Allison
the questions
touched the nature, ‘extent, and proﬁts of the
business before and after the trespass were
competent,
and improperly overruled; and
that the charge of the court, so far as it ex
cluded all consideration of the good will of
the place, its peculiar value to the plaintiﬂ,
and his probable proﬁts, was erroneous.
The judgment must be reversed, with costs
to the plaintiff, and a new trial granted.
The other justices concurred.
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(48 N.

W.

Court

of

Supreme

ST.

PAUL

559, 46

& D. R. CO.

Minn.

Minnesota.

39.)

April

8,

1891.

district court, Ramsey
county; KlI:LL\', Judge.
Wm. H. Bliss, ior appellant.
Eruin &
Wellington, ior respondent.
Appeal

from

J.

COLLINS,
To plaintiff,s complaint
herein the defendant corporation inter
posed a demurrer, upon the ground that
it failed to state facts sufﬂcient to consti
tutea cause of action. Upon the argu
ment of this appeal defendant contended
that its negligence in the premises was in
sufﬁciently pleaded; that the injury com
plained oi, provided the same could be said
to have been the result of defendant’s act.
was not proximate, but w as too remote a
consequence to be chargeable to it; and.
further, that from the allegations of the
complaint it was manifest that plaintiff
himself was guilty of contributory negli
Very little need be said on any of
gence.
these points,ior none are well taken.
The
complaint contains much that is superﬂu
ous, but in respect to negligence it avers the
defendant’s duty to have been to furnish
transportation to plaintiff, a car-repairer
in its employ, from the wrecked caboose,
which he had been sent out to repair by
the foreman, back to St. Paul, when he
had completed his work, and that it
wrongfully, unlawfully, and negligentl
failed and omitted so to do, or to furnish
plaintiff with transportation to anyother
place where shelter or food could be ob
tained, and that by reason ofsuch negligent
failure and omission plaintiff was com
pelled to and did walk to the village of
White Bear,a distance of nine miles,in the

night-time, in extremely cold and danger
ous weather, that being the nearest point
at which the necessary shelter and food
could be had; that placing reliance upon de
fendant,s periormance of its duty towards
plaintiff when he had completed his work,
by furnishing transportation back to St.
Paul from the place on its line of road
where he had been taken to repair the ca
boose, plaintiff was wholly unprepared
with means for properly sheltering or
clothing himself. It was also averred
that the facts and circumstances with ref
erence to the location of the caboose, the
inclemency of the weather, the distance to
shelter or iood, and that plaintiff, by rea
son of his reliance upon being transported
back to St. Paul when through with his
work. had not provided himself with
proper clothing ior such weather, were
then well known to the defendant. The
negligence of the defendant might have
been speciﬁed with greater certainty, but
from an inspection of the pleading it ap
pears that defendant is charged with hav
ing unnecessarily and unreasonably placed
its servant, the piaintiff.in serious danger,
from which injury resulted, by carelessly
and negligently omitting to perform‘ a
duty immediately
connected with his
work. on the periormance of which he had
a right to and did rely.
With full knowl
edge of the sit ttlon as to weather and
quently of the danger to
the iocaiity,cm
be apprehended, it neglected
and aban

TORT.

doned the plaintiff under circumstances
which he alleges resulted in personal in
jury to him. It had no more right to un
necessarily and unreasonably leave him in
a dangerous place, to expose him to an
unnecessary and unreasonable risk from
the elements, by failing to furnish trans
portation frOm the place where he had
been put at work, when that work was
completed, it being its duty so to do. ac
cording to the complaint, than it had to
unnecessarily and unreasonably expose
him to risks and dangers while he was at
work,—such risks and dangers as were
discoverable by the use of ordinary pre
caution
aud diligence.
The defendant
should have been reasonably diligent, and
could not, without incurring liability, de
sert the plaintiff in the manner and under
the circumstances set iorth in the com

/

plaint.

’i‘he important question in this case,
however, is whether, from the complaint.
it appears that defendant is liable ior the
injuries which resulted from plaintiff,s ef
forts to obtain shelter and iood on the
occasion referred to; the iormer, as be
fore stated. arguing that, as alleged. they’
are too remote, and are not the proxi
mate results of its act. it is averred that, ,
by reason of the unavoidable exposure of
the plaintiff, he was made sick, contracted
rheumatism, has ever since suffered great
pain and agony, and has been permanent
ly injured.
It must not be forgotten that
thegn’tvamen of the action.is the negligence
and carelessnessof the defendantin leaving
plaintiff at a place where hecould not pro
cure either shelteror iood.
it is an action
in tort, and not ior a breach of contract.
It is the negligence of the defendant
is complained of, and not the breach 0
contract to return the plaintiff to St. Paul
0
when he had periormed his labor. it was,
U
of course, essential that the plaintiff,s relation with the defendant be made to
appear, for, unless he was a servant to
whom the defendant owed a duty. there
could arise no liability by reason of its neg
lect to perform that duty. The relation
‘of master and servant ﬁrst having been
shown to exist, the law ﬁxes the duty of
the iormertowards the latter,and a viola
lon of this duty is a wrong, not a breach
This, then,is an action in
f the contract.
which the wrong-doer is liable iorthe nat- I
ural and probable consequences of its neg
ligent act or omission; the general rules
which limit the damages in actions of
of tort being, in many respects, different
from those in actions on contracts.
The
I
injury must be the direct result of the mis
conduct attributed. and the general rule
in respect to damages is that whoever
commits a trespass or other wrongful act
is liable ior all the direct injury resulting
therefrom, although such resulting injury
could‘ not have been contemplated as a
probable result of the act done. 1 Stalg.
Dam. 130, note, and cases cited; Clifford v.
Railroad Co., ii Colo. 333. 12 Pac. Re ). 2lii,
a case much like this.
He who co 0mlts
a trespass must be held to contemplate
all the damages which may legitimately /.
ﬂow from his illegal act, whether he,’
may have ioreseen them or not; and,l
so far as it is plainly traceable, he must
make
compensation
ior the wrong.\

wh~ d
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The damages cannot be considered too
to the usual ex
remote ii, according
oi mankind, injurious results
perience
ought to have been apprehended. It is not
necessary that the injury in the precise
orm in which it, in fact, resulted. should
It is enough that it
have been foreseen.
9‘ now appears to have been a natural and
Hill v. Winsor. li8
probable consequence.
Mass. 231. The question is whether the
negligent act complained of—leaving the
plaintifi‘ in the open country in the night
I
time, in extremely cold and dangerous
weather, a long distance from shelter or
food—was the direct cause of the injuries
mentioned in the complaint, or whether it
was a remote cause, for which an action
will not lie,and it must be taken ior grant
I ed that thewnlk oi nine miles and incident
exposure brought about the alleged sick
ness, pain, and disability. There was no
intervening independent cause of the in
M
jury, for all of the acts done by the plain
tiff. nis eiiort to seek protection from the
inclement and dangerous weather, were
legitimate, and compelled by de!endant’s
failure to reconvey him to the city. Had
he remained at the caboose, and lost his
hands, or his feet, or perhaps his life, by
freezing. no doubt could exist of the de
fendant,s liability. It must not be permit
ted to escape the consequences of its
wrong because the injuries were received
in an eiiort to avoid the threatened dan
ger, or because they differ in form or seri
ousness from those which might have re
sulted had the plaintiff made no such ci
fort. An eiiicient, adequate cause being
t€lve(1 by plaintiff.
iound for the lnjuri
the true cause,
it must be
other, not
cident to it, but in
mdent of it, is shown to have inter
ened betweenit and the result. This is
substance of very clear statements of
law found in Kellogg v. Railway Co.,

b
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\\’is.223. and in RaiiwayCo. v. Kellog.‘-.'. 94
U. S. 469. And upon the point now under
consideration
we fail to distinguish be
tween the case at bar and Brown v. Rail
way (,o.,54 Wis. 342,11 N. W. Rep.-256,911,
an action brought to recover ior like dam
ages said to have been caused by directing
passengers to alight from a train at a
place about three miles distant from their
At all events, the question
destination.
as to what was the proximate cause oi a
I piaintiff’s injuries is usually one to be de
termined by a jury. As was said in Railway Co. v. Kellogg. supra. the true rule"
is that what is the proximate cause oi an )4
injury is ordinarily one ior a jury. It is
not a question of science or legal knowl
edge.
it is to be determined as a fact, in
view of the circumstances attending it.
Finally, the defendant insists that plain
tiff was guilty of contributory negligence,
because,
from the complaint,“ appears
that he was wholly unprepared with
clothing suiiiclent ior the occasion. and
because he left the shelter of the caboose
when he undertook his journey upon loot
to the village of White Bear. The plain
tifi. undoubtedly, went prepared with such
clothing as he would ordinarily and nut
urally need ior the occasion, had the de
fendant pcriormed its alleged duty, and
this was all that was required oi him.
He Was not obliged to anticipate the de
fendant,s negligence or omission, and pre
pare ior it, nor does it follow that, be
cause there was a caboose at the place
where he worked, it afforded him ade
quate and proper shelter for the night.
If this was the fact. it can quite properly
be shown asa defense upon the trial of
the case.
But the complaint negatives
such a conclusion.
Order aiiirmed.

.\ilTCi:lELL.J.,

did not participate in
king and ﬁling of this decision.
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YOSBURG

(50 N.

Suprcum

Appeal

county;

versed.
Action
George

From

Court

W.

v.

403.

PUTXEY.
80

Wis.

of Wisconsin.

Christopherson v. Bare, 11 Q. B. 473; Holl
man v. Eppers, 41 Win. 251: i\’".‘ll v. l.ull,
49 Wis. 405, 5 N. W. Rep. 874; Or mdnll v.
Transportation (.‘o..l6 Fed. Re|'.7.3; Brown
v. Kendall, 6 Cash. 292.

523.)

Nov.

17,

1891.

from circuit court, Waukesha
A. Scorr SLOA:\, Judge. Re
by

Andrew

Putaey

a judgment

Ryan & Merton, ior respondent.

Vosburg against

ior personal .injuries.
ior plaintiff, defendant

appeals.
in the fol
’1‘he other facts fullv a
lowing statement by LY gear
, J.:
The action was brought to recover dam
ages ior an assault and battery, alleged to
have been committed by the defendant up
on the plaintiff on February :30. 1859. The
answer is a general denial. At the date of
the alleged assault the plaintiff was a
little more than 14 years of age, and the
defendant a little less than 12 years of
age. The injury complained of was caused
by a kick inﬂicted by defendant upon the
leg of the plaintiff, a little below the knee.
’1‘hetransaction occurred in aschool-room
in Waukesha, during school hours, both
A
being pupils in the school.
parties
former trial of the cause resulted in a ver
dict and judgment for the plaintiff ior
$2,800. The defendant appealed from such
judgment to this court, and the same was
reversed ior error, and a new trial aw'nrd
The case
ed.
78 \\,is. 84, 47 N. W. Rep. 99.
has been again tried in the circuit court,
and the trial resulted inn verdict ior plain
tiff ior $2,500. The facts of the case, as
they appeared on both trials, are sufﬁ
ciently stated in the opinion by Mr. Jus
tice \')n’ro.\, on the iormer appeal.and re
On the last trial the
quire no repetition.
jury iound a special verdict, as follows:
“(ll Had the plaintiff during the month
of January, 1889, received an injury jus_‘.
above the knee, which became inﬂamed,
Yes. (2)
and produced pus?
Answer.
Had such injury on the 20th day of Feb
ruary, lh‘S9, nearly healed at the point of
the iniury? A. Yes. (3) Was the plain
tiff, before said 20th of February, lame, as
the result of such injury? A. No. (4)
Had the tibia in the plainti-ffs right leg
become inﬂamed or diseased to some ex
tent beiore he received the blow or kick
from the defendant?
A. No. (5) What
was the exciting ca use of the injury to the.
plaintiff,s leg? A. Kick. (6) Did the dc
fendant, in touching the plaintiff with
his ioot, intend to do him any harm? A.
No. (7) At what sum do you assess the
dama,c;es of the plaintiff? A. Twenty-ﬁve
hundred dollars.” The defendant moved
forjudgment in his favor on the verdict,
and also for a new trial. The plaintiff
moved ior judgment on the verdict in his
favor. Themotionsofdefendantwereover
ruled, and that of the plaintiff granted.
judgment ior plaintiff, for
Thereupon
$2.-300 damages and costs ofsuit. was duly
entered. The defendant appeals from the
judgment.
’1‘. W. Hahzht (J.V. Quarles,of counsel),
for appellant, to sustain the proposition
that where there is no evil intent there can
be no recovery, cited: 2 Greenl. Ev. §§ 82
85: 2 Add. Torts,§ 790; Conley, Torts, p,
162; Coward v. Baddcley, 4 Hurl. & N. 478;

LYON, J. (after stating the facts). Several errors are assigned, only three of
which will be considered.
having found that the de
1. Thejury
fendant, in touching the plaintiff with his
ioot, did not intend to do him any harm,
counsel ior defendant maintain that the
plaintiff has no cause ofaction, and thatde
fendant’s motion ior judgment on the spe
cial ‘verdict should have been granted.
In support of this proposition counsel
quote from 2 Greenl. Ev. § 83, the rule
that “the intention to do harm is of the
essence of an assault."
Such is the rule.
no doubt, in actions or prosecutions ior
But this is an action to
mere assaults.
recover damages ior an alleged assault
In such case the rule is corand battery.
rectly stated, in many of the authorities
cited by counsel, that plaintiff must show
either that the intention was unlawful, or
that the defendant is in fault. If the in
tended act is unlawful, the intention to
commit it must necessarily be unlawful.
Hence, as applied to this case. if the kick
ing of the plaintiff by the defendant was
an unlawful act, the intention of defend
ant to kick him was also unlawful.
the parties been upon the play-grounds
of the school, engaged in the usual boy
is being free from
ish sports, the defe
negligence, and
malice. wantonne
daintiff in
intending no harm
did, we should hesitate to hold
the defendant unlawful. or that he coul
Some con
be held liable in this action.
sideration is due to the implied license of
But it appears that
the play-grounds.
the injury was inﬂicted in the school.after
it had been called to order by the teacher,
and after the regular exercises of .the
school had commenced. Under these cir
cumstances, noimplied license to do tb
act complained of existed. and such ac
was a violation of the order and decorum
of the school, and necessarily unlawful.
Hence we are of the opinion that, under
the evidence and verdict, the action may
be sustained.
II. The plaintiff testiﬁed. as a witness in
his own behalf. as to the circumstances of
thealleged injuryinﬁictad upon him by the
defendant. and also in regard to the wound
he received in January,near thesame knee,
mentioned in the special verdict. The de
fendant claimed that such wound was the
proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff,s
leg, in that it produced a diseased condi
tion of the bone, which disease was in act
ive progress when he received the kick,
and that such kick did nothing more than
to change the location, and perhaps some
what hasten the progress, of the disease.
The testimony of Dr. Bacon. a witness ior
plaintiff, (who was plaintiffs attending
physician,) elicited on cross-exa mination,
tends to some extent to establish such
claim. Dr. Bacon ﬁrst saw the injured leg
on February 25th, and Dr. Phlller, also
one of plaintiff,s witnesses, ﬁrst so w it

’
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lir. Philler was called as a
witness after the examination of the plain
tiff and Dr. Baron. On his direct examina
tion he testiﬁed as follows: “I heard the
testimony ofAndrew Vosburgin regard to
how he received the kick, February 20th.
from his playmate.
I heard read the tee
timony of Miss More, and heard where he
said he received this kick on that day."
(Miss More had already testiﬁed that she
was the teacher of the school. and saw de
fendant standing in the aisle by his seat,
and kicking across the aisle, hitting the
plaintiff.) The iollowing question was
then propounded to Dr. Philler: “After
hearing that testimony, and what you
know of the case of the boy, seeing it on
the 8th day of March, what, in your opin
ion, was the exciting cause that produced
the inﬂammation that you saw in that
boy,s leg on that day?" An objection to
this question was overruled, and the wit
ness answered:
“The exciting cause was
the injury received at that day by the kick
“
on the shin-bone.
It will he observed
that the above question to Dr. Pniller
calls for his opinion as a medical expert,
ba:=ed
in part upon the testimony of the
plaintiff. as to what was the proximate
Cause of the injury to plaintiffs leg. The
plaintiff testiﬁed to two u ounds upon his
leg. either of which might have been such
proximate cause. Without taking both
of these wounds into consideration, the
expert could give no intelligent or reliable
opinion as to which of them caused thein
jury complained of; yet. in the hypothet
ical question propounded to him, one of
these probable causes was excluded from
the consideration
of the witness, and he
was required to give his opinion upon an
.lr,ripet-fect and insuﬂicienthypothesls,—one
which excluded from his consideration a
material fact essential to an intelligent
.opinion.
A consideration by the witness
of the wound received by the plaintiff in
January being thus prevented, the wit
ness had but one fact upon which to base
his opinion, to-wit. the fact that defend
ant kicked plaintiff on the shin-bone.
Based, as it necessarily was, on that fact
alone, the opinion of Dr. Philler that the
kick caused the injury was inevitable.
been
when. had the proper hypothesis
submitted to him, his oninion might have
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The answer of Dr. Philler
to the hypothetical question put to him
may have had, probably did have. a con
trolling inﬂuence with the jury, ior they
found by their verdict that his opinion
been different.

was correct. Surely there can be no rule
of evidence which will tolerate a hypothet
ical question to an expert, calling ior his
opinion
in a matter vital to the case,
which excludes from his consideration facts
already proved by a witness upon whose
testimony such hypothetical question is
based, when a consideration of such facts
by the expert is absolutely essential to en
able him to iorm an intelligent opinion
concerning such matter. The objection to
the question put to Dr. Philler should
have been sustained.
The error in permit
ting the witness to answer the question
is material, and necessarily fatal to the
judgment.
III. Certain questions were proposed on
behalf of defendant to be submitted to
the jury, iounded upon the theory that
only such damages could be recovered as
the defendant might reasonably be sup
posed to ha vc'eontempinted as likely to
result from his kicking the plaintiff.
The
court refused to submit such questions to
the jury. The ruling was correct.
The
rule of damages in actions ior torts was
held in .Brown v. Railway Co., 54 Wis. 342,
11 N. W. Rep. 356, 911, to be that the wrong
doer is liable for all injuries resultim_r di
rectly from the wrongful act, whether they
could or could not have been ioreseen by
him. The chief justice and the writer of
this opinion dissented from the judgment
in that case,ehieﬂy because we were of the
opinion that the complaint stated a cause
of action ex contractu, and not ex delicto,
and hence that a different rule of damages
—the rule here contended for— was ap
plicable.
We did not question that the
rule in actions for tort was correctly
stated.
That case rules this on the ques
tion of damages. The remaining errors
assigned are upon the rulings of the court
These rul
on objections to testimony.
ings are not very likely to be repeated on
another trial, and are not of sufﬁcient im
portance to require a review of them on
this appeal. The judgment of the circuit
court must be reversed, and the cause will
be remanded ior a new trial.
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caused, as it was alleged, by the negligence
Among other defenses, it
of the defendant.
was alleged, and evidence was given to show,
(61 Md. 619.) .
that death was not caused by the injury, but
by a speciﬁc or typical pneumonia, and the
July 3, 188-i.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
case was sought to be taken from the jury
Bernard Carter and Arthur W. Machen, for
upon the ground that pneumonia, and not the
the motion.
injury received from the stone, was the di
The
rect and proximate cause of the death.
ALVI.ZY, C. J. There has been a motion
physician who attended the boy in his sick
based‘ ness testiﬁed that he died of pneumonia,
made in this case for reargument,
not
injured,
though he had been very seriously
largely upon authorities that were
on one side, and the
brought to the attention of the court on the
and was paralyzed
The
chances of recovery were against him.
former hearing; and hence we depart from
doctor said in his testimony: “I am unpre
the general practice of disposing of such mo
of rea
pared to say what caused pneumonia in this
tions without the formal assignment
In my opinion, it was a speciﬁc or
case.
sons for the action of the court thereon.
typical pneumonia.
The relation between it
Upon the question whether the jury should
it was
and the injured head was not close."
have been allowed to infer, upon the evi
contended,
however,
for the plaintiff, that
dence before them, that the cancer was the
owing to the broken and shattered condition
result of the injury received by plaintiff, the
of the boy’s system, caused by the injury re
defendant cites and relies upon the case of
Jewell v. Railway Co., 55 N. H. Si, a case not ceived, and his increased susceptibility to
But the
was superinduced
and de
cold, pneumonia
referred to on the former argument.
veloped as a natural result of the injury; and
facts of that case are so entirely different
from those of the case before us that the ' that question was submitted to the jury upon
analogy between the two cases is but slight.
the evidence, and they found for the plaintiff.
The case was taken to the supreme court of
in the ﬁrst place, the party whose negligence
Michigan, and the error assigned was the
caused the injury in that case was not, ac
submission of the question to and allowing
cording to the decision of the court, the
the jury to conclude as to whether pneumonia
servant or employee of the defendant, and
did in fact result from, and was a conse
therefore the defendant was not liable for his
quence of, the injury received by the boy.
In the second place, there was a con
acts.
The supreme court aﬁirmed the ruling of the
siderable length of time intervening between
court below, and held that, "if the injury re
the time of the accident and the death of the
ceived and sickness following concurred
in
party, the latter in the meantime being en
and contributed to the attack of pneumonia,
gaged in hard work, and subjected to much
of the the defendant must be held responsible there
and all the circumstances
exposure;
for." And so in this case, if the injury re
case rendered it exceedingly doubtful wheth
ceived by .Mrs. Kemp, by the negligence of
er there could be any connection between the
and contributed
the defendant, superinduced
injury received by a blow on the right should
to the production or development of cancer.
er, and a cancer that was found to exist, by
therefor; and
the defendant
is responsible
post mortem examination, in the left lung of
the cancer is not to be treated as an inde
the party a year and .a half after the injury
pendent cause of injury or suffering, any
And the physicians all testiﬁed
received.
more than pneumonia, resulting from an in
that in their opinion neither the last sickness
jury that rendered the system susceptible of
of the 'party nor the cancer was in any way
and liable to the attack, as a natural conse
attributable to the injury previously receiv
quence of such injury is to be regarded as an
The court, moreover, considered and de
ed.
independent
cause of death.
In both cases
termined the case upon the weight of evi
~/
the original injury was the prime cause that
as upon motion for a new trial, and
denct..
legal
suiﬁ
way
the
and
to
set other causes in
opened the
not as upon a demurrer to
motion which led to the fatal results. And
ciency of the evidence to be submitted to the
the wrong‘loer' cannot be allowed to appor
jury as in the case before us. The other
tion the mcasure of his responsibility to the
cases cited upon this question have only a re
\Vhether the direct casual con
initial cause.
mote or indirect bearing, and we do not per
nections exist, is a question, in all cases, for
ceive that they are at all in conﬂict with the
the jury, upon the facts in proof.
opinion that has been delivered in this case.
There is another ground upon which rear
Since the opinion in this case was delivered,
gument of the case is asked, and that is with
50 .\iich. has been published, and that volume
v. Saginaw
respect to the nature of the action, and for
contains the case of Beauchamp
In that what nature and extent of injury dmnages
Min. Co0 at page 163 (15 N. W. 65).
therein.
may be allowed to be recovered
case, a boy, while passing on a highway, was
injured by being struck on the side of his . The defendant insists that while the form of
action is as for a tort, yet the real ground of
head by a stone from a blast ﬁred by the
mining company, and, having died some ﬁve
the right to recover in this case is simply for \
an action
wasv breach of the contract to carry safely, and to
thereat’tcr.
or six months
put the party down safely. And, that being
brought to recover damages for his death,
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so, according to the contention, it is insisted I tween him and the company, but by reason
of a duty implied by law to carry him safe
that to entitle the plaintiff to damages by
ly." And in the same case .\ir. Justice Wil
reason of a breach of the contract the injury
think, put upon
for which compensation is asked should be liams said: “The case was,
shown to be such that it may fairly be taken
the right footing by .\Ir. Hill, when he said
that the question turned upon the inquiry
by the parties as
to have been contemplated
whether
was necessary to show
the possible result of the breach of the con
contract
tract; and that in this case, no such conse
between the plaintiff and the railroad com
pany.
His proposition was that this declara
quence as the production
of cancer in the
plaintiff could have been anticipated as the tion could only be sustained by proof of
probable result of the negligent act of the
contract to carry the plaintiff and his luggage
for hire and reward to be paid by the piaintift
defendant.
But to this proposition we can
n t agree, and in our opinion it is not sup
and that the traverse of that part of the dec
laration involves
rted by authority.
traverse of the payment by
the plaintiff.
am of opinion that there is no
A common carrier of passengers, who ac
oundation for that proposition.
cepts a party to be carried, owes to that par
It seems to
e that the whole current of authorities, be
ty a duty to be careful, irrespective of con
tract; and the gravamen of an action like ginning with Govett v. Radnidge,
East, 62,
and ending with Pozzi v. Shipton,
the present is the negligence of the defend
Adoi. &
E. 9433, establishes that an actionpf this sort
ant. The right to maintain the action does
is, in substance, not an action of contract,
not depend upon contract, but the action is
but an action of tort against the company as
duty to carry
founded upo
the common-law
safely; and the negligent violation of that carrier." And in the subsequent case of Aus
.\ duty to the damage of the plaintiff is a
tin v. Railroad Co., L. R.
Q. B. 442, Mr.
Justice Blackburn, now Lord Blackburn, in
or wrong which gives rise to the right
delivering his judgment in that case, said:
action. Bretherton v. Wood,
Brod. & B.
5-i.
If this were not so, the passenger would “I think that what was said in the case of
Marshall v. Railroad Co., 11 C. B. 655, was
occupy
more unfavorable position in refer
quite correct.
It was there laid down that
ence to the extent of his right to recover for
stranger;
injuries than
for the latter, for the right whicha passenger by railway has
to be carried safely does not depend on his
any negligent
injury or .wrong committed,
having made
contract, but that the fact of
tort, and the measure
can only sue as for
his being
passenger casts
of the recovery is not only for the actual suf
duty on the
fering endured, but for all aggravation that company to carry him safely." And to the
same effect, and with full approval of the au
may attend the commission
of the wrong;
thorities just cited, arc the cases of Foulkes
passenger, if the
whereas in the case of
v. Railroad Co.,
contention of the defendant be supported, for
C. P. Div. 267, 30 Eng. R.
536, and the same case on appeal,
the same character of injury, the right of re
C. P. Div.
157, 30 Eng. R. 740; and Fleming v. Railway
covery would be more restricted.
The prin
Co.,
ciple of these actions against common carriers
The case of Bretherton
Q. B. Div. 81.
Brod. & B. 54, is a direct authority
of passengers is well illustrated by the case
v. Wood,
it the question.
of aservant whose fare has been paid by the
A passenger may, without doubt, declare for
master, or the case of
child for whom no
a breach of contract where there is one; but
fare is charged. In both of the cases me
is at his election to proceed as for a tort
tioned, though there is no contract as be
where there has been personal injury suffer
tween the carrier and the servant, or as be
ed by the negligence or wrongful act of the
tween the carrier and the child, yet both
servant and the child are passengers, and for carrier, or the agents of the company; and
in such action the plaintiff is entitled to re
injuries snffered
any personal
by
them
cover according to the principles pertaining
through the negligence of the carrier
to that class of actions, as distinguished from
clear they could sue and recover; but they
actions on contract.
And this
could only sue as for a tort.
The authorities
the settled
doctrine and practice in this state.
would seem to be clear upon the subject, and
Stockton
Gill, 406; Railroad Co. v. Blocher,
v. Frey,
leave no room for doubt or question.
27 Md. 277, 287; Turnpike Co. v. Boone, 455
the case of Marshall v. Railroad Co.,
Md. 344; Stokes v. Saltonstall, 13 Pet. 181.
. B. 655, in discussing the ground of action
The motion for reargumeut must be over
against a common carrier, Jervis, O. J., said:
ruled.
“But upon what principle does the action lie
at the suit of the servant for his personal suf
STONE, ., dissented.
fering?
Not by reason of any contract he
a
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WESTERN

RAILWAY OF ALABAMA

(11

MUTCH.

v.

South. 894;‘9,i, Ala. 19-i.)

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 1, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Lee county; J.
M. Carmichael, Judge.
Action by George Mutch, administrator of
James Thomas Mutch, against the Western
Railway of Alabama, to recover for the al
leged negligent killing of his intestate by de
Judgment for plaintiff.
fendant.
Defendant
appeals.

Reversed.
After the rendition of the judgment for
plaintiff, defendant moved the court for a
new trial on the following grounds:
(1) Be
cause the jury found contrary to the evidence;
(2) because the evidence did not authorize a
verdict against the defendant; (3) because
Mr. Augustus Barnes, one of plaintiff,s at
torneys,
in his argument to the jury, in
speaking of defendant,s employes who were
in this case. said "that he would
_ witnesses
not say, as a north Alabama attorney had
said, that they ‘testiﬁed with halters around
their necks;’ but he would say that they tes
tiﬁed with a conscious regard to their posi
tion." The court overruled the motion for a
new trial, and the defendant duly excepted.
On this appeal, prosecuted by the defendant,
there are many assignments
of error, in
which were included the overruling of de
fendant,s motions for a new trial, but under
the opinion it is deemed unnecessary to notice
them in detail.
Geo. P. Harrison and R. F. Ligon, Jr., for
appellant.
A. & R. B. Barnes, W. J. Samford,
and J. M. Chilton, for appellee.

STO.\‘E, C. J. The plaintiff, George .\Iutch,
was a resident of Opelika. His son, James
Mutt.ll. was 9t/_, years old, well grown and de
veloped for his age, and, in intelligence and
brightness,
was above the average of boys
of his age. He went at large without being
attended by a nurse or protector, and was at
tending school. The Western Railway of Ala
bama runs through Opelika, and has a sta
tion and depot in that city or town.
There
was an ordinance of force_ in Opelika which
made it unlawful to run a train of cars with
in the corporate limits at a higher rate of
speed than four miles an hour, and imposing
a penalty for its violation.
A freight train
of the railroad was coming into Opeiika on
an afternoon
in \Iarch, t889. It had box
cars. and attached to the side of one of them
was a ladder, placed there to enable brake
men to reach the top of the car. The little
boy, James. having placed himself at the side
of the track. attempted to seize the ladder as
it passed him, that he might climb up on it,
thus enjoy a ride.
He did succeed in
\and
catching a round of the ladder, but. in at
tempting to ascend, he missed his footing, fell
under the train, and was
o injured and
Up to
crushed that he died of the wounds.
this point there is no conﬂict or uncertainty

in the testimony.
The present suit was
brought against the railroad, and seeks to re
cover damages from it for this alleged negli
gent killing of plaintiff,s intestate.
The neg
ligence charged (and there is no other pre
tended, or attempted to be shown) is that the,‘
train was being moved at a greater rate of
speed than four miles an hour.
Some of
plaintiff,s witnesses testiﬁed that it was mov
ing at the rate of six or seven miles an hour.
On the other hand, defendant,s
witnesses
placed the speed, some as low as three, and
none above four, miles an hour.
This was
not the ﬁrst time intestate had attempted to
spring on moving trains. and he had been
more than once cautioned against such at
Assuming that the speed of the
tempns.
train was in excess of four miles an hour.
was there a causal connection between such
breach of duty on the part of the railroad
company and the injury done to plaintiff,s
intestate?
Persons who perpetrate torts are, as a rule.
responsible,
and only responsible,
for the
proximate consequences of the wrongs they
In other words, unless the tort be
commit.
the proximate cause of the injury complained
of. there is ab legal accountability.
In that
able and valuable work, 16 Am. & Eng. Enc.
Law, 436. is this language:
“A ‘proximate
cause’ may be deﬁned as that cause which in ‘
sequence. unhmken
natural and continuous
by any efficient intervening cause. producing
the result complained of, and without which
that result would not have occurred; and it
is laid down in many cases, and by leading
text writers, that, in order to warrant a ﬁnd
ing that negllgence, or an act not amounting
to wanton wrong, is the proximate cause of ‘
an injury, it must appear that the injury was
the natural and probable co.nsequence of the
negligence or wrongful act, and that it was
such as might or ought to have been foreseen,
in the light of the attending circumstances."
On page 431 of the same volume it is said:
“To constitute actionable negligence. there
must be not only a causal connection between
the negligence complained of and the injury
suffered, but the connection
must be by a
natural and unbroken sequence, without in
tervening eﬁicient causes; so that, but for
the negligence of the defendant, the injury
would not have occurred.
It must not only
be a cause, but it must be the proximate
that is, the direct and immediate, eﬂicient
cause of the injury."
That philosophic law
writer Dr. Wharton, (Law of Negligence, §
“If
75.) expresses the principle as follows:
the consequence
ﬂows from any particular
negligence, according to ordinary natural se
quence, without the intervention of any hu
man agency, then such sequence, whether
foreseen as probable, or unforeseen, is im
putable to the negligence."
Quoting from
Chief Baron Pollock with apparent approval,
he (in section 78) says: “I entertain consid
erable doubt whether a person who has been
guilty of neg igence is responsible for all the
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consequences which may under any circum
and deserted horse, then we think that the
stances arise, and in respect of mischief
defendant cannot be permitted to avail him
which could by no possibility have been fore
self of that fact.
The most blamable careseen, and which no reasonable person could
lessness of his servant having tempted the
have anticipated.
I am inclined to consider child, he ought not to reproach the child with
yielding to that temptation." Reading the
the rule of law to be this: That a person is
expected to anticipate and guard against all
case of Lynch v. Nurdin in the light shed up
reasonable consequences, but that he is not 1 on it by Lord Denman’s reasoning,
no one
by the law of England expected to anticipate
can fail to note the marked difference between
‘
and guard against that which no reasonable
that case and the one we have in hand. The
In the same
argument
man would expect to occur."
by which the learned lord chief
justice supported the judgment he announced
section he quotes approvingly the following
“If the has no application to the present one. That
from Lord Campbell:
language
wrong and the legal damage are not known
case was manifestly decided on the well
by common experience to be usually in se
recognized principle that if one leave danger
quence, and the damage does not, according
ous machinery, or any other thing of similar
nature, unattended, and in an exposed place,
to the ordinary course of events, follow from
the wrong, the wrong and the damage are
and another be injured thereby, an action on
the case may be maintained
for such injury,
not suﬂiciently conjoined or concatenated, as
In unless plaintiff was guilty of contributory
cause and effect, to support an action."
& Rediield’s Law of Negligence negligence.
Clark v. Chambers, 3 Q. B. Div.
Shearman
“The
27; Kunz v. City of Troy (N. Y. App.) 10 N.
(section 26) the principle is thus stated:
E. 442; Stout v. Railroad Co., 2 Dill. 294,
proximate cause of an event must be under
Fed. Gas. No. 13,504; Beach, Contrib. Neg.
stood to be that which. in a natural and con
by any new
Infants of tender years, and
tinuous sequence, unbroken
§§ 140, 206.
wanting in discretion, are no
nable to .
cause, produces
that event, and without
the disabling effects of contributory negli
which that event would not have occurred."
gence. In the opinion of the court in the case
The authorities from which we have quoted
of Lynch v. Nurdin the causal connection be
are everywhere regarded as standard. What
tween the negligence and the injury was so
they assert is but the condensation of the ut
direct and patent that the driver, exercising
terances of a very great number of the high
ordinary care and prudence, should have an
est judicial tribunals, wherever the principles‘
ticipated and guarded against it. The impli
of the common law prevail. See 16 Am. &
Eng. Enc. Law, 428. 429; Railway Co. v.
cation from Lord Denman’s language is very
strong that he regarded the cart man’s con
Kellogg. 94 U. S. 469; Herring v. Skaggs, 62
Contributory nog
duct as grossly negligent.
Ala. 180; Daughtery v. Telegraph Co., 75 Ala.
ligence is no defense to injuries which result
Lynch v. .\,urdin, 1 Q. B. (N. S.) 29, 41
168.
from gross negligence.
But the principle de
E. C. L. 422. is the strongest of the cases re
clared in Lynch v. l\‘urdin was, if not mate
lied on in support of the present action. The
The
rially shaken, at least shown to be inapplica
injury in that case occurred in a city.
ble to a case like the present one, in the two
headnote contains a summation of the facts
later English cases of Hughes v. Macﬂe, 2
as follows: “Defendant (a cart man) negli
gently left his horse and cart unattended in
Hurl. & C. 744, and Mangau v. Attertou. L. R.
Plaintiff, a child seven years old,
See, also, McAlpin v. Powell.
1 Exch. 239.
the street.
Another child in
70 N. Y. 126; Wendell v. Railroad Co., 91 N.
got upon the cart in play.
cautionsly led the horse on, and plaintiff was
Y. 420; Railroad Co. v. Bell, 81 Ill. 76. The
thereby thrown down, and hurt." It was held
case of Messenger v. Dennie, 137 Mass. 197,
is a strong authority against the right to
that the action was maintainable for the re
maintain the present. action.
Another case
covery of damages, “and that it was properly
relied on in support of the present action is
left to the jury whether defendant,s conduct
was negligent, and the negligence caused the
That
Railroad Co. v. Gladmon, 15 Wall. 401.
In delivering his opinion, Lord
injury."
case is wholly unlike the present one, and
“If
The negli
Denman used the following language:
rests on a different principle.
gence of defendant,s agent was manifest, and
am guilty of negligence in leaving anything
know it to be ex
dangerous in a place where
the injury was the natural consequence of
tremeiy probable that some other person will
Had the driver been looking
the negligence.
unjustiﬁably set it in motion, to the injury of a
ahead, as he should have been, he would
third, and if that injury should be so brought
have seen the child,s danger, and could and
about,
presume that the sufferer might have
would have stopped his car before his horses
redress by action against both or either of
The causal connection in
did the injury.
the two, but unquestionably against the ﬁrst.
that case was complete, because the injury
‘ *
Can the plaintiff, then. consistently
resulted so naturally from the driver’s inat
with the authorities, maintain his action,
tention that the law‘regards it as the proba
having been at least equally in fault? The
ble consequence of his negligence.
None of
answer is that. supposing that fact ascertain
the cases cited support the contention of ap
ed by the jury, but to this extent: that he
pellee.
the natural instinct of a
merely indulged
The ordinance of Opelika, restricting the
child in amusing himself with the empty cart
speed of trains within the corporate limits to
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four miles an hour, had one purpose,—onc pol
should be obeyed and conformed to as tl rule
Opelika is a town probably of four or
of action. if we cut loose from its restraints,
icy.
The railroad
we expose ourselves to the tempests of hu
more
thousand
inhabitants.
man passion and human prejudice, and, like
antedated the town, and caused its location
there.
It runs centrally through the busi a ship at sea without rudder or compass, will
surely be dashed on some of the many
ness portions of the place.
In such condi
shoals which are found all along the voyage
tions, men pursuing business avocations, as
of life. .
well as idiers and curiosity seekers, will con
Trial by jury is a bulwark of American, as
gregate about the depot and track of the rail
road, and will be constantly crossing, if not
it has long been of English, freedom.
It
wisely divides the responsibility of determi
standing on, the track. They do both.
Knowing this habit of men, most towns native adjudication, of punitive administra
tion, between the judge, trained in the wis
requir
located on railroads have ordinances
dom and intricacies of the law, and 12 men
ing trains passing through them to move at a
chosen from the common walks of nonprofes
low rate of speed. Why? Not because they
sional life; chosen for their sound judgment
persons
will at
apprehend
that reckless
and stern impartiality.
tempt to board the train while in motion.
The one declares the
rules of law applicable to the issue or issues
The wildest conjecture would scarcely take
formed, in the light of the testimony ad
in an adventure so fraught with peril. The
policy was to enable persons who might be duced; the other weighs the testimony, destanding on the track, or whose business pur
termines what facts it proves, and. molded
by the law as declared by the court, renders
suits required them to cmss it, to get oﬂi the
track, and thus escape the danger of a col
its verdict.
In the jury box, and under the
oath the jurors have solemnly sworn on the
lision. The ordinance had no other aim.
holy evangelists of Almighty God, there is
We hold as matter of law that there was
no room for friendship, partiality, or preju
no proof whatever in this case tending to
dice; no permissible discrimination between
show a causal connection between the negli
friends and enemies, between the rich and
gence charged and the injury suffered.
To
illustrate our views: Let us suppose that the poor, between corporations and natural
persons.
The ancients painted the Goddess
the negligence charged against the railroad
of Justice as blindfolded, and jurors must
company had been, not the too rapid move
consequences
ment of the train, but some imperfection,
de ‘be blind to the personal
of
the verdicts they render.
cay, or derangement of the ascending ladder
1f the testimo
ny convinces their judgments of the exist
which caused plaintiff’s intestate to fall and
ence of certain facts, they must. be blind to
lose his life. Would any one contend the
the consequences
which result from those
railroad company would be liable for such
facts. A wish that it were otherwise fur
accident? And is there a difference in prin
nishes no excuse for deciding against their
ciple between the case supposed and the one
convictions.
Justice thus administered com
we have in hand? Charge No. 21, the gen
mands the approbation of heaven and earth
eral eharge in favor of the defendant, ought
alike; and a verdict thus rendered meets all
to have been given.
The great English com
the requirements of the jurors oath, in the
mentator said, “Law is the perfection of hu
This, in a sense, is true.
man reason."
It fullest sense of the word,—a true expression
is the expression of the combined wisdom of of the convictions ffxed on the minds of the
jury by the testimony.
Independent of the
the legislative body. It is the creature, how
ever, of human thought, and nothing human
legal question considered above, and which
is perfect.
Nor is it true that legislative
we have declared to be determinative of this
case, the verdict of the jury was so palpa
policy is unchanging. Conditions change,
bly against the evidence that a new trial
and the law which should adapt itself to hu
ought to have been granted on that account.
Still,
man wants must change with them.
while the law stands on the statute book, it
Reversed and remanded.
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CHA‘..HBERLAIN

v.

orrr or osrntosn.

(54 N. W. 618,

84

\Vis.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

289.)

Feb.

21,

1893.

circuit court, Winnebago
county; George W. Burnell, Judge.
Action by Anna Chamberlain against the
city of Oshkosh to recover for personal in
juries caused by defendant,s alleged negli
gence. From a judgment for plaintiff, and
an order denying a new trial, defendant ap
Appeal

peals.

from

Reversed.

H. I. Weed, for appellant.
Finch & Barber, for respondent.

For an ordinary, general, and transient
slipperiness,
due to the ordinary action of
the elements
only, and capable of being
removed by such ordinary action of the ele
ments, there is no liability, but for a local,
unusual, and permanent sllpperiness, caused
by a defect in the street, and which the ordi
nary action of the elements would not re
move, the city is liable. Cook v. City of
Milwaukee, 24 Wis. ..70, 27 Wis. 191; Per
kins 7. City of Fond du Lac, 34 Wis. 435;
Hill v. City of Fond du Lac, 56 Wis. 242, 14
N. W. Rep. 25; Stilling v. Town of Thorp.
54 VVis. 528, 11 N. W. Rep. 906; Grossenbach
v. City of Milwaukee, 65 Wis. 31, 26 N. W.
Rep. 182; Paulson v. Town of Pelican, 79
Wis. 445, 48 N. W. Rep. 715; McDonald v.
City of Ashland, 78 Wis. 251, 47 N. W. Rep.
434; Cromarty v. City of Boston, 127 Mass.
329; Taylor v. City of Yonkers, 105 N. Y.
202, 11 N. E. Rep. 642; Todd v. City of Troy,
61 N. Y. 506; Pomfrey v. Village of Sara
toga Springs, 104 N. Y. 450, 11 N. E. Rep.
. 43; Kinney v. City of Troy, 108 N. Y. 567,
15 N. E. Rep. 728; Kenney v. City of Cohoes,
(N. Y. App.) 3 N. E. Rep. 189; Spellman v.
443;
Inhabitants of Chicopee,
131
Mass.
.Keith.v. City of Brockton, 136 Mass. 119;
Cloughessey
v. City of Waterbury, 51 Conn.
405; Congdon v. City of Norwich, 37 Conn.
414; Burr v. Town of Plymouth, 48 Conn.
460; Landolt v. City of Norwich, 37 Con!0
615; Dooley v. City of Meriden, 44 Conn. 117;
Hubbard v. City of Concord, 35 N. H. 52;
Darling v. Town of Westmoreland, 52 N. H.
401; Clark v. City of Chicago, 4 Biss. 486;
Mosey v. City of Troy, 61 Barb. 580; Mayor,
etc., v. Marriott, 9 Md. 160; City of Provi
dence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161; Evans v. City
of Utica, 69 N. Y. 166; Darling v. Mayor.
etc., 18 Hun, 340; Evers v. Bridge Co., Id.
144; Blakeley v. City of Troy, Id. 167; Thomas
v. Mayor, etc., 28 Hun, 110. In all these
cases the test of liability is whether the
city is responsible for the slipperiness, either
in its formation by a structural defect in
the sidewalk, or by allowing it to remain
too long after it is formed.
Smooth and
level as may be dangerous as well as rough
ice, and the question simply is, was any
negligence of the city the cause of its forma
tion or retention? The following cases are
a direct authority on this point: Cromarty
LAw
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City of Boston, 127 .\Iass. 320; Spellman
v. Inhabitants of Chicopee, 131 Mass. 443:
Cloughessey v. City of Waterbury, 51 Conn.
405; Paulson v. Town of Pelican, 79 Wis. 445,
48 N. W. Rep. 715.
If the condition is artiﬁ
cial, instead of natural, and is caused by the
negligence
of the city, the city is liable.
The case of Spellman v. Inhabitants of Chic
opee, supra, is almost identical in the facts
with the case at bar.
v.

ORTON. J. This action is to recover dama
ges for a personal injury to the plaintiff, oc
'
casioned by the wnnt of repair and defective
condition of a walk in Merritt street, in the
city of Oshkosh. The defect is thus describ al
in the complaint: "The said street, known as
‘Merritt Street,‘ at a certain place in s id
street to wit, on the south side of said Merritt
street, on the southeast corner thereof where
said Merritt street intersects with Ford stnet
of said city, was, (on the 21st day of Febru
ary, 1SS9,) and for a period of four weeks or
more had been, unsafe, insuﬂlcient, defective.
and badly out of repair, in this, to wit, that at
the point of junction between the stone cross
ing on the south side of said Merritt street,
where
said Merritt street intersects
with
Ford street, and the sidewalk on the south
side of said Merritt street, where said stone
crossing ends, the authoriths of the city of
Oshkosh, to wit, this defendant, negligently
permitted a large hole to exist within the
usual line and course of travel over said stone
crossing and sidewalk. and neglig
tly per
mitted and allowed said hole to exis anl re
main without placing any guard over or
around the same, and negligently
allowcd.
said hole to become ﬁlled with water, and to
become frozen over with a large surface of
smooth ice, and negligently
failed to place
anyprotection, guard, or cover over or around
said surface of ice, ard failed to take any pre
caution to prevent or w.:rn ii aveiers ov. r said
crossing or sidewalk from walking upon and
over said surface of ice.
That persons trav
eling over and upon said crossing and side
walk were compelled to walk upon and over
said surface of ice, and that the aforesaid
city authorities, to wit, the defendant, neg
ligently failed to provide a safe and suillcient
crossing or passage over or around said large
surface of smooth ice."
The p‘.a'ntift"s in
jury, and the manner of it, are substantially
described as follows:
The plaintiff, while
traveling upon said Merritt stnet and over
the said stone cros.-ing, “did by necessity and
in tﬁe ordinary course of travel, walk'upon
and over said large surface of ice, and with
out any fault on her part she fell upon said
surface of ice with gre It iorce," and received
great bodily injuries therefrom.
After the
plaintiﬂ! was sworn as a witmss in her own
behalf, the defendant city interposed a de
murrer ore tenus. on ‘.1t8 ground that the com
plaint did not state a cause of action, and the
objection to any evidence under it was over
ruled, and emep.ion taken. The plaintiff tes
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tiihd that when she came to that point "her
feet came from under her, and she came
down on her back. She did not notice any
barriers or guards around this place, or any
ashes upon the sidewalk where she slipped."
According to the evidence, thedcpression in
the street, where the water had accumulated
which made the ice on which the plaintiff
slipped down and was injured, was made by
the junction of a sidewalk coming down
Ford street with the stone cross walk over
Merritt street. It would seem that the slight
difference of the grade of the two streets
’l.‘he slopé of the plank
made the depression.
sidewalk down to its junction with the stone
cross walk was only four inches, and the de
pression in the stone cross walk where the ice
accumulated was from an inch to an inch an].
a half. The plank walk was over the gutter
This defect, if any, ap
on Merritt street.
pears to have been in the plan of the work
At the t.onclu4ion of the
and its construction.
testimony the defendant,s motion for a non
suit was overruled. The jury found a special
verdict “that the cross walk was in a defect
ive and dangerous condition," and “that such
condition caused the plaintiffs injury," and
it will be
assessed her damages at $1,100.
observed that the complaint does not charge
that the plaintiff,s injury was causcd by a
hole or depression in the cross walk, but that
it was caused wholly by the smooth surface
of the ice at that place, and such was the
The plaintiff slipped and ft; ii on the
e\‘idmce.
smooth surface of the ice. The ice was the
proximate cause of the injury. The depres
sion in the walk where the ice formed, if a
dcfect, and a cause of the injury in any sense.
was a remote, and not the proximate, cause
of the injury. But at this time there was 1a)
hole. or even depression, at that place. It
was ﬁlled up by the ice. It is too plain for
argument
that the cause of the plaintiffs
injury, both by the complaint and testimony,
was the smooth surface of the ice on the cross
walk. The special verdict is careful not to
state the defect or dangerous condition.
It
will be observed, also, that the negligence
of the city consists “in failing to provide a
safe crossing or passage over and around said
large surface of smooth ice. and allowed and
permitted said crossing to remain in such in
suﬂicient, unsafe, and defective condition for
a period of four weeks, and failed to take any
precaution to prevent or warn travelers over
said crossing or sidewalk from walking upon
and over said surface of ice." The existence
and continuance of said ice for four weeks
was the presumptive notice to the city of the
defect complained of. The plaintiff does not
complain of being injured by the hole or de
pression, but by the “large surface of smooth
ice." The depression was the cause of the
there, and the water,
water accumulating
combined with a low temperature, caused the
ice to form which injured the piaintiff. The
depression was a remote cause or cause of
causes. The proximate or direct cause was

the ice, and this must be the cause of action. I.
"Causa proxima. non remota, spectatur,"—the
proximate, and not the remote, cause, must be
considered.
The cause nearest in order of
causation, which is adequate to produce the
result, is the direct cause. In law, only the
These are fa
direct cause is considered.
"The proximate cause is the //
miliar maxims.
cause which leads to, and is instrumental in
producing, the result." 3 Amer. & Eng. Enc.
Law, 45; State v. Railroad Co., 52 N. H. 528.
In this case the hole or depression is not the
cause of the injury for which an action may
It is too remote. There is a di
be brought.
rect cause of the injury, and that is the ice on
which she slipped down, and that is the only

The defect in
one which can be considered.
the street or walk is the ice, and the negli
gence of the city consists in allowing it to re
main. This was dangerous to the traveling
public, and the cause of the plaintiff,s injury
in the law and by the complaint and testi
mony. This ice was smooth and level, and
accumulated through the sole agency of the
elements and in the order of nature. No argu
ment, speculation, or casuistry can make this
case any different from this. The main and
important question which ﬁrst presents itself
on the demurrer to the complaint, and again
on the motion for a nonsuit, is, is such a con
dition of the walk an actionable defect? This
question is settled by this court in the negative in many cases, after a very full examina
tion of the authorities elsewhere, which we
need not cite. "When the walk is slippery be
cause of the smooth surface of the snow and
ice which had accumulated upon it," such a
defect is not actionable.
Cook v. City of Mil
In
waukee,
24
Wis. 270, 27 Wis. 191.
Perkins v. City of Fond du Lac, 34 Wis.
435, “the walk was entirely covered
with
packed snow and ice, and the whole sur
face
of the walk was very smooth
and
slippery."
It was held that such a con
dition of the walk did not alone constitute
an actionable defect;
and so in Grosseubach v.
City of Milwaukee, 65 Wis. 31, 26 N. W. Rep(
182. This holding is most reasonable.
Such ti
defect in a walk or street is common and
natural everywhere in the winter season, and
such actions would be numberiess, unreasona
ble, and oppressive.
The municipalities are
powerless to prevent or remove such a com
mon and natural condition.
The authorities
cited by the learned counsel of the respondent
are not applicable
to this case. They are
cases where other defects
with
combine
the ice to cause the injury.
Such defects
must be present with the ice, and they to
gether constitute
a cause of action; as
where the ice is formed on a steep de
clivity or descending grade, or there is some
other condition of the walk, which, to
gether with the ice. makes the walk danger
ous, as in Grossenbach v. City of Milwaukee
and
Perkins v. City of Fond du Lac,
But
supra, and other cases in this court.
here the hole or depression does not com
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with the ice, and is not present
with it. There is no hole at the time,
as it is ﬁlled with ice, and the surface
is made level as ice can
be anywhere.
The plaintlff was not injured by stepping into
the hole, but by slipping on the ice. But I
have said enough of this. The hole was only
the remote cause, or cause of causes, which
blue

‘_
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produced the result, and was not the direct,
efﬁcient, or adequate cause, which alone is ac
The court should have sustained
tionabie.
the demurrer ore tenus, or, failing in that,
ought to have ordered a nonsuit on the evi
dence. The judgment of the circuit court is
reversed. and the cause is remanded for a

new trial.
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BLYTHE

et al. v.

(25

Pac.

DE.\",ER & R.
702,

RY.

gencc was in not making the requisite
efiorts to save the goods after the peril
had been incurred.
We make no claim
that there was negligence in carrying a
stove in the car." By these concessions,
two important questions are eliminated,
and the issues are narrowed,
the only
questions remaining being:
First. Was
“
the act of God " the proximate and direct
cause of the loss sustained, so as to ex
onerate the carrier from liability, or was
it the remote cause, and the ﬁre against
which the carrier is supposed to be an in
surer the proximate
and direct cause?
Second. After the wrecking and overturn
ing of the train by “the act oi God," was
the carrier guilty of negligence in falling
to protect and secure the goods in the

CO.

15 Colo. 333.)

Supreme Court of Colorado.

Commissioners‘

G.

decision.

Jan.

10, 1891.

Error

to dis

trict court, Arapahoe county.
Plaintiffs in error brought suit against
the defendant as a common carrier ior
the loss of a package of merchandise

.

con

sisting of gold and silver watches, watch

cases and movements, of the alleged value
of $726.95, delivered to defendant at Ala
B. Moomaw. to be carried
mosa by one

J.

as an express package, directed to and to
be delivered to plaintiffs at Denver. The
package was not valued, and was accept
ed and receipted ior as an ordinary pack
age at a nominal valuation of $50, upon
which charges of 65 cents were paid in ad
vance ior its transportation.
The de
fendant, after denying the material alle
gations of the complaint, admitted the
receipt oi the package, the payment of the
money for its transportation, the execu
tion and delivery of its receipt ior the
same, and specially alleged as defenses:
1"1,rst, that the car in which such package
was being transported was blown from
the track by a furious wind, and the car
and contents destroyed by ﬁre, and that
theloss was by inevitable accident and
“the act of God;" second, that the ship
per frauduenfly concealed the value of the
package, and it was received as being only
of the value oi $50; that it was placed in
the body oi the car, where ordinary pack
ages were usually carried; that defend
ant had a ﬁre-proof safe in the car, and
had the shipper given the true value, and
paid transportation ior such value, the
goods would have been placed in the safe,
and would not have been lost; that. by
the terms of the receipt given, defendant
wasexempted from any liability exceeding
was ﬁled putting in
$50. A replication
issue the special matters pleaded in de
fense, and averring negligence in not so
curing the package in the safe, and in not
making proper efforts to save the prop
erty at the time of the disaster. The case
was tried to a jury. resulting in a verdict
for the defendant, and judgment upon the
verdict.
Lucius P. Marsh, ior plaintiffs in error.
Wulcott & Valle, for defendant in error.

REED, C., (after stating the facts as
It is concederhthat the wrecking
above.)
of a portion of the train, such portion con
sisting of one engine and four cars, one
being the express-car in which the goods
were being carried, was by “the act of
God, " and inevitable.
it is also conceded
in argument that havinga coal ﬁre burning
in a stove, and a lighted lamp in the com
partment, as testiﬁed to, was not negli
gence on the part of the carrier.
Counsel
for plaintiffs in error in reply say: “In the
brief of defendant in error, counsel have
assumed ior us a claim which we havenot
made, and they then proceed to demolish
They assume ior
such assumed claim.
us that we claim there was negligence in
carrying in the car a stove with ﬁre in it.
* " There was negligence,—we may
call it by that name,—but such negli

'

burning car?
Great ability and research have been
pended in attempting to arrive at and

.

'

v

ex
de

termine upon some general deﬁnition of
the terms “proximate " and “remote_
causes and establish a rule and a line of
demarkation between the two. Such ef
iorts appear to have been but partially
successful.
Both have received various
deﬁnitions, though
differently worded,
amounting to practically the same thing.
But, in almost every instance where they
have been attempted to be applied, their
applicability seems to have been deter
mined by the peculiar circumstances of the
Wcbsterdcﬁnes
case underconsideration.
“proximate cause," “that which imme
rliately precedes and produces the effect,
as distinguishd from the remote, mediate,
or predisposing cause. " And. Diet. Law:
“The nearest, the immediate, the direct
cause; the eﬂicient cause; the cause that
sets another or other causes in operation,
or dominant cause. " But with these deﬁ
nitions in view, when two causes unite
to produce the loss, the question still re
mains, which was the proximate cause?
In Insurance Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall. 52, the
late lamented Mr. Justice MILLER said:
“
We have had cited to us a general review
of the doctrine of proximate and remote
causes, as it has arisen
(1 been décided
in the courts in a great- ,ariety of cases.
It would be an unproﬁtable labor to en
ter into an examination of these cases.
If
we could deduce from them the best pos
sible expression of the rule. it would re
main after all to decide each case largely
upon the special facts belonging to it, and
often upon the very nicest discrimina
tions." In Howard Fire Ins. Co. v. Nor
wlch & N. Y. Transp. Co., 12 Wall. 199, in
delivering the opinion of the court, Mr.
Justice SraoNo said: “ And certainly,
that cause which set the other in motion,
and gave to it its efﬁciency to do harm
at the time of " the disaster, must rank as
predominant.
In Railroad Co. v. Kellogg,
“The inquiry must
94 U. S. 475, it is said:
thereiore always be whether there was any
intermedia te cause disconnected from the
primary fault, and self-operating, which
produced the injury. " In Insurance Co. v.
Boon, 95 U. S. 130, it is said: “The prox
imate cause is the efﬁcient cause; the one
that necessarily sets the other causes in
The causes that are merely
operation.
incidental or instruments of a superior or
controlling agency are not the proximate
causes and the responsible ones, though

.
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they may be nearer in time to the result.
It is only when the causes are independ-.
ent of each other that the nearest is, of
course, to be charged with the disaster.”
Leaving out of consideration, as we
must, by concession of counsel, all ques
tion of negligence in regard to the burning
ﬁre in the stove, a lighted kerosene lamp,
and regarding each of them as securely
protected against damage as prudence
would require. and applying the rules
apparent
above laid down, it becomes
that the overturning and wrecking of the
car by the violence of the wind was the
proximate, direct’ and efﬁcient cause of‘
the loss, and the ﬁre following, if not in
stantaneously,
immediately after, with
out negligence or any wrongful act oi the
carrier intervening to produce it, must be
regarded as resulting and incidental. It is
ably contended in argument, and many
supposed authorities in support of the po
sition are cited, that the negligence of the
carrier in failing to use proper exertion to
save the contents oi the car, after it was
overturned, rendered the defendant liable
ior the loss. ll‘, by proper diligence and
attention the goods couhi have been res
cued, a failure to secure them would have
ﬂxed the liability of the carrier. There
can be no doubt of the correctness of this
conclusion.‘ The questions. what was the
proximate cause oi the loss, and of negli
gence. were questions of tact to be deter
mined by the jury from the evidence, un
der proper instructions from the court.
There was not muchconﬂict of testim,:my.
In Railroad Co. v. Kellogg, supra, it is
said: “In the nature of things, there is in
every transaction a succession of events,
more or less dependent upon those preced
ing, and it is the province of thejury to
look at this succession O! events or iacts,
and ascertain whether they are naturally
and probably connected with each other
by a continuous sequence, or are dissev
ered by new and independent agencies;
and this must be determined in view of
the circumstances existing at the time."
The jury iound as a fact that the “ act of
"
‘
God was the proximate cause. and also
found as a fact that there was no negli
gence.
Viewed in the light oi all the evi
dence, and of attendant circumstances,
the ﬁnding of the jury was fully warrant
ed.
The iorce of the gale was such as to
blow the cars from the track over the em
bankment.
It was shown to be almost
impossible ior men to stand or walk, and
they were compelled to prostrate them
selves under the lee oi the track or bank
to escape its fury. The air was so full of

TORT.

117

dust and ﬂying material that scarcely any
thing could be seen. The car contained
inﬂammable material, and the ﬁre suc
ceeded the overturning almost instantane
ously.
The messenger escaped with great
difiiculty, and not without injury from
the ﬂames. The position of the car was
such that all movable goods must have
been hurled into the corner of the top of
the car. From the iorce of the wind, and
combustible material of the car, it is ob
vious that the destruction oi the car and
contents was inevitable in a very brief
space of time, and that any attempt to
rescue the goods would have been an

availing.

Considerable

criticism

is directed to the
Some of those
criticised, and upon which errors are as
signed. are in regard to negligence in the
use of the store and lamp.
As counsel
concedes in his ﬁnal argument that there
was no negligence in that respect, a re
view oi them becomes unnecessary. Con
siderable attention is given to the eighth
in which the learned judge
instruction.
charged: " Where one is pursuing a lawful
avocation, in a lawful manner, and some
thing occurs which no human skill or pre
caution could ioresee or prevent, and as a
consequence the accident takes nlace. this
iscalled ‘inevitable accident’ or the ‘act of
" The objection urged is more techni
God.’
cal than substantial. Whileitis, possibly,
not technically correct, and while there is
a legal distinction between “inevitable ac
cident" and the “act of God," we can see
nothing in it to the prejudice of the plain
tiff, or that could have misled the jury.
Tile immediate resulting cause producing
the loss was the ﬁre, which might proper
ly he termed an “inevitable accident"
growing out of the iormer disaster; while
the direct cause oi the agency that worked
the destruction was the “act of God,"
putting the resulting agent at work. We
think the charge, taken as a whole, was B.
fair and impartial statement of the law,
and should be sustained.
We advise that
the judgment be aﬁirmed.

instructions oi the court.

RICHMOND and BISSELL,

.
mug.

Cf.‘..,

concur

PER CURIAM. For the reasons stated
in the ioregoing opinion the judgment of
the court below is aﬂirmed.
ELLIOTT, J., having tried this cause
below, did not participate in this decision.
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the law, but of the facts. and on the applica
tion of the familiar doctrine that, where a
(19
plain inference is to be drawn from undis
May 19, 1890.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
puted facts. the court will decide it as a
from
court
of
common
matter of law. In Railroad Co. v. Kerr the
pleas, Brad
Appeal
ford county.
negligence had been held by the court below
Action by Leroy Haverly against the State
to be the proximate cause of the plaintiffs
Line At Sullivan Railroad Company for dam
loss.
This court held that it was remote, and
The testimony showed
did not award a new centre, but said that it
age caused by ﬁre.
that on May 11. 1880, about 4 or 5 o’clock P.
would do so if plaintiff should desire it upon
The question was then
M. a train of defendant’s passed over its road,
grounds shown.
new; an 1, from what was said about the
and near the tract of land where plaintiff was
centre, the court itself does not seem to have
lumbering; that soon afterwards smoke was
seen issuing from a stump in the line of the
been entirely clear that it should be decided
defendant,s right of way; that one of plain
It may be doubted wheth
as matter of law.
er, on the same facts, the court would not
tiffs agents was sent to put out this ﬁre,
who, returning, reported he had done so;
now send it to a jury. Certainly no subse
that no further smoke was seen in or around
quent case has assumed to decide where the
the stump until about 10 o,clock A. M. of the
facts were so near the line. Hoag v. Railroad
following day, when the plaintiff himself
Co. was a much clearer case, and so were
sent a servant, who, ﬁnding the stump on
Railway Co. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. St. 306;
West Mahonoy Tp. v. Watson, 116 Pa. St.
ﬁre. poured water thereon until he supposed
344, 9 Atl. Rep. 430; Railway Co. v. Trich,
it was entirely extinguished, and he re
mained there half or three-quarters of an
117 Pa. St. 890, 11 Atl. Rep. 627; and the
hour, until he satisﬁed himself that no ﬁre
other cases where the court has pronounced
remained; that about noon of the same day,
the negligence to be remote as matter of law.
But, whatever the result of the views taken
the wind coming up and blowing lively, a
ﬁre broke out on said tract in the vicinity of
of the facts in these cases, the principles of
said stump, which could not, on account of
decision are the same in all.
the wind, be controlled by the plaintiff or his
In the present case the learned judge left
the question of proximate or remote cause to
agents, and destroyed a quantity of logs in
which the plaintiff had an interest. Plaintiff
the jury, in substantial conformity with the
Defendant appeals.
obtained judgment.
doctrine of Railroad Co. v. Hope. Appellant,
Edward Overton, John F. Sanderson, and
however. claims that the succession of events
Rodney A. Mercur, for appellant. H. N.
was so broken as to bring the case under
Williams, I. MCP]t€7,S0ﬂ, E.
Angle, and
Hoag v. Railroad Co., and require the judge
R. H. Williams, for appellee.
The break in
to direct the jury in its favor.
the chain of events was merely a gap in the
MITCHELL,
The test by which the line
time. Had the ﬁre extended from the stump
is to be drawn between proximate and re
to plaintiff’s lumber without interval, on the
mote cause, in reference to liability for the
same afternoon, this case would have been ex
consequences of negligence, has been ﬁrmly
actly parallel with Railroad Co. v. Hope. But
established by the three cases of Railroad Co.
the fact that the ﬁre smouldered awhile in
v. Kerr, 62 Pa. St. 353; Railroad Co. v. Hope,
the stump, and’ after it was supposedto have
80 Pa. St. 373; and Hoag v. Railroad Co., 85
been extinguished, broke out again the next
Pa. St. 293. It is most elaborately expressed l day, while it makes the conclusion less
by Chief Justice AGNEw in Railroad Co. v.
obvious that the damage was done by the
Hope, in the iollowing language: “The jury
same ﬁre. does not interpose any new cause,
must determine’ therefore, whether the facts
or enable the court to say as matter of law
constitute a continuous succession of events.
The
that the casual connection was broken.
so linked together that they become a natural
sequence from the original ﬁre to the burn
whole, or whether the chain of events is so
ing of plaintiffs logs was interrupted by two
broken that they become independent, and
apparent cessations of the ﬁre, but the jury
the ﬁnal result cannot be said to be the nat
have found that the cessations were only ap
ural and probable consequence of the pri
parent, leaving intervals of time in the vis
mary cause,—the negligence of the defend
ible progress of the ﬁre, but making no
" ants. "
And the rule is again put somewhat
real break at all in the actual connection.
more tersely by the present chief justice in
In Railroad Co. v. Kerr, (page 366,) it is said
‘
Hoag v. Railroad Co., as follows: “The in
by Tnomrson, C. .I., that the rule “is not to
jury must be the natural and probable conse
be controlled by time or distance, but by the
quence of the negligence,—such a conse
succession of events;" and in Hoag v. Rail
quence as * * * might and ought to
road Co., TRUNKEY, P. J., in charging the
have been foreseen by the wrong-doer as
jury, had quoted the foregoing, and added:
“
The three lead
likely to ﬂow from his act."
Whether the ﬁre communicated to the plain
ing cases above referred to, though frequent
tiff's property within a few minutes, or after
ly cited on opposite sides of the same argu
the lapse of hours, from the negligent set,
ment, are not at all in conﬂict in principle.
It is said in this case
may be immaterial."
The different results which were reached in
that the agents of plaintiff on the ground did
them depended not on any different view of
not anticipate a further spread of the ﬁre aft
v.
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er the interval of time, and therefore it can
not be assumed that the defendant should
have anticipated it. But the agents of plain
tiff did not expect it because they thought the
ﬁre had been put out, not because they did
not see the danger of its spreading while it
was burning; and this was the danger that
appellant was bound to contemplate, to-wit,
the natural and probable consequence of the
original act, not the effect of the supposed
extinguishment subsequently. The pauses
in the progress of the ﬁre, therefore, and the
lapse of time, while matter for the considera
tion of the jury in determining the continuity
of effect, do not of themselves make such a
change as requires the court to say that they
break the connection.
But it is argued that it was not until the
next morning after the ﬁre started in the
stump, and during the time when it was ap
parently extinguished, that the wind rose,
and became a new cause of the spread of the
This, however,
ﬁre to plaintilfs lumber.
was, like the point already considered, de
In Railroad
pendent on the circumstances.
Co. v. Hope, one of the facts was a strong
wind which carried the ﬁre, and so, also, it
was in Railroad Co. v. Lacey. 89 Pa. St. 458,
and in Railroad Co. v. McKeen, 90 Pa. St.
129; and in this last case, Tmmxsy, J., says
the jury “could also determine whether dry
weather and high winds in the spring-time
are extraordinary, and whether, under these
* * * the injury was within
conditions,
the probable foresight of him whose negli
gence ran through from the beginning to the
end." No doubta hurricane or a gale maybe
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1
such as to be plainly out of the usual course
of nature, and therefore to be pronounced by
the court as the intervention of a new cause.
Such a wind would be like the ﬂood in Mor
rison v. Davis, 20 Pa. St. 171. But the or
dinary danger of wind helping a ﬁre to spread
is one of the things to be naturally anticipated.
The lapse of time before the wind rose, in this
case, was therefore not clearly a new cause
by the court, but a cir
to be so pronounced
cumstance to be considered, with the others,
On this branch of the case,
by the jury.
generally, the injury was not more remote
from the alleged cause than in Railroad Co. v.
Hope. supra. llailr’oad Co. v. Lacey, 89 Pa. St.
458, and Railroad Co. v. McKeen, 90 Pa. St.
129, and not so much so as in Fairbanks v.
Kerr, 70 Pa. St. 86, and Railroad Co. v. Keigh
ron, 74 Pa. St. 316, in all of which the ques
tion was held to have been properly submitted
to the jury.
There remains only the question of con
tributory negligence, and we do not ﬂnd any
evidence
that would have justiﬁed taking
this from the jury. If plaintiff had not
known of the ﬁre in the stump’ he would,
have had no duty in regard to it; but, know
ing of it, he was bound to take all reasonable
and practicable
to prevent its
measures
spreading to his lumber. He was not an
insurer. The measure of his duty in this
regard was reasonable care and diligence.
and whether he used these was fairly and ac
curately submitted to the jury. That they
iound against the defendant’s view was no
fault of their instruction as to the law. Judg
ment aﬂirmed.
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54 Mich. 55.)

Supreme Court of Michigan.

J une

11, 1884.

Error to Wayne.

Plaintiff brings error.
Blodget & Patchin and G. I. Walker, for
appellant
W. L. Webber and 0. F‘. Wis
ner, for appellee.

C. J.
Action to recover dam
for a personal injury.
The facts as
they appeared on the trial were as follows:
The plaintiff resides in the township of
Huron, a few miles east of Belden station,
on the road of defendant.
He was at
Wayne station on the evening of January
12, 1883, awaiting the train which was to go
south past Belden in the night. The train
left Wayne at 3:05 in the morning of the
13th, and he procured his ticket and took
passage for Belden, where the train was
due at 3:30.
The night was dark, cold. and
wet.
The train stopped
when “Belden"
was called, and plaintiff got off. Belden
was only a ﬂag station for this train, and
there was no one in charge of the station
house, and no light there.
When plalntiff
got off the train he was told by the brake
man or conductor that they had run by the
station about two car lengths, and he re
plied that if that was all, it was no matter,
as he had to go that way.
An east and
west highway crosses the railroad about 24
rods south of the station-house,
which the
plaintiff would take in going to his home.
If he‘ was two car lengths beyond the sta
tion-house,
he would still be north of the
highway; and, supposing that to be the
case, he followed the track along south, in
preference
to going back to the station
house,‘from which a passage east of the
track would have led him to the highway.
The piaintiff knew the place well, and knew
that on the track he must cross an open
cattle-guard to reach the highway.
He had
crossed this before, and sometimes found a
plank laid over it Passing on he soon came
to trees which he knew were some distance
south of the highway, and he then knew the
information given him as to where he was
when he alighted from the train was erro
neous.
He turned about to retrace his
steps, and followed the track in the direc
tion of the highway.
This he did carefully.
because it was very dark, and he knew
there was an open cattle-guard on the south
side of the highway, as well as on the north
side.
He was looking for this cattle-guard
constantly and carefully. There were burn
ing kiins near to the track on his right, and
the smoke from these affected his eyes, but
he saw a switch light, which he knew was
near the crossing, but which at the time
was too dim to aid him.
He continued to
approach the cattle-guard carefully, intend
ing, if there was a timber or plank over it, to
cross upon that; and if not, then to pass
In the dim
down into it and climb out.
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light he saw what he believed to be the cat
tle-guard, which seemed to be several paces
off, but at the very next step one foot slip
pod, and as he attempted to save himself by
springing upon the other, the other foot
caught, and he was precipitated into the
cattle-guard, and he received an injury of a
very serious and permanent nature.
He
was for a time senseless, but then succeed
ed in drawing himself out by his elbows,—
not being able to use his lower limbs,—and
with great difﬁculty he reached a neighbor
ing tavern, where he was cared for.
On the trial a claim was made on the part
of the defense that the plaintiff was negli
gent in following the railroad track back to
the cattle-guard, and in attempting to cross
it, when he might have left the track to the
right and passed along the ﬁeld until he
was
came to the highway;
and evidence
given to show that he would have encoun
But, in such a night
tered no impediments.
as this was, it is not clear that the ﬁeld
would have afforded a safer passage than
the highway, and his failure to take it
would at most only raise a question of neg
ligence on his part which would necessarily
go to the jury.
Railroad Co. v. Van Stein
burg, 17 .\lich. 118; Billings v. Breinig, 45
Mich. 72, 7 N. W. 722; Railroad Co. v. Mil
ler. 46 Mich. 537, 9 N. W. 841; Marcott v.
Railroad Co., 47 Mick. 7, 10 N. W. 3. In
this case the court took the case from the
jury, and directed a verdict for the defend
ant.
This direction is understood to have
been given on the ground that the injury
which the plaintiff suffered was not proxi
mate to the wrong attributable to the de
fendant, and for that reason would not sup
port an action.
The wrong of the defend- .
ant consisted in carrying the plaintiff past
the station, and then giving him erroneous
information as to where he was.
If the in- .
jury suffered was not a proximate conse
quence of this wrong, the instruction of the
court was right; otherwise, not. The difﬁ
culty here is in determining what is and
what is not a proximate consequence in con
templation of law.
For the plaintiff, the cases are cited in
which it has been held that one whose neg
ligence causes a tire by, the spreading of
which the property of another is destroyed,
is liable for the damages, though the prop
erty for which the compensation was claim
ed was only reached by the ﬁre after it had
passed through intervening ﬁelds or build
ings. Kellogg v. Railroad Co., 26 Wis. 223;
Fent v. Railroad Co., 59 Ill. 349; Wiley v.
Railroad Co., 44 N. J. Law, 248; Railroad Co.
v. Kellogg, 94 U. S. 469.
But these cases,
we think, are not analogous to the one be
fore us. The negligent ﬁre was the direct
and sole cause of the injury in each in
stance, and there was no intervening cause
whatever. The cases are in harmony with
Hoyt v. Jeffers, 30 Mich. 181.
The case of
Pennsylvania Co. v. Hoagland, 78 Ind. 203,
I
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seems, at ﬁrst view, to be more in point.
The action in that case was brought by a
woman, who, in consequence of misinforma
tion on the part of the person in charge
of a railroad train, left the car in the night
time at the wrong stopping place, and wan
dered about for an hour or more before
she could ffnd shelter, taking cold from ex
posure.
But here, as in the other cases cit
ed, there
was no cause intervening the
wrong complained of and the resulting m
jury, and the question of proximate cause
does not appear to have been raised in the
case.
Smith y. Packet Co., 86 N. Y. 408, is
also relied upon, but it is unlike this in the
important particular that the intervening
cause, which, after the ﬁrst wrong on the
part of the defendant, operated to bring in
jury to the plaintiff, was a neglect of proper
care, which the court held was due from the
defendant to the plaintiff under the circum
stances, so that all the injury received was a
proximate result of the defendant,s neglect
of duty.
The case of Brown v. Chicago, etc., R. Co.,
54 Wis. 3-Q, 11 N. W. 356, more nearly re
sembles the present case than any other to
which our attention has been called by coun
sel for the plaintiff.
The facts, as stated in
the prevailing opinion,
are the following:
The plaintiffs, with their child, 7 years old,
were being carried on defendant,s cars, with
Mauston for their destination. and when they
arrived at a station three miles east of Maus
ton they left the train, under the direction of
the brakeman, who told them they were at
\Iauston.
It was in the night; it was cloudy
and wet; there was a freight train standing
on a side track where they were put off the
train; there was no platform, and no lights
visible, except on the freight train. Plain
tiffs soon ascertained they were not at Maus
ton, but did not know where they were.
They did not see the station-house, though
there was one, hidden from their view by
the freight train. Tney supposed they were
at a place two miles east, where the train
sometimes stopped, but where there was no
They started west on the
station-house.
track towards Mauston, expecting to ﬁnd a
house where they might stop, but did not ﬁnd
one until they came to a bridge, within a
mile of Manston, and then they thought it
easier to go on to that place than to seek
shelter at the house, which was a considera
Mrs. Brown
ble distance from the track.
was pregnant at the time, and when she ar
rived at Mauston was quite exhausted.
She
had, during the night, severe pains, which
continued from time to time, and were fol
lowed by ﬂowing, and at length by a miscar
inﬂammation, and serious iliness.
riage,

The plaintiffs claimed that the miscarriage
and subsequent sickness were all caused by
the walk Mrs. Brown was compelled to take
to get from the place where they were left
by the train to Mauston, and the question
in the case was whether the defendant was
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liable for the injury to Mrs. Brown, admit
ting it to have been caused by her walk
The majority of the court ﬁnding that
“there was no intervening independent
cause of the injury other than the act of thedefendant," and that "all the acts done by
the plaintiffs, and from which the injury
ﬂowed,
were rightful on their part, and
compelled by the act of the defendant," heldi
that “the injury to Mrs. Brown was the di
rect result of the defendant,s negligence,
and that such negligence was the proximate,
and not the remote, cause of the injury,"
quoting Lord Ellenborough in Jones v. Boyce,
1 Starkie, 493, that “if 1 place a man in such
a situation that he must adopt a perilous al
ternative,
I am responsible for the conse
quences."
The case of Car Co. v. Barker, 4 Colo. 844,
is opposed to the case in Wisconsin, as are
also Hobbs v. Railroad Co., L. R. 10 Q. B.
111I and Francis v. Transfer Co., 5 310. App.
7.
But it is not necessary to express any
opinion upon the conﬂict which these cases
disclose, because in the case before us there .
was an independent cause intervening the
fault of the defendant and the injury the
plaintiff sustained, and from which the in
jury resulted as a direct and immediate con
sequence.
To show what is understood by
intervening cause, it may be useful to refer
to a few cases:
Livie v. Janson, 12 East, 648, was a case
of insurance on a ship warranted free of
American condemnation.
In sailing out of
New York she was damaged by perils of the
sea, stranded,
and wrecked on Governor,s
island, and then seized and condemned.
It
was the peril of the see. that caused the ves
sel to be seized and condemned;
but as the
condemnation
was the proximate cause of
the loss, the insurers were held not liable.
A similar case is Delano v. Insurance Co.,
10 Mass. 354, where a like result was reach
ed.
In Tisdale v. Norton, 8 Metc. (Mass) 388,
the facts were that a highway was defective
anu the plaintiff, who was using it, went
out of it into the adjoining ﬁeld, where he

sustained an injury.
He brought suit
against the town, whose duty it was to keep
the highway in repair.
But the court held
that only as a remote cause could the in
jury of the plaintiff be said to be due to the
defect in the highway.
The proximate, not
the remote, cause is that which is referred
to in the statute which gives an action
against the town; and the proximate cause
in this case was outside the highway, not
within it.
.
In Anthony v. Slaid, 11 Metc. (Mass) 290,
the plaintiff, who was contractor with a
town to support for a speciﬁed time and for
a ﬁxed sum all the town paupers in sickness
and in health, brought suit against one who,
it was alleged, had assaulted and beaten one
of the paupers, as a consequence of which
the plaintiff was put to increased expense
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was held to be the proximate cause of in
for care and support. but the action was held
jury.
not maintainable.
In Scheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U. S. 249,
In Silver v. Frazier, 3 Allen, 382. it was
it appeared that, by a collision of railroad
decided that a principal whose agent has
trains, a passenger was injured, and, be
disobeyed
his instructions, induced to do
coming thereby disordered in mind and body,
so by the false representations of a third
be, some eight months thereafter, committed
party, cannot maintain an action against
Action was brought against the
suicide.
such third party for the damage sustained.
railroad company as the negligent cause of
“The alleged loss or
Said Bigelow, C. J.:
injury suffered by the plaintiff is not the his death. Miller, ., speaking for the court.
and referring to Insurance Co. v. Tweed,
direct and immediate result of the defend
Stripped of its techni
7 Wall. 44, and Railroad Co. v. Kellogg, 94
ant’s wrongful act.
U. S. 469, said:
“The proximate cause of
cal lunguage, the declaration charges only
the death of Scheffer was his own act of self
that the agent employed by the plaintiff to
the
destruction.
do a certain piece of work disobeyed
It Was, within the rule in both
these cases. a new cause, and a suﬂicient
orders of his principal, and was induced to
cause of death.
do so by the false statement of the defend
The argument is not sound
which seeks to trace this immediate cause
ant.
In other words, the plaintiff alleges
of the death through the previous stages
that his agent violated his duty, and thereby
of mental aberration, physical suffering, and
did him an injury, and seeks to recover dam
eight months’ disease and mediml treatment,
ages therefor by an action against a third
to the original accident on the railroad."
person, on the ground that he induced the
In Bosch v. Railroad Co., 44 Iowa, 402,
agent, by false statements, to go contrary to
Such an action
the piaintiffs house took ﬁre, and the ﬁre
the orders of his principal.
because, as was alleged, of the
The im
is, we believe, without precedent.
department,
wrongful occupation and expansion of the
mediate cause of injury and loss to the plain
tiff is the breach of duty of his agent. This river bank, were unable to get to the river
The
to obtain water for putting out the ﬁre.
is the proximate cause of damage.
which operated to Plaintiff sued the defendant for the loss of
motives or inducements
his property, but the court said the acts of
cause the agent to do an unauthorized act
defendant complained of “have no connection
are too remote to furnish a good cause of
with the ﬁre, nor with the hose or other
action to the plaintiff."
apparatus of the ﬁre companies.
They are
In Dubuque Wood & Goal Ass‘n v. Du
independent acts, and their inﬂuence in the
buque, 30 Iowa, 176, the facts were that the
plaintiff had a quantity of wood deposited
destruction of plaintiffs property is too remote to be made the basis of recovery."
at one end of a bridge, which was to be tak
In this last case, Metallic Compression Co.
en over the bridge into the city of Dubuque.
v. Railroad Co., 109 Mass_ 277, was referred
The bridge was out of repair, and, while
awaiting repair by the city, whose duty it to and distinguished. The facts there were
that the plaintiff,s building was on ﬁre, and
was, the wood was carried away by a ﬂood.
water was being thrown upon it through
The plaintiff sued the city for the value of
his wood; but it was held he could not re
hose. when an engine of defendant was
recklessly run upon the hose and severed it,
cover.
Beck’ J., in deciding the case, il
thereby defeating the efforts to distinguish
lustrates the principle as follows: “An own
the ﬁre, which otherwise were likely to
er of lumber deposited upon the levee of the
In that case the relation of the
city of Dubuque, exposed to the ﬂoods of the
succeed.
plaintiff,s injury to the defendant,s act was
river, starts with his team to remove it.
A bridge built by the city, which he at direct and immediate.
So it was also in
tempts to cross, from defects therein, falls,
Billman v. Railroad Co., 76 Ind. 166; Lane v.
Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136; and Ricker
and his horses are killed. By the breaking
of the bridge and the loss of his team he
v. Freeman, 50 N. H. -i20,—ali of which are
in removing his property.
is delayed
On ruled by the Squib Case, (Scott v. Shepherd.
2 W. Bl. 892;) and so, perhaps,
account of this delay his lumber is carried
are Fair
away by the ﬂood and lost.
banks v. Kerr, 70 Pa. St. 90; and Lake v.
The proximate
Milliken, 62 Me. 240.
consequence of the negligence of the city is
the 10s of his horses; the secondary conse
In Henry v. Railroad Co., 76 Mo. 288, it
quence, resulting from the ﬁrst consequence,
appeared that the nlaintiﬂ! was wrongfully
is the delay in removing the lumber, which ‘\commanded to get oﬂ! a caboose of the de
fendant, where he had a right to be.
ﬁnally caused its loss. Damage on account
He
of the ﬁrst is recoverable, but for the second
obeyed the command, and, while upon the
is denied."
Similar to this are Daniels v.
ground, stepped upon a track. where he was
Ballantine, 23 Ohio St. 532; and McCiary
run upon and injured by a train. Hough.
v. Railroad Co., 3 Neb. 44.
In each of these J., speaking for the court’ said: “It is per
haps probable that if the plaintiff had not
cases the negligence of the defendant left
the property of the plaintiff where, by an act
been ordered out of the caboose he would
of God,—in one case a ﬂood. and in the other
But this hypothesis
not have been injured.
a tornado,—it
was lost or injured, and in
does not establish the legal relation of cause
each the act of God, and not the negligence,
and effect between
the expulsion
and the
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injury.
If the plaintiff had not left home ward under a supposition that the cattle ..
guard, upon the brink of which he already
he certainly would not have been injured
stood, was some paces oil‘, and his decep
as he was, but his leaving home could not
therefore be declared to be the cause of his tion, with the slipping of his foot, concurred
to produce the injury.
injury.
As the plaintiff,s injury was neith
What was this but
pure accident?
It was an event which hap
er the ordinary, natural, nor probable consepened unexpectedly and without fault.
The
quence of his expulsion from the caboose,
such expulsion, however it might excite our
defendant or its agents had not produced the
indignation, in the absence of any regulation
deception or caused the foot to slip; and such
wrong as the defendant had been guilty of
of defendant to justify it, cannot be con
v
was in no manner connected with or related
sidered in this action. and the legal aspect of
to the injury except as it was the occasion
the case is precisely the same that it would
for bringing the plaintiff where the accident
have been if no such expulsion had taken
It is to be regarded as if the plain occurred. It was after the plaintiff had .
place.
tiff had gone to the caboose and could not been brought there that the cause of injury
get in because it was locked, or, being able ‘ unexpectedly
arose. If lightning had chan
red to strike the plaintiff at that place, the
to get in, chose to remain outside."
fault of the defendant and its relation to
Further reference to authorities is need
the injury would have been the same as
less.
The application of the rule that the
now, and the injury could have been chargedwes
proximate, not the remote cause is to be reto the defendant
garded,
is obscure and difﬁcult in many
with precisely the same
By the wrong of the
cases, but not in this.
reason as now.
If the accidental discharge
of a gun in the hands of some third person
defendant the plaintiff was carried past the
had wounded the plaintiff as he approached
station where he had a right to be left, and
beyond where he had a right, from the in
the cattle-guard,
the connection of defend
serv
ant’s wrong with the injury would
formation received from defendant,s
have
ants, to suppose he was when he left the car.
been precisely the same which appears here.
..§f/
For any injury or inconvenience naturally But the proximate cause of injury in the
resulting from the wrong, and traceable to one case would have been the act of God;
in the other, inevitable accident;
it as the proximate cause, the defendant
but not
may be held responsible.) But before any in
more plainly accident than was the proxi
jury had been sustained the plaintiff dis
mate cause here.
Back of that cause in this
covered where ‘he was, and started back for
to
case were many others, all conducing
bring the plaintiff to the place of the danger
the road which he had intended to take.
Whatever danger there was to be encounter
and the injury;
the act of the defendant
ed in the way was to be found in the cattle
was the last of a long sequence; but, as be
guard, and this he understood and calculated
tween the causes which precede the proxi
upon.
Evidently it did not appear to him
mate cause, the law cannot select one rather
of a formidable nature; for, on the supposi
than any other as that to which the ﬁnal
tion that he was north of the highway when
consequence shall be at.tributed, and it stops
he left the train, he had voluntarily started
at the proximate cause, because to go back
south with the expectation
of crossing the
of it would be to enter upon an investigation
cattle-guard
on that side, over which he
which would be both endless and useless.
might or might not ﬁnd a plank laid, when
The injury being the result of pure acci-/
dent, the party upon whom it has chanced to .
by stepping back a few rods, where he sup
posed the station-house to be, he might pass
fall
necessarily left to bear it. No compen
from thence out to the highway by the pas
sation can be given by law in such cases.
sage-way for persons and vehicles leading
Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134; Gibbons v. Pepper,
from the station-house to it, and thereby avoid
Ld. Raym. 3“; Losee v. Buchanan. 51 N. Y.
the cattle-guard altogether.
It is very clear 476; Vincent v. Stinehour,
Vt. 62; Morris
Neither,
that he did not anticipate danger.
v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75; Brown v. Collins, 53
probably, would any other person have an
N. H. 442; Bizzell v. Booker, 16 Ark. 3(B;
ticipated it. The crossing
was a simple
Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N. J. Law, 339;
matter; it was only to ascertain ﬁrst wheth
Paxton v. Beyer, 67 Ill. 1312; Express Co. v.
Smith, 33 Ohio St. 511; Plummer v. State,
er a plank or timber was laid across, and if
so to cross upon it; and if not, to step down in
Tex. App. 310; Parrot v. Wells, 15 Wall.
524;
to the excavation and out on the other side.
Holmes v. Mather, L. R. 10 Exch. 261.
Where was he to look for danger? The night
A case like this appeals strongly to the
was dark, it is true, but even by the sense
but sympathy cannot rule the
sympathies,
of feeling, when he knew he was within a
decision.
Upon the undisputed facts of the case the
few feet of the cattle-guard, one would ex
pect him to be able to determine its exact
plaintiff has no right of action for the injury
happened
But then something
location.
which has befallen him, and the circuit court
which it is evident that the plairitiff, with
was correct in so holding.
The question
full knowledge of all the facts, did not at
what judgment shall be rendered in the case
Misled ap
all expect and had not feared.
is for the present reserved.
parently by visual deception, he moved for
The other justices concurred.
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MONMOUTH PARK ASS,N
IRON YVORKS.

LIQUIDATED
v.

WALLIS

Atl. 140; 55 N. J. Law, 132.)
of
Errors
and Appeals of New Jersey.
Court
March 6, 1893.
(26

Error to supreme court.
Action on a contract by the Monmouth
Park Association against the Wallis Iron
Works. Plaintiff had judgment, and defend
ant brings error.
Reversed.
The other facts fully appear in the follow
ing statement by DIXON, J.:
The plaintiff brought an action in the su
to re
preme court against the defendant
cover $6,384.66,
and interest, as a ﬁnal bal
ance for work done, chieﬂy, under a sealed
contract
between
them. providing for the
construction
of a grand stand at the Mon
mouth Park race course. The present writ
of error is prosecuted by the defendant to
review questions of law raised at the trial in
the Hudson circuit. The following is a copy
of the contract:
“Articles of agreement made and concluded
this ﬁrst day of October, A. D. 1889, by and
between the Wallis Iron Works, a corpora
tion of New Jersey, of the ﬁrst part, and the
Monmouth Park Association, of the second
part, witnesseth,
that for and in considera
tion of the covenants and payments herein
after mentioned, to be made and performed
by the said party of the second part, the said
party of the ﬁrst part doth hereby covenant
and agree to furnish all the labor and ma
terials. and perform the work, necessary to
complete, in the most substantial
and work
manlike manner, to the satisfaction and ac
ceptance of the chief engineer of the said
party of the second part. a grand stand at
the race course of mid party of the second
part, at Monmouth Park, Monmouth Co., New
Jersey, excepting the necessary excavation,
incidental thereto; the said work to be ﬁn
ished as described in the approved plans and
following speciﬁcations,
to
and agreeably
the directions received from the said chief en
gineer, on or beiore the ﬁrst day of March,
In case the said party of the ﬁrst part
1890.
shall to fully and entirely, and in conformity
to the provisions and conditions of this agree
ment, perforn and complete the said work,
and each and every part and appurtenance
thereto, within the time hereinbefore limited
or
for such performance
and completion,
within such further time as, in accordance
with the provisions of this agreement. shall
be ﬁxed or allowed for such performance and
completion, the said party of the ﬁrst part
shall and will pay to the said party of the
second part the sum of one hundred dollars
v
ior each and every day that they, the said
party of the ﬁrst part, shall be in default,
which said sum of one hundred dollars per
day is hereby agreed upon, ﬁxed, and deter
mined by the parties hereto as the dam
ages which the party of the second part will
suffer by reason of such default, and not by

DAMAGES.
way of penalty. And the said party of the
second part may and shall deduct and retain
the same out of any moneys which may be
due or become due to the party of the ffrst
part under this agreement.
“Speciﬁcation.
The entire work to be con
structed and ﬁnished, in every part, in a
good, substantial, and workmaniike manner,
according to the accompanying drawings and

speciﬁcations,
to the full extent and mean
ing of the same, and to the entire satisfaction,
approval, and acceptance of the chief en-'
gineer and owners of the said party of the
second part, and under the supervision and
direction
of such agent or agents as they
Additional detail and working
may appoint.
drawings will be furnished, in exempliﬁcation
of the foregoing, from time to time, as may
be required;
and it is distinctly understood,
that all such additional drawings are to be
considered as virtually embraced within, and
Fig
forming a part of. these speciﬁcations.
ured dimensions
shall in all cases be taken
in preference to scale measurements.
The
said engineer shall have the right to make
any alterations, additions, or omissions of
work or materials herein speciﬁed, or shown
on the drawings, during the progress of the
structure, that he may ﬁnd to be necessary,
and the same shall be acceded to by the said
party of the ﬁrst part, and carried into ef
fect, without in any way violating or vitiat
ing the contract. If any additions, altera
tions, or omissions are made in the struc
ture during the progress of the work, the
value of such shall be decided by the said
chief engineer, who shall make an equitable
allowance for the same, and shall add the
amount of said allowance to the contract
price of the work, if the cost has been in
creased, or shall deduct the amount. if the
cost has been lessened, as he, the said chief
The
engineer, may deem just and equitable.
said party of the second part will pay for no
extra work or material unless ordered in
writing by them, through their treasurer.
Any disagreement or difference between the
parties to this contract, upon any matter or
thing arising from these speciﬁcations, or the
drawings to which they refer, or to the con
tract for the work, or the kind or quality of
the work, required thereby, shall be decided
by the said chief engineer of the party of
the second part, whose decision and inter
of the same shall be considered
pretation
ﬁnal, conclusive, and binding upon both par
ties. All materials and labor used lbl‘0n;.‘,,ir
out the structure must be of the best of their
several kinds. and subject to the approval of
The said chief engineer
the chief engineer.
shall have full power, at any time during the
progress of the work, to reject any materials
that he may deem unsuitable for the purpose
for which they were intended, or which are
not in strict conformity with the spirit of
He shall also have the
these speciﬁcations.
power to cause any inferior or unsafe work
to be taken down and altered at the cost
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the said party of the ffrst part. Partic
ular care must be taken of all the ffnished
work, which work must be covered up and
thoroughly protected from injury or deface
ment, during the erection and completion
of
the structure.
All refuse material and rub
bish that may accumulate during the prog
ress of the work shad be removed
from
time to time as may be directed by the chief
engineer, and, on the completion of the work,
the structure,
grounds, and streets be. thor
oughly cleaned up, and the surplus material
and rubbish removed. The said party of the
second part will not transport free any of the
workmen or materials for this work, but all
materials must be shipped in the name of the
party of the ﬁrst part, and in no case shall
it be shipped in care of, or in the name of,
‘the company, or any of its oﬂicers or em
ployee, and said party of the ﬁrst part must
pay the regular freight rates arranged for
with the freight department.
“And the said party of the second part
doth promise and agree to pay to the said
party of the ﬁrst part, for the work to be
done under this contract, the following prices,
to wit: One hundred and thirty-three thou
On or about the last
sand ($133,000) dollars.
(day of each month, during the progress of
‘this work, an estimate shall be made of the
relative value of the work done and deliver
ed, to be judged by the engineer; and ninety
per cent. of the amount of said estimate shall
be paid to the party of the ﬁrst part on or
about the ﬁfteenth day of the following
And when all the work embraced in
month.
this contract is completed, agreeably to the
with the
and in accordance
speciﬁcations,
.directions,
and to the satisfaction and ac
.ceptance, of the engineer, there shall be a
ﬁnal estimate made of said work according
to the terms of this agreement, when the bal
.ance appearing due to the said party of the
ﬁrst part shall be paid to them, within thirty
days thereafter, upon their giving a release,
under seal, to the party'of the second part,
from all claims and demands whatsoever
growing in any manner out of this agreement,
.and upon their procuring and delivering to
the parties of the second part full releases. in
proper form, and duly executed, from me
chanics and material men, of all liens, claims,
and demands for materials furnished and
provided, and work and labor done and per
formed, upon or aboutvthe work herein con
tracted for under this contract It is fur
ther covenanted and agreed between the said
parties that the said party of the ﬁrst part
will at all times give personal attention, by
who shall superin
.competent representative,
tend the work. It is further agreed that the
contractors are not to interfere in any way
with the construction of the bookmakers’
stand, members’ stand or the paddocks, or
other work. It is further agreed and under
stood that the work embraced in this con
‘ tract shall be commenced
within ten days
from this date, and prosecuted with such
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force as the engineer shall deem adequate
to its completion
within the time speciﬁed;
and if at any time the said party of the ﬁrst
part shall refuse or neglect to prosecute the
work with a force suﬂicient, in the opinion
of the said engineer, for its completion with
in the time speciﬁed in this agreement, then,
in that case, the said engineer in charge. or
such agents as the engineer shall designate,
may proceed to employ such a number of
workmen,
laborers,
and overseers as may,
in the opinion of the said engineer, be neces
sary to insure the completion of the work
within the time hereinbefore limited, at such
wages as he may ﬁnd necessary or expedient
to give, pay all persons so employed, and
charge over the amount so paid to the party
of the ﬁrst part as for so much money paid
to them on said contract, or for the failure
to prosecute
the work with an adequate
force,
for noncompliance
with
his di
rections
in regard to the manner of con
structing it, or, for any other omission or
neglect of the requirements
of this agree
ment and speciﬁcations
on the part of the
party of the ﬁrst part, the said engineer
may, at his discretion, declare this contract,
or any portion or section embraced in lt,
void. And the said party of the ﬁrst part hath
further covenanted and agreed to take, use.
provide, and make all proper, necessary, and
precautions,
suﬂicient
safeguards,
and pro
tections against the occurrence or happening
of any accident, injuries, damages. or hurt to
any person or property during the progres
of the construction of the work herein con
tracted for, and to be responsible for, and to
indemnify and save harmless, the said par
ties of the second part, and the said engineer,
from the payments of all sums of money by
reason of all or any such accidents, injuries,
damages, or hurt that may happen or occur
upon or about said work, and from all ﬁnes,
penalties, and loss incurred for or by reason
of the violation of any city or borough ordi
nance or regulation or law of the state, while
the said work is in progress of construction.
And it is mutually agreed and distinctly lili
derstood that the decision of the chief en
gineer shall be ﬁnal and conclusive in any
dispute which may arise between the par
ties to this agreement, relative to or touching
the same.
“In witness whereof, the parties herein
named have hereunto set their seals, and
caused their presents to be signed by their
secretary,
year herein ﬁrst
the day and
As to Wallis Iron Works,
above named.

James I. Taylor.. Wallis Iron Works. [Seal.]
Wm. T. Wallis, Sec‘y. The Monmouth Park
Ass’n.
[Seal.] By A. J. Cassatt, President.
Witness to signature of A. J. Cassatt: T.
M. Croft.
“It is hereby further agreed that, in addi
tion to the work hereinbefore described and
provided for, the said party of the ﬁrst part
shall provide as hearing pieces to receive
ends of puriins, and in lieu of the angle irons
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already provided

for, 3x6 angle irons, 10 8-10
lbs. per foot, and 7 feet long, well bolted to
roof truss and to purlin ends. The party of
the ﬁrst part will also construct, complete. the
front steps to grand stand, as per revised
of the fore
sheet No. 26. In consideration
going changes, the party of the second part
agrees to pay the additional sum of nineteen
dollars.
hundred and seventy-one ($1,971.61)

Wallis Iron Works.
Wm. T. Wallis,
[Seal.]
The .\Ionmouth Park Ass‘n.
Treas.
[Seal.]
By A. J. Cassatt, President. Witness this
11th day of December, 1889: T. M. Croft."
Added to this are “Revised Speciﬁcations,"
the last clause of which is: “Payments. On
or about the ﬁrst day of each month, the en
gineer

will

make

an

approximate

estimate

of the amount of work erected and delivered
during the preced
under these speciﬁcations
ing month, and the contractor will be paid
ninety per cent. of the amount of these esti
mates. Thirty days after the acceptance of
the completed work by the owner, the retain

cent. will be paid the contractor,
upon his furnishing satisfactory evidence that
no liens or unsatisﬁed
claims exist on the
work, or any part of it." These speciﬁcations
were also signed and sealed by the parties.
The pleadings are sufﬁcient to warrant the
questions
involved in the exceptions taken
at the trial.
ed ten per

Jos. D. Bedle, for plaintiff in error.
bert Collins, for defendant in error.

Gil

DIXON, J. (after stating the facts). The
ﬁrst exception to be considered took its rise
from the fact that the structure was not com
pleted within the time limited by the con
, tract, nor until 94 days after the expira
tion of a month’s extension of that time.
The defendant claimed a deduction or set
off of $100 for each day,s delay. The plain
tiff met this claim by insisting that the
clause in the contract mentioning
the $100
per day is unintelligible, and therefore nuga
tory, because in its opening line it reads:
“In case the said party of the ﬁrst part shall
' ‘ ' to fully and entirely," etc., omitting
any effective verb. We agree, however, with
the trial judge, in thinking that the context
shows the verb which should be supplied.
It makes the $100 payable for each day that
“the party of the ﬁrst part shall be in de
fault." This plainly indicates the verb “fail"
as the

omitted

word,

to be supplied

as an

equivalent for the expression, "be in default."
The right of a court of law to read an in
strument according to the obvious intention
of the parties, in spite of clerical errors or
omissions which can be corrected by perusing
the instrument, is suﬂlciently vindicated by
the decision of this court in Sisson v. Don
nelly, 36 N. J. Law, 432. See, also, Burchell
v. Clark, 2 C. P. Div. 88.
Taking the clause thus perfected, the plain
tif! urged that the $100 a day was a penalty;
and so the trial judge ruled. requiring that
the defendant should prove the actual dam
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ages, and be allowed only for what was
proved.
To this ruling the defendant except
ed.
In determining whether a sum which’
contracting parties have declared payable on
default in performance
of their contract is
to be deemed a penalty, or liquidated dam
ages, the general rule is that the agreement
of the parties will be effectuated.
Their
agreement will, however, be ascertained
by
considering,
not only particular words in
their contract, but the whole scope of their
bargain,
including the subject to which it
If, on such consideration, it appears
relates.
that they have provided for larger damages
than the law permits. e. g. more than the
legal rate for the nonpayment
of money, or
that they have provided for the same dam
ages on the breach of any one of several
stipulations, when the loss resulting from
such breaches clearly must differ in amount,
or that they have named an excessive sum
in a case where the real damages are cer
tain, or readily reducible
to certainty by
proof before a jury, or a sum which it would
be unconscionable
to award, under any of
these conditions the sum designated is deem
ed a penalty.
And if it be doubtful, on the
whole agreement, whether the sum is in
tended as a penalty or as liquidated damages,
it will be construed as a penalty, because the
law favors mere indemnity. But when dam- L
ages are to be sustained by the breach of a
single stipulation, and they are uncertain in
amount, and not readily susceptible of proof
under the rules of evidence, then, if the par
ties have agreed upon a sum as the measure
of compensation for the breach, and that sum
is not disproportionate to the presumable
loss, it may be recovered as liquidated dam
ages.
These are the general principles laid
down in the text books. and recognized in the
judicial Reports of this state.
Cheddick’s
Ex‘r v. Marsh, 21 N. J. Law, 463; Whitﬁeld
v. Levy, 35 N. J. Law, 149; Hoagland v.
Segur, 38 N. J. Law, 230; Lansing v. Dodd,
45 N. J. Law, 525.
In the present case the
default consists of the breach of a single
v
covenant, to complete the grand stand as described in the approved plans and speciﬁca
tions within the time limited. It is plain that
the loss to result from such a breach is not

/

easily ascertainable. The magnitude and im
portance of the grand stand may be inferred
from its cost,—$133,000. It formed a neces
sary part of a very expensive enterprise.
The structure was not one that could be said
to have a deﬁnable rental value.
Its worth
depended upon the success of the entire ven
ture.
How far the noncompletion of this
ediﬁce might affect that success, and what
the proﬁts or losses of the scheme would be,
were topies for conjecture only. The condi-V

/

tions. therefore, seem to have been such as to
justify the parties in settling for themselves
the measure of compensation.
The stipula
tions of parties for speciﬁed damages on the
breach of a contract to build within a limited
time have frequently been enforced by the

/
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courts.
In Fletcher v. Dyche, 2 Term R. 32,
£10 per week for delay in ﬁnishing the parish
church; in Duckworth v. Alison, 1 Mees. &
W. 412, £5 per week for delay in completing
repairs of a warehouse; in Legge v. Har
lock, 12 Q. B. 1015, £1 per day for delay in
erecting a barn, wagon shed, and granary;
in Law v. Local Board (1892) 1 Q. B. 127,
£100 and £5 per week for delay in construct
ing sewerage works; in Ward v. Building
Co., 125 N. Y. 230, 26 N. E. $6, $10 a
day for delay in erecting dwelling houses;
and in Malone v. City of Philadelphia (Pa.
Sup.) 23 Atl. 628, $50 a day for delay in com
pleting a municipal bridge,—were all deemed
liquidated damages.
has referred
Counsel
as to two cases of building contracts, where
a different conclusion was reached:
Mul
doon v. Lynch, 66 Cal. 536, 6 Pac. 417, and
Clements v. Railroad Co., 132 Pa. St. 445, 10
Atl. 274, 276. In the former case a statutory
rule prevailed, and in the latter the real dam
age was easily ascertainable, and the stipu
In the case
lated sum was unconscionable.
at bar we have no data for saying that $100
a day was unconscionable.
The sole ques
tion remaining on this exception, therefore, is
whether the parties have agreed upon the
sum named as liquidated damages.
Their lan
guage seems, indisputably, to have this mean
ing. They expressly declare the sum to be
agreed upon as the damages which the de
fendant will suffer, they expressly deny that
they mean it as a penalty, and they provide
for its deduction and retention by the de
fendant in a mode which could be applied
,
only if the sum be considered liquidatwl.ﬂam
ages.
But it is argued that as th :
vid ‘st
authorized the engineer of the defen\..l.it to
make any alterations or additions that he
might ﬁnd necessary during the progress of
the structure, and required the plaintiff to
accede thereto, it is unreasonable
to suppose
that the plaintiff could have intended to bind
itself, in liquidated damages, for delay in
completing such a changeable contract.
But
this argument seems to be aside from the
present inquiry, which is, not whether the
plaintiff became responsible for damages by
reason of the noncompletion
of the grand
stand on the day named. but whether, if it
did becbme so responsible, those damages
are liquidated by the contract. On the ques
tion ﬁrst stated, changes ordered by the en
gineer may afford matter for consideration;
on the second question, they are irrelevant.
Certainly the bills of exceptions do not indi
cate any alterations or additions which, as
matter of law, would relieve the plaintiff
from responsibility for the admitted delay,
and consequently there may have been
ground for considering the defendant’s dam
If there was, the amount of the dam
ages.
ages was adjusted by the contract at $100
per day. We think the ruling at the circuit
'
on this point was erroneous.
We think, also, that the letter, Exhibit P
8, written September
10, 1890, by F. Latou

127

rette to the plaintiff, was illegally received in
evidence.
It was offered and admitted as a
decision by the chief engineer of the defend
ant uuder the contract.
Since it was writ
ten after the completion of the work. and
after the writer had ceased to be the engi
neer of the defendant, and without notice to
the defendant, it could not possess the char
acter attributed to it.
The only other exception which it appears
useful to notice is that relating to the exist
ence of claims by outside parties.
The agree
ment contains two clauses on this subject,——
one under the head, “Speciﬂcation;" the oth
er, under the head; “Revised Speciﬁcation."
It seems proper to hold that the latter clause
is substituted in the contract for the former,
and therefore it only need be considered.
It
“Thirty days after the acceptance of
reads:
the completed
work by the owner, the re
tained ten per cent. will be paid the contract
or, upon his furnishing satisfactory evidence
that no liens or unsatisﬁed claims exist on
the work, or any part of it."
The expres
sion, “liens or unsatisfied claims on the work,"
must mean claims which can be enforced
against the work, and such claims could exist
only under our mechanic’s lien law.
By
“liens" the parties intended claims ﬂied un
der that law; by “unsatisﬁed claims," they
intended claims which were not, but might
be, ﬁled under that law.
The statute (RtL
vision, p. 668, § 2) provides “that when any
building shall be erected, in whole or in part,
by contract in writing, such building, and
the land whereon it stands, shall be liable to
the contractor alone for work done or ma
terials furnished in pursuance of such con
tract: provided such contract, or a dupli
cate thereof, be ﬂied in..the ofﬁce of the clerk
of the county in which such building is sit
uate before such work done or materials fur
nished;" and (section 13) “that no debt shall
be a lien by virtue of this act unless a claim
is ﬁled as hereinbefore provided within one
year from the furnishing the materials or
performing the labor for which such debt is
due."
The contract between these parties
was ﬁled January 2, 1890.
Hence no liens
could arise in favor of outside parties for
work done or materials furnished after that
For work done or materials furnished
date.
before that date, no debt would be a lien un
less a claim were ﬂied within a year, i. e.
before January 2, 1891.
At the date last
named, no such claim was ﬁled, and, so far
as appears, no. such claim was ever ﬁled.
The suit was commenced .\Iarch 12, 1891.
We think these facts furnished satisfactory
evidence that there were no liens or unsatis
ﬁed claims on the work when the action was
brought, and that on this point there was no
error at the trial.
The other exceptions adverted to by counsel
for the defendant are either untenable, or on
questions not likely to arise upon a new trial.
Let the judgment be reversed, and a venire
de novo be awarded.
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KECK

v.

(24 Atl. 170,

BIEBER.
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Pa.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

645.)

,

May 2,1892.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Le
high county; Edwin Albright, Judge.
Assumpsit by Emeline C. Keck against Syl
vester Bieber on a bond whereby he prom
ised to pay her $2,000 upon the non.perform
ance of certain conditions. There was no
dispute as to the breach of condition, and
a verdict was directed for plaintiff for the
full amount of the bond. From a judgment
entered
versed.
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thereon,

defendant

appeals.

Re-

Jas. S. Biery and Edward Harvey, for ap
pellant. C. J. Erdman and R. E. Wright,s
Sons, for appellee.

MITCHELL, J. The general principle up!
on which the law awards damages is com'
The amount
pensation for the loss suffered.
may be ﬁxed by the parties in advance, but,/
where a lump sum is named by them, the,
court will always look into the question".
whether this is really liquidated damages or‘
only a penalty, the presumption being that
it is the latter. The name by which it is,
called is but of slight weight, the controlling
elements being the intent of the parties and
the special circumstances of the case. The
subject has always presented diﬁiculties in
the formulation of a general rule, and es
pecially in its application. The books are
full of inharmonious decisions. In no state,
however, have the difﬁculties been more suc
cessfully minimized than in Pennsylvania,
and in no case that I have seen is there a
better generalization than that by Agnew,
J., in Streeper v. Williams, 48 Pa. St. 450:
“In each case we must look at the language
of the contract, the intention of the parties
as gathered from all its provisions, the sub
ject of the contract and its surroundings, the
ease or diﬂiculty of measuring the breach in
damages, and the sum stipulated, and from
the whole gather the view which good con
science and equity ought to take of the case."
The only criticism to which this would seem
to be fairly open is that it does not perhaps
give suﬂicient prominence to the intention
of the parties as the controlling element, and
it should therefore be read in connection
with the restatement of it by our late Broth
er Clark, in March v. Allabough, 103 Pa. St.
335: “The question ‘ ' “ is to be de
by the intention of the parties,
.termined
drawn from the words of the whole contract,
examined in the light of its subject-matter
and its surroundings; and in this examina
tion we must consider the relation which the
sum stipulated bear to the extent of the in
jury which may be caused by the several
breaches provided against, the eae or diﬂl
culty of measuring a breach in damages, and
such other matters as are legally or neces

sarily inherent in the transaction." The in
tent of the parties being, therefore, the prin
cipal object of ascertainment, Greenleaf lays
down certain rules as the result of the cases,
and, among them, that the sum is to be
taken as a penalty “where the agreement
contains several matters of different degrees
of importance, and yet the sum named is
payable for the breach of any, even the
least." 2 Greenl. Ev. § 258. This rule is
approved in Shreve v. Brereton, 51 Pa. St.
175, and the present case falls exactly within
it. The conditions of the appellant,s bond
are two—First, be is to “save, defend, keep
harmless,
and indemnify the said Emelina
C. Keck" from liability by reason of the as- ’
signment to him over the head of Neiser,
and the termination of the latter’s mining
rights. This is clearly a covenant for indem
nity only, and, as no breach was assigned,
But, second
need not be further discussed.
ly, he is to pay the royalty accruing in the ,
future, and “keep and perform all the cove
nants, conditions, and stipulations of the said
lease and assignment." Turning now to the
lease, we ﬁnd that plaintiffs covenants with
Kemmerer, which appellant thus bound him
self to keep and perform, were to save harm
less and indemnify him against all costs and
damages to his neighbors from the washing
of the ore, to run the water in such places as
the lessor should order, to pay a stipulated
royalty, to ﬁll up holes made and left in the
search for ore, to produce or pay royalty up
on a minimum of one thousand tons a year,
‘to use the old wagon road for hauling said
iron ore. and, in case there are gates or bars
‘ ' I to keep said gates
road,
on s
and bars in repair, ' ' ' and keep them
shut when through," etc. The assignment
adds to these a covenant to pay plaintiff,
the assignor, an additional royalty upon a
sliding scale of the price of ore per ton. No
better illustration of the propriety of the rule
referred to could be stated. Here are nu
merous covenants of the most varied
kinds\
and importance. The covenants
to indem
against
against
nify
claims by Neiser, and
damages to the neighbors by the operation
of washing, are undertakings which may be
of serious magnitude; and under Dick v. Gas
kill, 2 Whart. 184; Shreve v. Brereton, 51
Pa. St. 175; Moore v. Colt, 127 Pa. St. 289, 18
Atl. 8,-and similar cases, the recovery for a
breach would probably not be limited by th
sum named in the bond. On the other hand,
the covenants to ﬁll up the holes made in
prospecting for ore, and to keep the gates on
the old wagon road in repair and shut, are
against such trivial inconveniences that it
would savor of absurdity to suppose that the
parties meant to stipulate for $2,000 damages
for the breach of any one of them. We are
therefore of opinion that defendant,s fourth
point, that the contract of the parties was
for a penalty, should have been aﬂirmed.
It will not follow, however, as appellee seems
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to fear, that her recovery must be limited to
the loss of the royalty due her at the time
of bringing suit, and that she must bring re
peated suits for future failures to pay. The
defendant has, by his acts, disabled hlmelt
absolutely and permanently from perform
ance of his covenants.
Under such circum
LAW n1m.—9
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the plaintlff may sue on the con
tract from time to time for the royalties due,
and for such other damages as she may sut
fer, or she may, at her election, treat the
contract as rescinded, and claim damages
in one action for the entire breach. Judg
ment reversed, and venire de novo awarded.
stances,

/
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Supreme Court

W.

262,

91 Tenn.

of Tennessee.

father as next friend, upon a quantum
meruit. The contract has been set up as
a defense to her suit.
The circuitjudge being of opinion that
the contract was invalid, as being one
with a minor who had a legal right to
repudiate same, gave judgment for the
plaintiff. In this we think his honor erred.
lithe contract had been alone with the
minor. she might undoubtedly repudiate
it, and recover upon a quantum meruit.
The law would give the infant the privi
lege of judging whether such acontract
was beneﬁcial or not, and of avoiding it
if she elected to do so, and recovering the
value of her services as if she worked
without any contract. 10 Amer. & Eng.

JAMES.

154.)

Jan.

26,

Error to circuit court, Davidson
ty; W. K. MCAi.LI8TER, Judge.

1892.

coun

Action by liiinnie James,a minor, by
next friend, against the Tennessee
Manufacturing Company, to recover on a
quantum meruit ior work and labor per
iormed by her ior defendant. Judgment
ior plaintiff, and defendant brings error.

her

Reversed.
Dickinson

& Frazer.ior plaintiff in error.
Wickware, for defendant in error.

Enc.Law,tit.“Infant."

1
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But thiscontract

was in law with the father, who agreed
that the wages in law due to him might
be paid over to his child, “subject to all
the conditions
of this contract." The
wages of a minor. peculiar circumstances
out of the way. are due to the father.
This springs from his legal duly to sup
port and educate his child. He may per
mit the minor to take and use his own
earnings.
This is called “emancipation."
and emancipation will be a defense to th
father,s suit ior the minor,s wages. It
may be express or implied; entire or par
tial. It may be conditional. it may be
in writing or oral; ior the whole minority
or ior a shorter term; as to a part of the
child,s wages or as to the whole. Eman
cipation will not enlarge the minor’s ca
pacity to contract; it simply precludes
the father from asserting his claim to the
wages of his child. Bish. Cont. § 898. If
one employ a minor with notice of the
of the infant, it will be
non-emancipation
no defense to the father,s suit for the
wages that the child has received them.
On the other hand, payment to the father
will be no defense to the minor’s suit. if
the employer knew of the fact of emanci
pation.
These principles oi the'common
law are well settled, and have not been
affected by statute.
Cloud v. Hamilton,
11 Humph. N15.
The cases in America are
collected in a note to Wilson v. McMillan,
35 Amer. Rep. 117.
In view of these principles, we must con
strue the contract of the father as an
emancipation, subject to the conditions as
to damages in case his child shall quit
without cause and without the stipulated
he had said:
notice. It is as much as
"My child is a minor. As such,
am en
am willing that she
titled to her wages.
shall work in your mill, and that the
wages she may earn shall be paid to her.
agree that she shall comply with this
contract, and,
she does not, then the
wages legally due me shall be detained by
you to the extent provided in the contract
make ior her, and only such wages paid
to her as would be entitled to receive
the contract were exclusively with me. "
This was a conditional emancipation, un
der a special contract made by and with
Her
the father ior himselfand his child.
emancipation was partial.
The father,
legal right to her en tire wages,
having
has stipulated that none shall be paid her
beyond the sum due under this agreement
with him.
this contract is binding on

.

v

I

if

.\iinnic James. a minor, was
an vmployc of the ap1vl'»nr_ " 1..-t.pm-li_
tion engaged in the manufacture of cotton
goods. The contract of employment was
in writing, and was with the minor and
her father. By oneofthe provisions of the
contract it was stipulated that the em
ploye should give two weeks‘ notice of her
intention to quit. his further provided
that' in caseshe should leave without giv
ing two weeks’ notice, “or fail or refuse
to faithfully work during a period of two
weeks after giving notice oi an intention
to leave, " ‘ ‘ then it is hereby agreed
that the amount stated below ior the
class to which I may belong is agreed
upon as liquidated damages due said Ten
Company at the
nessee Manufacturing
time of my failure to comply with the
terms of this contract, to compensate it
for all damages, both actual and exem
plary, and all loss, arisingfrom my failure
to carry out the terms of this agreement;
and it is further agreed upon that said
amount, applicable to the class of em
ployes to which I may belong, shall be de
ducted from any sum which maybe due
me by said company, whether on account
of services rendered or otherwise.” The
class to which appellee belonged was that
of those receiving 50 cents per day and un
der $1. The damages stipulated ior this
class was $10. At the foot of this agree
ment. which was signed by appellee, was
this further agreement signed by her in
ther: “ ’1‘he foregoing agreement has been
the
read by me, and, fully understanding
same, it is also agreed to by me, as binding
both me and my daughter, Minnie James,
who is legally disqualiﬁed from making
this contract, to all its terms and con
I agree, further, that said Minnie
ditions.
James is hereby authorized to receive the
wages of said work, and that all sums
paid to said employe are to be accepted
as fully discharging all liability, to the full
amount so paid; and said wages are to
be subject to all the conditions of this con
tract, as though said employs was legally
empowered to .act in person."
Appellee
gave notice of her intention to leave, and
thereafter worked 10 days, but at the end
of that time quit without any excuse.
At
the time she quit there was due her 20
days’ wages, including the 10 days after
her notice. if the stipulation as to dam
ages is invalid. then the company is due
her $10; if valid. then nothing is due her.
lfpon quitting she brought suit, by her
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him, the minor cannot recover beyond its.l holding the sum stipulated as liquidated
limits.
if the contract is invalid as to I damages'
him, as stipulating ior a penalty, then it
The plaintifi in error was a cotton-mill,
will not be in the way of plaintiff,s suit.
having in its employment
hundreds oi
We agree with the circuit judge in holding
hands. The work is divided into manv
that this contract does not fall within the departments.
The
raw
material
is
case of Schrimpf v. Manufacturing Co., 86
handled by one set of hands, and put in
Tenn. 219, 6 S. W. Rep. 131. That case
condition ior another, and the second deconcerned a contract construed as stipu
partment still further advances its manu
la ting ior a penalty in case of a breach. It facture; and so on, through successive
was held not to be an agreement ior liqui
stages of progress. The evidence shows
dated damages, because the iorfelturecov
that each department is dependent upon
breach,
wages
cred all the
due at time of
that immediately below it. Now, if the
regardless of amount due, and regardless
operatives of one department quit, or their
as to whether the arrearages were the
work is delayed. its effect is ielt in all to a
greater or less degree.
consequence of the default oi the company.
It is also shown
It wasa contract harsh and unconscion
that it is not always easy to replace an
operative at once, and that the uncx pected
able. lt preserved no proportion bet ween
quitting of even one hand will to some ex
the sum forfeited and the actual damages,
and put all employee upon same iooting,
tent afiect the results
the mill.
Yet the eﬁdence showsthroughout
t let it would be
whether much or little was earned. much
or little due, when breach occurred. The impossible to calculate with any certainty
the precise, actual loss due to an unex
damages were to he all that was due, in
pected
breach of an em ploye’s engage
any case. To one, this might have been
ment; though it is shown that there are
the wages of months; to another, the
some departments oi work where thequit
earnings of but a day. But in that case
ting of a small number of hands. without
Chief Justice TURN]-DY quoted and indorsed
notice, would stop the entire mill. and
the language oi CAMPBELL, J., in Richard
throw other hundreds out ofemployment.
son v. Woenler, 26 Mich.90, where he said:
“
In this day of great inctories, and the
We have no diﬂiculty in holding that the
injury caused by the sudden breaking off 1 consequent division of labor into separate
departments, a degree of interdependence
of a contract oi service by either party in
volves such diﬂiculties concerning the act- i among employee exists, which they ought
and do recognize, and which makes the
nal loss as to render a reasonable agree
‘
obligation oi each to the whole, and to
ment ior stipulated damages appropriate.
If a ﬁxed sum, or a maximum within the common employer, all the more im
portant. The case is one, then, where
which wages unpaid and accruing since
certainty of some damage, and the uncer
the last pay-day might be forieited,should
tainty of means and standards by which
be agreed on. and shall not be unreason
the actual damage can be ascertained, re
able or an oppressive exaction, there would
seem to be no legal objection to the stip- . quire the courts to uphold the contract
ulation, if both parties are equally and
as one ior liquidated damages, and not as’
providing ior a penalty. The sum ﬁxed is
justly protected."
Applying these prin
ciples to the case for judgment, we have . certain. It is proportioned to the earning
capacity of theemploye, and hence presum
no diﬂiculty in holding that the stipula
ably with regard to the particular results
tion here is ior liquidated damages. and
of a breach in each department.
not ior a penalty, and that thecontract is
There is
no hardship in the agreement requiring
neither
unreasonable
nor oppressive.
“The tendency and preference of the law is . 2 weeks‘ notice. if the operative leaves
ior good cause, the contract would not
to regard stated sums as a penalty, be
apply.
if able to work, the pay continues
cause actual damages can then be recov
on til notice has been worked out.
ered. and the recoverylimited to suchdam
ages. This tendency and preference, how
That she returned the next day after
quitting, and offered to work out her no
ever, do not exist when the actual dam
tice, is no compiiance.
K ages cannot be ascertained by any stand
The mischief had
been done. She had voluntarily, and with
ard. A stipulation to liquidate damages
out pretense of excuse, or asking to be re
in such cases is considered favorably.“ 1
leased, gone off, and left her work stand- ,
Suth. iiam. 490. This contract oi employ
ing, and endeavored to get others to go
ment on its face affords no data by which
with her. The damages had accrued, and,
the actual damages likely to result from
under the facts of this case, appellant was
its non.observance can with any certainty
not bound to restore her. Reverse. Judg
be ascertained.
Such a circumstance has
ment here ior plaintif?! in error.
been regarded as justifying the courts in
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Appeal by defendant from ajudgment
of the general term of the supreme court
in the second judicial department, afﬁrm
ing a judgment entered upon the decision
of the court after a trial without a jury.
Afﬁrmed.
Action ior breach of covenant to recov
er the sum of $5,000 as stipulated dam
ages. On the 15th of October, 1884, the de
fendant owned a cheese factory situate in
the town of Monroe, Orange county, com
prising two parcels of land, with the
buildings thereon, and
uantity of ﬁxt
ures, machinery, and "t )()|8 connected
therewith. For some time prior, with
the assistance oi her husband. Conrad
Gross, her brother-in-law, August Gross,
and her father. John Hoffman,she had
been engaged in the business oi manufact
uring cheeses at said factory known as
“
Fromage de Brie." “Fromage d’Isigny, "
Such cheeses were
and ".\‘eufchatel.”
made by a secret process known only to
herself and her said agents. On the day
last named, she entered into a sealed
agreement with the plaintiffs, whereby she
agreed to sell and transfer to them the
said factory and all its belongings, togeth
er with the “good-will, custom. trade
marks, and names used in and belonging
to the said business," ior the sum of $25.
1885,
000, to be paid and secured March
when possession was to be given. Said
instrument contained a covenant on her
part that she would "communicate after
the ﬁrst day of March, 1985, or cause to be
communicated,
to" said plaintiffs, “by
Conrad Gross, John Hoffman, and August
Gross, or one or other of them, the secret
of the manufacture of the cheeses known
as ‘Fromage de Brie,’ ‘Neuichatel,’ and
‘D’1signy,, and the recipe thereior, and
for each of them. and will instruct or
cause to be instructed them. and each of
them, in the manufacture thereof. And
that she and the said Conrad Gross, John
Hoffman, and August Gross will refrain
the secret recipe and
from communicating
instructions for the manuiactute of said
cheeses, or either of them. to any and all
persons other than the above-named par
ties of the second part, [plaintiffs,] and
.will also, after the ﬁrst day of April, 1885.
refrain from engaging in the business of
making, manufacturing,
or vending of
said cheeses, or either of them, and from
the use of the trade-marks or names, or ei
ther of them, hereby agreed to be trans
ferred in connection with said cheeses, or
either of them, or with any similar prod
uct, under the penalty of ﬁve thousand
dollars, which is hereby named as stipu
lated damages to be paid by the party of
the ﬁrst part, [defendant,] or her heirs,
executors, administrators, or assigns, in
case of a violation by the party of the
ﬁrst part [defendant] of this covenant,
of this contract. or any part thereof. with
in ﬁve years from the date hereof." She
further covenanted that she herself. as
Well as “said Conrad Gross, John Hoff
man, and August Gross, during and up to
a

.

1,

‘

until the ﬁrst day of May, 1885, shall
continue and remain in said county of
Orange, and from time to time, and at all
reasonable times during said period, by
herself, or by said Conrad Gross, John
Hoffman, and August Gross, whenever so
requested by the said parties of the second
part, [plaintiffs,] impart to them, or ei
ther of them, the secret of making such
cheeses, and each of them, and instruct
them, and each of them, in the process of
of
manufacturing
the same, and each
them, as fully as she or the said Conrad
Gross, John Hoffman, or August Gross,
or either of them, are iniormed concern
ing the same.” Both parties appear to
have duly kept and periormed the agree
ment, except that, as thetriai court iound,
“subsequently to the 1st day of May, 1885,
lonrad Gross, the husband of defendant,
went to New York city, and engaged in
the busmess of selling ‘ioreign and domes
tic iruits, and all kinds of cheese and saus
" "
ages, &c.,’
while so engaged
' " sold and and
personally
delivered
from his place of business to one John
Wassung three boxes of cheese marked
and named Fromage d’Isign_v,’ and hav
ing substantially the same trade-marks
thereon as that sold by defendant to
plaintiffs, and having stamped thereon
the name ‘Fromage d,Isigny,’ and that
said cheese so sold by him to said Was
sung was a similar product to that ior
merly manufactured by defendant. " Also,
that“said August Gross, the brother-in
law of defendant. subsequent to the 1st
day of May, 1885, engaged in the business
of retailing fancy groceries in the city of
New York. and in and during the fall of
1887, and prior to the commencement of
this action, kept ior sale at his place of
business in New York city boxes of cheese
marked or stamped ‘Fromage d’lsign_v."’
The court further iound that the cheese
under the name
so sold by Conrad Gross
_ “
was neversold by
of “ Fromuge d’lsigny,
plaintiffs, nor made or manufactured by
them, or either of them, but that the
same was a similar product." The court
found as conclusions of law that said
agreement was a reasonable one. and
was iounded upon a good and sufﬁcient
consideration; that said sale by Conrad
and said keeping ior sale by August
Gross was a direct violation of the cove
nant in question; that the restriction im
posed was no more than the interests of
the parties required, and that it was not
in restraint of trade or against public
Judgment was ordered ior the
policy.
plaintiffs ior the sum of $5,000 as stipulat
ed damages.
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John Fennel, ior appellant.
con, ior respondents.

Henry

Ba

VANN, J. (after.stating the facts).
The business carried on by the defend
ant was iounded on a secret process
known only to herself and her agents.
She had the right to continue the busi
ness, and by keeping

her secret to enjoy
its beneﬁts to any practicable extent.
She also had the right to sell the business,
including as an essential part thereof the
secret process, and, in order to place the
purchasers in the same position that she

LIQUJDATED
occupied, to promise to divulge the secret
to them alone, and to keep it irom every
one else. In no other way could she sell
what she had, and get what it was worth.
Having the right to make this promise,
she also had the right to make it good to
her vendees, and to protect them by cove
nants with proper safeguards against the
consequences 0! any violation. Such a
contract simply leit matters substantially
as they were beiore the sale, except that
the seller oi the secret had agreed that she
would not destroy its value after she had
received iull value ior it. The covenant
was not in general restraint oi trade, but
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that neither she nor they will disclose the
secret, or engage in making or selling ei
ther kind oi cheese, or use the trade-marks
or names connected with the business.
We do not think that a personal act oi the
deiendantis essential to a violation oi this
covenant by her; ior if she permits, or
even does not prevent, her agents from

doing the prohibited acts, the promise is
While it is her exclusive cove
broken.
nant, it relates to the action of others;
and, it they do what she agreed that they
would not do, it is a breach by her. al
though not her own act. She violated her
agreement, not by selling herself, but by
was a reasonable measure oi mutual pro
not preventing others irom selling. This
tection to the parties, as it enabled the
construction oi the restrictive part of the
one to sell at the highest price, and the
covenant would hardly be open to ques
tion, were it not that in the same sentence
other to get what they paid ior. It im
posed no restriction upon either that was
or compensatory
occurs the reparative
part designed to make the plaintifis whole
not beneﬁcial to the other, by enhancing
the price to the seller, or protecting the
ii the deiendant either could not or did
purchaser.
Recent cases make it very
not keep her agreement. While this pro
clear that such an agreement is not op
vides that any violation involves the pen
posed to public policy, even ii the restric
alty oi $5,000, it adds, “ which sum is here
tion was unlimited as to both time and
to be
by named as stipulated damage
territory. Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y.
paid " by the defendant incase oi a viola
473, 13 N. E. Rep. 419: Hodge v. Sloan, 107
tion by her oi the covenant in question.
N. Y. 244, 17 N. E. Rep. 335; Leslie v. Loril
What kind oi violation is thus referred to?
lard, 110 N. Y. 519, 534. 18 N. E. Rep. 363;
The defendant says a personal violation
Pool,
(Sup.) 4 N. Y.
Thermometer Co. v.
by her only, but we think, ior the reasons
Supp. 861. The restriction under consider
already given, that the spirit oi the agree
ation, however, was not unlimited as to
ment includes both a violation by her
time.
own act and by the act oi those whom
The chief reliance oi the defendant in
she did not prevent from selling, although
this court, where the point seems to have
she had agreed that they would not sell.
been raised ior the ﬁrst time, is that the
As no one not a party to a contract can
covenant, so far as stipulated damages
violate it, every act 01 deiend:int, iormer\.
agents contrary to her covenant was a vi- »
are concerned, is conﬁned to the personal
acts oi Mrs. Gross, and does not embrace
olation thereof by her, whether she knew ,f
the acts oi her agents. A careiul reading
oi it or assented to it or not. Whenever../
of the agreement, however, in the light oi
that was done which she agreed should
the circumstances surrounding the parties
not be done, it was a breach of a covenant
when it was made, shows that no such re
by her, even if the act was contraryto her
wishes, and in spite o! her efiorts to pre
suit was intended. What was the object
It was to heepsecrct,
of the covenant?
vent it. Her covenant was against a cer
at all hazards, the process upon which the tain act by any one oi iour persons, in
cluding herself.
Two of those persons
success of the business depended. On no
separately did the act which she had
other basis could the plaintiffs saiely buy,
agreed that neither oi them should do,
or the deiendantsell, ior what her property
was worth. Who had the power to keep
and thus there was a violation of the cove
the process secret? Clearly the defendant,
nant by her, the same as if she had done
if any one,as she had conﬁded it to no one
the act in person. The argument oi the
except her trusted agents. who were near
learned counsel ior the defendant that the
ly related to her by blood or marriage.
contract ﬁxed a sum to be paid in case of
a violation by the dciendant, but not in
But could she covenant against the acts of
“
by the other parties,"
case oi a violation
those over whom she had no control? She
had the right to so covenant, by assum
while plausible, is unsound, ior there were
ing the risk oi their actions; and, unless no "other parties" who could break the
she had done so, presumptively she could
covenant.
She was the sole covenantor,
not have sold her iactory ior so largea i and unless she kept the covenant she broke
it; and she did not keep it. As the actual
sum. It was safer ior her to sell with
damages ior a breach of the covenant
such a covenant than it was ior the plain
tlffs to buy without it. She could exercise
would necessarily be “wholly uncertain,
some power over her own husband and
and incapable oi being ascertained except
by conjecture, " wethink that the parties in
her lather and her husband,s brother, all
of whom had been associated with her in
tended to liquidate them when they pro
carrying on the business, and whose ac
vided that the sum named should be “as
stipulated damages. " Theuse oi the wordl
tions in certain other respects she assumed
“
penalty" under the circumstances is not
to control ior a limited time, whereas the
plaintiifs were powerless. unless they had
controlling. Bagley v Peddie, 16 N. Y.
469; Dakin
her promise to keep the process secret at
v. Williams, 17 Wend. 448,
the peril of paying heavily if she did not.
aﬂirmed 22 Wend. 201; Wooster v. Kisch,
It is not surprising, thereiore, to ﬁnd that 26 Hun, 61. As there is no other question
the restrictive part oi the covenant ap
that requires discussion, the judgment
plies with the same iorce to her agents
should be aiiirmed. with costs. All con
cur, except Baown J., not sitting.
that it does to herseli; ior she undertakes
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Error from district court, Labette coun
ty; Gnonor:CnA.\,ni.tI:n, Judge.
This was an action brought in the dis
trict court of Labette county by L. H.

Kemper against C. M. Condon to recover
as liquidated damages for the alleged
breach of the following written contract,
to-wit: “This agreement between L. H.
Kemper and (T. M. Condon witnesseth’
that whereas, the said Kemper has sold
to said Condon lot 7, block 38, in Oswego,
Kansas. said Condon,as a part ofthe con
sideration therefor, agrees to erect thereon
a two-story stone or brick building, not
less than 100 feet deep, within six months,
and to give use of the north wall thereof
to said Kemper; or else remove the house
now on lot 6, in said block 38, three feet
north of where it now stands, as said
Condon shall elect to do. and put said
building in as good condition asit is in its
present location. It is mutually agreed
between said parties that a failure on the
part of said Condon to perform these ob
ligations shall entitle said Kemper to re
cover from him the sum of ﬁve hundred
and ascertained
dollars as liquidated
damages ior the breach of this contract.
Oswego. Kansas. March
C. M. Coupon.
"
The defendant answered as iol
11. i887.
lows: “Said defendant admits the execu
tion and delivery of the writing marked
‘Exhibit A.’ attached to and made part
of plaintiff,s petition, but he alleges the
fact to be that said writing was executed
and delivered under a misapprehension
and a mistake of the facts in reference to
of the transaction
the subject-matter
therein referred to as they actually exist
ed, and that but ior such mistake such
writing would not have been executed.
Defendant alleges that plaintiff was the
owner of lots 6 and 7, in block 38, in the
city of Oswego, Kansas. That the frame
house mentioned in said writing‘ belonged
was appurtenant to said
to plaintiff. and
,
lot 6. That defendant negotiated for and
purchased from plaintiff said lot 7 with a
view of erecting thereon a stone or brick
building. That at the time of purchasing
said lot 7, and of executing and delivering
said writing, both plaintiff and defendant
understood and believed that said frame
house, mentioned in said writing, and
which belonged on and was appurtenant
to said lot 6, stood on the line between
said lots 6 and 7; the main part of it be
ing. as said parties supposed, on lot 6,
and about two or three feet in width of it
standing on said lot 7. That to permit
defendant to build on his said lot 7 would
necessitate the removal of said house, as
said parties believed, some three feet to
the north.
That plaintiff sold, and de
fendant bought, said lot under such belief.
That plaintiff, in negotiating ior the sale
of said lot 7, objected to being put to the
expense of removing said house so that it
would all stand on his own lot 6, orinsist
he
ed. if he were put to such expense,
should be compensated therefor; and to
this defendant assented. and agreed that
remove
he would, at his own expense,
$500

S.

said frame houseso that it should entirely
stand on said lot 6, and far enough across
the line between said lots 6 and 7 not to
interfere with the erection of a wall on
said line, and put it in as good condition
as it then was, where it then stood; or if
he should so elect, instead of removing
and repairing said house as aioresaid, he
might erect on said lot 7 a brick or stone
building not less than 100 feet deep, and
give plaintiff the use of the north wall
thereof as compensation ior his moving
and repairing said house as aioresaid.
That it was to meet such contingency,
and secure such end, that said writing
was executed and delivered. That there
after this defendant elected not to erect
said stone or brick building on said lot 7,
and not to furnish plaintiff the use of the
north wall thereof. That, by agreement ,
between said plaintiff and defendant. said
block was afterwards surveyed. and the
fact was then ascertained that said frame
building did not stand, as both of said
parties had supposed it did, across the
line between said lots 6 and 7,—a part on
6 and a part on 7,—but thatit all then
stood on said lot 6, and so far from the
line between lots 6 and 7 as not to inter
fere with the erection ofa wall thereon,
and thereiorea removal ofsaid frame build
ing was unnecessary, and would he of no
to plaintiff.
De
advantage
whatever
fendant alleges that the only purpose on
. the part of plaintiff or defendant in the
execution and deliverypf said writing
was to indemnify plaintiff against cost
and expense in the removal and repair of
said house as aioresaid, and that, had
plaintiff desired its removal after the fact
in reference to its true lOc€tion was ascer
tained, he could have had it removed
three feet north of where it then stood,
and put in as good condition as it was,
where it then stood,at a cost and expense
of not to exceed one hundred dollars.
That said house could, at the time of the
execution of said writing, or at any time
since then, have been removed three feet
.north of where it then stood and now
. stands. and put in as good condition as
1 it then was, in its then location’ at a cost
of not to exceed one hundred dollars.
That in no event could plaintiffs dum
age,had he desired to have had said house
removed, exceed one hundred dollars.
That to indemnify against such possible
damage was the only object in giving said
writing. Defendant alleges that plaintiff
has not removed said house, and has in
no way been to any cost or expense on ac
count of the removal of said house, or ior
any other purpose referred to in any way
Defendant denies that
in said writing.
plaintiff has suffered any damage on his
account, and denies any liability to him
in any respect. Whereiore defendant asks
that this cause be dismissed. and that he
The plaintiff
recover his costs herein._
replied, denying every allegation of the
answer inconsistent with the allegations
of his petition. At; the February term,
was called for trial,
1889, when the case
the plaintiff moved ior judgment upon the
pleadings; and the court sustained the
motion, and rendered judgment accord
ingly in favor of the plaintiff and against
the dcfendant ior $500, with intcre:,t and

LIQUIDATED
costs; the defendant excepted, and after
wards, as plaintiff in error, brought the
case to this court ior review.
Case & Glasse, ior plaintifi in error.
H. Morrison, ior defendant in error.
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lowing text-books upon this subject may
be examined with much proﬁt: 1Sedg.
Dam. (Kth Ed.) c. 12, §§ 389-427; 1 Suth.
Dam. pp. 475-530. c. 7.§6; 13 Amer. & Eng.
Enc. Law, pp. 857—8(i8; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur.

§§ 440—447; 3 Pars. Cont. pp. 156-l63,§ 2.
The text-books upon this subje .t unite in
VALEN,l‘INE,J. (alter stating the facts saying that the tendency and
as above).
The substantial question in
RuN] as B.
oi the law is to regard a state §preierence
volved in this controversy is whether the
penalty’ instead of liquidated damages.//
plaintiff below, L. H. Kemper, may re
because actual damages can then here
covered, and the recovery be limited to
cover irom the deiendant below. (3. M.
Condon, the sum of $500 as agreed and liq
such damages. 1 Suth. llam.490;13A1ner.
uidated damages. or whether he can re
The decis
& Eng. Enc. L W, pp. 853. 860.
cover only tbe amount of his actual loss
ions oi this court are also in this Iams
or damage resulting irom the breach oi
line. The only decisions of this court up
the contract sued on, which amount. ac
on the subject oi liquidated damages are
cording to the iacts oi the case as pre
the iollowing’ Kurtz v. Sponable, 6 Kan.
The
sented to us’ cannot exceed $100.
395; Foote v. Sprague, 13 Kan. I55; Rail
way Co. v. Shoemaker, 27 Kan. 677; Heat
contract upon which Kemper seeks to re
cover contains the iollowing among other
wole v. Gorrell, 35 Kan. 692’ 12 Pac. Rep.
stipulations: “It is mutually agreed he
We are satisﬁed with the foregoing
135.
tween said parties that aiuilure on the
decisions oi this court, but they do not go
part oi said Condon to periorm these ob
to the extent oi controlling the decision
ligations shall entitle said Kemper(to re
in the present case. The last case cited
cover irom him the sum oiﬂve hundred
is supported by the iollowing additional
and ascertaine
dollars as liquidated
N. H. 126:
52
cases: Davis v. Gillett.
damages ior the breach o! this contract.
Caswell v. Johnson. 58 Me. 164; Burrill
It will be seen that the parties themselves v. Dnggett, 77 Me. 545. 1 Atl. Rep. 677.
have used the words “liquidated and as
in 1 Sedgwick on Damages (8th Ed.) the
iollowing among other language is used:
certained damages;", but nearly all the
authorities agree that neither these “From the ioregoing we derive the iul
words, nor any other words of similar ilowing as a general rule governing the
import. are conclusive, but that the lwhole subject:
Whenever the damages
amount named, notwithstanding the us.e ‘were evidently the subject of calculation
oi such words, may nevertheless be noth
and adjustment between the parties’ and
ing more than a penalty. Some oi such
a certain sum was agreed upon and in
tended ascompensation. and is in tact rea
authorities are the iollowing: Lampman
sonable in amount. it will be allowed by
v. Cochran. 16 N. Y. 275: Ayres v. Pease,
Sec
the court as liquidated damages."
12 \Vend. 393; Hoag v. McGinnls’22 Wend.
tion 405. “And here we are brought back
163; Beale v. Hayes. 5 Sandi. 640; Gray v.
by a somewhat circuitous
path to the
Crosby, 18 Johns. 219; Jackson v. Baker,
great iundamental principle which under
2 Ed w. Ch. 471 ; Shreve v. Brereton, 51 Pa.
l4 lies our whole system,—that oi compensa
St. 175; Fitzpatrick v. Cottingham’
tion. The great object oi this system is
Wis. 219; Fisk v. Gray, 11 Allen’132; Wal
to place the plaintifi in as good a position
lis v. Carpenter,13 Allen, 19; Ex parte Pol
lard, 2 Low. 411; Basye v. Ambrose. 28
as he would have had if his contract had
not been broken. Solong aspartles them
Mo. 39; Carter v. Strom. 41 Minn. 522, 43
selves keep this principle in view. they will
N. W. Rep. 394; Schrimpi v. Manufactur
be allowed to agree upon such a sum as
ing Co., 86 Tenn. 219. 6 S. W. Rep. 131;
will probably be a lair equivalent of a
Haideman v. Jennings. 14 Ark. 329; l)avis
But when they go be
v. Freeman’ 10 Mich. ll~is; Hahn v. Horst
breach oi contract.
yond this, and undertake to stipulute.not
man. 12 Bush, 240; Low v. Nolte, 16 Ill.
475; Kemble v. Farren. 6 Bing. 14l ; Davies
ior compensation. but ior a sum out oi all
proportion to the .measure of liability
v. Penton’6 Barn. & (3. 216; Horner v.
Flintoii, 9 Mees. & W. 678; Newman v. which the law regards as compensatory,
Oi course, the
Capper. 4 Ch. Div. 724.
then the law will not allow the ag‘n-ement
to stand. In all agreements’ tipereiore.
words oi the parties with respect to dam
ﬁxing upon a sum in advance as the meas
ages, losses, penalties, ioricitures, or any
ure or limit oi liability’ the ﬁnal question
sum oi money to be paid’ received’ or re
covered, must be given due consideration,
is whether the subject of the contract is
such that itviolates this iundamental rule
and. in the absence oianything to the con
trary, must be held to have controiiin
of compensation.
Ii it does so, the sum
force; but when it may be seen from t e
ﬁxed is necessarily a penalty.
Iiit does
entire contract, and the circumstances un
not do so, the question arises. as in any
der which the contract was made. that other contract’ as to what agreement the
the parties did not have in contemplation , parties have actually made; and here, as
actual damages or actual compensation.
in all other cases’ their intention. as as
certained irom the language employed. is
,and did not attempt .to stipulate with
to the payment or recovery of, a guide."
Section 406. “ Where the stipu
reference
actual damages or actual compensation.
la ted sum is wholly collateral to the object
then the amount stipulated to be paid on - oi the contract. being evidently inserted
merely as security ior periormance, it will
the one side, or to be received or recov
not be allowed as liquidated damages."
ered on the other side. cannot be consid
ered as liquidated damages, but must be
Section 410. “ Whenever an amount stip
considered in the nature of a penalty; and
ulated is to be paid on the non-pa_v
this, even if the parties should name such' ment oi a less amount, or on deiault in de
amount “liquidated damages.” The ioi-ll livering a thing oi let-is value, the sum will
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generally be treated as a penalty.” Sec
tion 411. “ Whenever thestipulated sum is
to be paid on hreach of a contract of such
a nature that the loss may be much great
er or much less than the sum, it will not
Sec
be allowed as liquidated damages."
tion 4l2. “A sum ﬁxed as security for
the periormance of a contract containing
a number of stipulations of widely differ
ent importance, breaches of some oiI which
are capable of accurate valuation, for any
of which the stipulated sum is an excess
ive compensation, is a penalty.” Section
“If the contract is one in which the
413.
measure of damages ior part periormance
is asccrtainable, and a sum is stipulated
for breach of it, this sum will not be al
lowed as liquidated damages, in case of a
partial breach." Section 415.
In 1 Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence
the folio wing language is used: “Where
an agreement contains provisions ior the
performance or non.periormance of several
acts of different degrees ofimportauce, and
then a certain sum is stipulated to be paid
upon a violation of any or all of such pro
visions, and the sum will be in some in
tances too large. and in ‘others too small,
a compensation ior the injury thereby oc
cnsioned, that sum is to be treated as a
penalty, and not as liquidated damages.
This rule has been laid down in a some
what different iorm, as iollows: Where
the agreement contains provisions ior the
periormance or non-periormance of acts
which are not measurable by nny exact
pecuniary standard,and also of one or
more other acts in respect of which the
by a
damages are easily ascertainable
jury, and a certain sum is stipulated to be
paid upon a violation of any or of all
these provisions, such sum must be taken
to be a penalty.”
Section 443. “Whether
an agreement provides ior the periormance
or non-periormance of oncsingle act, or oi
several distinct and separate acts, if the
stipulation to pay a certain sum of money
upon a default is so framed, is of such a
nature and effect, that it necessarily ren
ders thedeiaulting party liable in the same
amount at all events, both when his fail
ure to perform is complete and when it is
only partial, the sum must be regarded
as a penalty, and not as liquidated dam
ages._ Section 444.
In Sutherland on Damagesthe following
among other language is used: “ While no
one can fail to discover a very great amount
of apparent conﬂict, still it will be iound
on examination
that most of the cases,
however conﬂicting in appearance. have
yet been decided according to the justice
and equity of the particular case.“ Page
“To be potential and controlling
478.
that a stated sum is liquidated damage,
that sum must be ﬁxed as the basis of
compensation, and substantially limited
to it; ior just compensation is recognized
as the universal measure of damages not
punitory.
Parties may liquidate the
But,
agreement.
by previous
amount
when a stipulated sum is evidently not
based on that principle. the intention
to
liquidate damages will either be found not
to exist, or will be disregarded, and the
stated sum treated as a penalty.
Con
tracts are not made to be broken; and
hence, when parties provide for consequen

DAMAGES.
with less cau
tion than if that event was certain, and
they were ﬁxing asum absolutely to be
paid. The intention in all such cases is
material; but. to prevent a stated sum
rom being treated asa penalty, the in
tention should be apparent to liquidate
damages in the sense of making just com
pensation.
It is not enough that the par
ties express the intention that the stated
sum shall be paid in case of a violation of
ces of a breach,they proceed

A penalty is not converted
the contract.
into liquidated damages by the intention
that it be paid. It is intrinsically a differ
ent thing,and theintention thatit be paid
cannot alter its nature. A bond, literally
construed, imports an intention that the
penalty shall be paid if there be default in
the performance of the condition; and
iormerly that was the legal effect. Courts
of law now, however, administer thesame
equity to relieve from penalties in other
iorms of contract as from those in bonds.
The evidence of an intention to measure
the damage, thereiore, is seldom satis
factory when the amount stated varies
materially from a just estimateof
theactu
“
Pages 480, 481.
al loss ﬁnally sustained.
See also. especially, 3 Parsons on (Jon
tracts (16th Ed., p. 156 et seq.)
Many courts hold that the intention of
the parties must govern, but say that if
to be paid, re
the damages stipulated
ceived, or recovered on the breach of the
contract are out of proportion to the act
ual damages that might be sustained, then
the parties could notin fact have intended
liquidated damages.but merely a penalty,
whatever their language might be. Other
courts hold that it makes no difference
what the intention of the parties might
be; that the nature of the contract itself
must govern, and if the amountstipulated
to be paid, received, or recovered is out of
all proportion to the actual damages that
might be sustained; then that such amount
must be treated asn penalty, whatever
may have been the intention of the par
ties; that in fact, and in the very nature
oi things, such amount would be a penal
ty, and could not be anything else; that
the parties could not by misnamingz the
amount, and calling it liquidated damages,
make it such. In this connection, the
following language of Judge CHRIs,i‘lANC\,,
who delivered the opinion of the court in
the case of Jaquith v. Hudson,5 Mich. 1%,
“
Again, the attempt
136, 137, isinstructive:
to place this question upon the intention
of the parties. and to make this the gov
erning consideration,
necessarily implies
that, if the intention to make the sum
stipulated damages should clearlyappear,
the court would eniorce the contract ac
cording to that intention.
To test this,
let it be asked whether, in such a case, if
it were admitted that the parties actually
intended the sum to be considered as stip
ulated damages, and not as a penalty,
would a court of law enforce it ior the
Clearly, they could
amount stipulated‘?
not, without going back to the technical
and long-exploded doctrine which gave
the whole penalty of the bond, without
reference to the damages actually sus
tained. They would thus besimplychang
log the names of things, and enforcing,
under the name of stipulated damages,

LIQD IDATED DAMAGES.
what in its own nature is but a penalty.
The real question in this class of cases will
be iound to be, not what the parties in
tended, but whether the sum is in fact in
the nature of a penalty; and this is to be
determined by the magnitude of the sum,
in connection with thesubiect-matter, and
not at all by the words or the understand
ing of the part‘es. The intention of the
parties cannot alter it. While courts of
law gave the penalty of the bond,the par
ties intended the payment of the penalty
as much as they now intend the payment
of stipulated damages. Itmust thereiore,
we think, be very obvious that the actual
intention of the parties in this class of
cases, and relating to this point,is wholly
immaterial; and, though the courts have
very generally professed to base their de
cisions upon the intention of the parties,
that intentionis not,and cannot be made,
In en
the real basis of these decisions.
deavoring to reconcile their decisions with
the actual intention of the parties, the
courts have sometimes been compelled to
use language wholly at war with any idea
‘
of interpretation, and to say that the
parties must beconsidered as not meaning
exactly what they say.’ Horner v. Flint
oh, 9 Mees. & W. 678, per PARKE. B. May
it not be said. with at least equal proprie
ty, that the courts have sometimes said
what they did not exactly mean?" And
in the case of Myer v. Hart, 40 Mich. 5l7,
523, the supreme court of Michiga1: held as
follows: “Just compensation ior the in
jury sustained is the principle at which
the law aims, and the parties will not be
permitted, by express stipulation, to set
this principle aside."
We might quote further from the text
books and the reported cases. but we think
the foregoing is sufﬁcient; and from the
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it certainly follows that the
plaintiff below, Kemper,cannot “recover"
ioregoing
“

;

the sum of $500 as liquidated and ascertained damages ior the breach of this con
tract." notwithstanding such is the lan
1zuag,eof the contract. If the defendant,
(.‘ondon, had removed the building situat
ed on lot 6 three ieet north, and had then
put the same in as good condition as it
was beiore, he would have so completed
his contract that not one cent of damage
could be recovered from him: and to so
remove such building, and to put it in as
good condition as it was beiore. would
not have cost to exceed $100. But sup
pose that Condou had removed the build
ing, and then have failed to put the same
in as good condition as it was beiore; he
would have committed a breach of the
contract, but the actual damages might
not have been $25. Then. should the
plaintiff, Kemper, recover the said sum of
Or suppose that Condon had re
$500?
moved the house. and attempted to put it
in as good condition as it was beiore, but
have failed torepalr a lock, or a small por
tion of the plastering, or a broken win
dow, which repairing might not have cost
$1; then, should Kemper have the right
to recover the said sum of $500? All this
shows that the parties did not have in
contemplation
the matter of actual com
pensatory damages when they stipulated
that Kemper might re.-cover $500 from
Condou asliquidated and ascertained dam
agosdncaseol a breach of the contract. but
shows that in fact, though not in words,
they ﬁxed the sum of $500 as a penalty to
cover all or any damages which might re
suit from a breach of the contract. The
judgment oi the court below will be re
versed. and cause remanded ior iurther
proceedings. All the justicesconcurring.
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PRIMROSE

vi

WESTERN UNION TEL.' C0.

(14 Sup. Ct. 1098, 154 U. s. 1.)

May

26,

189-1.

No. 59.

In error

to the circuit court of the United
for the eastern district of Pennsyl

States

v

vania.
This was an action on the case, brought
January 25, 1888, by Frank J. Primrose, a
citizen of Pennsylvania, against the Western
Union Telegraph Company, a corporation of
New York, to recover damages for a negli
gent mistake of the defendant,s
agents in
transmitting a telegraphic message from the
plaintiff, at Philadelphia, to his agent at
Waukeney, in the state of Kansas.
.
The defendant pleaded (1) not guilty; (2)
that the message was an unrepeated mes
sage, and was also a cipher and obscure mes
sage, and therefore, by the contract between
the parties under which the message was
sent, the defendant
was not liable for the
At the trial, the following facts
mistake.
were proved and admitted:
On June 16. 1887, the plaintiff wrote and
delivered to the defendant, at Philadelphia,
for transmission to his agent, William B.
Toland, at Ellis, in the state of Kansas, a
message upon one of the defendant,s printed
blanks, the words printed below in italies
being the words written therein
by the
plaintiff, to wit:

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH
COMPANY.

"THE

"THOs. T. PICK l€RT.

General Manager.

“Receiver’s No.

NORvIN GREEN.

Time1Filed
3

“Send the following message,
subject to the terms on back
hereof, which are he r e by
agreed to.

‘To

President.

Check

Jun‘

16 1887‘

“FRANK J. PRIJIROSE.

BACK

negligence of its servants or otherwise, be
yond the amount received for sending the
same;
nor for mistakes
or delays in the

transmission or delivery or for nondelivery
of any’ REPFZATED message beyond ﬁfty times
the sum received for sending the same, un
less specially insured; nor in any case for
delays arising from unavoidable interruption
in the working of its lines, or for errors in
cipher or obscure messages. And this com
pany is hereby made the agent of the send
er, without liability, to forward any mes
sage over the lines of any other company
when necessary to reach its destination.
“Correctness in the transmission of a mes
sage to any point on the lines of this com
pany can be nvsunnn by contract in writing,
stating agreed amount of risk, and payment
of premium thereon, at the following rates.
in addition to the usual charge for repeated
messages, viz. one per cent. for any distance
not exceeding 1,000 miles, and two per cent.
for any greater distance.
No employe of the
company is authorized to vary the foregoing.
“No responsibility regarding messages at
taches to this company until the same are
presented and accepted at one of its trans
mitting oﬂices; and, if a message is sent to
such otﬂce by one of the company,s messen
gers, he acts for that purpose as the agent
of the sender.
“Messages
will be delivered free withm
the estahlished
free delivery limits of the
terminal oﬂice. For delivery at a greater
distance, a special charge will be made to
cover the cost of such. delivery.
"The company will not be liable for dam
ages or statutory penalties in any case where
the claim is not presented in writing within
sixty days after the message is ﬁled with
the company for transmission.

“NORVIN GREEN. President.
“THOS. T. ECKERT, General Manager."

of the same day. an agent
delivered
to Toiand, at
Wankeney,
upon a blank of the defendant
company. the message in this form’ the writ
ten words being printed below in italies:
On the evening

B. To’and, Ellis, Kansas.
“Deapnt am ezreedingly busy bay all kinds qua
perhaps bracken half of it mince moment promptly
of purchases.
Wm.

“WanAa

THE NOTICE AID AGREEMEIT oN

of the defendant

"THE

or nus BL..\NK._&]"

Upon the back of the message was the fol
lowing printed matter:

“ALL MESSAGES TAKEN BY THIS COM
PANY ARE SUBJECT TO THE FOL
LOWING TERMS:

“To guard against mistakes or delays, the
sender of a message should order it RF
PEATED; that is, telegraphed back to the
originating oﬂice for comparison.
For this.
one.half the regular rate is charged in ad
dition. It is agreed between the sender of
the following message and this company
that said company shall not be liable for
mistakes
or delays in the transmission or
or for nondelivcry of any UNRE
delivery
PEATED

mesmge,

whether

COMPANIES.

happening

by

“This

WESTERN UNION
COMPANY.

LIVERS

company
messages

TELEGB?PH

TRANSMITS

and

DE

only on conditions limit
ing its liability, which have been assented to
by the sender of the following message.
“Errors can be guarded against only by re
peating a message back to the sending sta
tion for comparison,
and the company will
not hold itself liable for errors or delays in
transmission or delivery of UNREPEATED
MESSAGES beyond the amount of tolls
paid thereon. nor in any case where the claim
is not presented in writing within sixty days
after sending the message.
MESSAGE,
“This is an UNREPEATED
and is delivered by request of the sender,
under the conditions

named above_

\
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"THOs. T. ECKIERT,

General M nnaner.

!\‘L‘MliE[l
RL

sl£.\"l‘ BY
S.

NOBVlN GREEN,

llEC,D BY
1".N.

President.

CllEi.‘K.
22 Collrcl 8 e;drawords.

June 16, 1_ss7.‘
at 5 K. p. 111
Dated P/u'l¢nielphia, 16. Forwarded from Ellis.

“RECEIVED

“

“To

W. B. Toland, Waukeney, Kansas.
“Destroy am exceedingly busy buy all kinds quo
perhaps bratlcm half of it mince moment promlitiy
of purchase.

“FRANK J. PRIJIROSE."

The difference between the message as
sent and as delivered is shown below, where
so much of the message sent as was omitted
in that delivered is in brackets, and the
words substituted in the message delivered
are in italies.
“[Despot] Destroy am exceedingly
busy
[bay] buy all kinds quo Derhaps bracken half
of it mince moment promptly of purchase[s]."
By the private cipher code made and used
by the plaintiff and Toland, the meaning of
these words was as follows:
“Yours of the [ﬁfteenth] serenteentk re
ceived; am exceedingly busy; [I have bought]
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two dots, a space, andthen two dots; and that
the difference between “a" and “u" was one
dot, “a" being a dot and a dash, and “u" two
dots and a dash, and the pause upon the last
touch of the “u;" that an experienced talegraph operator, if the words were properly
rapped out, and he was paying proper atten
tion, could not well mistake the one for the
other, but might be misled if he way not
careful; and that it was very likely that an
other dot could be put in if there was any in
terruption in the wire. He further testiﬁed
that there was a great difference between the
words “despot" and “destroy" in telegraphic
symbols;
and that the letter "s" was made
by three dots, so that, if an operator received
the word “purchases"
over the wires, and
wrote down “purchase,"
he omitted threc
dots from the end of the word.
The plaintiff introduced depositions, taken
in September, 1888, of one Stevens and one
Smith, who were respectively
telegraph op
craters of the defendant at Brookville and at
Ellis, in the state of Kansas, on June 16,
1887.

Stevens testiﬁed that Brookville was a relay
station of the company, at which messages
buy all kinds. ﬁve hundred thousand pounds;
from the east were repeated westward; that
perhaps we have sold half of it; wire when
on that day one Tindall, his fellow operator
you do anything; send samples immediately,
in the Brookville oﬂice, handed him a copy in
promptly of [purchases] purchase."
Tinuan,s handwriting of the message in ques
The plaintiff testiﬁed that on June 16. 1887,
tion (an impression copy of which he identi
he wrote the message in his own oiiice on
ﬁed and annexed to his deposition), contain
one of a bunch or book of the defendant,s
ing the words “despot“ and “bay," and be im
blanks which he kept at hand, and sent it to
mediately transmltted it, word for word, to
IIhiladclphia;
the defendant,s
that
oftlce at
Ellis; that the equipment of the oﬂlce at
he had a running account with the defend
Brookvillc was in every respect good and suf
ant,s agent there, which he settled monthly,
amounting to $180 for that month; that he . iiclent; and that he had no recollection of
the wires between it and Ellis having been in
did not then read, and did not remember that
other than good condition on that day.
he had ever before read, the printed matter
Smith testiﬁed that on that day he received
on the back of the blanks; and that he paid
the message at Ellis from Brookville, and
the usual rate of $1.15 for this message, and
immediately
wrote it down, word for word,
did not pay for a repetition or insurance of it.
just as received (and identiﬁed and annexed
He also testiﬁed that he then was, and for
to his deposition an impression copy of what
many years had been, engaged in the busi
he then wrote down), containing
the words
ness of buying and selling wool all over the
"destroy" and “buy," and transmitted it. ex
country, and had employed Toland as his
actly as he received it, to “,aukonoy, to
agent in that business, and early in June,
which Toland had directed any messages for
1887, sent him out to Kansas and Colorado,
him to be forwarded; and that the oﬂice at
with instructions to buy 50,000 pounds, and
Ellis was well and sufﬁciently equipped for
then to await orders from him before buying
its work, but he could not recall what was
more; that, before June 12th, Toland bought
the condition of the wires between it and
50,000 pounds, and then stopped buying; and
Brookville.
that he had sent many telegraphic messages
The plaintiff also introduced evidence tend
to Toland during that month and previously,
ing to show that June 16, 1887, was a bright
using the same code.
and beautiful day at Ellis and Waukeney;
agent at Philadelphia,
The defendant’s
that Toland, upon receiving the message at
called as a witness for the plaintiff, testiﬁed
Waukeney, made purchases of about 300,000
that he sent this message for the plaintiff,
pounds of wool; and that the plaintiff, in set
and knew that he was a dealer in wool, and
tling with the sellers thereof, suffered a loss
that Toinnd was with him, but in what ca
of upwards of $20,000.
pacity he did not know; that he had fre
The circuit court, following White v. Tele
quently sent messages for him, and consid
graph Co., 5 McCrary, 103, 14 Fed. 710,
ered him one of his best customers during the
and Jones v. Telegraph Co., 18 Fed. 717,
wool season;
that telegraphic messages by
ruled that there was no evidence of gross
the present system were sent and received by
sound, and were all dots and dashes;
negligence on the part of the defendant;
and
that
that, as the message had not been repeated,
"b“ was a dash and three dots, and "y" was
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the plaintiff, by the terms printed upon the
back of the message, and referred to above
his signature on its face, could not recover
more than the sum of $1.15, which he had
paid for sending it. The plaintiff not claim
ing that sum, the court directed a verdict for
the defendant, and rendered judgment there
The plaintiff tendered a bill of excep
on.
tions, and sued out this writ of error.
Geo. Junkin and Jos. de F. Junkin, for
Silas W. Pettlt. John H.
plaintiff in error.
Dillon, Geo. H. Fearons, and Bush Taggart,
for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case,
delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action by the sender of a tele
graphic message against the telegraph com
pany to recover damages for a mistake in the
transmission of the message, which was in
cipher, intelligible only to the sender and to
his own agent, to whom it was addressed.
The plaintiff paid the usual rate for this mes
sage, and did not pay for a repetition or in
surance of it.
The blank form of message, which the
plaintiff ﬁlled up and signed, and which was
such as he had constantly used, had upon its
face, immediately above the place for writing
the message, the printed words, “Send the
following message, subject to the terms on
back hereof, which are hereby agreed to;"
and, just below the place for his signature,
this line: “E§‘Read the notice and agree
"
ment on back of this
blank_E3.

Upon the back of the blank were conspicu
ously printed the words, “All messages taken
by this company are subject to the following
terms," which contained the following condi
tions or restrictions of the liability of the
company:
"[1] To guard against mistakes or delays,
the sender of a message should order it RE
PEATED; that is, telegraphed back to the
originating oﬂice for comparison.
For this,
one-half the regular rate is charged in addi
tion.
It is agreed between the sender of the
following message and this company that
said company shall not be liable for mistakes
or delays in the transmission or delivery or
for nondelivery of any urmarnArsn message,
whether happening by negligence of its serv
ants or otherwise,
beyond the amount re
ceived for sending the same; [2] nor for mis
takes or delays in the transmission or deliv
cry or for nondelivery of any REPEATED mes
sage beyond ﬁfty times the sum received for
seudihg the same, unless specially insured;
[3] nor in any case for delays arising from
interruption in the working of
unavoidable
its lines, or for errors in cipher or obscure
messages."
After stating the rates at which
correctness in the transmission of a message
may be insured, it is provided that “no em
ploye of the company is authorized
to vary
the foregoing."
“[4] The company will not
be liable for damages or statutory penalties
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in any case where the claim is not presented
in writing within sixty days after the mes
sage is ﬁled with the company for transmls
sion."
The conditions or restrictions, the reason
ableness and validity of which are directly
involved in this case, are that part of the
ﬁrst by which the company is not to be lia
ble for mistakes in the transmission or de
livery of any message beyond the sum re
ceived for sending it, unless the sender or
ders it to be repeated by being telegraphed
back to the originating oﬂice for comparison,
and pays half that sum in addition; and that
part of the third by which the company is
not to be liable at all for errors in cipher or
obscure messages.
Telegraph companies
resemble
railroad
and other common carrier, in
companies
that they are instruments of commerce, and
in that they exercise a public employment,
and are therefore bound to serve all custom
alike,
They
ers
without discrimination.
have, doubtless, a duty to the public to re
ceive, to the extent of their capacity, all
messages clearly and intelligibly
written.
and to transmit them upon reasonable terms.

Their
in
different ways; and they are not subject
Express Co. v. Cald
to the same liabilities.
well, 21 Wall. 264, 269, 270; Telegraph Co. v.
Texas, 105 U. S. 460, 464.
The rule of the common law by which
common carriers of goods are held liable
for loss or injury by any cause whatever, ex
cept the act of God or of public enemies, does
or wharf
not extend even to warchousemen
ingers, or to any other class of bailees, except
innkeepers, who, like carriers, have peculiar
opportunities for embezzling the goods or
The carrier has
for collusion with thieves.
of the
the actual and manual possession
goods.
The identity of the goods which he
receives with those which he delivers can
hardly be mistaken.
Their value can be

a-’»_11_t_i.11_@:;_=%%Ttt9L_cIw__<'\,_.I1*“r1@rsi erent, and are per ormed
uties are

easily

estimated,

and may be ascertained

by

inquiry of the conslgnor, and the carrler’s
compensation
ﬁxed accordingly; and his lia
bility in damages is measured by the value
of the goods.
But telegraph companies are not bailees,
in any sense. They are intrusted with noth
ing but an order or message, which is not to
be carried in the form or characters in which
it is received, but is to be translated and
transmitted through differeut symbols, by
means of electricity, and is peculiarly liable
to mistakes.
The message cannot be the
subject of embezzlement.
It is of no intrin
Its importance cannot be estimat
sic value.
ed, except by the sender, and often cannot
be disclosed by him without danger of de
feating his purpose.
It may be wholly val
ueless, if not forwarded immediately; and
the measure of damages, for a failure to
transmit or deliver it, has no relation to any
value of the message itself, except as such
value may be disclosed by the message, or
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be agreed between
pany.

the sender

and the comv

As said by Mr. Justice Strong, speaking
for this court, in Express Co. v. Caldwell,
"Like common carriers, they
above cited:
cannot contract with their employers for ex
emption from liability for the consequences
But they may by
of their own negligence.
such contracts, or by their rules and regula
tions brought to the knowledge of their em
ployers, limit the measure of their responsi
Whether their
bility to a reasonable extent.
or unreasonable
must
rules are reasonable
be determined with reference to public poli
cy, preciely as in the case of a carrier."
By the settled law of this court, common
carriers of goods or passengers cannot, by
any contract with their customers, wholly
from liability for dam
exempt themselves
ages caused by the negligence of themselves
or their servants.
Railroad Co. v. Lock
wood, 17 Wall. 357; Liverpool 8: G. W.
Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397,
442, 9 Sup. Ct. 469, and cases cited.
But even a common carrier of goods may,
by special contract with the owner, restrict
the sum for which he may be liable, even in
case of a loss by the carrier,s negligence;
and this upon the distinct ground, as stated
by Mr. Justice Blatchford, speaking for the
whole court, that “where a contract of the
kind, signed by the shipper, is fairly made,
agreeing on the valuation of the property
carried, with the rate of freight based on
the condition that the carrier assumes lia
bility only to the extent of the agreed valu
ation, even in case of loss or damage by the
negligence of the carrier, the contract will
be upheld as a proper and lawful mode of
securing a due proportion between
the
amount for which the carrier may be respon
sible and the freight he receives, and of pro
tccting himself against extravagant and fan
ciful valuations." l-lart v. Railroad Co., 112
U. S. 331, 343. 5 Sup. Ct. 151.
By the regulation now in question, the tele
graph company has not undertaken to wholly
exempt itself from liability for negligence;
but only to require the sender of the message
to have it repeated, and to pay half as much
again as the usual price, in order to hold the
company
liable for mistakes or delays in
transmitting or delivering or for not deliv
ering a message, whether happening by neg
ligence of its servants or otherwise.
In Telegraph Co. v. Hall, 12-} U. S. 444.
453, 8 Sup. Ct. 577, the effect of such a regu
lation was presented by the certiﬁcate of
the circuit court, but was not passed upon
by thi court, because it was of opinion
that, upon the facts of the case, the damages
claimed were too uncertain and remote.
But the reasonableness and validity of such
regulations have been upheld in McAndrew
v. Telegraph Co., 17 C. B. 3, and in Baxter
v. Telegraph Co., 37 U. C. Q. B. 470, as well
as by the great preponderance
of authority
in this country.
Only a few of the principal
'
cases need be cited.
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In the earliest American case, decided by
the court of appeals of Kentucky, the reasons
for upholding the validity of a regulation
very like that now in question were thus
stated:
“The public are admonished by the
notice that, in order to guard against mis
takes in the transmission of messages, every
message of importance ought to be repeated.
A person desiring to send a message is thus
apprised that there may be a mistake in its
transmission, to guard against which it is
necessary that it should be repeated.
He is
also notiﬁed that, if a mistake occur, the
company will not be responsible for it unless
the message be repeated.
There is nothing
unreasonable in this condition.
It gives the
party sending the message the option to send
it in such a manner as to hold the company
responsible, or to send it for a less price at
his own risk. If the message he unimport
‘ant, he may be willing to risk it without
paying the additional charge.
But if it be
important, and he wishes to have it sent cor
rectly, he ought to be willing to pay the cost
of repeating the message.
This regulation,
considering the accidents to which the busi
ness is liable, is obviously just and reasona
ble.
It does not exempt the company from
responsibility, but only ﬁxes the price of that
responsibility, and allows the person who
sends the message either to transmit it at
his own risk, at the usual price, or by paying
in addition thereto half the usual price to
have it repeated, and thus render the com
pany liable for any mistake that may occur."
Camp v. Telegraph Co., 1 Metc. (Ky.) 164,
168.

In Telegraph

Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 525,
the supreme court of Michigan held
that a similar regulation was a valid part
of the contract between the company and the
sender, whether
“The
he read it or not.
regulation," said Chief Justice Christianey,
“of most, if not all, telegraph companies op
erating extensive lines, allowing messages to
be sent by single transmission for a lower
rate of charge, and requiring a larger com
pensation when repeated, must be considered
as highly reasonable, giving to their custom
er the option of either mode, according to
the importance of the message or any other
circumstance which may affect the question."
"The printed blank, before the message was
written upon it, was a general proposition
to all persons of the terms and conditions
By
upon which messages would be sent.
writing the message under it, signing. and de
livering it for transmission, the plaintiff be
low accepted the proposition, and it became
a contract upon, those terms and conditions."
In Birney v. Telegraph Co., 18 Md. 341,
358. the court of appeals of Maryland, while
recognizing the validity of similar regulations,
held that they did not apply to a case in
which no effort was made by the telegraph
company or its agents to put the message on
535, 536,

its transit.
In Telegraph Co. v. Gihiersleve, 29 Md.
232, 2-16, 248, the same court, speaking by
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Mr. Justice Alvey (since chief justice of Mary
land and of the court of appeals of the dis
trict of Columbia), said: “The appellant had
a clear right to protect itself against extra
ordinary risk and liability by such rules and
regulations as might be required for the pur
pose."
“The appellant could not, by rules
and regulations of its own making, protect
itself against liability for the consequences
of its own willful misconduct or gross neg
ligence or any conduct
inconsistent with
good faith; nor has it attempted by its rules
and regulations to afford itself such exemp
tion.
It was bound to use due diligence, but
not to use extraordinary care and precaution.
The appellee, by requirmg the message to be
repeated, could have assured himself of its
dispatch and accurate transmission to the
other end of the line. if the wires were in
working condition; or, by special contract
for insurance, could have secured himself
against all consequences of nondelivery.
He
did not think proper, however, to adopt such
precaution, but chose rather to take the risk
of the less expensive terms of sending his
message: and, having refused
to pay the
charge
extra
for repetition
or insurance,
we think he had no right to rely upon the
declaration of the appellant,s agent that the
message had gone through, in order to ﬁx the
liability on the company."
In Passmore v. Telegraph Co., 9 Phila. 90,
78 Pa. St. 238, at the trial in the district
court of Philadelphia, there was evidence
that Passmore, of whom one Edwards had
offered to purchase a tract of land in West
Virginia, wrote and delivered to the company
at Parkersburg, upon a blank containing
similar conditions, a message to Edwards,
at Philadelphia, in these words:
"I hold the
Tibbs tract for you; all will be right,"—but
which, as delivered by the company in Phila
delphia,
was altered by substituting the
word "sold_ for "hold;" and that Edwards
thereupon broke oﬂ! the contract for the pur
chase of the land, and Passmore had to sell
it at a great loss. The verdict being for the
plaintiff, the court reserved the question
whether the defendant was liable, inasmuch
as the plaintiff had not insured the message
nor directed it to be repeated, and after
wards entered judgment for the defendant,
notwithstanding the verdict, in accordance
with an opinion of Judge Hare, the most im
portant parts of which were as follows:
“A railway, telegraph, or other company,
charged with aduty which concerns the public
interest, cannot screen themselves from lia
bility for negligence; but they may prescribe
rules calculated to insure safety, and dimin
ish the loss in the event of accident, and
declare that, if these are not observed, the
injured party shall be considered as in de
fault, and precluded
by the doctrine
of
contributory negligence.
The rule must
however. be such as that reason, which is said
to be the life of the law, can approve; or.
at the least, such as it need not condemn.

By no device can a body corporate avoid
liability for fraud, for willful wrong, or for
the goss negligence which, if it does not in
tend to occasion injury, is reckless of con
sequences,

and

transcends

the

bounds

of

right with full knowledge that mischief may
Nor, as I am inclined to think, will
ensue.
any stipulation against liability
be valid
which has the pecuniary interest of the cor
poration as its sole object, and takes a safeguard from the public without giving anything
in return.
But a rule which, in marking out
a path plain and easily accessible, as that in
which the company guaranties
that every
one shall be secure, declares that, if any man
prefers to walk outside of it, they will ae
company him, will do their best to secure
and protect him, but will not be insurers,
will not consent to be responsible for acci
dents arising from iortuitous and unexpected
causes, or even from a want of care and
watchfuiness on the part of their agents,
may be a reasonable
held by the courts."

rule,

and, as such, up

“The function of the telegraph differs from
that of the post ofﬁce in this: that while the
latter is not concerned with the contents of
the missive, and merely agrees to forward
it to its address, the former undertakes the
much more diﬂicuit task of transcribing a
nmssage written according to one method of
notation,
in characters
which are entirely
different, with all the liability to error neces
sarily incident to such a process.
Nor is
this all. The telegraph operator is separated
by a distance of many miles from the paper
on which he writes, so that his eye cannot
discern and correct the mistakes committed
by his hand.
It was also contended during
the argument that the electric ﬂuid which is
used as the medium of communication is lia
ble to perturbations arising from thunder
storms and other natural causes.
It is there
fore obvious that entire accuracy canuot al
ways be obtained by the greatest oare, and
that the only method of avoiding error is to
compare the copy with the original, or, in
other words, that the operator to whom the
message is sent should telegraph it back to
the station whence it came."
“Obviously he who sends a communication
is best qualiﬁed to judge whether it should
be returned for correction.
If he asks the
company
to repeat the message, and they
fail to comply, they will clearly be answera
ble for any injury that may result from the
omission.
If he does not make such a re
quest, he may well be taken to have acqui
esced in the conditions which they prescribe,
and at all events cannot object to the want
of a precaution he has virtually waived. It
is not a just ground of complaint that the
power to choose is coupled with an obligation
to pay an additional sum to cover the cost of
repetition." 9 Phlia. 92-94; 78 Pa. St. 242
244.

The judgment was afﬁrmed by the supreme
court of Pennsylvania, for the reasons given
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by Judge Hare and above stated.
Telegraph Co. v. Stevenson,

246;

442, 455,

In

18

At].

441.

78
128

Pa. St.
Pa. St.

.

v. Telegraph Co., 48 N. Y. 132,
the plaintiffs’ agent wrote, at his own oiiice
in Palmyra. on one of the company’s blanks.
substantially like that now before us, and
delivered to the company at Palmyra, a mes
sage addressed to brokers in New York, and
in these words, “Buy us seven ($700) hundred
In the statement of facts
dollars in gold."
upon which the case was submitted, it was
agreed that he had never read the printed
part of the blank, and that “the message
was transmitted from the
thus delivered
oﬁice at Palmyra as written; but, by some
error of the defendant,s operators working
between Palmyra and New York," it was
received in New York and delivered in this
form, “Buy us seven thousand dollars in
gold," and the brokers accordingly bought
that amount for the plaintiffs, who sold it at
It was held that there was no evi
a loss.
dence ot negligence on the part of the com
pany, and that, the message not having been
repeated, the company was not liable.
In Kiley v. Telegraph Co., 109 N. Y. 231,
235—237, 16 N. E. 75, a similar decision was
"That a telegraph
made. the court saying:
company has the right to exact such a stipu
lation from its customers is the settled law
in this and most of the other states of the
Union and in England. The authorities htild
that telegraph companies are not under the
obligations of common carriers; that they
do not insure the absolute and accurate trans
mission of messages delivered to them; that
they have the right to make reasonable regu
lations for the transaction of their business,
and to protect themselves against liabilities
which they would otherwise incur through
the carelessness of their numerous agents,
and the mistakes and defaults incident to the
transaction of their peculiar business. The
stipulation printed in the blank used in this
case has frequently been under consideration
in the courts, and has always in this state,
and generally elsewhere, been upheld as rea
sonable." “The evidence brings this case
within the terms of the stipulation. It is not
the case of a message delivered to the oper
ator, and not sent by him from his oﬂice.
This message was sent, and it may be infer
red from the evidence that it went so far as
Buffalo, at least; and all that appears fur
ther is that it never reached its destination.
“fhy it did not reach there remains unex
plained. It was not shown that the failure
was due to the willful misconduct of the de
fendant, or to its gross negligence. It the
plaintiff had requested to have the message
repeated back to him, the failure would have
been detected and the loss averted. The case
is therefore brought within the letter and
purpose of the stipulation."
In the supreme judicial court of Massachu
setts. the reasonableness and validity of such
regulations have been repeatedly aﬂirmed.
Breese

‘.

kg."

\ (.17.;

Ellis v. Telegraph Co., 13 Allen, 226; Red
path v. Telegraph Co., 112 Mass. 71; Grinnell
v. Telegraph Co.,‘113 Mass. 299; Clement v.
Telegraph Got, 137 Mass. 463.
There are cases, indeed, in which such reg
ulations have been considered to be wholly
void. it will be sufﬁcient to refer to those
specially relied on by the learned counsel for
the plaintiff, many of which, however, upon
examination,
appear to have been inﬂuenced
by considerations
which have no application
to the case at bar.
Some of them were actions brought. not by
the sender, but by the receiver, of the mes
sage, who had no notice of the printed con
ditions until after he received it, and could
not therefore have agreed to them in ad
vancc.
Such were Telegraph Co. v. Dryburg.
35 Pa. St. 298;
Harris v. Telegraph Co., 9
Phiia. 88; and De la Grange v. Telegraph
Co., 25 La. Ann. 383.
Others were cases of night messages, in
which the whole provision as to repeating
was omitted, and a sweeping and comprehen
sive proviion substituted, by which, in ef
fect, all liability beyond the price paid was
avoided.
True v. Telegraph Co., 60 Me. 9, 18;
Bartlett v. Telegraph Co., 62 Me. 209, 215;
Candee v. Telegraph Co., 34 Wis. 471, 476;
I-Libbard v. Telegraph Co., 33 Wis. 558, 56.1.
In Bartlett’s Case the court said: “Most, if
not all, the cases upon this subject, refer to
rules requiring the repeating o!1‘ messages to
insure accuracy, and seem to be jtiStl1l8(l in
their conclusion on the ground that, owing
to the liability to error from causes beyond
the skill and care of the operator, it is but
a matter of common care and prudence to
have the messages repeated, the neglect of
which in messages of importa.nce, after being
warned of the danger, is a want of care on
the part of the sender, and, as the person
sending the message is presumed to be the
best judge of its importance, he must, on his
own responsibility, make his election wheth
er to have it repeated."
62 Me. 216, 217.
The passage cited from the opinion of the
circuit court of appeals in Delaware & A.
Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. State. 3 U. 8.
App. 30, 105, 2 C. C. A. 1, and 50 Fed. 677,
in which the same judge who had decided
the present case in the circuit court said, “It
is no longer open to question that telephone
and telegraph companies are subject to the
rules governing common carriers and others
engaged in like public employment,"
had re
gard, as is evident from the context, and
from the reference to Budd v. New York. 143
U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468, to those rules only
which require persons or corporations exer
cising a public employment to serve all alike,
without discrimination, and which make
them subject to legislative regulation.
In Rittenhouse v. Independent Line, etc, 1
Daly, 474, 44 N. Y. 263, and in Turner v. Tel
egraph Co., 41 Iowa, 458, it does not appear
that the company had undertaken to restrict
its liability by express stipulation.
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appear
The Indiana decisions
cited
to
have been controlled by a statute of the state
enacting that telegraph companies should “be
liable for special damages occasioned by fail
ure or negligence of their operators or serv
ants in receiving, copying, transmitting, or
delivering despatches."
Telegraph Co. v.
Meek, 49 Ind. 53; Telegraph 00. v. Fenton,
52 Ind. 1.
The only cases cited by the plaintiﬂ! in
which, independently of statute, a stipulation
that the sender of a message, if he would hold
the company liable in damages beyond the
sum paid, must have it repeated and pay half
that sum in addition, has been held against
public policy and void, appear to be Tyler v.
Telegraph Co., 60 Ill. 421, 74 I1l. 168; Ayer v.
Telegraph Co., 79 Me. 493, 10 Atl. 495; Tele
graph Co. v. Griswold. 37 Ohio St. 301; Tele
graph Co. v. Grail, 38 Kan. 679, 17 Pac. 309;
Telegraph Co. v. Howell. 38 Kan. 685, 17 Pac.
313; and a charge to the jury by Mr. Justice
Woods, when circuit judge, as reported in
Dorgan v. Telegraph Co., 1 Am. Law T. (N.
S.) 406, Fed. Gas. No. 4,004, and not included
in his own reports.
The fullest statement of reasons, perhaps,
on that side of the question, is to be found in
Tyler v. .‘.‘elegraph Co., above cited.
In that case the plaintiffs had written and
delivered to the company on one of its blanks,
containing the usual stipulation as to repeat
ing, this message, addressrd
to a broker:
“Sell one hundred (100) Western Union; an
swer price."
In the message, as delivered by
the company to the broker, the message was
by substituting “one thousand
changed
(1,000)."
It was assumed that “Western
Union" meant shares in the Western Union
Telegraph Company.
The supreme court of
Illinois held that the stipulation was “unjust,
unconscionable,
and
without consideration,

utterly void." 60 Ill. 439.
The propositions upon which that decision
was based may be suﬁiciently stated, in the
very words of the court, as follows: “Wheth
er the paper presented by the company, on
which a message is written and signed by the
sender, is a contract or not, depends on cir
cumstances;"
and “whether he had knowl
edge of its terms, and consented to its restric
tions, is for the jury to determine as a ques
tion of fact, upon evidence aliunde." "Admit
ting the paper signed by the plaintiffs was a
contract, it did not, and could not, exonerate
the company from the use of ordinary care
and diligence, both as to their instruments
and the care and skill of their operators."
“The plaintiffs having proved the inaccuracy
of the message, the defendants, to exonerate
themselves, should have shown how the mis
take occurred;" and, "in the absence of any
proof on their part, the jury should be told
the presumption was a want of ordinary care
on the part of the company.."
The printed,
conditions could not “protect this company
from losses and damage occaioned by causes
wholly within their own contro ," but “must
be conffned to mistakes due to the inﬂrmities

of telegraphy,
60

Ill.

and

which are unavoidable."

431-433.

The ‘effect of that construction would be
either to hold telegraph companies to be sub
ject to the liability of common carriers, which
the court admitted in an earlier part of its
opinion that they were not, or else to allow to
the stipulation no effect whatever; for, if they
were not common carriers, they would not,
even if there were no express stipulation, be
liable for unavoidable mistakes, due to causes
over which they had no control.
But the ﬁnal, and apparently the principal,
ground for that decision, was restated by the
court when the case came before it a second
time, as follows: “On the. question whether
the regulation requiring messages to be re
peated, printed on the blank of the company
on which a message is written, is a contract,
we held it was not a contract binding in
law, for the reason the law imposed upon the
companies duties to be performed to the pub
lic, and for the performance of which they
ﬁxed by
were entitled to a compensation
themselves, and which the sender had no
choice but to pay, no matter how exorbitant
Among these duties, we held,
it might be.
was that of transmitting messages correctly;
that the tariff paid was the consideration for
the performance of this duty in each particu
lar case, and, when the charges were paid, the
duty of the company began, and there was
for the supposed
therefore no consideration
contract requiring the sender to repeat the
message at an additional cost to him of ﬁfty
per cent. of the original charges." 74 Ill. 170,
171.

‘

The fallacy in that reasoning appears to us
to be in the assumption that the company, un
der its admitted power to ﬁx a reasonable
rate of compensation, establishes the usual
ior the duty of
rate as the compensation
transmitting any message whatever; where
as, what the company has done is to ﬁx that
rate for those messages only which are trans
mitted at the risk of the sender, and to re
quire payment of the higher rate of half as
much again if the company is to be liable for
mistakes or delays in the transmission or de
livery or in the nondelivery of a message.
Indeed, that learned court frankly admitted
that its decision was against the general cur
rent of authority, saying: “It must, however,
be conceded that there is great harmony in
the decisions that these companies can pro
tect themselves from loss by contract, and
that such a regulation as the one under which
appellees defended is a reasonable regulation,
and amounts to a contract." And, again:
“We are not satisﬁed with the grounds on
,which a majority of the decisions of respect

able courts are placed."
60 Ill. 430, 431, 435.
In the case at bar, the message, as appeared
by the plaintiff,s own testimony, was written
by him at his oﬂice in Philadelphia, upon one
of a bunch of the defendant,s blanks, which
Although he
he kept there for the purpose.
testiﬁed that he did not remember to have
read the printed matter on the back, he did
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not venture to say that he had not read it;
still less that he had not read the brief and
clear notices thereof upon the face of the
message, both above the place for writing the
message and below his signature.
There can
be no doubt, therefore, that the terms on the
back of the message, so far as they were not
inconsistent
with law, formed part of the
contract between him and the company un
der which the message was transmitted.
The message was addressed by the plain
tiff to his own agent in Kansas, was written
in a cipher understood by them only, and
“Despot am exceed
was in these words:
ingly busy bay all kinds quo perhaps bracken
halt of it mince moment promptly of pur
As delivered by the company to
chases."
the plaintiffs agent in Kansas, it had the
words "destroy" instead of "despot," "buy"
instead of "bay," and “purchase" instead of
"purchases."
.
The message having been sent and received
on June 16th, the mistake, in the ﬁrst word, of
“despot" for “destroy," by Which, for a word
signifying to those understanding the cipher,
that the sender of the message had received
from the .person to whom it was addressed
his message or June 15th, there was substi
tuted a word signifying that his message of
June 17th had been received (which was evi
dently impossible), could have had no other
effect than to put him on his guard as to
v
the accuracy of the message delivered to
him.
The mistake of substituting, for the last
word "purchase," in the singular, the word
“purchases,” in the plural, would seem to
have been equally unimportant, and is not
suggested to have done any harm.
The remaining mistake, which is relied on
as the cause of the injury for which the
plaintiff seeks to recover damages in this ac
tion, consisted in the change of a single let
ter, by substituting “u" for "a," so as to put
“buy" in the place of “bay." By the cipher
code, “buy_ had its common meaning, though
the message contained nothing to suggest to
any one, except the sender or his agent, what
the latter was to buy; and the word “bay,"
according to that code, had (what no one
without its assistance could have conjec
tured) the meaning of "I have bought."
The impression copies of the papers kept
at the defendant,s ofﬁces at Brookvillc and
Ellis, in the state o1' Kansas (which were an
nexed to the depositions of operators at those
oﬂices, and given in evidence by the plain
tiﬂ! at the trial), prove that the message was
duly transmitted over the greater part of its
route, and as far as Brookville; for they
put it beyond doubt that the message, as re
ceived and written down by one of the opera
tors at Brookville, was in its original form,
and that, as written down by the operator
at Ellis, it was in its altered form.
While
the testimony of the deponents is conﬂicting,
there is nothing in it to create a suspicion
that either of them did not intend to tell the
LAw DAM.—1‘)
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truth; nor is there anything in the case tend
ing to show that there was any defect in the
defendant,s
instruments or equipment, or
that any oi.‘ its operators were incompetent
persons.
If the change of words in the message was
owing to mistake or inattention of any of the
defendant,s
servants. it would seem that it
must have consisted either in a want of
plainness of the handwriting of Tindall, the
operator who took it down at Brookville, or
in a mistake of his fellow operator, Stevens,

in reading that writing or in transmitting it

to Ellis, or else in a mistake of the operator
at Ellis in taking down the message at that
place.
the message had been repeated,
the mistake, from whatever cause it arose,
must have been detected by means of the
differing v.ersions made and kept at the of
ﬂces at Ellis and Brookville.
As has been seen, the only mistake of any
consequence in the transmission of the mes
sage consisted in the change of the word
“bay_ into “buy," or rather of the letter “a"
into “u." In ordinary handwriting, the like
ness between these two letters, and the like
lihood of mistaking the one for the other,
especially
when neither the word nor the
context has any meaning to the reader, are
familiar to all; and in telegraphic symbols,
according to the testimony of the only wit
ness upon the subject, the difference between
these two letters is a single dot.
The conclusion is irresistible that, if there
was negligence on the part of any of the de
£endant,s servants,
a jury would not have
been warranted in ﬁnding that it was more
than ordinary negligence;
and that, upon
principle and authority, the mistake was one
for which the plaintiff, not having had the
message repeated according to the terms
printed upon the back thereof, and forming
part of his contract with the company, could
not recover more than the sum which he had
paid for sending the single message.
Any other conclusion
would restrict the
right of telegraph companies to regulate the
amount of their liability within narrower
limits than were allowed to common carriers
in Hart v. Railroad Co., already cited, in
which ﬁve horses were delivered by the plain
titf to a ral oad company for transportation
under a bi
f lading, signed by him and by
its agent, which stated that the horses were
to be transported upon the terms and con
ditions thereof, "admitted and accepted by"
the plaintiff “as just and reasonable,"
and
that freight was to be paid at a rate speci
lied, on condition that the carrier assumed
a liability not exceeding $200 on each horse;
and the circuit court, and this court on writ
of error, held that the contract between the
parties could not be controlled by evidence
that one of the horses was killed by the neg
ligence of the railroad company, and was a
race horse, worth $15,000.
2 .\IcCrary, 333,
7 Fed. 630; 112 U. s. 331, 5 Sup. C9151.
It is also to be remembered that, by the

If

DAMAGES AGAINST ’.[ELEGRAPH

146

third condition or restriction in the printed
terms forming part of the contract between
these parties, it is stipulated that the com
pany shall not be “liable in any case_ “for
errors

in cipher

or obscure

messages;"

and

that it is further stipulated that “no em
ployo of the company is authorized to vary
the foregoing," which evidently includes this
as well as other restrictions.
It is diﬂicult to see anything unreasonable
or against public policy in a stipulation that
if the handwriting of a message delivered
to the company for transmission is obscure,
so as to be read with difﬁculty, or is in
cipher, so that the reader has not the usual
assistance of the context in ascertaining par
ticular words, the company will not be re
and that none
sponsible for its miscarriage.
of its agents shall, by attempting to trans
mit such a message, make the company re
sponsible.
As the message was taken down by the
telegraph operator at Brookville in the same
words in which it was delivered by the plain
tiff to the company at Philadelphia, it is evi
dent that no obscurity in the message, as
originally written by the plaintiff. had any
thing to do with its failure to reach its ulti
mate destination in the same form.
But it certainly was a cipher message, and
to hold that the acceptance by the defend
ant’s operator at Philadelphia made the com
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either arising naturaily—i. e. according to the
usual course of things—from such breach of
contract itself, or such as may reasonably
be supposed to have been in the contempla
tion of both parties, at the time they made
the contract, as the probable result of the
breach of it. Now, if the special circum
stances under which the contract was actual
ly made were communicated by the plaintiffs
to the defendants, and thus known to both
parties,
resulting from the
the damages
breach of such a contract, which they would
reasonably contemplate, would be the amount
of injury which would ordinarily follow from
a breach of contract under these special cir
so known and
cumstances
communicated.
But, on the other hand. if these special cir
were wholly unknown to the
cumstances
party breaking the contract, he, at the most,
could only be supposed to have had in his
contemplation
the amount which would arise
generally, and in the great multitude of cases
not affected by any special circumstances,
from such a breach of contract." 9 Exch.
354.

In

35.3.

Sanders v. Stuart, which was an action
by commission
against a person
merchants
whose business it was to collect and trans
mit telegraph messages, for neglect to trans
mit a message in words by themselves wholly
unintelligible, but which could be understood
by the plaintiffs‘ correspondent in New York
pany liabie for errors in its transmission
as giving a large order for goods, whereby .
would not only disregard the express stipu
the plaintiffs lost proﬁts, which they would
lation that no employe of the company could
otherwise have made by the transaction, to
vary the conditions of the contract, but would
the amount of £150, Lord Chief Justice Coler
idge, speaking for himself and Lords Jus
wholly nullify the condition as to cipher
messages, for the fact that any message is
tices Brett and Lindley, said: “Upon the
written in cipher must be apparent to every
facts of this case, we think that the rule in
Hadley v. Baxendale applies, and that the
reader.
Beyond this, under any contract to trans
damages recoverable
are nominal only.
It
mit a message by telegraph, as under any
is not necessary to decide, and we do not
give any opinion, how the case might be if
other contract, the damages for a breach
must be limited to those which may be fairly
the message, instead of being in language
utterly unintelligible, had been conveyed in
considered as arising according to the usual
plain and intelligible words.
course of things from the breach of the very
It was con
contract in question, or which both parties
veyed in terms which. as far as the defend
must reasonably
ant was concerned, were simple nonsense.
have understood
and con
templated,
For this reason, the second portion of Baron
when making the contract,
as
likely to result from its breach.
Alderson’s rule clearly applies.
No such
This was
directly adjudged in Telegraph Co. v. Hall,
damages as above mentioned could be ‘rea
sonably supposed to have been in the con
124 U. S. 444, 8 Sup. Ct. 577.
templation of both parties, at the time they
In Hadley v. Baxendale (decided in 1854)
9 Exch. 345, ever since considered a leading
made the contract,
as the probable result
case on both sides of the Atlantic, and ap
of the breach of it;‘ for the simple reason
proved and followed by this court in Tele
that the defendant, at least did not know
graph Co. v. Hall, above cited, and in How
what his contract was about. nor what nor
ard v. Manufacturing Co., 139 U. S. 199, 201;'
whether any damage would follow from the
207, 11 Sup. Ct. 500; Baron Alderson laid
breach of it. And for the same reason, viz. '
down, as the principles by which the jury
the total ignorance of the defendant as to
ought to be guided in estimating the dam
the subject-matter of the contract (an ignor
ages arising out of any breach
ance known to, and indeed intentionally pro
of con
tract, the following:
“Where two parties
cured by, the plaintiffs). the ffrst portion of
have made a contract which one of them
the rule applies also; for there are no dam
has broken, the damages which the other
ages more than nominal
which can ‘fairly
party ought to receive in respect of such
and reasonably be considered as arising nat
urally—i. e. according to the usual course of
breach
of contract
should
be such
its
may fairly and reasonably
t.hings——from
the breach‘ of such a contract
be considered
]
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this." 1 C. P. Div. 326, 328, 45 Law J.
P. (W, 684.
In Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, already re
ferred to, which was an action by the sender
against a telegraph company for not deliver
ing this message received by it in Baltimore,
in New York, “Sell
addressed to brokers
ﬁfty (50) gold," Mr. Justice Alvey, speaking
for the court of appeals of Maryland, and ap
plying the rule of Hadley v. Baxendalc. above
cited, said:
"While it was proved that the
in question would be understood
dispatch
among brokers to mean ﬁfty thousand dol
lars of gold. it was not shown. nor was it
put to the jury to ﬁnd, that the appellant,s
agents so understood it, or whether they un
derstood it at all. ‘Sell ﬁfty gold‘ may have
in its literal import, if it
been understood
can be properly said to have any, or was
likely to be taken to mean ﬁfty dollars .
ﬁfty thousand dollars by those not initiated;
and, if the measure of responsibility at all
depends upon a knowledge of the special cir
cumstances
of the case, it would certainly
follow that the nature of this dispatch should
have been communicated to the agent at the
time it was offcred to be sent, in order that
the appellant might have observed the pre
cautions necessary to guard itself against the
risk. But without reference to the fact as
to whether the appellant had knowledge of
the true meaning and character of the dis
patch, and was thus enabled to contemplate
the consequences of a breach of the contract,
the jury were instructed that the appellee
was entitled to recover to the full extent of
his loss by the decline in gold.
In thus in
structing the jury, we think the court com
mitted error, and that its ruling should be
reversed." 29 Md. 232, 251.
In Baldwin v. Telegraph Co., which was an
action by the senders against the telegraph
company for not delivering
this message,
“Telegraph me at Rochester what that well
is doing," Mr. Justice Allen, speaking for the
court of appeals of New York, said: “The
message did not import that a sale of any
property or any business transaction hinged
upon the prompt delivery of it, or upon any
For all the
answer that might be received.
purposes for which the plaintiffs desired the
information, the message might as well have
been in a cipher or in an unknown tongue.
It indicated nothing to put the defendant up
on the alert, or from which it could he in
ferred that any special or peculiar loss would
of it. Whenever
ensue from a nondelivery
special or extraordinary damages, such as
would not naturally or ordinarily follow a
breach, have been awarded for the nonper
formance of contracts, whether for the sale
or carriage of goods or for the delivery of
messages by telegraph, it has been for the
reason that the contracts have been made
to peculiar circumstances
with reference
known to both, and the particular loss has
of both, at the
been in the contemplation
time of making the contract, as a contingen
as
C.

147

follow the nonperformance."
dispatch not indicating any purpose
other than that of obtaining such information
as an owner of property might desire to have
at all times, and without reference to a sale,
or even a stranger might ask for purposes en
tirely foreign to the property itself, it is very
evident that, whatever may have been the
special purpose of the plaintiffs, the defend
ant had no knowledge or means of knowledge
of it, and could not have contemplated either
a loss of.a sale, or a sale at an tmdervalue,
or any other disposition of or dealing with
the well or any other property, as the proba
ble or possible result of a breach of its con
The loss which would naturally and
tract.
necessarily result f:om the failure to deliver
the message would be the money paid for its
cy that might

"The

transmission,
and no other damages can be
claimed upon the evidence as resulting from
the alleged breach of duty by the defendant."
45 N. Y. 7-14, 749, 750, 752.
See, also, Hart
v. Cable Co., 86 N. Y. 633.
The supreme court of Illinois, in Tyler v.
Telegraph Co., above cited, took notice of the
fact that in that case “the dispatch disclosed
the nature of the business as fully as the case
demanded."
60 11l. 434.
And in the recent
case of Cable Co. v. Lathrop the same court
said: “It is clear enough that, applying the
rule in Hadley v. Baxendaie, supra, a recov
ery cannot be had for a failure to correctly
transmit a mere cipher dispatch, unexplained,
for the reason that to one unacquainted with
the meaning of the ciphers it is wholly unin
telligible and nonsensical.
An operator would
therefore be justiﬁable in saying that it can
contain no information of value as pertain
ing to a business transaction, and a failure to
send it or a mistake in its transmission can
reasonably result in no pecuniary loss."
131
‘
Ill. 575, 585, 23 N. E. 583.
The same rule of damages has been applied,
upon failure of a telegraph company to trans
mit or deliver a cipher message, in one of the
Wisconsin cases cited by the plaintiff, and in
many cases in other courts. Candee v. Tele
graph Co., 3.} Wis. 471, 479-481; Beaupre v.
Telegraph Co., 21 Minn. 155; Mackay v. Tele
graph Co., 16 Nev. 222; Daniel v. Telegraph
Co., 61 Tex. 452; Cannon v. Telegraph Co.,
100 N. C. 300, 6 S. E. 731; Telegraph Co. v.
Wilson, 32 Fla. 527, 14 South. 1; Behm v.
Co., 8 Biss. 131, Fed. Gas. No.
Telegraph
1,,.’34l; Telegraph Co. v. Martin. 9 Ill. App.
587; Abeles v. Telegraph Co., 37 Mo. App.
554; Kinghorne v. Telegraph Co., 18 U. C. Q.

B.

60. 69.

In

the present

case the message was, and

was evidently intended to be, wholly unintel
ligible to the telegraph company or its agents.
They were not informed, by the message or
otherwise, of the nature, importance,
or ex
tent of the transaction to which it related, or
of the position which the plaintiff would
probably occupy if the message were correct
ly transmitted.
Mere knowledge
that the
plaintiff was a wool merchant, and that To
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land was in his employ, had no tendency to
Accord
show what the message was about.
ing to any understanding
which the tele
graph company and its agents had, or which
have supposed
the plaintiff could possibly
that they had, of the contract between these
parties. the damages which the plaintiﬂ seeks
to recover in this action, for losses upon wool
purchased by Toland, were not such as could
reasonably be considered, either as arising,
according to the usual course of things, from
the supposed breach of the contract itself, or
as having been in the contemplation of both

parties, when they made the contract, as a.
probable result of a breach of it.
In any view of the case, therefore, it was
rightly ruled by the circuit court that the
plaintiff could recover in this action no more
than the sum which he had paid for sendtug
the message.
Judgment aﬂlrmed.

Mr. Chief Justice

HARLAY

FULLER

and Mr. Justice

dissented.

Mr. Justice WHITE, not having been a
member of the court when this case was ur
gued, took no part in its decision.
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WESTERN UNION TEL.
(14 South. 1, 32

CO.

Fla.

Supreme Court of Florida.

v.

WILSON.

527.)

Nov. 8, 1893.

Appeal from circuit court, Escambia coun
James F. McClellan, Judge.
Action by Charles M. Wilson against the
Western Union Telegraph Company for a
failure to transmit and deliver a message.
Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant ap
1)‘;

peals.

Reversed.

Mallory & Maxwell, for appellant.
C. Avery, for appellee.

John

TAYLOR, J. The appellee sued the ap
pellant in the circuit court of Escambia
county, in case, for damages for its failure
to transmit and deliver a telegraphic mes
sage in cipher.
The suit resulted in a judg
ment for the plaintiff in the sum of $688.88,
and therefrom the defendant telegraph com
pany appeals.
The declaration alleges as follows:
“That
the Western Union Telegraph Company.
0.
corporation, the defendant, on the 12th day
of December, 1887, was engaged in the busi
ness of transmitting telegraphic messages
between Pensacola, Fla., and New York, in
the state of New York, and in the delivery
thereof to other cable and telegraph com
panies for transmission to Liverpool, Eng
land, where the said plaintiff had a regular
merchant broker or agent, to wit, one A.
Dobell, through whom the plaintiff negoti
ated, by means of such messages, the sale in
Europe of cargoes of lumber and timber, the
plaintiff being then and there a timber and
lumber merchant at the city of Pensacola.
That on said day the 'plaintiff delivered to
the defendant, and the defendant received
from him at its oﬂice in the city of Pensa
cola, and undertook to transmit and cause
to be transmitted, and it was its duty to
transmit and cause to be transmitted, to the
said A. Dobell, the following cipher message:
‘Dobell, Liverpool: Gladfuiness—shipment—
rosa — bonheur — luciform — banewort —
margin,,—which the said Dobell would have
understood, and the plaintiff intended to be
an offer of a cargo of lumber and timber
from aid port of Pensacola for sale through
the said Dobell in Europe, and the said Do
bell would have sold the same for the plain
tiff on the tcrms of said offer at a proiit to
the plaintiff of twelve hundred dollars, but
the defendant failed and neglected to send
the said message, in violation of its duty
to the plaintiff, and to the plaintiffs loss of
$1,200,_

therefore he sues, etc.
I
the plaintiff, over the defend
ant,s objection, was permitted to testify, in
establishment of the damages claimed, that
he had to sell his cargo of lumber in"Europe
upon the market for the best price he could
get, which was 52 shillings a load, and
which amounted to $630.84 less than the
price at which he offered same for sale in
the message failed to be sent.
The over
and

At the trial
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ruled objection of the defendant to this testi
mony was that the damage sought to be shown
thereby was too remote, and was not in the
of the parties at the time of
contemplation
the alleged making of the contract for the
transmission of said message. To this rul
ing the defendant excepted, and it is assigned
as error.
The question presented is, what is
damages to be re
the proper
covered of a telegraph company holding it
self out to the service of the public, for hire,
as the transmitter of messages by electricity,
upon its failure to transmit or deliver‘ a mes
sage written in cipher, or in language un
intelligible except to those having a key to
its hidden meaning.
As this question has
this
passed
upon
by
heretofore
been
court contrary to the views we ﬁnd it im
possible to become divested of, and, as we
think, contrary to the great weight of the
adjudications both in this
well-reasoned
country and in England, we take it up with
diiiidence that ﬁnds no palliative in the fact
that the decision heretofore
was by a di
Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, 22 Fla.
vided court.
637, 1 South. 129.
In that case the majority
of the court, while approving the following

W

well.established

rule

ﬁrst

formulated

in

reference to carriers of goods in the cause
celebre of Hadley v. Baxendale,
9 Exch.
341:
“Where two parties have made a con
tract, which one of them has broken, the
damages which the other party ought to re
ceive in respect of such breach of contract
should be either such as may fairly and sub
stantially be considered as arising naturally,
i. e. according to the usual course of things,
from such breach of contract itself, or such
as may reasonably be supposed to have been
in the contemplation of both parties at the
time they made the contract, as the probable
result of the breach of it,"—hold that it has
no applicability to the contracts of telegraph
companies for the transmission of messages,
and that such companies may be justly con
sidered and treated as standing alone,—a
The reasoning leading
system unto itself.
to this conclusion is as follows:
“The com
mon carrier charges different rates of freight
for dlfferent articles, according to their bulk
and value, and their respective
risks of
transportation, and provides different meth
ods for the transportation of each.
It is not
shown here that the defendant company
had any scale. of prices which were higher
or lower, as the importance of the dispatch
was great or small.
It cannot be said, then,
that for this reason the operator should be
informed of its importance,
when it made
no difference in the charge of transmission.
It is not shown that, if its importance had
been disclosed to the operator, that he was re
quired by the rules of the company to send
the message out of the order in which it
came to the oﬂice, with reference to other
that he
messages awaiting transmission;
was to use any extra degree of skill, any
different method or agency for sending it,
from the time, the skill used, the agencies
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demanded
or the compensation
employed,
for sending an unimportant dispatch, or that
it would aid the operator in its transmission.
For what reason. then, could he demand in
formation that was in no way whatever to
affect his manner of action, or impose on
It could
him any additional obligation?
only operate on him persuasively to perform
a duty for which he had been paid the price
he demanded, which, in consideration thereof,
he had agreed to perform, and which the
law, in consideration of his promise, and the
reception of the consideration therefor, had
already enjoined on him." The answer to
all this is that the same argument is equally
applicable as a reason why the rule in Had
ley v. Baxeudale should not apply to carriers
The carrier of goods, in
of goods for hire.
contracting to carry and deliver, deals with
the tangible.
When he contracts, he has in
his mind’s eye, from the visible, tangible
subject of his contract, what will be the
probable damage resulting directly from a
breach of it on his part, and so has the
other party to the contract with the carrier.
Therefore, the damage likely to ﬂow from
a breach by the carrier can properly be said
of
to enter mutually into the contemplation
both parties to the contract, and it is this
mutuality in the contemplation ofboth parties
to the contract of the results that will be
likely to ﬂow directly from its breach that
really furnishes that equitable feature of the
rule that the damages thus mutually contem
plated arc in fact the damages that the law
will impose for the breach. Why? Because,
in the eye of the law, the parties having
mutually contemplated such damages in go
ing into such contract, those damages can
alone be inferred as having entered into their
contract as a silent element thereof. The rule
in Hadley v. Baxendale is applicable alone to
breaches of contract,
and formulates con
cisely the measure of damages for the breach
of those contracts that do not within them
selves, in express terms, ﬁx the penalty to
follow their breach.
In other words, this
rule does nothing more than to give ex
pression to that part of the contract which.
in the eye of the law, has been mutually
agreed upon between the parties, but con
cerning which their contract itself is silent.
This essential leading feature of the rule, we
think, was wholly lost sight of in the discus
sion of the question in Telegraph Co. v. Hyer.
supra, i. e. that the damages provided for un
der the rule arise ex contractu, and that, un
less there is mutuality in all the essential ele
ments that enter into or grow out of the
contract, the whole fabric becomes unilateral,
and abhorrent in the eyes of the law.
The
assertion. as a rule of law, that one party to
a contract shall alone have knowledge that
a breach of that contract will directly re
suit in the loss of thousands of dollars, and
that upon such breach he can recover of the
other party to the contract all of such, to
him, unforeseen, unexpected. uncontempiated,
noucousented.to
damages,
seeins to us to

COMPANIES.

be a complete upheaval of all the old land
marks in reference to damages upon broken
contracts,
and the establishment of a new
rule, that is neither fair, just, or equitable,
and which, if it is to be applied to the broken
contracts of telegraph companies, must also,
according to every principle- of consistency,
to every
be applied, under like conditions,
violated contract where individuals are the
contracting parties.
The argument in Tele
graph Co. v. Hyer, supra, that it was not
shown that the telegraph company would
have charged more, or used more dispatch,
or taken more care, or been aided in any
way in the performance of its duty, if it had
been informed of the contents or purport of
to be sent in that
the message contracted
In
case, is entirely foreign to the question.
arriving at the rule of law as to the damage
that parties to contracts are entitled to, as
matter of legal right, upon breach thereof,
a consideration of anything that might or
might not in fact have prevented the wrong
ful breach has nothing to do with the sub
ject whatever.
But we are to look to and
the mutual rights of the parties
consider
from the inception of the contractual rela
tions between them, down through the con
tract itself, to the breach complained of.
One of the primary rights that each party
has, who is about to enter into a contract
with another, a breach of which may result
in damage, is to be so situated that he may
foresee what direct, probable results will
of
and in the usual
course
reasonably,
events, follow bad faith, neglect, or other
Why?
Not that it
breach upon his part.
will or will not in fact deter him from being
delinquent,
but that he may, if he will, so
act as to guard against and avoid, for his
own beneiit, the foreseen, calamitous conse
quence, or that he may, if he does not, be
held to have knowingly and willingly sub
conse
jected himself to the contemplated
quences of his wrong. that, from being fore
the law will impute
seen and contemplated,
his consent thereto.
That the rule formulated in Hadley v. Bax
endale,
supra,
is the
one properly ap
plicable to the contracts of telegraph com
panies for the transmission of messages has
the support of the overwhelming weight of
the decided cases, not only as to the numer
concurring
ical strength of the decisions
therein, but in the logical soundness of the
reasoning upon which their conclusions rest,
as will be seen from the following authori
ties: Telegraph Co. v. Hall, 124 U. S. 444,
8 Sup. Ct. 577; Sanders v. Stuart, 1 C. P.
Div. 326; Behm v. Telegraph Co., 8 Biss. 131:t
White v. Telegraph Co., 14 Fed. 710; Bald
win v. Telegraph Co., 45 N. Y. 744; Tele
graph Co. v. Graham. 1 Colo. 230; First
Nat. Bank v. W. U. Tel. Co., 30 Ohio St. 555;
Gandce v. Telegraph Co., 34 Wis. 471; Dan
iel v. Telegraph Co., 61. Tex. 4522; Beanpre
v. Telegraph Co., 21 Minn. 155; True v. Tel
1 Fed.

Gas. No. 1,234.
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egraph Co., 60 Me. 9; Squire v. Telegraph
Co., 98 Mass. %2; Telegraph Co. v. Wenger,
55 Pa. St. 262; Tyler v. Telegraph 'Co., 60
Ill. 421; Telegraph Co. v. Gildersleve, 20 Md.
232; Telegraph Co. v. Kirkpatrick,
76 Tex.
217, 13 S. W. 70; Cannon v. Telegraph Co.,
100 N. C. 300, 6 S. E. 731; Landsbcrger v.
Telegraph Co., 32 Barb. 530; Manville v.
Telegraph Co., 37 Iowa, 214; Telegraph Co.
v. Edsall, 63 Tex. 668; Hibbard v. Telegraph
Co., 33 Wis. 558; Thompson v. Telegraph
Co., 64 Wis. 53l, 25 N. W. 789; Abeles v.
Telegraph Co., 37 Mo. App. 554; Telegraph
Co. v. Cornweli, 2 C01o. App. 491, 31 Pac.
393; 3 Suth. Dam. 298; Wood, Mayne, Dam.
40; Thomp. Elect. §§ 311-316, inclusive; Id.
Opposed to this
§§ 346, 358-375, inclusive.
array of authorities are the following de
cisions by divided courts, with the exception
of the Georgia and Mississippi cases: Tel
egraph
Co. v. Hycr, supra; Daughtery v.
Telegraph Co., 75 Ala. 168; Id., 89 Ala. 191,
7 South. 660; Telegraph Co. v. Way, 83 Ala.
542, 4 South. 844; Telegraph Co. v. Fatman,
73 Ga.
Alexander v. Telegraph Co., 66
Miss. 161, 5 South. 397.
The case of Tele
graph Co. v. Reynolds, 77 Va. 173, is also
cited as sustaining a contrary rule. but a
careful reading of that case will disclose the
fact that the conclusions reached are predi
cated upon a statutory provision in their
In the case at bar, the message that
Code.
it is alleged the defendant company failed to
send was in cipher, and contained nothing
that would indicate to the defendant,s oper
ator whether it contained a criticism upon
the “Horse Fair" painting by the great artist,
Rosa Bonheur, named in the message, or
whether it related to a matter of dollars and
cents.
There was no explanation made to the
operator as to its meaning or importance.
except that the plaintiff said that the word
“gladfuiness." in the message, had a special
meaning.
What that special meaning was,
he did not disclose.
Under these circum
stances, ail that the plaintiff could rightfully
recover for the defendant,s failure to send or
deliver the message would be nominal dam
ages, or, at most, the sum paid by him as the
price of its transmission.
It was error,
therefore, for the court to admit testimony
as to the damage sustained by the plaintiff
by the loss of sale of a cargo of timber con
sequent upon the failure to forward the mes
sage.
There is another feature presented in the
proofs, aside from all that has been said up
on the rule of damages in such cases. that
would prevent the recovery had in this case.
The plaintiff himself testiﬁes that he re
ceived from his agent, Dobeli, in Europe, an
offer for the cargo of timber. What that
offer was, is nowhere stated or shown. Then
“I decided to make a ﬁnal propo
he says:
sition, which
did by taking the message to
the telegraph oﬂice, that was not sent, which
message, when translated,
was an offer by
me of said cargo of timber for sale at 54
shillings per ioa ." Then he says that be

m
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missed the sale of the cargo at the terms
offered by him in his message in consequence
of the defendant,s failure to send it, and con
sequently had to sell on the market for the
best price he could get, which was 52 shil
lings per load. There is not a word of proof
in the record to show that his offer contained
in the unsent message would ever have been
accepted, or that he could ever at any time
have sold the timber at the price at which
he so offered it, or that it could ever have
been sold at any greater price than the one
he actually received for same, whether his
message had been sent or not.
Yet, in the
face of this state of the proofs, damages
have been allowed to the plaintiff equal to
the difference between a price at which he
simply offered his timber for sale, and the
price actually received by him for it, with
out a word of proof to show whether the
higher price at which he offered it for sale
could ever have been obtained
for it or
not.
The appellee contends that because of the
in Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, supra,
decision
the question of damages cannot be consid
ered; that, as to this case, it is stare
decisis.
This doctrine. as we understand it, is rop
erly applicable to decisl ns furnishin
rules
of property, and those onstrui g statutes,
and to those passing upon th
validity of
contracts in which investments have or may
have been made upon the faith of the adju
dication as to their validity, in which cases
former decisions upon the same questions
will be adhered to. but we do not think this
case falls within the rule.
In reversing the former ruling of the court
in the Hyer Case, we do not interfere with
any vested right acquired upon the faith of
that adjudication, but pass upon the rule of
damages, as upon an abstract proposition, to
follow the breach of such contracts.
Of the
crroneousness
of the rule as laid down in
that case, we are perfectly and clearly sat
isﬂed; and in such case, in determining the
propriety of overruling it as a solemn adju
dication, we are to be governed largely by a
consideration
of the results that will likely
ﬂow from the enunciatlon and establishment
of the one or the other of the two rules. If,
in such case, we conclude that the aﬂirmance
of what we deem to be the erroneous rule in
that case will be productive of more far
reaching and harmful results than would
follow the disaﬂirmance thereof, then it be
comes our duty to overturn it, and such we
think would be the result here. Besides be
ing unilateral and wholly unfair, as we have
before stated, we cannot see why, if the pro
tection of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendaie is
to be withheld from contracts with telegraph
companies. it should not also he denied in
the daily recurring contractual controversies
between individuals. To overturn the rule in
controversies
as between man and man,
would be uch an uprooting of the old land
marks as to make it impracticable to sur
mise the harmful results that would follow.

Q
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Entertaining these views, we do not think
that the doctrine of stare decisis constrains
us to adhere to the rule in the Hyer Case,
but thin. mat less harm will follow our re
turn to the well-beaten and familiar track
that furnishes a plain and easily compre
hended rule for all contracting parties, be
they corporate or individual.
The judgment appealed from is reversed,
and a new trial ordered.

RANEY,

C.

J.,

(concurring.)

A

reconsid

eration of the question of the measure of
damages involved here conﬁrms the correct.
ness of the view expressed in my dissenting
opinion in Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, 22 Fla.
649 et seq., 1 South. 129, and I concur in the
opinion of Judge Taylor, that the rule fol
lowed in the case mentioned is unfair, and
ought not to be perpetuated;
and, without
committing myself further upon the question
of stare decisis, my conclusion is that more
injury will result in the future from adhering
to the rule of the Hyer Case than will accrue
to parties to past transactions from changing
it, and that the judgment should be re
versed. Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th Ed.) 63'),
and note 1; Wells, Stare Dec. § 624 et seq.;
Chaniberlain, Stare Dec. 19.

MABRY, J., (dissenting.)
The question of
liability to damage for a failure on the part
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of a telegraph company to send a cipher
message is not a new one in this court.
Over six years ago this question was delib
erately settled here by the decision in the
case of Telegraph Co. v. Hyer, 22 Fla. 652, 1
South. 129. It is proposed now to reverse
this case, and my view is that it should not
Every question in reference to
be done.
cipher messages entering into the case now
before us was fully discussed and maturely
considered in the Hyer Case, and this case
has the support of decisions in Alabama,
Mississippi, Georgia, and Virginia.
Under
the decision in the Hyer Case, there was a
remedy for damages for a failure on the part
of a telegraph company to send a cipher mes
sage, when it had, for compensation,
agreed
to do so. There is much merit in the rule
that, where the company holds itself out to
the public as a transmitter of cipher mes
sages for pay, it should not be allowed, after
receiving the money and agreeing to send the
message, to deny its liability for damages
resulting from its own violation of duty on
the ground that the message was in cipher,
and its contents not known to the company
when it agreed to send it. This court hav
ing planted itself in favor of this rule over
six years ago. I do not think we should now
disturb it. I do not see how greater harm
will result from adhering to the decision than
overruling it.
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16, 1893.

Error to circuit court,
ard Field, Judge.

Pettis county;

Rich

Actionby Mathew Connell against the West
ern Union Telegraph Company for failure to
promptly deliver a telegram.
From an or
der of dismissal for want of jurisdiction,
plaintiﬁ appeals.
Aﬂirmed.
Karnes,
Wm. S. Shirk, for plaintiff in error.
Holmes & Krauthoff. Charles E. Yeater, and
G. H. Fcarons, for defendant in error.

GANTT, P. J. This is an action for dam
ages for the negligence
of defendant
in
failing. to deliver to plaintiff the following
telegraphic message sent to him by his wife:
“Sedal1a. Mo., Dec. 13, 11:89. To Matt Con
Home, Leavenworth, Kan
nell,
Soldiers’
Mary." The
dying.
sas:
Your child
is
plaintiff alleged that his wife paid the cus
tomary charge, 50 cents, for its transmis
sion. and that he had refunded that sum to
her. Plaintiff then alleges that his child died on
the 24th day of December, 1889. “and that if
message had
been transmittedl
said
and
delivered with any degree of diligence or
whatever,
een
he would have
promptness
,ing‘
able to be present with his said child
its last sickness, and at its death, and that
by reason of the great negligence and care
in failing to deliver
lessness of defendant
said message, and of his being thereby deprived of being wlthhis said child during
its last sickness, and at its death, he lost,
not only the ﬁfty cents paid for sending said
message, but also suffered great anguish and
pain of mind and body. and was physically
and mentally prostruted when he learned that
his child had died. and been buried, without
knowledge on his part of its sickness and
" He alleges that he was an inmate
dea
of the soldiers’ home from December 13,
1880,
continuously,
till February 21, 1890,
and by the slightest diligence he could have
been found.
He alleges. further, that he is
damaged in the sum of $5,000, for which he
prays judgment. On motion of defendant the
circuit court struck out of the petition the
words, “but also suffered great anguish and
pain of mind and body, and was physically
when he learned
prostrated,
and mentally
that his child had died, and had been buried,
without knowledge on his part of its sick
This left the action pend
ness and death."
ing for the 50 cents only, and, plaintifi’ declin
ing to amend, the court sustained another
motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction
of the subject-matter of the action.
The sole question discussed by the appeh
lant in this case is this: “Where a telegraph
company is advised by the contents of a
message that great mental suffering and pain
will naturally result from its neglect to trans
can
mit and deliver the message promptly,

\
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damages be recovered by the sendee for suclgl
y a fail
mental agony and distress, caus
ure to promptly transmit and deliver?" The
proposition, it will be observed, relates sim
ply to damages arising from a breach of
Prior to this time there had been
contract.
but one opinion expressed in the decisions of
this court, and that is clearly adverse to the
contention of the appellant, and this is not
questioned by the able counsel who repre
but he urges that, in
sents the appellant;
re
asmuch ns telegraphy is of comparatively
cent origin, we should, in view of the func
tion lt performs, make an exception in the
of the contracts made by those
construction
engaged in it, and the damages which ﬂow
That an action for
from a breach thereof.
mental anguish, disconnected with physical
injury, for the breach of a contract, could.
not be maintained at common law, with the
single exception of the breach of a marriage
contract, we think, is abundantly established.
Wood, Mayne, Dam. 75; Lynch v. Knight. 9
H. L. Cas. 577; Walsh v. Railroad Co., 42
Wis. 23; Wyman v. Le-avitt, 71 Me. 22".
The subject came under view in this court
in Trigg v. Railway C00 74 Mo. 147. In
that case a lady, with twollttle children, was
carried beyond the station to which she was _
traveling.
It was not claimed that any in
dignity was offered. or that she suffered per
sonal injury;
The trial court instructed that
the jury might award her damages for the
anxiety and suspense of mind suffered in con
sequence of the delay in reaching her desti
nation.
This court, in reversing the cause, v
said: “The instruction as to the measure of‘
damages was erroneous.
Neither the anxi
ety and suspense of mind suffered by the
plaintiﬂ? in consequence of the delay, nor the
effect upon her health, nor the danger to
which she was exposed in consequence of
the. train being stopped an insuﬂlcient length
of time, were proper elements of damage in
this case, as no personal injury was received.
by the plaintiff, and no circumst’ances of ag
gravation attended the wrongful act com
plained of.
If the anxiety and suspense of
mind suffered by the plaintiff in consequence
of the delay in this case is a ground of recov
ery, similar suspense and anxiety of mind
would be an equally good ground of recov
ery in a case where a railroad train should
wrongfully stop to take on a passenger."
The general rule is that “pain of mind, when
connected with bodily injury, is the subject
of damages; but it must be so connected
in order to be included in. the estimate, unless
the injury is accompanied by circumstances
of malice, insult,
or inhumanity;“ citing
Pierce, 11. R. (1881) 302; Railway Co. v:

l

Birney.

71

Ill.

391.

The authority of this

case has never been questioned. by the courts
of this state, to our knowlezlge. The rule
announced is in strict harmony with that of
the courts of last resort in our sister states,
until, in 1881, the supreme court of Texas,
in So ltelle v. Telegraph Co., 55 Tex. 308. an
nounced the doctrine that the sender of a so

DAMAGES AGAINST TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

154

clal telegram could recover for the mental an
The
guish caused by delay in its delivery.
authorities relied upon by the supreme court of
Texas in that case were actions for physical
injuries, in which the mental agony formed

where not expressly given by the statute.
Field, Dam. 498; Porter v. Railroad Co., 71
Ho. 66; Parsons v. Railroad Co., 94 Mo.
286, 6 S. W. Rep. 464; Scihaub v. Railroad
0o., 106 Mo. 74, 16 S. W. Rep. 924.
But it is said damages for injury to the
feelings have always been allowed in actions
founded upon a breach of promise to marry,
and this is true in this as in other states. Wil
bur v. Johnson, 58 Mo. 600; Bird v. Thomp
son, 96 Mo. 424, 9 S. W. Rep. 788.
But it
has always been regarded as an exception to
the rule.
In this action, plaintiifs pecuniary
loss forms an important element
The ac
tion is of common-law origin, and at common
law the husband, on marriage, became liable
for the wife,s debts, and for support in a
manner and style commensurate
with his
own social standing. and evidence of his sta
tion in life and ﬁnancial condition has always
Wilbur v. Johnson. supra.
been admitted.
As was well said by Cooper, J., in Telegraph
Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748, 9 South. Rep.
8,13: “This action, though in form one for
partakes
in sev
the breach
of contract.
of the characteristies
of an
eral features
action for the willful tort; and, though the
damages
recoverable
for the plaintiff for
mental sut‘l’ering are spoken of as ‘compen
satory,’ the fervent language of the courts
indicates how shadowy is the line that sep
arat
them from those strictly pecuniary."
Ha
on v. Swift, 13 Allen, 144; Kurtz v.
Frank’ 76 Ind. 595; Thorn v. Knapp, Q N.
Y. 475; Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N. J. Law,
"Especially those cases in which evi
77.
dence of seduction is admitted to ascertain

an inseparable part,.—a doctrine never ques
tioned in this state since Porter v. Railroad
Co., 71 Mo. 66.
The learned commissioner
who prepared the opinion did quote a sug
gestion of the authors of Shearman & Red
ﬁeld on Negligence, to the effect that they
thought such an action ought to lie, but they
did not claim that any court in this country
or England had previously sustained their
The Texas case has been followed in
view.
that state in a great number of cases, and
has been adopted in Indiana, North Carolina,
Kentucky, Alabama, and Tennessee.
On the
other hand, this new departure has been vig
orously assailed and denied by the supreme
courts of Mississippi, Georgia, Kansas, and
in Dakota, and in a most luminous dissenting
opinion by Judge Lurton. of the supreme
court of Tennessee, now judge of the United
States circuit court for the sixth circuit, in
The majority
which Folkes, J., concurred.
of the supreme court of Tennessee do not
go to the length contended for by the appel
lant here. The majority lay great stress
upon the fact that by virtue of a statute
in Tennessee a cause of action is given to
the aggrieved party for damages for failure
to deliver any message.
Hence they argue .
that, as the party has the right to
ome
damages by virtue of the statute. they con
clude they may add the anguish of mind as
an element.
It is impossible to escape the
feeling that the very able judges were re
the damages.
So much, indeed, does the
sorting to a ﬁction to justify them in sup
motive of the defendant enter into the ques
porting the action.
The case of So Relle
tion of damages, that in Johnson v. Jenkins,
v. Telegraph Co., 55 Tex. 310, has been no
24 N. Y. 252, the defendant
was permitted
where more ﬂatly repudiated than by the
to give in evidence, in mitigation of dam
supreme court of Texas itself, in Railway Co.
ages, the fact that he refused to consummate
Judge Stayton, in an
v. Levy, 59 Tex. 563.
the marriage because of the settled opposi
able and lucid discussion of the authorities,
tion of his mother,
who ' was in inﬁrm
demonstrates
“that the cases in which
health."
damages have been allowed for mental dis
sufﬁciently indicate
These considerations
‘ ‘ was the incident to a bodily the reasons that actuated the courts to
tress
injury suffered by the distressed person. or
make this exception.
Few precedents
for
cases of injury to reputation or property, in
this action will be found where the defend
which pecuniary damage was shown, or the
ant was impccunious.
The learned counsel
act such that the law presumes some dam
has collected various other cases in which
age. however slight, from the act complained
mental anguish was recognized as an ele
of.
They are not cases in which the bodily
ment of damage, and concludes with the
injury or other wrong was suffered by one per
query, "It allowed in these, why not in this
The
son. and the mental distress by another."
action?" Let us consider these in the order
reasoning of the supreme court of Tennessee
of his brief: Assault and battery.
Under
—that, because the Oode gave an action for
this head is cited the case of Craker v.
some damages, that opened the way to add
Railway Co., 36 Wis. 657. In that case the
damages for mental dlstress—is, we think, at
conductor
of a train seized upon .the mo
complete variance with our own decisions.
ment when the other empioyes were absent
In this state we have a damage act which
from the car to take improper liberties with
gives a right of action where death has re
The evidence showing that
a lady passenger.
sulted, and similar statutes exist in most of
lie placed his ‘arm around her, and, again.~u.
the states.
The construction placed upon
her vehement protests, kissed her. It was
these statutes
has been that no relative,
a clear physical violation of her person.
save
those named
in the statute.
can
which the courts have ever held constituted
recover
at all.
and
no recovery
as a
an assault and battery, and actionable.
The
solatium
for mental suffering is allowed,
law redresses such a wrong in its initial

'
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stages. The protection
of the person has
ever been an object of great solicitude
to
the common
law. The present ability of
often justiﬁes recourse to
actual violence
extreme measures in preventing a consum
wrong to the person.
mation of threatened
’l,he cases cited under this head clearly add no
weight to plaintiffs claim.
The cases of‘ ma
licious prosecution
and false llIi[)risv',nln€Dt
come under that general
class of willful
wrong to the person, affecting the liberty,
character, reputation, personal security, and
Judge Lumpkin, in Chap
domestic relations.
man v. Telegraph Co., (Ga) 15 S. E. Rep. 901,
disposes of the argument attempted
to be
drawn from this class as follows: “In an ac
tion for wrongful attachment, on the ground
that the defendant was about to dispose of his
property with intent to deprive his creditors,
it was held (ivy a divided court) that the mor
tiiication was a part of the actual damages.
Byrne v. Gardner, 33 La. Ann. 6. Of course
it was a case of serious injury to the plain
tiff,s business standing, and therefore, even if
sound, is no authority on the present question.
In an action for false imprisonment, or for
malicious arrest and prosecution, mental an
guish has been held a proper subject for
compensatory
damages.
Fisher v. Hamil
ton, 49 Ind. 341; Stewart v. Maddox, 63
Ind. 51; Coleman v. Allen, 79 Ga. 637, 5
S. E. Rep. 204. Of course, such injuries are
essentially willful, and, besides, are viola
tions of the great right of personal security
or personal liberty." As to the action of
seduction,
every lawyer knows that proof
of some service by the daughter has been
invariably required to sustain it; and the
same rule is rigidly adhered to in Magee v.
Holland, 27 N. J. Law, 86, to which we are
cited by counsel, for the forcible abduction
of a daughter. In the case of enticing away
a daughter, we are referred to Stowe v.

Heywood,7 Allen, 118. The court permitted
damages for mental suffering on the express
ground that it was a willful injury, and
declined to say whether such damages could
ever be recovered for negligence alone, as
in the case at bar.‘ This cae illustrates the
greatest diﬂiculty in estimating damages
for mental suffering. Judge Mctcalf says.:
"Mental suffering cannot be measured aright
by outward manifestations,
for there may
be a show of great distress where little or
none is felt. And great distress may be
concealed,
and borne in silence, with an
apparently quiet mind.
Ab inquieto saepe
simulatur qules." “And we nowhere
ﬁnd
that any other evidence of mental suffer
Lllg, besides that of the injury which was
the alleged ca\us,e‘\ of action, was ever be
fore admitted.’, \ The court reversed
the
case because the trial court permitted
evi
dence “tending to show" plaintiff suffered
from "pain andlanxiety
of mind." It is
hardly necessary ‘to add that in a case of
libel or slander, if the words are not ac
tionable per se, special damages must be a1
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and proved.
When they are action
per se, they
are construed
because
of their evident tendency to degrade the
citizen in the estimation of his neighbors,
and in both cases they are malicious.
We
have now gone through
the list, and we
ﬁnd in none of them any reason for adopt
ing the rule that, for the mere negligent
failure to comply with a contract, damages
may be recovered on the sole ground of in
jured feelings, when the plaintiff has suf
fered no physical injury. The law, up to
this time, has essayed to protect the per
son and property of the individual. All the
cases cited are based upon this principle.
Repuiailon is included in the person. John
son v. Bradstreet Co., 87 Ga. 79, 13 S. E.
Rep. 250.
The damages claimed in this action can
not be allowed as exemplary damages. The
Texas court, in one case, did so bold, but
afterwards repudiated
it. Stuart v. Tele
graph Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S. W. Rep. 351.
‘
But we do not think that the courts of Eng
land and of this country, prior to 1881, were
rejecting actions like this on a mere arbi
‘
trary assumption,
unsustained
by reason.
A doctrine which has passed so long un
challenged
by the great jurists who have
adorned the bench of our state and federal
‘ courts is not
to be lightly discarded at the
i behest of ingenious
and able counsel. The
‘
law is, and ought to be. more stable than
i this.
It has long been the boast of com
mon.law writers that the common law was
a system founded upon reason; and one of
1 its maxims
has ever been that, when the
reason upon which a law was based ceased,
the law itself ceased. Speaking
for our
. selves. we are satisﬁed
that the common
l law, denying
an action for mental distress
alone. was founded upon the best of reason,
and an enlightened
public policy. And we
question if the real reasons were ever more
clearly and satisfactorily stated than by
i Judge Lurton, which opinion we adopt: (“,i‘he
reason why an independent
action for such
. damages cannot and ought not to be sustained
is found in the remoteness
of such dam
ages, and in the metaphysical
character of
such an injury. considered apart from phys
I ical pain.
Such injuries are generally more
sentimental
Depending
than substantial.
largely upon physical and nervous condition,
the suffering of one under precisely
the
same circumstances
would be no test of the
suffering of another.
Vague and shadowy,
there is no possible standard by which such
an injury can be justly compensated, or even
approximately measured. lliasily simulated,
,and impossible to disprove, it falls within
Iall the objections to speculative damages,
which are universally excluded because of
their uncertain character. I‘ That damages so
imaginary, so metaphysical,
so sentimental
shall be ascertained and assessed by a jury
with justnes, not by way of punishment to
the defendant, but as mere compensation to
leged

able
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plaintiff, is not to be expected. That the
grief natural to the death of a loved relative
shall be separated from the added grief
and anguish resulting from’ delayed informa
tion of such mortal illness'or death, and
compensation
given for the latter only, is
the task imposed by the law, as determined
by the majority of the supreme court of
“It is legitimate to consider
Tennessee."
the evils to which such a precedent logically
leads' Upon what sound legal considera
tions can this court refuse to award dam
ages for injury to the feelings, mental dis
tress, and humiliation, when such injury re
sults from the breach of any contract? Take
the case of a debtor who agrees to return
the money borrowed on a certain day, who
willfully,
agreement
breaches
his
with
knowledge that such breach on his part
will probably result in the ﬁnancial ruin
and dishonor of his disappointed
creditor.
Why shall not such a debtor, in addition to
the debt and the interest,

also compensate

his

creditor for this ruin, or at least for his
suffcrings? Upon what principle
mental
can we longer refuse to entertain an action
for injured feelings consequent upon the
use of abusive and defamatory language,
not charging a crime, or resulting in special
Mental distress is, or
damages?
pecuniary
may be. in some cases, as real as bodily
pain, and it as certainly results from lan
to an imputation of
guage not amounting
crime; yet such actions have always been
by the law as
dismissed as not authorized
it has come down to us, and as it has been
for all time administered."
Why, if this rule is to become the law of
this state in regard to this contract, shall it
not apply to all disappointments and mental
by delays in railroad
sufferings
caused
04,)‘, trains? Tele ra h com anies
and yet
9°‘; I. carriegsg so are railroad companies;
this court, in the Trigg Case, held the com
‘1
not liable for mental anguish, as an
mm _pany
independent cause of.action for a mere act
of negligence. A similar conclusion was also
reached in the United States circuit court
for the fourth circuit in Wilcox v. Railroad
Co., 52 Fed. Rep. 264, 3 C. C. A. 73, where
the plaintiﬂ! made a special contract for a
train to take him to the bedside of a sick
parent.
The court held that the trouble of
by the delay at a railroad
mind
caused
station could not be made the basis of an
action, saying:
“But we know of no decided
case which holds that mental pain alone,
unattended by injury to the person, caused
by simple negligence, can sustain an action."
“The plaintiff was the subject of two mental
for the condition of the sick
pains,—one,
person; the other, from the delay at the sta
tion,—the latter, only, being the subject of
this action." "It cannot be pretended that
damages from the latter cause of ‘anxie
indeﬁnite, un
ty’ and ’suspense’—uncertain,

J

deﬁnable,
unascertainable,
dependent
so
largely on the peculiar temperament of the
person suffering the delay—was
in the con

templation of the defendant when it entered
into the contract." Griiﬁn v. Colver, 16 N.
, Y. 489; Telegraph Co. v. Hall, 124 U. S. 444,
v
But, as before said,
b Sup. Ct. Rep. 577.
if we establish the rule as to one common
carrier or private person, with what sort of
consistency
can we refuse to extend it to
all? The courts of Texas have already
spoken of a similar case as “intolerable litiga
tion." We see no reason for making this
The legislature has
innovation
or exception.
v
imposed a penalty
for each infraction of
its duty in delaying a message, and it seems
very clear to us that, if it is to become the
policy of the state to adopt this new rule,
the legislature, and not this court, should do
it. The common law has always attempted
to deal with the citizen, and his rights and
wrongs, in a practical way, and the declared
object of awarding damages is to give com
pensation for pecuniary less. The right, in a
civil action, to inﬂict punishment by way
of punitory damages, has been ably contro
'
allowance of damages for
verted.
.The
1
wounded feelings, when they are the con
comitant or result of a physical injury, is
that the
placed rightfully on the ground
. mind is as much a part of the body as the
bones and muscles. and an injury to the
body included the whole, and its effects were
1 not separable;
but the experience of every
‘judge and lawyer teaches him how unsatis
factory, in these personal injury cases, are .
the verdicts of juries. They are utterly in
consistent,
and the courts do not attempt
l to justify these
upon any
inconsistencies
other theory than that it is the sole province
1 of the jury to ﬁx the amount.
The result
‘ is that, in nearly every appeal that reaches
this court, one ground for reversal is the
awarded; and the right
damage
excessive
of this court to interfere at all on this ground
l is seriously challenged.
It is no uncommon
thing to have the appellee voluntarily enter
a remittitur to save his verdict from the
1
ii charge of passion or prejudice. Under these
circumstances,
is it wise to venture upon the
ar more speculative ﬁeld of mental anguish,
We
,‘,without guide and without compass?
think not. We have examined the cases in
the courts of Kentucky, Indiana, Tennessee,
Alabama, and North Carolina. They are all
based upon the So Relle Case, in 55 Tex.
. 808,
which, we have shown, stands upon
no previous adjudication, but is opposed by
the Levy Case, in 59 Tex., which, to our
completely
refutes
it.
The caes
I minds,
holding this view are Stuart v. Telegraph
Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S. W. Rep. 351; Rail
road Co. v. Wilson, 69 Tex. 739, 7 S. W. Rep.
653; Telegraph Co. v. Cooper, 71 Tex. 507, 9
72 Tex.
S. W. Rep. 598; Same v. Broesche,
654, 10 S. W. Rep. 734; Same v. Simpson,
73 Tex. 423, 11 S, W. Rep. 385; Same v.
Adams, 75 Tex. 531, 12 S. W. Rep. 857;
Wadsworth v. Telegraph Co., 86 Tenn. 695,
8 S. W. Rep. 574; Reese v. Same, 123 Ind.?
294, 24 N. E. Rep. 163; Beasley v. Same, 39
Fed. Rep. 181; Telegraph Co. v. Henderson,
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Ala. 510, 7 South. Rep. 419;Thompson v.
Tele;.:raph Co., 106 N. C. 549, 11 S. E. Rep.
269; Chapman v. Same, (Ky.) 13 S. W. Rep.
880; Young v. Same, 107 N. C. 370, 11 S. E.
Rep. 1044; Thomp. Elect. § 378, and cases
cited. The cases opposing this view are, no
tably, the dissenting opinion of Judge Lurton
in Wadsworth v. Telegraph Co., 86 Tenn.
1395, 8 S. W. Rep. 57-i; Chapman v. Telegraph
Co., (Ga.) 15 S. E. Rep. 901, in which Judge
Lumpkin, of the supreme court of Georgia,
reviews all the cases in a most admirable
Wilcox v.
tone, and with great clearness;
Railroad Co., (4th clrcult,) 52 Fed. Rep. 264.
3 G. C. A. 73; Crawson v. Telegraph Co., 47
Fed. Rep. 544; Chase v. Same, 44 Fed. Rep.
554, where all the authorities are cited; West
v. Same, 39 Kan. 93, 17 Pac. Rep. 807; Russell
v. Same, 3 Dak. 315, 19 N. W. Rep. 408; Tele
graph Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748, 9 South.
Rep. 823; Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. 577; Com
missioners v. Couitas, L. R. 13 App. Cas. 222;
‘Tyler v. Telegraph Co., 54 Fed. Rep. 634;
89

157

Kester v. Telegraph Co., (Taft, Judge.) 55
Fed. Rep. 603.
We are fully aware that the plaintiff,s
claim appeals strongly to the sensibilities;
but to adopt that view we must either be
guilty oif adopting one rule of damages for
one class of common carriers, and the breach
of their contracts, or we must conclude _that
all of our predecessors in the great common
law courts were at fault, and henceforth
repudiate, not only their utterances, but our
own, on this subject, and this we have no
inclination to do. We prefer to travel yet
awhile super antiquas vias. It’, in the evolu
tion o1f society and the law, this innovation
should be deemed necessary, the legislature
can be safely trusted to introduce it, with
those limitations and safeguards which will
be absolutely necessary, judging from the
variety of cases that have sprung up since
Our
the promulgation of the Texas case.
conclusion is. the judgment should be and is
affirmed.

All

concur.
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84 Iowa, 479.)

of Iowa.

Feb.

1, 1892.

Appeal from district court, Plymouth coun
ty; Scott M. Ladd, Judge.
Action for personal injury. Judgment for
plaintiﬂ? and the defendant appealed.

J. H. & C. M. Swan, for appellant.
Hudson, Call & Joy, for appellee.

-ToY,

GRANGER, J. 1. The plaintiff is the ad
ministrator of the estate of Ann Dwyer,
deceased, who was on the 9th day of July,
struck by defendant,s
1889,
cars. as a re
sult of which she died about 30 days there
after. The petition speciﬁes the injuries sus
tained, and adds:
“All of which caused her
great pain and suffering for a period of about
thirty days, when she died from such in
juries."
A motion to strike out the words as
to pain and suffering was overruled, and the
court instructed the jury that, if it found for
the plaintiff, to allow a "reasonable compen
sation for pain and suffering." The jury re
turned a general verdict for the plaintiff for
$3,000, and specially found that $2,300 of the
amount was for "pain and suffering," and
An assign
$700 “as damages to the estate."
ment brings in question the correctness
of
the court’s action in permitting the jury to
consider pain and sufferiug as an element of
damage.
The action was commenced after
If the ac
the death of plaintiffs intestate.
tion had been commenced in her life-time, it
is unquestioned that pain and suffering caus
ed by the injury would have been a proper
element of damage;
and this would be true
if, after the commencement of the action, she
had died, and her administrator had been sub
tituted as party plaintiff, and prosecuted
the suit to judgment. Muldowney v. Rail
way Co., 36 Iowa, 462.
We come, then, to
the important inquiry if such damages are
permissible in such a case, where the action
is commenced by the administrator. The
only authority for maintaining such an action
by the legal representative
is by virtue of the
At the common law, the cause of
statute.
action abated with the death of the injured
party. The law authorizing the action is
found in Code, § 2525. “Ali causes of action
shall survive and may be brought notwith
standing the death of the person entitled or
liable to the same." We are cited to no case,
in this or any other state, where the rule
contended for by the appellee, and allowed
by the district court, has been sustained.
It
is claimed, however, that the reason for this,
as to other states, is because of the peculiar
ity of the statutes under which such actions
are permitted
to survive.
In several cases
this court has expressed its view as to the
measure of damages in such cases, and in
such a way that the appellant regards the
law on this point as settled in its favor, while
the appellee regards the language thus relied

upon as merely incidental to other points de
termined, and in no way decisive of the ques
tion now before us. It is true that the pre
cise question now before us was not involved
for determination
in any of the Iowa cases
cited, and the language relied upon by the ap
pellant has been used incidentally in the dis
cussion of other questions;
but it is not to be
understood,
because of this, that such lan
guage is without value in our deliberations on
for much of the language so
this question;
used is in regard to questions so allied to this
in its legal signiﬁcance as to make them de
terminable upon quite similar considerations.
For instance, the rule as to the measure of
damage in cases of this kind has been consid
ered, and, with the point before us in view, a
rule excluding such damage has been adopted.
In Rose v. Railway Co., 39 Iowa, 24b‘, it is
said:
"The action is brought by the adminis
trator for the injury to the estate of the de
ceased sustained in his death. There is there
fore no basis for damage for pain and suﬂ!er
* ‘ Compensation for the pecuniary
ing.
loss to his estate is alone to be allowed."
See, also, Donaldson v. Railway Co., 18 Iowa,
at page 290, and Muldowney v. Railway Co.,
36 Iowa, at page 468. In the latter case the
action was commenced by the injured party,
who died pending the suit, and his adminis
trator was substituted; and it was held that
pain and suffering were proper elements of
damage because of the action having been
commenced
by the injured party; but the
court guards the rule by saying: “A different
rule would obtain if the action had been com
menced after his death."
It is thought that
the expression may be accounted for on the
theory that the case was determined under a
different statute. Rev. St. § 3467, under
which the action arose, is as follows: “.\,o

'

cause of action ex delicto dies with either or
both of the parties, but the prosecution there
of may be commenced or continued by or
against their personal representatives."
With
reference to the particular matter under con
sideration, lt is diﬂiicuit to trace a distinction
between the statutes.
The one says. in ef
fect, that such causes of action shall survive
the party, and the other that it does not die
with the party.
The effect of each i to cre
ate a survival. and the one, as plainly as the
other, contemplates the existence of the cause
of action before the death. It is not the ef
fect of either, as seems to be thought by the
appellee, to create a cause of action because
of the death.
The statutes deal with the
“cause of action," and not with the rule of
damage to be applied.
In ﬁxing the dam
age, we iook to the wrong to be remedied;
to the injury to be repaired.
If the action is
brought by the injured party, the law at
tempts to remedy the wrong to him.—not spe
ciﬁcally to hi estate,—and that may include
loss of property, time, and that bodily ease
and comfort to which he is entitled as against
the wrong-doers.
If the action is brought to
repair an injury to his estate, the law looks,
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tate is affected by the act, and attempts to
repair the injury. Loss of time and expenses
paid, as a result of the wrong, presumably
lessen the estate; but bodily pain and suffer
ing in no manner affect it. It is an item of
damage peculiar to the person, and not to
pecuniary or property rights. Under our stat
ute, these damages belong “to the estate of
Uode, § 2526. This distinc
the deceased."
tion is maintained throughout all the cases
and authorities that have come to our notice.
This court has repeatedly said that these ac
tions are for “injury to the estate."
See
cases cited supra: Rose v. Railway Co., Don
aldson v. Railway Co., Muldowney v. Rail
way Co. Mr. Sutherland, in his work on
Damages, (volume 3, p. 282.) speaking in gen-‘
eral of these statutes of survival of actions,
says:
“The measure of damages is not the
loss or suffering of the deceased, but the in
jury resulting from his death to his family.
it is only for pecuniary injuries that this stat
utory right of action is given.
Although it
can be maintained only in cases in which an
action could have been brought by the de
ceased if he had survived, damages are given
on different principles and for different caus
es. Neither the paiu and suffering of the de
ceased, nor the grief and wounded feelings of
his surviving relatives, can be taken into ac
count in the estimate of damages." In Rail

way Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 90, a like case, it
is said. speaking of the wife or next of kin,
who, under the Illinois statutes, are the bene
iiciaries in such a case: “They are conﬁned
to the pecuniary injuries resulting to the wife
and next of kin; whereas, if the deceased had
survived, a wider range of inquiry would
have been admitted.
It would have embraced
personal suffering as well as pecuniary loss,
and there would have been no ﬁxed limita
tion as to the amount."
The language of
the Illinois statute is different in phraseology
from ours, but not to the extent of inducing
a different rule in this respect.
Under the
statute of Minnesota, so similar to ours as to
justify the same rule as to these damages, it
is held that “no compensation
can be given
"‘
for the pain and suffering of the de
ceased."
Hutt.hins v. Railway Co. (Mina) 46
N. W. 79.
We conclude, without doubt, that
the district court erred in its ruling on the
motion and the instruction to the jury. Some
other questions are argued which we have
examined, the consideration
of which would
require extensive quotations from the evi
dence, and we think they do not involve re
versible error, and it is unnecessary to dis
The cane is remanded to the
cuss them.
district court, with instructions to deduct
from the judgment entered the $2,300 allowed
for pain and suffering, and give judgment for
the balance.
Modiﬁed and aﬂirmed.

' '

<\.

in ﬁxing the rule of damage, to how the
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SOUTHERN PAC.

(30 Pac.

Supreme

CO.

(No.

5,

1892.

14,SB.)

603,

95 Cal.

Court of California.

510.)

Aug.

Appeal from superior court,
Department 2.
Kern county; A. R. Conklin, Judge.
Action by Flora Morgan against the South
ern Paciﬁc Company to recover damages for
the death of her child caused by defendant,s
negligence.
From a judgment rendered on
the verdict of a jury in favor of plaintiff, de
Reversed.
fendant appeals.
The facts fully appear in Morgan v. Paciﬁc
Co., 30 Pac. 601.
E. L. Craig, Foshay Walker, Horace Hawes,
Charles
and R. B. Carpenter, for appellant.
G. Lamberson, Lamberson & Taylor, and J.
W. Ahern, for respondent.

McFARLA.ND, J. The parties to this ac
tion are the same as in Morgan v. Paciﬁc Co.,
30 Pac. Rep. 001 (No. 14,841, this day decid
.ed), in which plaintiff recovered a judgment
for $15,000 for alleged personal injuries re
ceived by being thrown from the steps of de
fendant,s
car, which judgment was by this
When she fell from the steps
court aﬂirmed.
of the car she had in her arms her infant
Nine days
daughter, aged about two years.
afterwards the child died from an attack of
and plaintifﬂ brought this present
pneumonia;
action to recover damages for the death of said
child, upon the theory that the pneumonia was
The jury gave her dam
.caused by said fall.
ages in the amount of $20,000, for which sum
judgment was rendered; and defendant ap
peals from the judgment, and from an order
denying a motion for a new trial. The evi
.dence upon the issues of the alleged negligence
of defendant,s employes at the time of the ac
cident, and the alleged contributory negligence
of plaintiff, was substantially the same as in
the other case, and as to those issues the ver
There was some ev
.dict cannot be disturbed.
idence tending slightly to show that the death
of the child was caused by the accident, but
it is not necessary to inquire whether or not it
was suﬂicient to establish that fact, because
the judgment must clearly be reversed on ac
count of the excessive damages awarded by

the jury.
There was no averment in the complaint

of
special damage, and no averment of any
damage at all, except the general statement
that the child died, “to the damage of plaintiff
in the sum of ﬁfty thousand doilars;" and
there was no evidence whatever introduced or
The ju
offered upon the subject of damage.
ry, therefore, had nothing before them upon
which to base damages except the naked fact
of the death of a female child two years old;
and it is apparent, at ﬁrst blush, that “the
.amount of the damages is obviously so dispro
portionate to the injury proved as to justify
the conclusion that the verdict is not the result
of the cool and dispassionate discretion of the

any

jury."
The main element of damage to plain
tiff was the probable value of the services of
the deceased until she had attained her ma
jority, considering the cost of her support and
during the early and helpless.
maintenance
part of her life. We think that the court erred’
in charging that “the jLu,y is not limited by the
actual pecuniary injury sustained by her, by
reason of the death of her child." An action
to recover damages for the death of a relative
was not known to the conmion law; it is of
There are statutes
recent legislative origin.
in many of the American states providing for
such an action, and it has been quite uniform
ly held that in such an action the plaintlff does
not represent the right of action which the de
ceased would have had if the latter had sur- ,,
vlved the injury, ‘mt can recover only for the
pecuniary loss suffered by the plaintiff on ac
count of the death of the relative; that sorrow
and mental anguish caused by the death are
and that nothing can
not elements of damage;
be recovered as a solatium for wounded feel
ings. ] The authorities outside of this state are
almost unanimous to the point above stated.
The following are a few of such authorities:
Railroad Co. v. Vandever, 36 Pa. St. 298; Iron
Co. v. Rupp, 100 Pa. St. 95; Railroad Co. v.
Freeman, 30‘ Ark. 41; Railroad Co_ v.
Brownv
26 Kan. 443; Pennsylvania 00. v. Lilly, 73
Ind. 252; Donaldson v. Railroad Co., 18 Iowa,
280:, Railroad 0o. v. Pauik, 24 Ga. 356; Ball
road Co. v. .\liller, 2 Colo. -t6(3; Kesler v.
Smith. 66 N. C. 154; March v. Walker, 48
Tex. 372; Railroad Co. v. Levy, 59 Tex. 563;
James v. Christy, 18 Mo 162; Hyatt v.
Adams, 16 Mich. 180', Chicago v. Major, 18
Ih. 349; Railroad Co. v. Delaney, 82 Ill. 198;
Blake v. Railroad Co., 18 Q. B. 93.
With respect to the decisions in this state we
do not think those cited by respondent (except
one) are, when closely examined, inconsistent
Beeson v. \Iin
with the general authorities.
ing Co., 57 Cal. 20, is a leading case on the
subject, and is cited by all the cases which
follow it. in that case the action was brought
by the widow for the death of her husband,
and the question was whether or not the lower
court erred in allowing evidence of the kindly
relations between the plaintiff and the de
The.
ceased during the lifetime of the latter.
court sustained the ruling of the court below,
but clearly upon the ground that those rela
tions could be considered only in estimating
the pecuniary loss. The court say: “It is
true that in one sense the value of social re
lations and of society cannot be measured
by any pecuniary standard; * ‘
but. in
another sense, it might be not only possible,
but eminently ﬁtting, that a loss from sever

'

ing social relations, or from deprivation of
society, might be measured or at least con
sidered from a pecuniary standpoint. ' ' "‘
If a husband and wife were living apart by
mutual consent, neither rendering the other
assistance or kindly oﬂices, the jury might
take into consideration the absence of social
relations and the absence of society in esti

DAMAGE: FOR CAUSING
mating the loss sustained by either from
the death of the other.
So if the husband
and wife had lived together in concord, each
rendering kindly oﬂlces to the other, such
facts might be taken into consideration, not,
as the books say, for the purpose of afford
ing solace in money, but for the purpose of
estimating pecuniary losses. The loss of a
kind husband may be a considerable pe
cuniary loss to a wife; she loses his advice
and assistance in many matters of domestic
economy." A quotation is made from a
Pennsylvania case where the same rule was
applied to the loss of a wife, the court say
ing that “certainly the service of a wife is
pecuniarily more valuable than that of a
mere hlreling."
The Beeson Case, therefore,
does not decide that the jury may depart
from a pecuniary standpoint in assessing
damages; it merely holds that in estimating
the pecuniary losses of a wife from the
death of her husband they may consider
whether or not the deceased was a good hus
band, able and willing to provide well for
his wife. The opinion of the court no doubt
goes somewhat further in this direction than
the general current of authorities, but it de
cides nothing more than above stated. Cook
v. Railroad Co., 60 Cal. 604, also cited by re
spondent, decides nothing more than the
Beeson Case. In McKeever v. Railroad Co.,
59 Cal. 300, the point was not involved, and
in Nehrbas v. Railroad Co., 62 Cal. 320, the
point does not appear in any way to have
been involved; and the dictum at the. close
of the opinion, as it refers to the Beeson
Case, must be held as only intended to go to
the length of the latter case. It is true, how
ever, that in Cleary v. Railroad Co., 76 Cal.
240, 18 Pac. 269, a decision in department,
views were expressed favorable to respond
ent,s contention. The opinion of the commis
sion in that case was, however, expressly
based on Beeson v. Mining Co., supra, and
upon, as we have seen, a misunderstanding
of that case. There appears to have been no
petition for a hearing in bank. It was stat
ed in that case that there could be a recov
ery for the “mental anguish and suffering of
the parents," but we have been referred to
Cer
no other case that holds such doctrine.
tainly it was not so held in the Beeson
Vase. But entirely contrary views were ex
pressed in the latest decision of this court
on the subject (Munro v. Reclamation Co.,
In that case
84 Cal. 515, 24 Pac. 303).
which was for the death of an adult son
the lower court had instructed that the jury
in estimating the damages might consider
“the sorrow, grief, and mental suffering oc
casioned by his death to his mother;" and
this court held the instruction erroneous,
and for that reason reversed the judgment,
the court holding that such a rule would
‘afford an “opportunity to run into wild and
excessive
verdicts." The court said: “We
are of opinion that the court erred in includ
lilg in the instruction the words, ’sorrow,
t...uv mm.-—11
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grief. and mental suffering, occasioned by
the death of the son to his mother.’
In thus
directing the jury the court fell into error.
In our opinion, the damage should have been
conﬁned to the pecuniary loss suffered by
the mother, and the loss of the comfort, so
ciety, support, and protection of the deceas
' ' We have found no case in which
ed.
damages for sorrow, grief, and mental suf
fering are allowed, under any of the stat
utes." And, further, that the statutory ac
tion is a new one, "and not the transfer to
the representative of the right of action
which the deceased person would have bad
if he had survived the injury." The case
was decided in bank. Justice Thornton de
livered the opinion, which was concurred in
by two other justices,.and a fourth justice
concurred in the judgment, and must, there
fore, have concurred in the one main rea
son for which the judgment was reversed.
He may not have been ready to say that the
“comfort and society" of the deceased could
be considered.
There was only one dissent.
but upon what ground does not appear. We
think, therefore, that the case is full author
ity on the main point. At all events, we
think that the .opinion states the general
propositions of law governing the case cor
rectly, although, as to one matter, it may be
misunderstood. The language, “the loss of
the comfort, society, support, and protection
of the deceased," must be held as having
been used within the meaning given to it in
Beeson v. Mining Co., supra, as hereinbefore
stated, that is, with reference to the value
of the life of the deceased, and the pecuniary
loss to the plaintiff caused by the death.
The said language would not be correct in
any other sense. But in the case at bar the
jury were not conﬁned by the instructions to
pecuniary loss or any other kind of loss;
they were given wide range to run into any
wild and excessive verdict which their ca
price might suggest. Wedonot think that the
complaint is defective because it does not
specially aver the loss of the services of the
deceased; _ that was a natural and necessary
sequence of the death.
It was not special
damage necessary to be averred. There is
nothing in the point made by respondent
Upon that
that the answer was not veriﬁed.
point the court ruled in favor of defendant,
and piaintlff is not appealing. The judg
ment and order appealed from are reversed,
and a new trial ordered.

'

SHARPSTEIN,

J. I

I

concur.

DE HAVEN, J.
concur in the judgment
and generally in the foregoing opinion. The
measure of damages in actions by a parent
for the death of a child, when the facts are
not such as to warrant exemplary damages,
is correctly stated in section 763 of Shear
man and Rediieid on Negligence, as follows:
“The damages recoverable bya husband. par
ent, or master for a negligent injury to the
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person of his wife, child, or servant are
strictly limited to an amount fully compen
satory for the consequent loss of service for
a period not exceeding the minority of the
child, or the term of service of a servant,
and the expenses which the plaintiff has in
curred in consequence of the injury, such
as for surgical attendance, nursing, and the
like." The sixth instruction given upon the
;;quest of plaintiff, to the effect that “in
estimating the damage sustained by her the
jury is not limited by the actual pecuniary
injury sustained by her by reason of the
death of her child, but such damages may
be given as under all the circumstances of
the case may be just," is contrary to this
The object of sec
rule, and was erroneous.
tion 376 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
for the
not to give redress or compensation
mental distress of a mother, consequent up
on the death of her child. The general lan
guage of section 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, that in actions of this character
“such damages may be given as under all
the circumstances of the case may be just,"

L-\

\

is used with reference to the fact that the
damages which are allowed to be recovered
by sections 376 and 377 of the Code of Civil
Procedure are, with the exception of the ex
penses incurred by the plaintiff in conse
quence of the injury resulting in the death
for which they are claimed, prospective in
their nature, relating, as they do, to the loss
of future service, and necessarily based up
on probabilities, and upon data which in
many respects are uncertain, and therefore
the estimate of such damages must neces
sarily call for the exercise of a very large dis
cretion upon the part of the jury; and all
that is meant by the language quoted is that
the jury shall, in view of all the circumstan
ces of the case, and considering also the age
and the ability of the deceased to serve the
relative for whose beneﬁt the action is
brought, give such damages as they shall
deem just, keeping in view that such dam
ages are to be measured by what shall fair
ly seem the pecuniary injury or loss to the

plaintiff.
Hearing in bank denied.
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March 15, 1892.
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
Fourth department.
Action by Ira Dwight against the Elmira,
Cortland & Northern Railroad Company.
From a judgment for plaintiff entered on an
order aﬂirming a judgment entered on the
report of a referee, defendant appeals.
Re
versed.
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for appellant.
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PARKER, J.

The judgment awards to
plaintiff $503 for damages occasioned by
defendant,s negligence in setting on ﬁre
destroying 21 apple-trees, 2 cherry-trees,
2% tons of standing grass, and also in
juring 7 apple-trees, the property of plain
tiff. The only question presented on this ap
peal is whether the proper measure of dam
ages was adopted on the trial.
A witness called by the plaintiff was ask
ed: “Question. What were those twenty-one
trees worth at the time they were killed?"
Objection was made that the evidence did
not tend to prove the proper measure of
damages, but the objection was overruled,
and the answer was: “Answer. I should
say they were worth ﬁfty dollars apiece."
Similar questions were propounded as to the
other trees; a like objection interposed;
the
same ruling made; answers to the same ef
fect, except as to value, given; and appro
priate exceptions taken. Testimony was al
so given, tending to prove
that the land
burned over by the ﬁre was depreciated in
value $30 per acre. The only evidence of
fered by the plaintiff, touching the question
of damages, was of the character already
alluded to.
Fruit-trees, like those which are the sub
ject of this controversy,,.have little if any
value after being detached from the soil, as
the wood cannot be made use of for any
practical purpose; but, while connected with
the land. they have a producing capacity
which adds to the value of the realty. Neces
sarily the testimony adduced tended to show,
not the value of the trees severed from the
freehold, but their value as hearing trees,
connected
with and depending on the soil
for the nourishment essential to the growth
of fruit. How inuch was the realty, of which
the trees formed a part, damaged, was the
result aimed at by the questions and at
tempted to be secured by the answers. Can
the owner of an injured freehold because
the trees taken or destroyed
happen
to
be fruit instead of timber trees, have his
damages measured in that manner? is the
question presented now, for the ﬁrst time,
in this court, so far as we have observed.
The learned referee followed the decision in
Whitbeck v. Railroad Co., 36 Barb. 644, in
the
the
and
and
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which the proposition is asserted that, while
fruit-trees form a part of the land, the true
rule is that if the thing destroyed has a
value which can be accurately measured
without reference to the value of the soil in
which it stands, or out of which it grows,
the recovery must be for the value of the
thing destroyed, and not for the difference
in the value of the land before and after
such destruction. The court cited no au
thority for the conclusion reached, and our
attention has not been called to any prior
Nor has the
decision j_ustifying its position.
Whitbeck Case been approved in this court,
although cited and distinguished in Argot
singer v. Vines, 82 N. Y. 309. While the
rule is, undoubtedly, as stated by the learned
judge in the Whitbeck Case, that a recovery
may be had for the value of the thing de
stroyed, where it has a value which may
without reference
be accurately measured
to the soil in which it stands, he apparently
overlooked
the fact that fruit-trees do not
have such a value; and the rule was, there
Cases
fore, as we think, wrongly applied.
are not wanting to illustrate a proper appli
cation of that rule. Where timber forming
part of a forest is fully grown, the value of
the trees taken or destroyed can be recover
In nearly all jurisdictions, this is all
ed.
that may be recovered; and the reason as
signed for it is that the realty has not been
because, the trees having been
damaged,
brought to maturity, the owner is advantag
ed by their being cut and.sold, to the end
that the soil may again be put to productive
uses. 3 Suth. Dam. p. 374; 3 Sedg. Dam.
(8th Ed.) p. 45; Single v. Schneider, 30 Wis.
570; Webster v. Moe, 35 Wis. 75; Webber
v. Quaw, 46 Wis 118, 49 N. W. 830; Hasel
tine v. Mosher, 51 Wis. -H3, 8 N. W. 273;
Tuttlo v. Wilson, 52 Wis. 643, 9 N. W. 822;
Wooden-Ware Co. v. U. S., 106 U. S. 432, 1
Sup. Ct. 398; Graessle v. Carpenter, 70 Iowa,
166, 30 N. W. 392; Ward v. Railroad Co., 13
Nev. 44; Tilden v. Johnson, 52 Vt. 628;
Adams v. Blodgett, 47 N. H. 219; Cushiug v.
Longfellow, 26 Me. 306. In this state it is
‘mber
settled that even where full-grown
land
is cut or destroyed the damage to
may also be recovered, and in such cases
the measure of damages is the difference in
the value of the land before and after the
cutting or destruction complained of. Argot
singer v. Vines, 82 N. Y. 308; Van Deusen
v. Young, 29 N. Y. 36; Easterbrook v. Rail
road Co_, 51 Barb. 94. The rule is also ap
plicable to nursery trees grown for mar
ket, because they have a value for trans
planting. The soil is not damaged by their
removal, and their market value necessarily
furnishes the true rule of damages. 3 Sedg.
Dam. (Sth Ed.) p. 48; Birket v. Williams. 30
Coal furnishes another illus
11l. App. 451.
tration of the rule making the value of the
thing separated from the realty, although
once a part of it, the measure of damages.
where it has a value after removal, and the

.
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land has sustained no injury because of it. 3
Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.) p. 48; 3 Suth. Dam.
p. 374; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 36, note
2; Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Cone Iron-Works,
108 Pa.
102 Mass. 80; Goal Co. v. Rogers,
St. 147—152; Dougherty v. Chesnutt 86 Tenn.
1, 5 S. W. 444; Coleman’s Appeal, 62 Pa. St.
For
232; Ross v. Scott, 15 Lea, 479-488;
syth v. Wells, 41 Pa. St. %1; Chamberlain
v. Collinson, 45 Iowa, 429; Morgan v. Pow
ell, 3 Q. B. 2'8; Martin v. Porter, 5 Mees. &
W. 351. On the other hand, cases are not
wanting where the value of the thing de
tached from the soil would not adequately
compensate the owner for the wrong done,
and in those cases a recovery is permitted,
embracing all the injury resulting to the
land. This is the rule where growing tim
not yet
Because
ber is cut or destroyed.
fully developed, the owner of the freehold
which would
is deprived of the advantage
accrue to him could the trees remain until

§l;e

rent of authority is to the effect that fruit
trees and ornamental
or growing trees are
subject to the same rule.
Montgomery v.
Locke,
Mitchell
72 Cal.
75, 13 Pac. 401;
v. Billingsley, 17 Ala. 391-393;
Wallace v.
Goodall, 18 N. H. 439-456; 3 Sedgw. Dam.
(8th Ed.) § 933.
It is apparent from the authorities already
cited, as well as those following, that in cases
of injury to real estate the courts recognize
two elements of damage: (1) The value of
the tree or other thing taken after separa
tion from the freehold, if it have any; (2)
.
the damage to the realty, if any, occasioned
by the removal.
Ensley v. Mayor, 2 Baxt.
144; Striegel v. Moore, 55 Iowa, 88, 7 N. W.
413; Longfellow v. Quimby, 33 Me. 457;
A party may
Foote v. Merrill, 54 N. H. 490.
be content to accept the market value of the
thing taken when he is also entitled to re
cover for the injury done to the freehold.
But if he asserts his right to go beyond the
fully matured. His damage, therefore, nec
value of the thing taken or destroyed after
severance from the freehold, so as to secure
essarily extends beyond the market value of
compensation
for the damage done to his
the trees after separation from the soil, and
land because of it, then the measure of dam
the difference between the value of the land
the
ages is the difference in value of the land
before and after the injury constitutes
Long
before and after the injur . In this case the
compensation to which he is entitled.
plaintiff was not satts ed with a recovery
fellow v. Quimhy, 33 Me. 457; Chipman v.
Hibberd, 6 Cal. 163; Wallace v. Goodall, 18
based on the value of the trees destroyed.
Hayes v. Railroad Co., 925 after separation from the realty, of which
N. H. 439-456;
they formed a part,—as indeed he should not
Minn. 17-20, 47 N. W. 260. In Wallace’s
“The value of
Case, supra, the court said:
have been, as such value was little or noth
ing,—so he sought to obtain the loss occa
young timber, like the value of growing
sioned to the land by reason of the destruc
crops, may be but little when separated from
tion of an orchard
of fruit-bearing trees,
the soil. The land, stripped of its trees may
The trees, considered as tim
which added largely to its productive value.
be valueless.
and I This was his right, but the measure of dam
ber, may from their youth be valueless;
ages in such a case is. as we have observed.
so the injury done to the plaintiff by the tres
‘
differencein value of the land before and
pass would be but imperfectly compensated
unless he could receive a sum that would be 1 tter the injury; and as this rule was not
llowed, but rejected, on the trial, and a
equal to their value to him while standing
The same rule prevails as to method o1’ proving damages adopted not rec
upon the soil."
shade-trees, which, although fully developed,
ognized nor permitted by the courts, the judg
ment should be reversed.
All concur, except
may add a further value to the freehold for
BRADLEY, BROWN, and LANDON,
purposes, or in furnishing shade
ornamental
dissenting.
for stock.
Nixon v. Stillwell (Sup.) 5 N. Y.
Judgment reversed.
The cur
Supp. 248, and cases cited supra.
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Atl.

Supreme Court

LAMPREY.

v.

133,

64 N.

of New

July

H.

510.)

Hampshire.

Belknap.

19, 1888.

Trover for 200 spruce logs. The defendant
was defaulted, with the right to be heard as
to the assessment of damages.
Facts found
by the court. The parties own adjoining tim
ber lots in Moultonborough. The defendant,
while engaged in an operation on his own lot,
negligently, but without malice, cut over the
line dividing the lots, and cut down, trimmed,
hauled to, and deposited in the lake at Mel
vin village, in Tuftonborough, and thence
towed to his saw-mill, the trees in question,
which facts constitute the cause of action.
The question whether the measure of dam
ages is the value of the stumpage, or the
value of the logs when cut and trimmed, or
when deposited in the lake. or when deliv
ered at the mill, was reserved.
E. A. & C. B. Hlbbard, for plaintiff.
ell 8; Stone, for defendant.
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their severance from the land. The usual rule
I damages in actions of trover is compensa
tion to the owner for the loss of his property
occasioned by its conversion;
and where the
conversion is complete, and results in an en
tire appropriation of the property by the
wrong-doer, the loss is generally measured by
the value of the property converted with in
terest to the time of trial. Hovey v. Grant,
52 N. H. 569; Gove v. Watson, 61 N. H. 136.
The defendant converted the logs by cutting
and severing the trees from the land, and, the
conversion being complete by that wrongful
act, their value there represents the plaintitfs
loss. His loss is no greater by reason of the
value added by the labor of cutting and trans
portation to the mill. It does not appear that
the logs were of special or exceptional value
to the plaintiff upon the land from which they
were taken, nor that he had a special use for
them other than obtaining their value by a
sale, nor that the market price had risen aft
If, in estimating the
er their conversion.
damages, the value at the mill, increased by
the cost of cutting andhansportation,
is to
be taken as the criterion, the plaintiff will recelve more than compensation
for his loss.
With such a rule of damages, if, besides the
defendant, another trespasser had cut logs of

ALLEN, J. The claim of the plaintiff to
recover as damages the value of the logs at
the mill, which includes the value added by
cutting and transporting them, is iounded up
an equal amount upon the same lot, and had
on his title and right of possession of the
hauled them to the lake shore, and a third had
simply cut and severed the trees from the
property there, and his right to treat it as
converted at any time between its severance
land. and sold them there, and suits for their
from the realty and the commencement of the
conversion
had been brought against
each
action. The plaintiff had the title to the logs
one. the sums recovered would differ by the
and the right of possessing
them at the
cost of transporting the logs to the place of
mill. Whenever and wherever they may have
the alleged conversion,
while the loss to the
plaintiff would he the same in each of the
been converted, the conversion did not change
the title so long as the property retained its
three cases. The injustice of such an appli
identity. The title could be changed only by
cation of the rule of damages is apparent
a suit for damages with judgment, and satis
from the unequal results. In Foote v. \Ier
faction of that judgment. Smith v. Smith, 50‘ rill, supra, which was trespass quare claus
N. H. 212, 219; Dearth v. Spencer, 52 N. H.
um. and for cutting.and removing trees. it
213.
The plaintiff might have recovered the
was decided that the plaintiff could recover
logs themselves at the mill, or wherever he
for the whole injury to the land, including the
could have found them, and so availed him
value of the trees there, but not any increase
self of their value there, by replevin, or by
in value made by the cost of cutting and tak
ing them away. In the opinion it is said,
any form of action in which the property in
(Hibbard, J.:) “If the owner of mber cut
specie, and not pecuniary damages, are sought.
upon his land by a trespasser g s posses
But in such a case, if the claimant makes a
title, no question of damages or compensation
sion of it increased in value, he has the bene
for loss arises. He recovers his own in.the
ﬁt of the increased value. The law neither
form and at the time and place in which he
divests him of his property, nor requires him
ﬁnds it. In trespass quare clausum, with an
to pay for improvements
made without his
authority. Perhaps, in trover, and, possibly,
averment of taking and carrying away trees,
the plaintiff may recover for the whole in
in trespass de bonls asportatis, he may be en
jury to the land, including the damage for titled to the same beneﬁt." This dictum, not
being any part of, nor necessary to, the tieprematurely cutting the trees, and for the loss
of the trees themselves, but nothing for the
cision of that case, and given in language ex
pressive of doubt, cannot be invoked as a
value added by the labor of cutting and trans
precedent decisive of this case. When tres
porting them. Wallace v. Goodall, 18 N. H.
456; Foote v. Merrill, 54 N. H. 490. Trover
pass de bonis asportatis is coupled with tres
pass ouilre ciausum. either as a separate count
cannot be maintained for any injury to the
wealty, but only for the conversion of chattels; or as an averment in aggravation of dam
f’ and in this case the plaintiff is limited in his vages. as in Foote v. Merrill, the increase in
damages bv reason of such averment and
recovery to the loss of the trees; that is, his
defendant,s converting them by
proof of it is the value of the chattels taken
2 loss by the
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Wis. 570) until the legislature of that state,
converted;
and in such a case is the same
in 1873, enacted a statute providing that the
as the whole damages would have been in an
rule of damages, in the case of one wrong
Smith v. Smith,
action of tresoas de bonis.
fully cutting and converting timber on the
‘50 N. H. 212. 219. Had the plaintiff in Foote
land of another, should be the highest mar
v. Merrill, sued in trespass for taking and
ket value of the property up to the time of
carrying away the trees merely, he would
trial, in whatever state it might be put.
have recovered their value upon the lot at the
Webster v. Moe. 35 Wis. 75; Ingram v. Ran
time of the taking, allowing nothing for the
N. W. 755.
expense of cutting and removing them; and
kin. 47 Wis. 406,
The weight
of authority, however, in this country is in
no good reason appears why the same rule of
daunages should not prevail in trover as in
favor of the rule which gives compensation
for the loss; that is, the value of the prop
trespass de bonis asportatis.
The loss to the
plaintiff from the taking and carrying away
erty at the time and place of conversion,
with interest after, allowing nothing for
of his property is. ordinarily, the same as the
value subsequently added by the defendant,
of it by complete appropriation,
conversion
when the conversion does not proceed from
‘land the rule of compensation for the loss
/gives him the value of his property at the
willful trespass, but from the wrong-doer,s
mistake or from his honest belief of owner
time and place of taking or conversion, and
ship in the property, and there are no cir
\interest from that time for its detention.
showing a special and peculiar
cumstances
The English case upon the subject give as
the rule of damages, when the conversion and
value to the owner or a contemplated special
appropriation of the property are by an inno
use of the property by him.
Forsyth v.
Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291; Herdic v. Young, 55
cent mistake. and bona ﬁde. or where there
Pa. St. 176; Wooley v. Carter,
real dispute as to the title, the value of
N. J. Law,
85; Coal Co. v. McMillan, 49 Md. 549; Coal
the property in place upon the land. allow
ing nothing for enhancement of value by la
Co. v. Cox, 39 Md. 1; Bennett v. Thompson,
13 Ired. 146; Railway
bor in its removal and improvement.
But
Co. v. Hutchins, 32
Ohio St. 571; Wetherbee v. Green, 22 Mich.
when the conversion is by fraud or willful
311; Winchester v. Craig, 33 Mich. 205; Nes
trespass, the full value at time of demand
bitt .v. Lumber Co., 21 Minn. 491; Ellis v.
Martin v. Porter,
and refusal is given.
Mess. & W. 351; Morgan v. Powell,
Adol. Y/Wi1e, 33 Ind. 127; Ward v. Wood Co., 13
& E. (N. S] 2'8: YVo0d v. Morewood, Id. 4-10,
Nev. 44; Waters v. Stevenson, Id. 177; Gol
ler v. Fett, 30 Cal. 481; Gray v. Parker, 38
note: Wild v. Holt.
Mees. & W. 672; In re
United Collieries Co., L. R. 15 Eq. 46. The
Mo. 160. 166; Wooden Ware Co. v. U. S.,
early New York cases give the full value at
106 U. S. 432, 434,
Sup. Ct. 398; Sedgw.
the time of conversion. including any value
Dam. (5th Ed.) 571, 572; Cooley, Torts, 457,
458, note.
added by labor and change in manufacturing.
In cases of conversion by willful
Betts v. Lee.
Johns. 348; Curtis v. Great.
act or by fraud, the value added by the
Johns. 16%; Babcock v. Gill, 10 Johns. 287;
wrong-doer,
after conversion, is sometimes
given as exemplary or vindictive damages,
Brown v. Sax,
Cow. 95; Baker v. Wheeler,
Wend. 505.
In these cases the conversion or because the defendant is precluded from
is treated as tortlous, and the same as if
showing an increase in value by his own
made by willful trespass.
In later cases a wrong, and from claiming
corresponding
distinction is made between a willful taking
reduction of damages.
The contention of
and conversion, and the rule of just compen
the plaintiff that he is entitled to recover
sation is upheld in case of the conversion of
the value of the logs increased by the ex
trees at least, and their value upon the land,
pense of cutting and removal to the mill in
is given as damages when the conversion
\’Volfbonough, because, as the case ﬁnds, the
does not
from willful trespass.
defendant’s acts constituting the conversion
Whit
result
beck v. Railroad Co0 36 Barb. 614; Spicer v.
were negligent, cannot be sustained on any
Waters, 65 Barb. 227.
ground warranting vindictive damages.
The Illinois decisions
The
‘make no distinction between cases of willful
cutting and taking the logs was not willful
trespass and those of conversion by mistake
trespass; nor does
appear that the de
or inadvertence, and include in damages all
fendant’s want of reasonable care amounted
in value, from any cause, be
to a fraud.
enhancement
No malice is shown, nor were
fore suit is brought. Robertson v. Jones, 71
there other facts of outrage upon which such
ill. 405; Coal Co. v. Long,.81 Ill. 359; Rail
damages could be predicated.
No part of
road Co. v. Ogle, 82 Ill. 627.
the damages in dispute is found ‘as exem
In Maine the
plary, and the plaintiff cannot be permitted
increased
value added by cutting and re
moving the timber is not included in the
to assign as damages to his feelings a mere
damages, although the conversion be by will
value added to the property by the defend
Cushing v. Longfellow, 26 Me.
ful trespass.
ant after the completion of the tort, nor take
306; Moody v. Whitney, 38 Me. 174.
And
as a beneﬁt that which is outside of compen
the same rule seems to govern in
assachu
sation for the wrong. Fay v. Parker, 63 N.
setts, (Iron Co. v. iron-Works, 102 Mass. 80,
H. 342; Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H. 4536; Kim
ball v. Holmes, 60 N. H. 163.
86.) and did in Wisconsin (Weymouth v. Rail
The damages
way Co., 17 Wis. 567; Single v. Schneider, 30
must be according to the usual rule in trover,
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which is the value of the property at the
The
time of conversion, and interest after.
severance of the trees from the land, and
their conversion from real to personal prop
erty, was in law a conversion of the proper
The value of the
ty to the defendant,s use.
trees, immediately upon their becoming chat

10?

is, as soon as felled,—whlch is
found to be $1.50 per thousand feet, with in
terest from that time, the plaintiff is entitled
Judgment for the plaintiff.
to recover.
tels,—that

SMITH, J., did not
curred.

sit.

The others con

‘ff /
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GASKINS

v.

DAVIS.

(20 s. E. 188, 115 N. c. s5.)
Supreme

Court of North Carolina.

Oct.

16,

1894.

Appeal from superior court, Craven county;
Bynum; Judge.
Action of trespass by Patsy Ann Gaskins
against Henry C. Davis. Judgment was ren
dered for defendant,
and plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
XV.

mons

W. Clark, for appellant. F. M. Sim
and P. M. Pearsall, for appellee.

AVERY, J.

I

The plaintiffs complaint is in
the nature of a declaration for ti.espass in
the entry by the defendant upon her land,
after being forbidden, and cutting, carrying
away, and converting to his own use valuable
timber that was growing thereon, to her
damage $500.
The logs, after being severed,
were transported to Newbern in two lots. one
of which lots was seized by plaintlff after
reaching that city, where it was much more
valuable than at the stump, and was sold
by her for the sum of $112.
The other lot
was converted into boards and sold by the
The defendant, for a second de
defendant.
the
fense, sets up by way of counterclaim
and
seizure of the logs by the plaintiff;
may be a defective
though the counterclaim
of the defendant,s cause of ac
statement
tion, in that it fails to aver an unlawful tak
ing. the defect is cured, if the, counterclaim
can be maintained at all, by the reply, which,
by way of alder, raises the question of the
rightfuiness of the seizure.
"he well-estab
lished rule is that in such cases the injured
party is entitled to recover of the trespasser
the value of the timber where,it was ﬁrst
severed from the land and became a chattel
(Bennett v. Thompson, 13 Ired. 146), together
with adequate damage for any injury done to
the land in removing it therefrom.
As long
as the timber taken was not changed into a
different species, as by sawing into boards,
the owner of the land retained her right of
property in the speciﬁc logs as fully as when
by severance it became her chattel, instead
of a part of the realty belonging to her. Pot
ter v. Uardre, 74 N. C. 40. The value of the
material taken indicates the extent of the
loss, where there are no circumstances of ag
gravation or willfuiness shown, and is the
usual measure of damages.
Where the tres
passer has converted the property taken into
a different species, under the rule of the
civil law which we have adopted, the article,
in its altered state, cannot be recovered, but
only damages for the wrongful taking and
conversion, when the change in its form is
“made by one whois acting in good faith, and
under an honest belief that the title was in
him." In Potter v. Mardre, supra, Rodman,
.l0 delivering the opinion of the court, says:
“The principle of equity [applied in that case]
is supported by the analogy of the rule estab

REAL PROPERTY.
lished in this state by the decisions which
hold that a vendee of land by a paroi con
tract of sale, who takes possession and makes
improvements,
and is afterwards ejected by
the vendor, may recover the value of his im
provements.
Albea v. Grifﬁn, 2 Dev. & B.
Eq. 9. So if one who has purchased land
from.another, not having title, enters and im
proves, believing his title good, and is ejected
by the rightful owner, he is entitled to com
pensation.
In bothgeases one who is morally
innocent has confused his property with that
of another, and he is held entitled to sep
arate it in the only why it can be done, viz.
by being allowed the value of his improve
ments in the raw material."
The judge laid
down correctly the rule as to the damage
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover of
’
the defendant for the original trespass,—the
value of the logs when severed at the stump,
and adequate damage for injury done to the
land in removing them.
Potter v. Mardre.
supra; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law. p. 36; Ross
v. Scott, 15 Lea, 479.
The character of the
logs had not been changed by cutting and
transporting to Newbern, but the value had
probably been greatly enhanced.
The ap
proved rule, where the plaintiff is asking
damage for trespass, seems to be that the
owner is entitled to recover the value of
the logs when and where they were severed,
and without abatement for the cost of sever
ance.
Coal Co. v. McMillan, 49 .\Id. 549.
But, if he prefers to follow and claim the
timber removed, he is entitled to do o, as
long as the species remains unchanged.
The
plaintiff was entitled to recover in a claim
and delivery proceeding
the logs that she

/

seems

to have

acquired

peaceful

possession

of without action.
Was the ‘defendant en
titled, by way of recoupment, to the beneﬁt
of the enhanced value imparted to the prop
erty by transporting it to market? Had they
been sawed up in planks, and used to con
struct a boat, the plaintiff would not have
been entitled to recover the boat, or the ma
terial used in its construction.
But if the
plaintiff had then unlawfully seized and lost
or destroyed the boat, and the defendant had
been thereby driven to an action to recover
compensation
for his loss, he might have re
covered the value of the boat. together with
the damage, if any, done to his land in re
moving it therefrom; but the present plain
tiff would have been entitled “to deduct,
by way of counterclaim, the value of the
timber which was manufactured into the
boat, just after it was felled and converted
into a chattel." Potter v. Mardre, supra. It
seems to have been conceded that the defend
ant cut and carried away the logs under the
honest but mistaken belief that the land upon
which they were growing was his own.
Where a trespasser acts in good faith under
a claim of right in removing timber, though
he may not be allowed compensation for the
cost of converting the tree into a chattel, may
he not recoup,in analogy to the equitable doc
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trine of betterments, for additional value im
parted to the property after its conversion in
to a chattel, and before it is changed into a
different species? The judge below, in allow
ing the defendant, by way of recoupment,
the beneﬁt of the enhanced value imparted to
the logs by removal from the stump to the
Newbern market, seems to have acted upon
the idea that the defendant, by reason of his
good faith, was entitled to the beneﬁt of the
improvement in value imparted by his labor
and expense.
In Ross v. Scott, supra, where
it appeared that the defendant had entered
upon land to mine for coal, and, under the
honest but erroneous belief that he was the
owner, liad built houses thereon, it was held
that the plaintiff might recover the cost of
the coal in situ, subject to reduction by an
put
allowance for permanent improvements
upon the land.
See, also, In re United
Merthyr Coilieries Co., L. R. 15 Eq. 46; Hil
ton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 432: Forsyth v.
Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291.
The weight of authori
ty, it must be conceded, sustains the rule
that, where the action is brought for damages
for logs cut and removed in the honest belief
on the part of the trespasser that he had title
to them, the measure of damages is the value
in the woods from which they were taken,
with the amount of injury incident to re
moval, not at the mill where they were car
ried to be sawed.
Tilden v. Johnson, 52 Vt.
(:28. 36 Am. Rep. 769, and note, 770; Herdic
v. Young, 55 Pa. St. 176: Hill v. Canﬁeld. 56
Pa. St. 454; Moody v. Whitney. 38 Me. 174;
Cushing v. Longfellow, 26 Me. 306; Golier v.
Fett, 30 Cal.. 482; Foote v. Merrill, 54 N. H.
496; Railway Co. v. Hutchins, 32 Ohio St. 571.
In the absence of any evidence that would
justify the assessment of vindictive damages,
there is only one exception to the rule, as we
have stated it, and that is where the trees
I
destroyed are not the ordinary timber of the
forest, but are peculiarly valuable for orna
ment, or as shade trees.
It being settled in this state that the right
to the speciﬁc chattel, which vests on sever
ance from the land in the owner of the soil,
remains in him till the species is changed,
we are constrained
to go further, though
it may sometimes subject a mistaken tres
pnsser to hardship, and hold that the true
owner is entitled‘ to regain possession of a
log cut and removed from his land, either
by recapture or by any other remedy pro-.
_ vided bylaw, whatever additional value may
have been imparted to it by transporting it
to a better market, or by any improvements
in its condition short of an actual alteration
of species. In Weymouth v. Railroad Co.,
. 17 Wis. 550, the court say:
“In determining
the question of recaption the law must either
allow the owner to retake the property, or it
must hold that he has lost his right by the
wrongful act of another.
If retaken at all,
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it must be taken as it is found, though en
hanced in value by the trespasser.
It cannot
be returned
to its original condition.
The
law, therefore, being obliged to say either
that the wrongdoer shall lose his labor, or
the owner shall lose the right to take the
p’operty wherever he may ﬁnd it, very prop
erly decides in favor of the latter. But where
the owner voluntarily waives the right to re
claim the property itself, and sues for dam
ages, the diﬂiculty of separating the en
hanced value from the original value no long-_
er exists.
It is then entirely practicable to
give the owner the entire value that was
taken from him, which it seems that natural
justice requires, without adding to it such
value as the property may have afterwards
acquired from the labor of the defendant.
In
the case of recaption the law does not allow
it, because it is absolute justice that the orig
inal owner should have the additional value.
But where the wrongdoer has by his own
act created a state of facts, when either he
or the owner must lose, then the law says
the wrongdoer shall lose." Id., 26 Am. Rep
When, therefore, the plaintiff re
529, note.
captured the one lot of logs that had been
enhanced in value by transportation from
the stump to the city market, she but excr
cised the right given her by law to peace
fully regain possession of her own chauels
wherever found. She was guilty of no in
fringement of the rights of t.he defendant. for
which an action would lie. It is familiar
learning that a defendant can only maintain
successfully a counterclaim when it is of
such a nature that he could recover upon it 1
in a separate suit brought against the plain
tiff. The defendant could not recover, there
fore, either in a distinct action for the taking
of . the logs, or by way of counterclaim.
When the plaintiff recaptured the logs she
was guilty of no wrong, and the question of
title to the property so rightfully taken was
eliminated from all possible future contro
versy.
Her remedy by act of the law re
mained as to so many of the logs as she had
not regained possession of by her own act.
After she had recaptured one lot the property
in them in their altered state, and at the new
situs, revested in her, with the absolute jus
disponendi, as in the case of her other per
sonal property.
Nothing remained to be ad
justed in the courts, except her claim for
damages for the taking of the other lot and
the injury to the land, if any, incident to the
removal of both lots. It was error. there
fore, to instruct the jury that the enhanced ,
value imparted by removal to the one lot \
of logs might be allowed the defendant as a
counterclaim,
so as to set off the damages
assessed for injury to the land and for the
value at the stump of the other lot, and the
plaintiff is entitled to a new trial.
New trial.
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925, 13 Colo. 41.)

of Colorado.

May

28, 1889.

Appeal from Ms
Commissioners’ decision.
trict court, Lake county.
Two suits, in the nature of actions in tro
ver, brought by Horace A. W. Tabor, David
H. Moffatt, Jacob J. B. Du Bois, James G.
Blaine, and Jerome B. Chaffee,—the ﬁrst,
against Eddy, James. and Grant; the second,
against the Omaha 80 Grant Smelting & Re
ﬁning Company, in which it appears the bus
iness of the former defendants was merged.
Plaintiffs alleged that they, with Charles E.
Rider, were the owners and in the possession
of the mine in the county of Lake known as
the “Maid of Erin Lode," and as survey
“Lot No. 568," and “Mineral Entry No.
384," from the 1st day of January, 1882, un
til the 11th of October, 1883. That between
the 3d of July and the 31st of August’ 1883,
Thomas Ovens, Stanley G. Wight, and oth
ers wrongfully entered upon the property,
and mined and took out a large quantity of
valuable ore, and sold the same to the defend
ants, who converted it to their own use; and
that the ore so mined, sold, and purchased
by the defendants was of the value of $25.
O00 over and above the cost of mining, rais
That about the
ing, hauling, and treating.
9th day of March, 1886, the plaintiff Jerome
B. Chaffee died, and David H. Moffatt be
That on or about the 20th
came executor.
of November, 1885, Charles E. Rider sold and
transferred to l"_1vid H. Motiait his cause or
causes of action in the premises, and that the
defendants mixed and confused the ores of
plaintiffs with other ores, destroyed their
identity, and sold and converted them into
money. Plaintilfs pray judgment for $25’
Defendants answer, de
OOO. and interest.
nying all the allegations in the complaint,
except the allegation of sale and assignment
by Rider to Moffutt, in regard to which they
say they are not informed, and the allegation
that defendant had not paid plaintiffs for the
For further defense,
ore, which is admitted.
defendants allege that, at the time of the al
leged entry and wrongful taking of ore, Stan
B.
ley G. Wight, Jervis Joslin, Chester
Bullock, Boyd Park, A. W. Rucker, and
Rucker were the owners and in the
of the Vanderbilt lode mining
possession
claim, which conﬂicted with and embraced a
part of the Maid of Erin claim. That the
territory in conﬂict was in litigation between
That several actions
the respective parties.
at law and equity concerning it were pend
That at the dates
ing and undetermined.
mentioned in the complaint Wight and oth
ers were mining and taking ores from the
Vanderbilt claim, and from that part in con
That these facts
ﬂict with the Maid of Erin.
were unknown to defendants; and that the
ore so taken, or a part of it. was sold and
delivered to the defendant at its smelting

works in Leadville. as ore from the Vander
bilt lode, and purchased by defendants in
That long after
regular course of business.
the purchase of the ore by defendants they
were informed that the ore was taken from
the ground in dispute. Defendants further
say, in answer, that some time during Au
gust or September. 1883, they did purchase
ores belonging to Wight, ltucker, and others
which were known as and called “Vander
bilt Ores," which as defendants believe were
taken from the Vanderbilt claim, of which
the said Wight and others were the owners
and claimants, and in possession under claim
Plaintiffs, in reply, deny
and color of title.
that Wight and others were the owners of
any part of the Vanderbilt claim in conﬂict
with the Maid of Erin claim; deny that any
part of the Vanderbilt claim conﬂicted; and
allege that prior to the date mentioned the
government of the United States had sold to
the plaintiffs Tabor and Du Bois the Maid of
Erin claim, and given areceiver’s receipt for
the same from the land-oﬁice at Leadville;
and aver that Ovens and Wight wrongfully
went into a portion of the ground described
in the complaint while plaintiffs were in pos
session of it, and mined and carried away the
in
ore, which was the same ore mentioned
defendants’ answer; deny that Ovens and
Wight had any title to the ground from which
ore was taken, and Aver that all the posses
sion they had was wrongful and illegal, and
temporary, for the purpose of obtaining the
ore; that the entry of Ovens and Wight was
through a. shaft on the Big Chief claim, not
owned by either party to the controversy,
and that from such shaft they worked over
the boundary into plaintiffs’ property; deny
that defendants did not know that Ovens and
Wight were taking the ore from plaintiffs’
ground; and aver full notice and knowledge
of the fact. The two suits were consolidated
The venue was
for the purpose of the trial.
changed to Lake county; the cause tried be
fore the court and a jury, April 15. 1888;
verdict for plaintiffs against Eddy, James,
and Grant for $3,990.45, and against the
Omaha do Grant $melting & Reﬁning Com
There are 61 assign
pany for $14,397.67.
Of these, 38 are to the rul
ments of error.
ing of the court in admitting and rejecting
testimony; 22 (being those from 39 to 60,
both inclusive) are to the rulingsof the court
in giving and refusing theinstructions asked;
the 61st and last is to the refusal of the
The other facts
court to grant a new trial.
necessary to a proper understanding of the
case necessarily appear in the opinion.
Patterson & Thomas, for appellant. Wol
B. Bis.sell, and L. 0. Rock
cott & Va.ile,
well, for appellees.
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REED, C., (after stating the facts as
The lirst I5 and the 18th errors as
abmre.)
signed are to the ruling of the court on thtI

cross-examination of plaintiffs‘ witness 0. II.‘
Counsel in their argument for ap
Harker.
pellants say: “The defendants sought to
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show by cross-examination of the plaintiffs’
witnesses that at the time of the commission
of the trespasses complained of, the Maid of
Erin mine was owned by the llenriett Mm
ing &. Smelting Company and J. B. Du Bois,
and that the original trespassers were en
joined at the suit of these parties by proper
proceedings instituted for that purpose, but
it ap
they were not permitted to do so."
pears that counsel for appellants (defendants
below) upon the trial attempted, on cross
examination of the witness, to show that the
plaintiff Du Bois owned one-half of the Maid
of Erin property, and the Henriett Company
the other half, and that the other plaintiffs
were not owners, by showing that the wit
ness had so stated in a legal document signed
and veriﬁed by him as manager and agent in
some former proceeding concerning the prop
erty, in which case an injunction was issued
to restrain a trespass upon the Maid of Erin
claim upon the complaint so signed and ver
iﬁed; but the court would not permit it to be
done. An examination of the questions asked
the witness, which the court did not per
mit him to answer, will show that none of
the testimony sought went to any issue in
the case, was not directed to an_vthing in his
direct testimony, and was not legitimate
cross-examination.
Many of the questions
were in regard to facts that could only have
been proved by production of records or doc
uments. Some of the questions were in regard to suits at law and proceedings where
there is nothing in the record to show he in
any way participated or of which he had any
knowledge; and all the testimony sought, in
our view of the case, was immaterial. except
in so far as it tended to discredit him or
weaken his testimony by showing that his
acts or declarations on previous occasions
were at variance and inconsistent with his
testimony at that time. This counsel had a
right to do by introducing the records or doc
uments, and asking him in regard to oral
statements. ‘It appears that in the course of
the trial the papers executed by the witness,
to which his attention was called, were ad
mitted in evidence for the purpose of im
peachment,—the only legitimate
purpose they
'
could serve.
It is clear that the title of the Henriett
Company to one-half of the Maid of Erin
claim could not have been established by pa
rol statements, or the acts of an agent in
verifying papers where the facts were so
statel.
Counsel say this was one purpose
for which the evidence was sought to be elic
ited on cross-examination. Had it been
proper cross.examination, aml directed to an
issue, it was incompetent for the declared
purposes for which it was I sought. The
agency of the witness had not been estab
lished by any testimony but his own. He stat
ed under oath at the time suit was brought
that he was the manager. and agent of the
1lenriettCompany. This wasinsuliicient. An
agency cannot be established by his own dec
larations. llarker v. Dement, 9 Gill, 16:

If an
1 Wash. C. C. 330.t
agency had been proved, it was that at the
time of verifying the papers he was the man
ager and agent of the Henriett Company;
and his sworn statement that he was such
agent, and that his principal owned one-half
of defendants’ claim, could not be binding
upon or in any way affect the plaintiffs in
this action. And although he was the agc0t
of plaintiffs, in charge of their work in the
Maid of Erin, no statement, no matter how
solemnly made by him as theagent of the
llem iett Company, in favor of such company,
or against the title of plaintiffs, could affect
either, much less conclude and estop the plain
ttffs from asserting the contrary, as is urged
There was no plea of property in
by counsel.
the Henriett Company, and of entry and justi
ﬁcation under such a title. The defendant in
this case cannot set up a title of a third per
son in defense, unless he in some manner
connects himself With it.
Duncan v. Spear.
11 Wend. 54; Weymouth v. Railroad Co., 17
Wis. 555; Harker v. Dement, 9 Gill, 7. It
follows that the court did not err in limiting
the testimony on the cross-examination to
the attempted
discrediting of the witness,
and in refusing to admit records, except for
purposes of impeachment.
It is assigned for error that the court al
lowed plaintiff Tabor to testify to a conver
sation with Mctfomb after the latter had
been called, and had given his version of it.
Counsel put it upon the ground that a party
cannot be allowed to contradict or impeach
It does not appear that
his own witness.
Tabor was called for any such purpose. or
He was
that his testimony had that effect.
called to give his version of what occurred
A careful
at that interview with McComb.
of the testimony of both shows
comparison
that of Tabor more corroborative of than con
tradictory to that of McComb,—at least, as
to the result of such conversation,—although
there is some discrepancy in regard to the
“The party calling a wit
language used.
ness is not precluded from proving the truth
of any particular fact by any other competent
1 Greenl. Ev. § 443.
testimony."
Appellants’ counsel rely upon the conver
sation of Tabor with Mctlomb as a license or
consent on the part of Tabor to the entry and
taking of the ores from the Maid of Erin
ground, and contend that his license or con
sent as a co-owner to the extent of one-six
teenth of the Maid of Erin ground was con
clusive upon himself’ and also upon his co
owners of the other ﬁfteen-sixteeuths, and
was equivalent to a license or consent from
all, to the extent of covering the entire prop
A license or consent cannot be ex
erty.
tended by inference as a consent to enter
property not spoken of or rcferre:l to in the
conversation, and we can ﬁnd nothingin the
testimony of either .\IcComb or Tabor in re
gard to entering and taking ore from the
Maid of Erin ground. It was not attempted
James v. Stooke.y.

.
.
1
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to be shown that Ovens. Wight’ and Rocker
entered under license or consent from Tabor.
At the conversation both testify that Tabor
was iniormed the parties had entered under
an order from the court, against which he
was powerless for the time. It further ap
pears that those parties were in at the time
McComb and Tabor had the conversation,
to join
and McComb only asked consent
them.
It cannot be contended that such a
consent was a license to Ovens, Wight, and
Rucker to enter. The testimony went to the
jury, and in the eighth and ninth instruc
tions given on prayer of plaintiffs the_v were
instructed, in effect. that they could not limit
or reduce the amount to be recovered by rea
son of the supposed license or consent of
Tabor, unless they should ﬁnd that there was
a consent on his part that they should enter
through the Big Chief shaft, and take the
ore from the Maid of Ii,rin claim; and the
same proposition is submitted in theinstruc
tion given on behalf of defendants in place
of No. 7, refused.
These instructions on
that point, we think, were correct’ and fairly
submitted to the jury the question of license
or consent.
And it is evident from the ver
dict that the jury iound against any such
license or consent; and’ the jury having so
found, it would srem unnecessary to deter
mine whether the instructions were correct
or otherwise in regard to the extent such con
sent. if found, should affect or modify the
amount; or, in other words. whether it should
cover,the,whole taking of ore, or be conﬁned
The
to the one-sixteenth owned by Tabor.
jury having found no consent or license on
the part of Tabor, defendants could not be
prejudiced by the instructions of the court in
regard to its effect, if it were found.
The question is quite different from what
it would be if it related to a transaction in
the ordinary course of business relative to
the joint property of tenants in common.
Here it is attempted to justify atort, and
the injury to the entire property by the sup
If the en
posed license of one joint owner.
try had been made by Tabor in person, and
the wrongs attempted to be jusliﬁed under
permission from. had been done by, him, his
co-tenants could have had against him the
same actions at law for injuries to their in
terests that all are attempting to enforce
against parties having no interest. It is
held "an action on the case sounding in tort
may be maintained by one tenant in common
against his co-tenant for a misuse of the com
mon property, though not amounting to a
total destruction of it." .\lcLellan v. Jen
ness, 43 Vt. 183; Agnew v. Johnson. 17 Pa.
St. 373; Lowe v. Miller, 3 Grat. 205. And,
if one tenant in common assume to own and
sell the

thing

held in common,

the other may

maintain an action of trover against him.
Burbank v. Grooker, 7 Gray, 159; Wheeler
v. Wheeler, 83 Me. 347; Coursin’s Appeal,
79 Pa. St. 220; White v. Osborn, 21 Wend.
72; binyth v. Tankersley. 20 Ala. 212.
The
authorhy of the tenant in common could not

be extended to cover acts of others that he
could not legally have done himself.
Hence
the court was correct in holding and instruct
ing the jury that the consent or license of
Tabor, if such were found, could only extend
to the iuter‘st owned by him in the cominon

.

property.
Appellants f urther assign for errorthe rul
ing of the court in admitting the testimony
of Tabor when called by the plaintiffs to
show that, by a purel agreement made at; the
time of the conveyance of the different inter
ests by Tabor, Motfatt, and Chaffee in the
Henriett Company, possession of the proper
ty conveyed was to remain in the grautors
until the purchase price was paid; that it
never was paid; and possession under the
A part of such
conveyance never delivered.
which went to show that
testimony—0that
possession was to be retained—was inad
missible. “All conveyances of real estate
and of any interest therein duly execuled
and delivered
shall be held to carry with
them the right to immediate
possession of
the premises or interest conveyed. unless a
iiuture day for the possession is therein speci
ﬁed." Gen. St. c. 18, § 9; Drake v. Root,2
Colo. 685.
Under the statute. it is certainly
required that the intention to postpone the
operation of a deed shall be declared in the
instrument. and it cannot be proved by parol.
It follows that the instructions of the court
on this point were in part erroneous; that
part of the testimony going to prove that
possession of the property was never deliv
ered, aad remained
in the grantors, was
clearly competent and proper; and the in
structions of the court were proper on that
point.
The admission in evidence of the deeds of
reconveyance by the Henriett Mining Com
pany and the assignment of Rider of his
and
cause of action was not erroneous,
should be sustained,—the former investing
plaintiffs with full title before the com
mencement
of suit; and of tlye validity of
the latter, so as to enable Moffatt, assignee,
to succeed to all the rights of his assignor.
there can be no question under our statute.
Had defendants,_ by proper and competent
testimony, attempted to prove the owner
ship of one-half of the Maid of Erin claim in
the Hemiett Company, it would have been
inadmissible. There was no attemped justi
ﬁcation of entry of VViglll; and others un
Under a
der the Henriett title of one-half.
plea that the close upon which the alleged
trespass was committed was not at that
time the close of the plaintiff, the defendant
may show lawful right to the possession of
the close in a third person, under whom he
claims to have acted. Jones v. Chapman, 2
Exch. 803. But a bare tort-fensor cannot
set up in defense the title of a third person
between whom and himself there is no priv
Branch v. Doane, 18
ity of connection.
In justifying under a third per
Conn. 233.
son, the defendant must show both the title
and the possess.on of that person, (Chambers
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v. Donaldson, 11 East, 65; Merrill v. Bur
bank, 23 Me. 538; Reed v. Price, 30 Mo.
442,) and that the acts were done by that;
(Dunlap v. Glidden, 31
person’s authority.
A defendant can only justify up
Me. 510.)
on the ground of a better right or title than
And it has been held
the plaintiffs have.
that mere naked possession, however ac
quired, is good as against a person having
Knapp v. Win
no right to the possession.
chester, 11 Vt. 351; llaslem v. Lockwood,
37 Conn. 500;
Cook v. Patterson, 35 Ala.
It will be apparent that in thejudg
102.
ment of this court the effort of defendants
to set up title to half of the property in the
Maid of Erin claim in the Bennett Company,
without a plea to that effect, and attempt
ing to show privity or attempting to justify
under it, was unwarranted in law, and that
no testimony should have been taken in
support of any such attempted defense.
Another defense interposed, which seems
incompatible with the former. was that cer
tain parties, named in the answer, were the
owners of the Vanderbilt claim, and that
such claim conﬂicted with and comprised a
part of the Maid of Erin claim, and that the
claim was in the possession of the owners
named under claim and color of title; and
that the ground from which the ore was tak
en was in conﬂict between the owners of the
claim, and that divers suits in regard to the
same were pending and undetermined; that;
Wight and others, while engaged in mining
the Vanderbilt claim, took the ores from the
ground in controversy, which defendants
bought as Vanderbilt ore; and that the same
was taken by the owners of such claim while
the locus was in their possession under color
of title. it is shown in evidence that there
were two entries on the property in contro
versy,-the lirst by Wight, one of the owners
of the Big Chief in 1882’ after the Maid of
Erin had a receiver’s receipt from the United
States land-oliice, when a drift was run from
the Big Chief shaft for the Maid of Erin,
and was run over the line 20 or 28 feet, in
to the Maid of Erin ground. The second
entry was by the same party and others, in
‘the same way. and upon the same ground.
1.\,either entry was made by extending the
work of the Vanderbilt claim to its exterior
limits, and thus entering the Maid of Erin
property. The party entering and partici
pating in the proceeds of the ores mined
were not the owners of the Vanderbilt, but
seems to have been one made up for the occa
sion,—part of the owners .of the Vanderbilt,
some of the owners of the Big Chief, and, per
haps, parties owning in neither.
The plain
tiffs pleaded title to the Maid of Erin claim
from the government of the United States,
and put in evidence a receiver,s receipt for
the purchase of the property, of date Novem
ber 23, 1881, and a patent from the United
States government dated
March 17, 1884.
It has been frequently held that a patent for
land emanating from the government of the
United States is the highest evidence of title,
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in courts of law is evidence of the true
performance of every prerequisite to its is
suunce, and cannot be questioned
either in
courts of law or equity, except upon ground
of fraud or mistake, and, if not assailed for
1 fraud or mistake, is conclusive evidence of
title. On the 23d of November, 1881, the gov
ernment parled with its title to the Maid of
Erin property, sold it to Tabor and Du liois,
and gave a receipt.
The government could
thereafter no more dispose of the land than
‘ if a patent had been issued.
“The linal cer
tiﬁcate obtained on the payment of the money
is as binding on the government as the pat
* * * When the patent issues it
ent.
* * * " As
relates back to the entry.
trom v. Hammond, 3 McLean, 107;2 Blach
ley v. Coles, 6 Colo. 350; Poire v. Wells. id.
406; Steel v. Smelling Co., 106 U. S. 447. 1
Sup. Ct. Rep. 389; lleydenfeldt v. Mining
Co., 93 U. S. 634. The patent does not in
vest the purchaser with any additional prop
erty in the land. It only gives him better legal
evidence of the title which he ﬁrst acquired
.by the certiﬁcate.
Cavender v. Smith, 5
Clarke, (lowa,) 189; Id. 3G. Green, 349; Ar
nold v. Grimes. 2 Clarke, (Iowa,) 1; Carroll
v. >‘aﬂ’ord, 8 How. 460; Bagnell v. Broder
ick, 13 Pet. 450; Canaan v. Johnson, 29
Mo. 94; Hutchings v. Low, 15 Wall. 88. A
patent title cannot be attacked collaterally.
“Individuals can resist the conclusiveness of‘
the patent only by showing that it conﬂicts
with prior rights vested in them.” Boggs
v. Mining Co., 14 Cal. 362; Leese v. Clark,
18 Cal. 555; Jackson v. Lawton, 10 Johns.
24.
An “adverse possession" is deﬁned to
be the enjoyment of land, or such estate as
lies in grant, under such circumstances as
indicate that such enjoyment has been com
menced and continued under assertion or color
of right on the part of the possessor.
Wal
lace v. Duﬂleld, 2 Scrg. & R. 527; French
v. Pearce. 8 Conn. 440; Smith v. llurtis, 9
Johns. 174. The entry of a strang.'er. and
the taking of rents or proﬁts by him, is
not an adverse possession. When two parties
are in possession, the law adjudges it to be
the possession of the party who has the
Reading v. liawsterne, 2 Ld. lfaym.
right.
829; Barr v. Gr0itz,v4 Wheat. 213; Smith v.
Burtis, 6 Johns. 218; Stevens v. Hollister, 18
Vt. 294; Brimmer v. Long Wharf, 5 Pick.
Possession, to be supported by the law.
131.
must be under a claim of right, and adverse
possession must be strictly proved.
Grube
v. Wells. 34 Iowa, 150.
The color must
arise out of some conveyance purporting to
convey title to a tract of land. 3 Washb.
Real Prop. 155; Shackleford v. Bailey, 35
and

Ill.

391.

The title of the Maid of Erin claim was in
the government of the United States until
divested by its own act. There could be no
adverse possession against the government.
The claimants of the Vanderbilt claim en
tered under license only from the govern
! Fed. Gas. No.

596.
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necessary.
We do not think the court erred in refusing
to admit the testimony offered in support of
possessory title of the Vanderbilt in the land
from which the ore was taken, nor in re
fusing the testimony in reference to litigation
and
suits pending between
the parties.
Neither the title nor right of possession of
plaintiffs could be attacked collaterally as at
tempted, and the testimony offered under
the law as shown above was incompetent and
inadmissible to prove either adverse pos
session or color of title.
From our view of
the law controlling the case, as stated above,
it follows that the court did not err in re
fusing the instructions asked on this point
by the defendants, or in giving those which
were given. They were substantially correct.
The sale of ore by Wight and others, and
purchase by the defendants, was a conver
sion. A “conversion" is deﬁned to he any
act of the defendant inconsistent with the
plaintiffs right of possession, or subversive
of his right of property. llarris v. Saunders,
2 Strob. Eq. 370, note; Webher v. Davis, 44
Me. 147; Gilman v. Hill, 36 N. H. 311; Clark
v. Whitaker, 19 Conn. 319.
The defend
ants, by purchasing the ore, acquired no
title, and are consequently equally liable for
its conversion as the parties who sold it.
Clark v. Wells, 45 Vt. 4; Clark v. Rideout,
39 N. H. 238; Carter v. Kingman, 103 Mass.
And it was a matter of no importance,
517.
so far as the legal liability of defendants was
concerned,
whether they were ignorant or
informed of the true ownership. Morrill v.
Moultou, 40 "t. 242; Johnson v. Powers, Id.
611; Railroad Co. v. Car-Works Co., 32 N.
Law, 517; Dixon v. Caldwell, 15 Ohio St.
412; Hoffman v. Carow, 22 Wend. ‘285.
The
A person
principle caveat emptor applies.
purchasing property of the party in posses
sion, without ascertaining where the true

&

either from the government or its grantees.
The fact of the actual possession and occu
pancy ot the Maid of Erin by plaintiffs was
not seriously disputed, and the testimony
was ample to warrant the jury in ﬁnding the
The government had granted thel -nd
fact_
previous to the entry of Wight and others,
and that such possession under a legal title
was co.extensive with its bounds is so well
settled that authorities in its support are un

title is, does so at his peril, and, although
honestlymlstaken, will be liable to the owner
for a cunversion. Taylor v. Pope, 5 Cold.
413; (jihnore v. Newton, 9 Allen,
171;
Spraights v. Hawley, 39 N. Y. 441.
The question of the proper measure of
damages is one of much greater diﬂiculty.
We can ﬁnd no conclusive adjudication in our
own court. The decisions of the different
states are conﬂicting and irreconcilable.
Al
though, under our Code, different forms of
action are abolished, the principles controlling
the different actions remain the same as be
iore its adoption. Consequently the law ap
plicahle and to be administered in each case
depends as much as formerly upon the nat
ure of the case,—the allegations and the dis
tinctive form the case assumes.
In many
states the courts have attempted in this ac
tion to make the rule of damage correspond.
to that in the action of trespass. and make it.
in that respect as full and cumpletea remedy.
In the state of New York it was long held,
and perhaps still is. that the increased value
of the property, added by the labor and acts
of defendant, belongs to the rightful owner
of the property, and the value of the property
in its new and improved state thus becomes
the measure of damages, but the doctrine
has been questioned
and severely criticised
in the same state.
Brown v. Sax, 7 Cow. 95.
In trespass. damage for the whole injury, in
cluding diminution in the value of the land
by the entry and removal, as well as of the
value of the property removed. may be re
covered;
and the character of the entry,
whether willful and malicious, or.
good
faith, through iuadvertence or mistake,is an
important element.—an element that cannot
enter into the action of trover. In trover,
the speciﬁc articles cannot be recovered as in
replevin. Consequently the same rule as
increased value cannot be applied as in that
action, where the speciﬁc property can be
followed, and’ when identiﬁed, taken without
has assumed.
It seems,
regard to the form
in har
on principle, therefore, (and this
mony with the English authorities and those
of many of the states,) that where
party
makes his election, and adopts trover, the
rule of damage is and should be proper com/
pensation for the property taken and con
verted. regardless of the manner of entry and
taking; and, where the chattel was severed
from the realty, regardless of the diminished
value of the realty by reason of the taking.
In other words, the true rule should be the
value of the chattel as such when and where
ﬁrst severed from the realty and becoming a
chattel.
An examination of the authorities
will show that the rule of damages to some
extent depends upon the form of action,
for an injury to the
—whether the action
land itself. or for the conversion of chattel
which had been severed from the land. This
'
distinction seems well founded in principle
This view of the law
and reason.
sup
Mees.
W. 352;
ported by Martin v. Porter,
Wild v. Holt,
Mees.
\V. 672; Morgan v.,
it

ment. Admitting, for the purposes of this
case. that the entry under the license was
legal. that they had complied with the laws
of congress and the state, and that their pos
session extended to and was protected to their
exterior lines while the fee remained in the
government, when the fee passed from the
government to the other party conveying the
locus, before that time in controversy, the
supposed license was revoked, and all acts
and declarations of the parties themselves,
whether by record or otherwise, as estab
lishing a possessory right, were void as
against the grantees of the government,
and there could be no entry under color of
title. except by some right by conveyance
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Powell, 3 Q. B. 278; Hilton v. Woods, L. It.
Eq. 432; Mayo v. Yappen, 23 Cal. 306;
Goller v. Felt, 30 Cal. 481; Coleman,s Appeal.
26
62 Pa. St. 252; Cushing v. Longfellow,
Me. 306; Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291;
Kier v. Peterson, Id. 357; Moody v. Whit
We are therefore of the
ney’ 38 Me. 174.
Opinion that the rule of damage adopted, and
the instructions of the court as to the meas
ure of damage, were erroneous. and tha it
should have beeu<lthe value of the ore
shown, less the reasonable and proper soldéas
cos of
raising it from the mine after it was broken,
and hauling from the mine to the defendants’
We do not ﬂnd it neces
place of business.
sary to decide whether or not plaintiffs‘ coun
sel, by stating in the complaint that the ore
taken and converted was. of a certain value
“over and above the cost of mining, digging,
and extracting the same from the ground,
raising the same to the surface, hauling the
same to the defendants’ reduction works. and
the cost of treating the same," and defend
ants taking issue upon it, precluded them
from‘ proving and taking greater damage
upon the trial; but if it were necessary, for
the purpose of determining this case, we
In this action
should be inclined to so hold.
value is a material averment, and the plain
tiffs have deliberately asserted one rule, and,
issue having been taken upon it. should not
be permitted to change base. and adopt upon
trial another more disadvantageous to the de
fendants. In this case it could not have
been said the evidence was in support of the
allegation or directed to an issue. The testi
mony should have been directed to the issue,
or the pleadings amended.
Counsel for appel lees, after obtaining leave
from this court, assigned for cross-error the
refusal of the court to allow interest on the
amount found due from the time of the con
version, and the instruction of the court on
that point. It is true, as stated by the learned
judge, “that interest in this state is a creat
ure of statute, and regulated thereby; that it
is only recoverable in the absence of contract
in cases enumerated in the statute; and that
damages to property arising from a wrong or
negligence of the defendants is not one of the
This could not come
enumerated cases."
under the last clause of the instruction.
It
It is for the
is not for damage to property.
wrongful detention of money belonging to
plaintiffs. It is clearly distinguishable from
Railroad Co. v. Conway, 8 Colo. l. 5 Pac.
Rep. 142, and Hawley v. Barker, 5 Colo. 118.
There does not appear to have been any de
cision in this state directly on the question
presented. The same statute has been con
4

175

strued in Illinois (from which state it was
taken)as allowing interest in this class of cases
from the time of the conversion, and there
has been an unbroken line of decisions in
that state from Bradley v. Geiselman, 22 Ill.
494, to Railroad Co. v. Cobb, 72 Ill. 148, in
which it is said, reviewing the decisions:
“The doctrine established by these author
ities is, where property has been wrongfully
taken or converted into money, and an action
of trespass or trover may be maintained, in
terest may properly be recovered; and this
is based upon the statute which authorizes
interest when there has been an unreason
able and vexatious delay of payment.
There
can be no difference between the delay of pay
ment of a money demand and one where prop
erty has been wrongfully taken, or taken and
converted into money or its equivalent.
The
two rest upon the same principle."
The rule
is that when the statute of another state is
0 adopted the construction of the statute in
that state is also adopted, and remains the
true construction until authoritatively con
strued by the courts of the state adopting it.
The general rule in trover is that the dam
ages should embrace the value of the prop
erty at the time of the conversion, with in
terest up to the time of judgment, and this
rule has been followed in almost if not all
the states, and seems right on principle. But
our statute does not seem to have received
the same construction here as in the state of
Illinois. While in that state it has been put
plainly and squarely as interest under the
statute. in our state damage for the detention
of the money equal to the legal interest upon
the value of the chattels converted from the
time of the conversion has been allowed, not
as interest,
Machette v.
but as damage.
. Wanless, 2
Colo. 170; llauauer v. Bartels, Id.
514; Tucker v.I’arks, 7 Colo.62, 1 Pac. Rep.
427.
We think the court erred in its instructions to the Jury on this point. They should
have been instructed to add to the amount
found as the value of the ore, as further
damage, a sum equal to legal interest on the
For
same from the time of the conversion.
the errors in assessing the damage, the case
should be reversed, and remanded ior a new
trial in accordance with the views herein ex
pressed.
‘
’

‘

RICHMOND

and

PATTISON,

CC., con

cur.

PER CURIAM.

For

the reasons

stated

in the foregoing opinion the judgment is re
versed.
Reversed.
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E. E. BOLLES WOODEN WARE CO.

UNITED STATES.

(1 Sup. Ct. 398,

Supreme

Court

106

U.

of the United
1882.

v.

S. 432.)

States.

Dec. ,18,

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United
States for the Eastern District of Wiscon
sin.
Samuel D. Hastings, Jr., for plaintiff in
error.
Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for defendant in
\Gl'ro r.

MILLER, J. This is a writ of error to
the circuit court for the eastern district of
VVisconsin,
founded on a certiﬁcate of di
vision of opinion between the judges holding
that court. The facts, as certiﬁed, out of
which this difference of opinion arose ap
pear in an action in the nature of trover,
brought by the United States for the value
of 242 cords of ash timber, or wood suitable
for manufacturing purposes. cut and re
moved from that part of the public lands
known as the reservation of the Oneida tribe
of Indians, in the state of Wisconsin. This
timber was knowingly and wrongfully taken
from the land by Indians, and carried by
them some distance to the town of Depere,
and there sold to the E. E: Bolles Wood
‘Ware Company, the defendant, which was
not chargeable with any intentional wrong
.or misconduct or bad faith in the purchase.
The timber on the ground, after it was felled,
was worth 25 cents per cord, or $60.71 for
the whole, and, at the town of Depere, where
defendant bought and received it, $3.50 per
cord, or $850 for the whole quantity. The
question on which the judges divided was
whether the liability of the defendant should
be measured by the ﬁrst or the last of these
valuations. It was the opinion of the circuit
Judge that the latter was the proper rule of
damages,
judgment
and
was
rendered
against the defendant for that sum. We
cannot follow counsel for the plaintiff in er
ror through the examination of all the cases,
both in England and this country, which his
commendable research has enabled him to
place upon the brief. In the English courts
the decisions have in the main grown out of
.coal taken from the mine, and in such cases
the principle seems to be established in those
courts that when suit is brought for the
value of the coal so taken. and it has been
the result of an honest mistake as to the
true ownership of the mine, and the taking
was not a willful trespass, the rule of dam
ages is the value of the coal as it was in the
mine before it was disturbed, and not it
value when dug out and delivered at the
mouth of the mine. Martin v. Porter, 5
Mees. & W. 351; Morgan v. Powell, 3 Adol.
8: E. (N. S.) 2"8; Wood v. Morewood. 3 Adoi.
& E. 440; Hilton v. Woods, L. R. 4 Eq. 438;
Jegon v. Vivian, L. R. 6 Ch. App. 760.

The doctrine of the l’.Englishl courts on
this subject is probably as well stated by
Lord Hatherly in the house of lords, in the
case of Livingston v. Coal Co., L. R. 5 App.
Cas. 33, as anywhere else. He said: “There
is no doubt that if a man furtively, and in
bad faith, robs his neighbor of his property,
and because it is underground is probably
for some little time not detected, the court of
equity in this country will struggle, or I
would rather say, will assert its aut’hority,
to punish the fraud by ﬁxing the person with
the value of the whole of the property which
he has so furtively taken, and making him
no allowance in respect of what he has so
done, as would have been justly made to
him if the parties had been working by
agreement."
But “when once we arrive at
the fact that an inadvertence has been the
cause of the misfortune. then the simple
course is to make every just allowance for
outlay on the part of the person who has so
acquired the property, and to give back to
the owner, so far as is possible under the
circumstances of the case, the full value of
that which (annot be restored to him in
specie."
here seems to us to be no doubt that in
the case of a willful trespass the rule as
stated above is the law of damages both in '
England and in this country, though in some
of the state courts the milder rule has been
applied even to this class of cases. Such are
some that are cited from Wisconsin. Single
v. Schneider, 24 Wis. 299; Weymouth v. Rail
road Co., 17 Wis. 56?. On the other hand,
the weight of authorit
in this country as
well as in England favors the doctrine that
where the trespass is the result of inad
vertence or mistake, and the wrong was not
intentional, the value of the property when
ﬁrst taken must govern)or if the conversion
sued for was after value had been added to
it by the work of the defendant, he should
be credited with this addition. Winchester
v. Craig, 33 Mich. 206, contains a full exam
ination of the authorities on the point.
Heard v. James, 49 Miss. 236; Baker v.
Wheeler, S Wend. 505; Baldwin v. Porter,
12 Conn.
484.
While these principles are
suﬂicient to enable us to ﬁx a measure of
damages in both classes of torts where the
original trespasser is defendant.
there re
mains a third class where a purchaser from
him is sued, as in this case, for the conver
sion of the property to his own use. In such
case, if the ﬁrst taker of the property were
guilty of no willful wrong, the rule can in
no case be more stringent against the de

fendant who purchased of him than against

his vendor.
ut the case before us is one where, by
reason of the willful wrong of the party who
committed the trespass, he was liable, under
the rule we have supposed to be established,
for the value of the tim r at Depere the
moment before he sold it,
estion .
to be decided is whether the defendant who
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be absurd that the work of an Appclles or
it then with no notice that the
perty belonged to the United States. and
Parrhasius should go without compensation
with no intention to do wrong, must respond
to the owner of a worthless tablet, if the
by the same rule of damages as his vendor
painter had possession fairly, he says, as
should if he had been sued. It seems to us
translated by Dr. Cooper: “But if he, or any
/that he must. The timber at all stages of other, shall have taken away the tablet felo
the conversion was the property of plaintiff.
niously, it is evident the owner may prose
Its purchase by defendant did not divest the
cute by action of theft."
title nor the right of possession.
The ease of Nesbitt v. Lumber Co., 21 Minn.
The recov
491, is directly in point here.
ery of any sum whatever is based upon that
The supreme
proposition.
This right, at the moment pre ‘court of Minnesota says: “The defendant
claims that because they [the logs] were en
ceding the purchase by defendant at Depere,
was perfect, with no right in any one to set
hanced in value by the labor of the original
wrong-door in cutting them, and the expense
up a claim for work and labor bestowed on
of transporting them to Anoka, the piaintlff
it by the wrong-doer.
t is also plain that
is not entitled to recover the enhanced value,
by purchase from the
rong-doer defendant
that is, that he is not entitled to recover the
did not acquire any better title to the prop
erty than his vendor
It is not a case v full value at the time and place of conver
had.)
sion."
where
an innocent purchaser can defend
himself under that plea. if it were, he would 3 That was a case, like this, where the de
‘
fondant was the innocent purchaser of the
be liable to no damages at all, and no re
logs from the willful wrong-doer, and where,
covery could be had. On the contrary, it is
:1 case
to which the doctrine of caveat . as in this case, the transportation of them to
a market was the largest item in their value
emptor applies, and hence the right of re
at the time of conversion by defendant; but
covery in plaintiff.
On what ground, then,
and af
can it be maintained that the right to re- , the court overruled the proposition
‘
ﬁrmed a judgment for the value at Anoka,
cover against him should not be just what it
To establish any other
was against his vendor the moment before \ the place of sale.
he interfered and acquired possession?
If principle in such a case as this would be
very disastrous to the interest of the public
‘the case were one which concerned addition
al value placed upon the property by the 1 in the immense forest lands of the govern
meat.
It has long been a matter of com
work or labor of the defendant after he had
plaint that the depredations upon these lands
purchased, the same rule might be applied as
are rapidly destroying the ﬁnest forests in
in case of the inadvertent trespasser.
But
the world.
Unlike the individual owner,
here he has added nothing to its value.
He
who, by fencing and vigilant attention, can
acquired possession of property of the United
States at Depere, which, at that place, and in protect his valuable trees, the government
its then condition, is worth $850, and he has no adequate defense against this great
evil. Its liberality in allowing trees to be cut
wants to satisfy the claim of the government
on its land for mining, agricultural, and oth
by the payment of $60.
He founds his right
er speciiied uses, has been used to screen
to do this, not on the ground that anything
the lawless depredator
who destroys
and.
he has added to the property has increased
sells for proﬁt.
To hold that when the gov
its value by the amount of the difference be
ernment iinds its own property in hands but
tween these two sums, but on the proposition.
one remove from these willful trespassers,
that in purchasing the property, he pur
and asserts its right to such property by the
chased of the wrong-doera right to deduct
slow processes of the law, the holder can
what the labor of the latter had added to its
set up a claim for the value which has been
value.
added to the property by the guilty party in
if. as in the case of an unintentional tres
v
the act of cutting down the trees and remov
passer, such right existed, of course defend
lug the timber, is to give encouragement
ant would have bought it and stood in his
and reward to the wrong-doer, by providing
shoes; but, as in the present case, of an in
a safe market for what he has stolen and
tentional trepasser, who had no such right
for the labor he has been com
compensation
to sell, the defendant could purchase none.
pelled to do to make his theft effectual and
Such is the distinction taken in the Roman
proﬁtable.
law as stated in.the Inst. Just. lib. 2, tit. 1,
We concur with the circuit judge in this
§ 34.
case, and the judgment of the circuit court
After speaking of a painting by one man
on the tablet of another, and holding it to 1 is aﬂirmed.
rchased
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GRIGGS
(82

Uourt

N. E.

v.

612,

of Appeals

DAY
136

of New

et al.

N. Y.
York.

152.)

Nov.

29,

1802.

Appeal from superior court of New York
City, general term.
Action by Clark R. Griggs against Mel
ville C. Day and another, as executors of
Cornelius K. Garrison, for an accounting
for transactions had between plaintiff and
said Garrison. From a judgment of a ref
For former re
eree both parties appeal.
ports, see 11 N. Y. Supp. 835, 12 N. Y. Supp.
958, 18 l\,. 1'. Supp. 796, and 19 N. Y..Supp.
1019.

Reversed.

Melville C. Day and Esek Cowen, for ap
pellants. John H. Post, for respondent.

‘

EARL, G. J. This action was brought
against Cornelius K. Garrison, since deceas
It was referred to
ed, for an accounting.
a referee. and he ordered judgment in favor
of the plaintiff for upwards of $188,000.
and in the
The record is very voluminous,
briefs submitted and the arguments of coun
of law and fact were
sel many questions
A careful
presented for our consideration.
study of the record has satisﬁed me that the.
judgment appealed from is both illegal and
unjust. In September,
1879,
the plaintiff
entered into a contract with the Wheeling
& Lake Erie Railroad Company, an Ohio
for the construction and equip
corporation,
ment of its line of railroad in that state
according to the speciﬁcations and upon the
terms and conditions mentioned in the con
tract. By one of the provisions of the con
tract the railroad company was “to furnish
the contractor available subscriptions, or pro
ceeds thereof,
and aid, to the amount of
$4,000
per mile of main track, branches,
and sidings, or so much as may be neces
sary to furnish right of way, grade, bridge,
and tie said railroad between Hudson,s and
Martin,s Ferry," a distance of 143 miles, and
“to use its best endeavors to secure for the
contractor available subscriptions and aid
to the extent of $4,000 per mile, or so much
as may be necessary,"
for a similar pur
pose. as to the balance of the road, a distance
For the performance of this
of 58 miles.
contract,
besides the aid to be furnished
as above stated, the plaintiff was to receive
bonds and stock of the company.
He was
without ﬁnancial ability, and he applied to
Garrison for ﬁnancial aid to enable him to
perform his contract; and upon his appli
cation Garrisoii, from time to time, advanc
ed him large sums of money, amounting in
all, besides interest, to nearly $4,500,000.
For
so advanced
the money
the plaintiff as
signed and delivered to Garrison as collat
contract and
eral security his construction
bonds and stock of the company, and some
of it was repaid by the sales to him of bonds

n‘—_._=='I—q,-—

and stock.
In 1882 the plaintiff
from the company for extra work claim
accou
to have been done by him, and on recelv?
of its failure to perform the portions of the
contract above quoted, its promissory notes,
and they were
amounting to $1,049,710.72,
delivered by him to Garrison for moneys ad
vanced and to be advanced by him for the
Garrison held
construction of the road.
these notes until May, 1883, when there was
to the
advanced
due to him for moneys
plaintiff for the construction of the road
nearly $2,500,000.
He then received from the
company 2,280 of its second mortgage bonds
of the denomination
of $1,000, at 75 cents
on the dollar, amounting, with some interest,
to $1,736,600, to apply upon his claims, and
to it all of the above
he then surrendered
mentioned promissory notes, and they were
canceled.
On the same day he caused an
original entry to be made in his journal,
one of his account books,—as follows: "This
amount of notes and interest, $2,062,643.13,
taken from contractor at 75 per cent., $1,
546,982.35."
He then charged the company
in his books of account with the whole
amount of the notes and interest, and gave
it credit for $1,736,600,—the price, including
interest, at which he took the second mort
and he credited the plaintiff
gage bonds;
The differ
with the sum of $1,546,982.35.
ence between the total amount due upon the
notes and the amount allowed by him for
the second mortgage bonds was $326,043.13,
and thus he had in his hands, not used for
the payment of the bonds, the notes to that
amount, which he then surrendered to the
without any consideration what
company
ever; and, as the referee found, be elected
as his debtor on
to look to the company
The referee
open account for that amount.
also found that by reason of the surrender
of the notes in consideration of the purchase
of the bonds, and by reason of the surrender
of the balance of the notes, and by reason
of the election before mentioned, Garrison
of the plaintiff
discharged
the indebtedness
to him to the amount of the face value of
the notes at the time of the surrender.
He
also found that the plaintiffs rights as
pledgor in the construction contract, and in
the bonds, stock, and other property trans
ferred to Garrison as collateral security, Were
never cut o11? by foreclosure of his rights, or
in any other way. These facts having been
found by the referee, he found. among other
conclusions of law, that the legal effect of
the surrender by Garrison to the railroad
of the promissory notes held by
company
him as collateral
for moneys ad
security
vanced to the plaintiff, and of the charge
by him against the railroad company of the
full amount of the notes and interest, was
to relieve the plaintiff from any liability to
him for the amount thereof; and in the ac
counting he charged Garrison with the full
The
amount of the notes, with interest.

INJURIES RE5l’EC'l‘ I NG PERSON AL PROPERTY.

I

deem it important’
only question
which
now to consider is whether the learned
referee was right in making that charge.
The further fact must be‘ taken into con
sideration that the notes surrendered were
It
of no value as against the company.
insolvent,
with property no
was utterly
more than suﬂicient to pay its ﬁrst mort
gage bonds.
The second mortgage bonds
The
were absolutely of no intrinsic value.
referee held these facts to be immaterial,
Garri
and that, under the circumstances,
with the
son had made himself chargeable
full amount of the notes, without reference
Such a conclusion is some
to their value.
what startling, and should not be sanctioned
in well-recognized
unless it has support
principles of law or authorities which we feel
The entries in Garri
constrained to follow.
son’s books of account in reference to these
notes have very little bearing upon the con
troversy between these parties. They were
private entries, made by Garrison, undis
closed to the plaintiff, and without his author
ity. They were important simply as evidence,
and are entitled to no more weight than would
have been the oral declarations or admissions
They
of Garrison made to any third party.
show what use he made of the notes, and
about that there is no dispute. They did not
bind the plaintiff, and he has never, so far as
appears, assented to them. They show that
Garrison intended to take the notes at 75
cents on the dollar, and that he was willing
to allow the plaintiff that sum for them. But
there was no actual purchase of them. If that
entry had come to the knowledge of the plain
tiff, and he had adopted it, ‘and so notiﬁed
Garrison, he could probably have held him
to a purchase of the notes for that sum. But
he repudiates that entry, and refuses to let
Garrison have the notes for that sum. He
cannot use that entry to fasten upon him
a purchase of the notes at their face value.
The minds of the partlts never met upon
Garrison either purchased
such a contract.
the notes used in exchange for the bonds at
75 per cent. of their face value, or he did
not purchase them at all. Therefore, as the
plaintiff repudiates the purchase at the price
named, there was no contract of purchase;
and as to these notes, pledged for collateral
security, Garrison ntust be held to have wrong
fully converted them to his own use. It would
make no difference whether we consider these
notes as having been exchanged for the bonds,
or as having been used in payment for the
bonds.
In either view, Garrison was, at most,
guilty of a conversion of them. As to the
balance of the notes, which were surrendered
to the company without any consideration,
there was simply a wrongful converion of
They had no value as obligations
them.
against the company, and it is preposterous to
suppose that Garrison intended by the sur
render to charge himself for their full face
value against an indebtedness of the plaintiff
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to him for money actually loaned. By the
surrender he did not intend to release the
company from its indebtedness evidenced by
the notes, but he intended and elected still
to hold the indebtedness.
evidenced by hi
charge
in open account upon his books.
The obligation of the company was not im
paired or lessened by the transaction, and it
Even
owed just as much after it as before.
if he made the notes his own by surrender
ing them, there was simply a conversion of
them.
It is true that he elected to hold the

company as his debtor upon open account, just
as it was his debtor before for the same
He did not
amount evidenced by the notes.
take a new debtor, but he retained and in
Here
tended to retain the same debtor.
there was no novation. and nothing resem
bling it. It usually, if not always, takes
three parties to make a novation, and they
must all concur upon suﬁicient consideration
in making a new contract to take the place
of another contract, and in substituting a
new debtor in the place of another debtor.
“l\,ovation" is thus brieiiy deﬁned: "A trans
action whereby a debtor is discharged from
his liability to his original creditor by con
tracting a new obligation in favor of a
new creditor by the order of the original
Here there
creditor." 1 Pars. Cont. 217.
was no element answering to this deﬁni
tion.
There was no intention to make a no
vation, no consideration for a new contract,
of‘ the three or even of
no concurrence
the two parties.
So we reach the conclusion
as to all the notes that Garrison, by their
surrender, made himself liable for a wrong
ful conversion of them to his own use, and
thus became responsible to the piaintitl’ for
the damages caused by the wrong; and the
The
question is, what were such damages?
answer must be, the value of the notes con
There can be no other measure, as
verted.
that measures the entire damage of the
plaintiff absolutely. As to the notes surren
dered for the bonds, the plaintiff could have
elected to take the bonds or their Value;
but this he refuses to do, as the bonds have
no value, and thus he is conﬁned absolutely
to the value of the notes.
Now, how does the case stand upon au
thority? In Garlick v. James, 12 Johns. 146,
the plaintiff deposited with the defendant a
promissory note of a third person a collat
eral security for a debt, and the defendant,
or consent of the
without the knowledge
plaintiff, compromised with the maker of the
note, and surrendered the note to him upon
It
payment of one half of the face thereof.
was found that the maker was at the time
of the compromise abundantly able to pay
the full amount of the note, and under such
circumstances
it was properly held that the
pledgee was liable for the balance unpaid up
In Hawks v. Hincheliff, 17
on the note.
Barb. 492, the plaintiff sued the defendant
delivered,
upon an account for merchandise
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and the defendant showed that the plaintiff
and had subsequently, without the consent of
took two notes for the amount of the ac
the pledgor, compromised
it by receiving the
count as collateral security for the payment
one half thereof from the maker, it was
thereof;
that he transferred one of the notes
held that the bank was bound to credit the
pledgor with only the
to a person, who recovered judgment there
amount received upon
on against the makers, and afterwards as
compromise, upon proof that the compromise
signed the judgment to one Prindle; that he
was advantageous, and that the maker was
insolvent, and unable to pay the balance; and
recovered judgment upon the other note, and
assigned that to Prindle; and it appeared
the general rule was laid down which was
that the defendants in those judgments had
announced
in the cases last above cited. If
It the pledgee of the note of an insolvent mak
never paid the notes or the judgments.
was held that the plaintiff, the pledgee, could
er may surrender it upon a compromise
for
It was not one dollar without being made liable for
not recover upon his account.
shown upon what consideration
the notes
more than he receives, upon what conceiva
ble principle can a pledgee be held for the
and the judgments were transferred by the
pledgee, or that at the time of the transfer
face value of a worthless note by surren
dering it without any consideration whatev
the makers of the notes were not perfectly
If one intrnsted with a note as agent,
er?
solvent.
The plaintiff there relied upon the
or holding it as pledgee, loses it by his caresimple fact that the notes and judgments
lessness, or even willfully destroys it, he can,
Upon this state of the facts
were not paid.
nothing
in an action against him by the principal or
the court held that the presumption,
pledgor, be held liable only for the value of
appearing to the contrary, was that the note
the note.
If Garrison had broken into the
and judgments were transferred by the plain
plaintiffs safe and taken these notes with
tiff for the full amount appearing to be due
upon them, and hence he was charged with
out any right whatever, in .an action for
their conversion the plaintiff could have re
the full amount.
There are some broad ex
pressions
contained
in the opinion, which,
covered against him as damages only the ac-{
tual, not the face, value of the notes.
I
when isolated from the facts of the case,
to the plain
need go no further.
Other illustrations are
tend to give some countenance
tiff,s contention here. In Vose v. Railroad
not needed.
Our attention has been called
Co., 50 N. Y. 369, it was held that a wrong . to no case in law or equity which upholds
the plaintiff,s contention
as to these notes.
ful sale by a creditor of collateral securities
should be greatly surprised to ﬁnd any,
placed in his hands by the principal debtor
and do not believe there are any.
does not, per se, discharge
even a surety
have
for the debt (much less the principal debtor)
assumed. without a careful examination of
the defendants’ objections to the notes, that
in toto, but that by such sale the creditor
they were valid, and properly issued by the
makes the securities his own to the extent
I have also
of discharging the surety only to an amount company for their full amount.
In Potter v. assumed, without examining the matter, that
equal to their actual value.
Bank, 28 N. Y. 6-i1; Booth v. Powers, 56 N.
upon this record we must hold against the
Y. 22; and Thayer v. Manley, 73 N. Y. 305,
contention
of the defendants that the sec
ond mortgage bonds took the place of the
—it was held that in an action to recover
damages for the conversion of a promissory
notes given for them, and were held in their
as collateral security. Statements
stead
note the amount appearing to be unpaid
with
made upon the argument by the counsel for
thereon at the time of the conversion,
for us
interest, is prima facie the measure of dam
the appellants render it unnecessary
ages, but that the defendant has the right to
to consider any other objections to the judg
ment, and for the reasons stated the judg
Vshow in reduction of damages the insolven
cy or inability of the maker, or any other
ment should be reversed,and new trial grant
All concur;
fact impugning the value of the note. In ed, costs to abide the event.
Bank v. Gordon, 8 N. H. 66, where thebank GRAY, J., in result.
Judgment reversed.
had received a note as collateral security,

I
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DIMOCK

Court

et al. v.

UNITED ‘STATES NAT.

BANK.’

(25 Atl. 926, 55 N. J. Law, 296.)
of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Feb. 6, 1893.

Error

'

Union county; Van
Syckel, Judge.
Action on a note by the United States Na
tionai Bank against Anthony W. Dimock
and others.
Plaintiﬂ! had judgment, and
defendants bring error. Aﬂirmed.
The facts appear in the following state
ment by DEPUE, J.:
This suit was brought upon a note of which
the following is a copy:
“$50,000.
New York, April 15, 1884. Four
months after date, without grace, we prom
ise to pay to the United States National
Bank, or order, at its oﬁice in the city of
New York, the sum of ﬁfty thousand 00/t00
for value received, with interest at the rate
of six per cent. per annum payable; having
deposited herewith, and pledged as collater
al security to the holder thereof, the fol
lowing property, viz.: 200 shares Bankers‘
& \Ierchants’ Tel. stock; 200 shares Mis
souri Paciﬁc R./Ii. stock; 200 shares Dela
ware, Lac. dz W. ll. R. stock; 15 shares Cen
tral Iowa, Ill. Div. 1st bonds,—with author
ity to the holder hereof to sell the whole of
said property, or any part thereof, or any
substitute therefor, or any additions thcre
to, at any brokers’ board in the city of New
York, or at public or private sale in said
city or elsewhere, at the option of such hold
er, on the nonperformance of any of the
promises herein contained, without notice of
amount claimed to be due, without demand
of payment,
without
and
advertisemeng,
without notice of the time
and place
f sale,
each and every of which is hereby express
ly waived.
“It is agreed that, in case of depreciation
in the market value of the property hereby
pledged,
(which market value is now
,) or which may hereafter be pledged
is
for this loan, a payment shall be made on
account of this loan upon the demand of the
holder hereof, so that the said market value
per cent. more
shall always be at least
than the amount unpaid of this note; and
that, in case of failure to make such pay
ment. this note shall, at the option of the
holder hereof, become due and payable
forthwith, anything hereiubefore expressed
to the contrary notwithstanding; and that
the holder may immediately reimburse
by sale of the said property or any part
In case the net proceeds arising
thereof.
from any sale hereunder shall be less than
promise to
the amount due hereon,
pay to the holder, forthwith after such sale,
the amount of such deﬁciency, with legal
interest.

to circuit court,

“It is further agreed that any excess in
the value of said collaterals, or surplus from
the sale thereof beyond
the amount due

18].

hereon, shall be applicable upon any other
note or claim held by the holder hereof
against
now due or to become due,
or that may be hereafter contracted; and
that, if no other note or claim against
is so held, such surplus, after the payment
of this note, shall be returned to
or
assigns.
“It is further agreed that, upon any sale
by virtue hereof, the holder hereof may pur
chase the whole or any part of such prop
erty discharged from any right of redemp
tion, which is hereby expressly released to
the holder hereof, who shall retain a claim
against the maker hereof for any deﬁciency
arising upon such sale. A. W. Dimock &
"
Co
The other facts appear in the opinion of
the court.

Bradbury C. Chetwood,‘ for plaintiff in er
Edward A. & William T. Day, for de
fendants in error.
ror.

DEPUE, .1. (after stating the facts).
The
note on which this suit was brought was
in terms made payable in four months after
date.
It became due August 15, 1884. This

suit was brought May 21, 1891.
The suit
was in all respects regular, and its regu
larity was in no wise dependent upon that
paragraph in the pledge of securities which.
upon certain conditions, accelerated the ma
turity of the note, and made the money pay
able at a time earlier than that named on
its face. The securities pledged for the pay
ment of the note were sold by the plaintiff
on the 15th of May, 1884, as the note matured
in the following August. From the sale the
sum of $45,456.26 was realized,
leaving a
balance due on the note of $4,456.25,
for
which the plaintiff claimed judgment. The
defendants’ contention was that the sale in
May was unauthorized, and amounted
in
In all other respects
law to a conversion.
the sale was in conformity with the power.
On the theory that the sale at the time in
question was unauthorized, the defendants
contended that they were entitled to have
the value of the securities allowed to them
at their highest market price between the
conversion and the time of the trial. The
defendants gave in evidence the fact that in
December,
1886, and April and May, 1887,
these securities were worth in the market
the sum of $56,860, sufﬁcient to pay the
plaintiffs note, andleave a balance of $6,
860 due the defendants.
.The defendants‘
claim was disallowed, and judgment given
for thevplaintiﬂ‘ for the sum of $4,456.25,
being the balance due on the note after cred
iting on it the proceeds of sale with interest.
The case was tried by the judge, a jury be
ing waived. . A general exception was taken
Upon such an exception. if
to his ﬁnding.
there be evidence to sustain the ﬁnding, the
exception

will

not be sustained.

The plaintiff is a national bank. located in
the city of New York. The defendants, at
/'
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the time of these transactions, were bankers
The debt for
and brokers in New York.
which the note was given was a loan of $50,
The form of the con-'
000 to the defendants.
tract pledging securities for the repayment
of loans is such as is usual in. that city. It
that the parties were
must be assumed
aware of the effect of the terms of such con
tracts, and with the course of dealing in that
market with securities pledged as security
for loans.
By the ﬁrst paragraph in the defendants‘
contract the plaintiff was authorized to sell
the securities at any brokers’ board in the
city of New York, or at public or private sale
in said city or elsewhere, at its option, on
the nonperformance of any of the defend
without
ants’ promises therein contained,
any notice of the time and place of sale.
This contract was embodied in and made
part of the note itself, and the promise to
pay in the note was one of the promises on
the nonpayment of which a sale was author
The sale was made through a ﬁrm of
ized.
brokers who were members of the stock ex
There is no
change in New York city.
foundation in the evidence for complaint of
the manner or fairness with which the sale
was conducted.

The power of the plaintiff to sell the se
curities before the four months named in the
note had expired depends upon the con
struction and effect of the second paragraph
of the contract. There was some discussion
on the argument as to the right to ﬁll the
blanks in that paragraph.
The evidence was
not suﬁicient to justify the court in filling
the blanks.
The contract will be construed
in the condition it was in when it was de
livered to the plaintiff.
In this paragraph
it is provided that, in case of a depreciation
in the market value.of the property pledged,
the defendants should, on demand by the
holder of the note, make a payment thereon,
so that the market value of the securities
should always be more than the amount of
the debt; and that, in case of the failure of
the defendants to make such payment, the
note should, at the payee’s option, become
and that the plaintiff might
due forthwith;
immediately reimburse itself by the sale of
the property or any part thereof; and that in
case the net proceeds of such sale should be
less than the amount then due on the note.
the defendants should forthwith, after such
sale. pay the amount of such deﬁciency, with
interest.
The power to sell the securities be
fore the maturity of the note, according to
its terms, was made to depend upon the con

currence of two conditions,—the depreciation
in the market value of the property pledged;
and the failure of the defendants, after de
mand, to_make a payment on account of the
loan, so that the market value of the secu
rities pledged should be more than the
amount due on the note.
The proof was
that on the 6th of May, 1884, the ﬁrm of
Grant, Ward & Co. failed. and the \Iarine

Bank closed its doors.
On the 14th, the .\Iet
ropolitan Bank closed its doors, and a num
ber of leading bankers failed.
These fail
ures created a panic in the money market.
and a great depreciation in the market value
Early on the
of all commercial securities.
morning of the 15th, the defendants’ embar
rassments led them to an assignment for
the beneﬁt of their creditors.
It fully ap
of busi
peared that, at the commencement
ness hours on the morning of May 15th, the
securities pledged had so depreciated that
their market value was considerably below
Under a
the amount of the plaintiffs debt.
pledge, with a power of sale such as exists
in this case, the pledgee, tmless restrained
by other conditions in the contract of pledge,
has a right to sell whenever the condition of
the market makes it prudent for him to do
so for the protection of his interests.
The
other condition was that a demand should
be made upon the defendants, and that, up
on such demand, the defendants should pay
on account of the note a sum sufﬁcient to re
duce the amount due below the market value
The case shows
the securities then had.
that,‘B.t the beginning of business hours on
the morning of the 15th, two notices were
One of these no
served on the defendants.
tices was in form signed by the cashier of
the bank, in these words: “I hereby call
your loan of April 15, 1884, for $50,000."
This notice was plainly not a demand in con
formity with the condition expressed in the
contract. A depreciation in the market vai
ue of the securities pledged did not convert
the loan, which was made on four months’
time, into a call loan.
That condition of af
fairs imposed upon the defendants the obli-v
gation not to pay the note in full, but, by a
payment upon it, to reduce the loan until
the amount remaining due was under the
market value of the securities. It appeared
in evidence that the other notice served was
“a demand for the payment on account of
the

loan

to

a degree

corresponding

to

the

depreciation of the securities." Neither the
original notice nor a copy was produced.
The witness who testiﬁed upon this subject
was not able to state the amount of the de
preciation, but he added that such deprecia
tion was known to both the borrower and
The object of a demand in a con
lender.
tract of this sort is to give the party an
opportunity to comply with the terms of his
contract,
and preserve his securities from
sale before the expiration of the time for
which the loan was negotiated; and it would
that, in making the demand.
be reasonable
the party, before he is put in default. should
have been made aware of the extent of the
approximately at least. and the
depreciation.
sum required to be paid to save his rights
should be speciﬁed.
If the case rested solely
on the sufﬁciency
of the demand made, I
should have some hesitation in sustaining
.
this judgment.
Assuming that the sale of the securities i
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May was unauthorized, it was a conversion
of the property, though the sale was made in
Nevertheless, the judge,s ﬁnd
good faith.
ing, and the rule of damages applied, were
The general rule is that the meas
2 ‘orrect.
ure oi.‘ damages for conversion is the value
.
of the property at the time of the conversion.
This rule has been modiﬁed with respect to
the conversion of stocks and bonds, commer

cial securities vendibie in the market, the
market value of which is liable to frequent
U
and great ﬂuctuations, caused by the depres
sion and inﬂation of prices in the market.
In Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235, the
court of appeals held thatas between a cus
tomer and his broker, holding stock pur
chased for the former which had been pledg
ed as security for advances
made in the
purchase,
the measure of damages for the
conversion by an unauthorized sale was the
(highest market pl‘icefbetween the time of
Relying upon
the conversion and the trial.
this case, the defendants put in evidence no
proof of value except the market value in
December,
1886, and April and May, 1887.
But Markham v. Jaudon has been overruled
by a series of cases in the New York courts,
1
and the rule adopted that in such cases the
it principal may disaﬂirm the sale, and that
the advance in the market price trom the
time of sale up to a reasonable time to re
place it after notice of the sale was the prop
er measure of damages.
Baker v. Drake,
53 N. Y. 211, 66 N. Y. 518; Gruman v. Smith,
81 N. Y. 25; Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368.
These decisions were made in cases where
the transactions were dealings between the
customer and broker in the purchase and
sale of stocks on a margin.
Subsequently
the same rule was applied where the owner
of stock for which he had paid full value,
and which he held as an investment, put it
in the hands of a broker as collateral securi
ty for the debt of a third person, upon condi
tion that it’should not be sold for six months.
the stock having been sold without the own
er’s authority before the expiration of that
time.
Under the decisions of the New York
courts, reasonable time, where the facts are
undisputed, is a question of law for the
court. ‘Wright v. Bank, 110 N. Y. 238, 18
N. E. 79.
In Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368,
30 days after the sale and notice of it was
regarded as reasonable
time.
The rule of
the highest intermediate value between the
time of the conversion and the time of the
trial has been rejected in the supreme court
o1.’ the United States as the proper measure
of damages, and the rule that the highest in
termediate value between the time of the
‘
conversion and a reasonable time after the
owner has received notice of it was adopted
as the correct view of the law; for the rea
son. as expressed by Mr. Justlce Bradley,
that more transactions of this kind arise in
the state of New York than in all other parts
of the country, and that the New York rule,
as ﬁnally settled by its court of appeals, has
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Galigher v.
the most reason in its favor.
Jones, 129 U. S. 194, 9 Sup. Ct. 335.
The
principle upon which this doctrine rests is
the consideration that the general rule that
in an action for a conversion the market
value of the property at the time of the con
version would afford an inadequate remedy,
or rather no remedy at all, for the real in
jury, which consisted in the wrongful sale
of property of a ﬂuctuating value at an un
favorable time, chosen by the broker himself;
hence the cost of replacing the securities by ,
a purchase in the market, allowing a reason
;able time for that purpose, has been regard
of damges.
As
{ed as the proper measure
[was said by Mr. Justice Bradley in Galigher
v. Jones:
"A reasonable time after the
wrongful act complained of is to be allowed
to the party injured to place himself in the
position he would have been in had not his
rightsbeen invaded." The general rule that .
the market value at the time of the conver
sion is the measure of damages being found
to be impracticable in these cases, and hav
ing been abandoned, the effort has been to
obtain some rule by which substantial jus
tice, as near as may be, may be attained.
In Iﬁngland the market value at the time of
the trial appears to be the measure of dam- '
ages.
.Owen v. Routh, 14 G. B. 327.
In
some of the sister states the rule of the high
est intermediate price before the trial has
been adopted.
In New York, and in most of
the sister states. as well as in the supreme
court oI.,.the United States, the formula which
has been called the “New York Rule" has
been adopted, and is the rule which will ac
complisla the most complete justice in the or
dinary ’ausactions between the broker and
his cust mer dealing in stocks when an un
In
authorized sale is the act of conversion.
such cases the customer has a choice of rem
edies.
He may claim the beneﬁt of the sale' K
and take the proceeds;
he may require the
broker to replace the stock, or replace it him
self, and charge the broker for the loss; or
he

may

recover

the

advance

in

the market

price up to a reasonable time within which
Cook,
to replace it after notice of the sale.
Stock & S. 460.
But where tocks and ne
gotiable securities are pledged as collateral’
security for the payment of a debt to be
come- due and payable on a future day, an
other element enters into the consideration
of the compensation to be awarded to the
owner of the securities for the unauthorized
Up
sale of them before the debt matures.
on such a bailment it is the duty of the
pledgee to keep the securities in hand at all
times ready to be delivered to the pledgor on
Cook, Stock & S.
the payment of the debt.
469-471.
An unauthorized sale before the
debt matures is a conversion.
for which the
pledgor may have remedy in the manner
But the sale may be made
above mentioned.
when the market value is depreciated, and
the market with a downward tendency.
The
market may revive, and prices be enhanced
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before the debt matures.
Under such cir
cumstances, a rule that the pledgor shall be
at liberty to elect to treat the unauthorized
sale as a conversion, or to hold the pledgee
for the breach of his duty to keep the secu
rities until the maturity of the debt, and
recover as damages the market value of the
securities as of that time, would commend
As applied to
itself in reason and justice.
the facts of this case, this rule would be
eminently just. The plaintiff in good faith
sold the securities in the manner authorized
The breach of
by the contract of pledge.
duty was inseliing at an unauthorized time.
The debt was not paid or tendered at maturi
ty; and if the plaintiff had held the stock,
and sold it at that time, the sale would have
been strictly in conformity with the power.
If the defendants lost anything by the sale
at a time unauthorized, they would be rec
ompensed for that loss by an award of dam
ages equivalent to the market value of the
securities at the time the debt became due.
Tested by either of these standards, the prop
er credit was allowed, the proof being that
the prices of the securities were less when
the note matured than when the securities
No evidence of an increased
were sold.
price prior to December, 1886, was produced.
The ﬁnding of the judge should be aﬂirmed
on the ground, also, that the sale was con
sented to and ratiﬁed by the defendants.
The notices served on the morning of May
15th informed the defendants that the secu
rities pledged had, in the plaintiff,s estima
tion, depreciated
in market value, and that
the contingency provided for in this part of
the contract had happened, and also plainly
indicated the purpose on the part of the
plaintiff to avail itself of the right which,
under those circumstances, would accrue unImmediately after the sale
der the contract.

v

was made, the defendants had notice of'the
fact of sale, and, very shortly after, of the
amount realized therefrom. No objection
was made to the sale or the amount realized.
On the 4th of June, 1884, the defendants
ﬁled a schedule of their indebtedness under
their assignment.
This schedule was veri
ﬂed by the oaths of the defendants that it
contained a true account of their creditors,
and of the sum owing to each, and also a
statement of any existing collateral or other
security for the payment of such debt.
In
this statement the plaintiff was put down as
a creditor for the sum of $4,737.50,
which
was about the amount due the plaintiff after
the proceeds were applied to the debt; and
to this speciﬁcation of the existing debt due
the plaintiff was appended a statement that
for the payment of this debt there was no ex
isting collateral or other security. In Sep
tember, 1885, the defendants caused to be
presented
to the plaintiff
a composition
agreement with a view to a compromise with
their creditors, in which the debt due the
plaintiff was stated to be the sum of $5,118.
87, ﬁgures which represented
approximately
the net amount due the plaintiff on the note
after applying thereon the proceeds of the
sale of the securities, with interest.
This
agreement
was signed by the plaintiff, but
the project fell through, the defendants being
unable to effect-a compromise with all their
creditors. The defendants had the election
either to ratify the sale, and claim the ben
eiit of it, or repudiate it, and hold the plain
The act of the defendants
tiff in damages.
in applying the proceeds of the sale as a
credit on the plaintiff,s note is so positive
and emphatic an act of ratiﬁcation and adop
The case
tion that it cannot be retracted.
was properly decided at the trial, and the
judgment should be afﬁrmed.
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ELLIS
(43 N.

W.

r.

1048,

HILTON.
78

Mich.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Error to circuit

150.)

Nov.

15,

1889.

court, Grand Traverse
county; RAMsDELL, Judge.
Pratt & Davis. for appellant.
I orin Rob
erts (J. R. Adsit. of counsel), for appellee.
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have been its actual value.
The horse was
seriously injured; but the plaintiff, acting in
good faith, and in the belief that she might be
helped and made of some value, expended
this $35 in care and medical treatment. Ile
is the loser of the actual value of the horse.
and what he in good faith thus expended.
lie is permitted to recover the value, but cut
off from what he has paid out. This is not

compensation.
for defendant contends that such
. Counsel
is an action to recover
damuges cannot exceed the actual value of
damages against the defendant for negli
the property lost, because the loss or destruc
gently placing a stake in a public street in
tion is total. There may be cases holding to
Traverso City, which plainLitI’s horse ran
this rule; but it seems to me the rule is well
It was conceded
against, and.was injured.
stated, and based upon good reason, in Wat
on the trial by counsel for defendant that
son v. Bridge, 14 Me. 201, in which the court
the horse of plaintiff was so injured that it
says: “l’laint;il't is entitled to a fair indem
was entirely worthless.
Plaintiff claimed
nity for his loss. He has lost the value of
damages, not only for the full value of the
his horse, and also what he has exprnded in
horse, but also for what he expmded in at
endcavoring to cure him. The jury having
tempting to effect a cure. and on the trial
allowed this part of his claim, it must be um
his counsel stated to the court that plaintiff
derstood that it was an expense prudently
was entitled to recover a reasonable expense
incurred. in the reasonable expectation that.
in trying to cure the horse before it was de
it would prove irenelicial.
It was incurred,.
r.idrd that she was actually worthless.
The
not to aggravate, but to lessen the amount
court ruled, however, that the damages could
ior which the defendants might be held lla
not exceed the value of the animal. A claim
ble.
Had it proved successful, they would.
is made by the declaration for moneys expend
have had the beneﬁt of it.
As it turned out
ed in trying toeffect a cure of the horse after
othr.rwise, it is but justI in )ur judgment,
th
pjury. Upon the trial the plaintiff testi
that they should sustain the oss." lu .\lur
iier ‘hat he put the horse, after the injury, in
phy v. McGraw, 41 N. W. iep. 917. it ap
to the hands of a veterinary, and paid him
peared on the trial that the horse was worth
$;‘3 forcure and treatment.
On his cross-ex
less at the tune of purchase by reason of a.
amiuation, he also testiﬁed that the veteri
disease called “eczema." The court charged
nary said “there was hopes of curing her, if
the jury that if the plaintiff was led by de
the muscles were not too badly bruised. He
fendant to keep on trying to cure the horse
didn,t say he could cure her. He thought
the expense thereof would be chargeable to the
thére was a chance that he might."
defendant, as would also be the case if there
)r. DeCow, the veterinary, was called. and
were any circumstances, in the judgment of
testiﬁed, as to the injury, that the stake en
the jury, which rendered it reasonable that
tered the brcast of the horse, on the left
he should keep on trying as long as he did to
side. about six inches; that the muscles were
effect the cure.
The plaintiff recovered for
bruised, and the left leg perfectly helpless.
such expense and on the hearing here the
He got the wound healed, but on account of
charge of the trial court was held correct.
the severe bruise of the muscles the leg be
It is a question, under the circumstances,
came paralyzed and useless,
On being asked
for the jury to determine whether the plain
whether we thought she could be helped when
tiff acted in good faith, and upon a reasona
he ﬁrst saw her, he stated that he did not
ble belief that the horse could be cured, or
know but she might; that she might be
made of some value’ if properly taken care
helped, and kept for breeding purposes, and
of; and the trial court was in error in with
be of some value.
drawing that part of the case from them.
It is evident from the testimony that the
Such damages. of course, must always be
r/fplaintiff acted in good faith in attempting
bounds. and no
the cure, and under the belief that the mare, conlined within reasonable
one would be justlﬁed, under any circum
could be helped, and be of some value.
The
stances, in expending more than the animal
court below, however, seems to have
liasol was worth in attempting a cure. This is the
its ruling that no greater damages could be
The judgment
only error we ncel notice.
recovered than the value of the animal. and“
that these moneys expended in attempting ii. of the court below must be reversed, with
‘costs, and a new trial ordered.
cure could not be recovered, upon the ground
,
that the defendant was not consulted in rela
CHAMPLIN and MORSE,
, concurred
tion to the matter of the attempted
cure.
with LONG,
'Whatever damages the plaiutilf sustained
‘
were occasioned by the negligent conduct of
SHERWOOD, 0.
I concur in the re
the defendant. and recovery in such cases is
suit.
always permitted for such amount as shall
com pensate for the actual loss.
If the horse
I think the rule laid.
CAMPBELL.
had been killed outright the only loss would
down at the circuit the proper one.

LONG,

J.

This

JJ

J.

J.

J.
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5?LOUISVILLE
(17 S.

Supreme

& N. R. CO.
W.

v.

WALLACE.

882, 91 Tenn. 35.)

Court of Tennessee.

Dec.

12,

1891.

Appeal irom circuit court, Sumner coun
ty; H. C. CARTER, Judge.
Action by W. L. Wallace against the
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company
ior personal injuries. Judgment ior plain

tifi, and deiendant appeals. Reversed.
J. J. Turner, ior plaintifi. S. F. Wilson,
R. K. Gillespie, anu Geo. W. Boddie, ior de
iendant.

SNODGRASSJ. Thodeiendantin error,

I

while in the service oi the Louisville & Nash
ville Railroad Company as brakeman, sus
tained severe personal injury, resulting in
the loss oi a leg, which he alleged was
occasioned by the negligence of the com
He sued ior $15,000 damages and
pany.
recovered judgment ior $9,940. The rail
road company appealed, and assigned nu
merous errors. It is not deemed material to notice but one of them,as the others
are not well taken. and involve nothing
new, so as to make their consideration
in
a written opinion necessary. The one ma
terial to be considered relates to the ques
tion oi interest. The court told the jury
it could assess plaintifi,s damages with or
withoutiuterest, as the jury should see
proper, in connection with instructions
as to the measure oi damages not other
wise complained oi. The verdict assessed
the damages at $7,000 with 7 years‘ inter
est $2.940. aggegating $9,940. it is ob
jected in the assignment oi errors that the
charge on this qurstion. and verdict, with
judgment thereon,are erroneous. This in
oi the question,
volves a consideration
what is the true measure of damages ior
such personal injury? The rule ior deter
mining damages ior injuries not resulting
in death, (where the statute ﬁxes the
measure.) and not calling ior exemplary
punishment, deducible from the decisions
of this court since its organization in this
state, is that of compensation ior mental
suiiering and physical pain. loss of time,
and expenses incident to the injury, and,
ii it be permanent, the loss resulting from
complete or partial disability in health.
mind, or person thereby occasioned. And
this is the rule most consonant to reason
adopted in other states. 3 Sedg. Dam.
(8th Ed.) § 481 et seq.; 5Amer. &Eng. Enc.
Law, pp. 40-44, and notes; Railroad Co.
v. Read, 87 Amer. Dec. 260. As this sum
in gross includes all the compensation
which is requisite to cover pain, suffering.
and disability to date oi judgment, and
prospectively beyond, it is intended to be
and is the iull measure of recovery, and
cannot be supplemented by the new ele
ment oi damages ior the detention of this
sum irom the date oi the injury. The
measure oi damages being thus ﬁxed, it is
expected that in determining it juries and
courts will make the sum given in gross a
iair and just compensation, and one in full
oi amount proper to be iven when ren
dered, whether soon or ate alter the in
jury; as. ii given soon. it looks to contin
uing suiiering and disability-lust as, when
given late, it includes that oi the past. it

is obvious thatdamageseould not begiven
ior pain and suﬂering and disability ex
perienced on the very day oi trial, and then
interest added ior years beiore. These
are items considered to make up the ag
gregate then due, and the gross sum then
1
ior the ﬁrst time judicially ascertained.
l The error oi the court below was in the
assumption that alike measure oi dam
ages is applied in this class oi cases as in
that oi injury to propegty effecting its de
struction or conversion or other unlawful
or iraudulent misappropriation, or deten
tion oi property or money, in which the
rule applied by the circuit judge is held to
be a proper one; not on the theory, even
in this class of cases, that interest as such
is due, but that the pinintifi is entitled to
the ﬁxed sum oi money or deﬁnite money
value oi property converted or destroyed.
and the jury may give as damages an
amount equal to interest on the value oi
But such rule applies alone
the property.
to such cases, and not to that oi e.rson
in,urv, which does not cease when'i‘iil‘i‘ict
1 Bil, and is not susceptible of deﬁnite and
i accurate computation.
it never creates
‘
a debt, nor becomes one, until it is judi
cially nscertained and determined. Only ll
from that time can it draw interest; and
interest as damages cannot at any preced
‘ ing time be added to it without changing
and superndding a new element, never
given in this state or any other in a similar
case. so iar as our investigation has dis
The counsel oi piaintiii, who
covered.
cite many authorities supposed to be in
support oi the ruling below, were doubt
less misled by the generality of terms used
in some oi them. Under the head oi “In
‘
terest," after stating that “it was gener
ally aliowed by law on two grounds,
namely, on contract, express or implied,
or by way oi damages either ior deiault in
payment of a debt or ior a use or bene
ﬁt derived irom the money oi another," it
is stated in ii Amer. 8: Eng. Enc. Law
that, “ where it is imposed to punish tor
tions, negligent, or iraudulent conduct, it
is a question within the discretion oi the
For this proposition va
. jury." Page
rious authorities are cited, including Mr.
Sedgu iek on Damages, p. 374, (the reierence
being to paging oi the ﬁith or earlier edi
tion.) This author uses similar general
terms, but neither was speaking oi cases
oi personal injury, but of the class oi cases
i to which we have reierred, as iully appears
irom Mr. Sedgwick’s iurther discussion oi
this general head, on pages 385, 386, and as
to
‘ most clearly appears irom a reierence
the authorities cited by both, which relate
to cases oi trover and trespass and to
controversies only. In neither
. property
oi these books is the proposition now
thought to be sustained by them ad
vanced,—that the measure oi damages for
a personal injury includes damages ior de
tention oi the supposed amount due. The
generality oi statement indulged in that
and iormer editions oi this work is cor
rected by editors of the last edition. Chap
ter 10 of the ﬁrst volume of this edition is
devoted to interest allowed in actions
where it is by rule oi law, or in the dis
cretion oi the jury or court trying the
case, allowed as part oi the measure of
damages. In these cases are enumerated
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and discussed those actions soundim,r in
tort in which interest may be given as
damages. The distinction is there taken.
as taken here, and actions ior personal in
juries excluded, because oi the existence of
a wholly different measure of damages re
specting them. In this connection we
quote section 320 in the volume and chap
ter referred to: “It sufﬁciently appears,
from what has already been said, that
there is no general principle which pre
vents the recovery of interest in actions of
tort. The fact that the demand is unllq
‘uldated has been shown to he insufheient
to exclude interest, and there is nothing in
the mere iorm of the action which renders
it unreasonable that interest should be
given. Nevertheless it is in the region of
tort that we ﬁnd the clearest cases fordis
allowance of interest. There are many
cases which are not brought to recover a
sum of moneyrepresenting a property loss
of the plaintiff, and it is frequently said
broadly thatinterest is not allowed in
such actions.. It is certainly not allowed
in such actions as assault and battery. or
ior personal injury by‘ negligence. libel,
slander, seduction." etc.‘, The measure of
damage in such case seems nowhere to in
clude this,or be based upon tbisidea. Even
in respect to injury or destruction of prop
erty, where the supreme court of the United
States has adopted fully the prevailing
rule (allo wing damages in the iorm of in
terest n value of the property, the rule
hash enlimited to such injury of property
or property right as had a ﬁxed or cer
tain value; and it is accordingly held in
that court that indeﬁnite damages, as
that resulting from infringement oi a pat
ent, could not bear interest until after the
amount had been judicially ascertained.
Tilghman v. Proctor. 125 U. S. 161, 8 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 894.
The direct question we are umsidering
also came before the supreme judicial
court oi Maine. and it was there held that
the rule permitting damages equal tolu
terest on value of propertyin cases of tres
pass and trover did not apply, and that
interest could not he allowed upon a re
covery ior personal injury, and that, too.
under a statute authorizing a recovery
"to the amount of the damage sustained. "
(This is not material, however. as their
. sta tute ga ve no more nor less right than ex
ists here.) Sargent v. Hampden,38 Me. 581.
The cases cited by the editors of the last
edition oiSedgwick on Damages sustaining
the propositionlhat interest cannot be in
cluded in a recovery of damages ior per
sonal injuries are from eorgla and Penn
sylvania. Ratteree v.C apman,79Ga.57 .
4 S. E. Rep. 684: Railro (1 Co. v. Young, 81
Ga. 397, 7 S. E. Rep. 912: Railway Co. v.
Taylor, 104 Pa. St. 306. These cases have
all been examined, and fully sustain the
text. One oithe cases cited to the proposi
tion in Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law was a
Pennsylvania case, earlier than either of
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those to which we have referred. The case
there cited, (Fasholt v. Reed, ifi Serg. 8:
R. 266.) which we have not been able to
ﬁnd in libraries here. was evidently not
one of personal injury, or else not consist
In
ent with later holdings of that court.
court seems hard
deed, the Pennsylvania
ly to have gone as far on that question in
reference to allowance of interest as dam
ages in other actions ex delicto as other
In suits ior the destruction of
courts.
property that court has held that, while
lapse of time may be looked to. it is error
to instruct the jury that plaintiff is enti
tled to interest on such damage from the
time it occurred. Township of Plymouth
v. Graver, 125 Pa. St. 24, 17 Atl. Rep. 249;
Emerson v. Schoonmaker, 135 Pa. St. 437.
Of the other cases cited
19 Atl. Rep. 1025.
in Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, we have ex
amined those in 13 Wis. 31. (Hinckley v.
Beckwith,) 36 N. Y. 639. (Vandevoort v.
Gould.) and 30 Tex. 349. (Wolfe v. Lacy.)
They all sustain the text as it is intended
to be understood, and as we have herein
explained,and doubtless the other cases
do so. To the same effect are the cases of
Lincoin v. Claﬂin. 7 Wall. 132; Dyer v.
Navigation Co., 118 U. S. 507,6Sup.Ct.
Rep. ll7-i; U. S. v. North Carolina, l36 U.
S. 21l, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 920; Clement v.
Spear, 56 Vt. 401 ; and cases from A merican
decisions and reports cited in Rapaljc’s Di
gest. volume 1, pp. 1039-1041, under heads
“’l‘rover,“ and “ When Interest may he
Added, " and volume 2, p. 199i, under head oi
“Interest. " Sec,also’l1 Sedg. Dam. §§ 432
493, (8th Ed.) )The effect and meaning oi
statements quoted from Amer. & Eng.
Enc. Law and its reference to Sedg. Dam.
are made perfectly clear when these cases
and authorities herein added are examined.
and the generality of expresslonslimited lo
the purpose of their use and the class of
being considered. They were not
cases
dealing at all, nor intended to be under
uestiun of re
stood as dealing, with the
covery ior personal iujurics.(twhich is itself
a recovery of damages pure and simple,
and measured by a rule which needs no
upplement that would add damages to
damages
The charge and verdict were
erroneous on this point. and
thereior
prejudicial to defendant to the extent and
only to the extent of the injury. The cir
cuitjudge might have refused to receive
the verdict as to interest, and the same
of the
effect may now follow a remitting
interest by plaintiff, if he elects to do so.
In that event the plaintiff is entitled to a
judgment ior $7,000, with interest from
date of its rendition, and costs, and with
this modiﬁcation the judgment will be
afﬁrmed. This was the practice adopted
in the Maine case on this point, as well as
cases, (135 Pa.
in one of the Pennsylvania
St. 437’ ii) Ati. Rep. l0‘.‘5,) citing several
others, and is clearly the correct rule. in
default of such remission, a new trial will
be granted.
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ON DAMAGES.

CITY OF TROY..

44. 135

N. Y.

of Appeals of New York.

96.)

Oct. 4, 1892.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,
third department.
Action by Walter V. Wilson against the
city of Troy to recover damages for an in
jury to a horse resulting from a defcctive
street. Plaintiﬂ had judgment, which was
aﬂirmed at general term (14 N. Y. Supp. 721),
‘qpd defendant appeals. Aﬂirmed.
Wm.

J.

Patterson,

Roche,
for appellant.
for respondent.

Chas.

E.

O,BRIEN, J. The record in this case pre
First, whether the ﬁnd
sents two questions:
ing of the jury that the damage was the re
sult of the defendant,s negligence is sustained
by any evidence; and, secondly, whether in
terest could legally be allowed by the jury in
estimating the amount of the damages.
On
1879, a
the night of the 13th of November,
horse belonging
to one Learned,
valuable
assignor,
plaintiff’s
while being
driven
through South street in the city of Troy, fell
into an open ditch or unguarded excavation,
made during that day, and was permanently
injured. There is little, if any, controversy
with respect to the value of the horse, the ex
tent of the injury, or the amount of damages.
The night was dark, and it is not denied that
there was evidence for the jury suﬂicient to
sustain a ﬁnding of negligence on the part of
some one by reason of the failure to protect
a place of danger in a public street, by proper
guards and lights. It was not shown that the
city had any actual notice of the existence
of the excavation, if made by private parties
without its permission;
and a suﬁicient pe
riod had not elapsed between the time of open
ing it and the accident to render the city lia
ble on the ground of implied notice. The ex
cavation was made for the purpose of con
ducting the water from the principal main in
the street. through lateral pipes, into a pri
vate house.
The owner of the house em
ployed a ﬁrm of plumbers to do the work,
which included the digging of the trench as
well as laying and connecting
the lateral
pipes with the main in the street.
The ﬁrm
applied to the superintendent
of the water
works for men to open the trench in the
street, and that oﬂicer directed laborers in
the employ of the city to do so.
The open
ing in the street was made by them. and they
were paid for the work by the city, the plumb
era refunding to it the sum so paid.
The
question is whether the men who dug the
ditch were under the control and direction of
the defendant, or subject to the orders of the
plumbers engaged in performing a piece of
work for the owner of the house.
The system of waterworks in Troy is the
property of the municipality, and is umlcr the
manpgement and control of a board of water
commissioners,
which may be regarded as a

of the city government.
The
i department
commissioners
are by law required to nom
inate, and the common council of the city to
appoint, a uperintendent of the waterworks,
who is the executive oﬂicer in that depart
ment, and who, in this case, directed the men
in the employ and pay of the city to ma»;
the excavation in the street.
The board is
authorized by law to extend the distributing
pipes of the waterworks wherever they might
think proper, and to make such alterations
and improvements
in the works, and in the
thereof,
management
and preservation
as
they might deem necessary and expedient,
and to employ such persons and assistants as
they might require, to execute any of these
purposes, which employi.s were to be paid for
their services from the city treasury.
The
commissioners
were also empowered to enact
such by-laws, regulations, and ordinances as
they should deem necessary for the protec
tion of hydrants and water pipes, and the
preservation,
protection, and management of
the waterworks.
These by-laws. unless dis
approved by a vote of two-thirds of all the
members of the common council of the city,
were to have all the force and effect of law.
In pursuance of the power thus conferred by
the statute, the board of water commission
ers enacted by-laws and ordinances on the
subject which were in force at the time the
They, in
excavation in question was made.
effect, prohibited any person except the super
intendent, and those employed by him or by
to tap or make any con
the commissioners,
nection with the main or distributing pipe,
or to permit the same to be done, unless by
the permission and under the direction of the
superintendent.
The learned counsel for the
defendant contends that this regulation sim
ply forbids the act of connecting the lateral
pipes from the house with the main, and did
not prohibit private persons from digging
the necessary trenches and uncovering
the
main or distributing pipe, and hence that
part of the work was done by the contractors
who were employed by the owner of the
house to make the connection,
and not by
the city. But a private individual had no .
right to dig in the street for this or any other
purpose without the permission of the proper
municipal authorities, and the object, as well
as the language, of the ordinance indicates
that it was intended to prevettt-t-he'ﬁover
ing of the main, or any interference with the
street in which it was placed, by private par
ties.
At all events, the water board and its
chief executive oﬂicer, the superintendent, in
of the duties imposed upon
the discharge
them by the statute, might very properly
give to it that construction,
and act accord
ingly. To hold that such a by.law did not
embrace within its object and purview the
evils that might result from unguarded and
unregulated interference with the bed of the
street by private parties in order to reach the
main, would be giving to it a construction al

INTEREST ON DAMAGES.
together too narrow.
The evidence tends to
show that the water board gave to it the
meaning,
broader and more comprehensive
as it was the custom and practice for years
before the accident in question to make appli
cation to the superintendent for men to do the
digging, and they were always furnished, as
in this case. As between the owner of the
.house and the plumbers employed by her to
introduce the water into her house, the dig
ging was undoubtedly a part of the contract
If no main had been
or work of the latter.
placed in the street at that time, they could
also have contracted with her to procure its
extension, but that part of the work would be
subject to the action and regulations of the
water board, and, while the contractors might
be obliged to pay the city for the whole or
some part of the expense, it would be none
the less the work of the city.
One of the
plumbers testiiied that while he agreed with
the owner of the house to do all the work,
yet he knew then that it was the practice and
custom to apply to the superintendent of the
waterworks for men to do the digging and to
make the connection, and acted upon the as
sumption that he had no right to do it. He
also says that the men who made the exca
vation were not employed by him, but by the
city. We think that, upon the proof, it
could not be held, as matter of law, that the
men who dug the trench and left it unguard
ed ceased for the time being to be the serv
ants of the city, and subject to the directions
of the superintendent, and became, while do
ing this job of work, the servants of the par
ty employed to put in the lateral pipes into
the house, as is urged by the learned counsel
for the defendant.
What party sustained the
relation of master to the men who dug the
trench, and had the control and direction of
them, and was charged with the duty of di
recting them to properly guard the ditch,—
whether the plumbers on the one hand, or the
.city, through the superintendent of the water
works, on the other,-was the important ques
tion to be determined, and the trial court sub
Under all the circum
mitted it to the jury.
stances, the question became one of fact, and
this disposition oif it was not error.
Ward v.
Fibre Co., 1-3-i Mass. 420, 28 N. E. Rep. 299.
This ﬁnding of the jury is conclusive upon
us, and imports that the city itself, through
one of its oﬂicers or departments, caused the
trench to be dug, and left it unguarded, re
sulting in the damage complained
of.
In
such a case the negligent act is imputable
to the city, and the doctrine of actual or im
plied notice has no application, or, at least,
is unnecessary, where one injured by the neg
lect of the city to properly guard a place
made dangerous by its own act brings the ac
Petteugill v. City of Yonkers, 116 N.
tion.
Y. 558, 22 N. E. 1095; Walsh v. Mayor, etc.,
107 N.vY. 220, 13 N. E. 911; Turner v. City
of .\‘ewburgh, 109 N. Y. 301. 16 N. E. 344;
Brusso v. City of Buffalo, 90 N. 1,. 679; Bus

l

,

1

189

sell v. Village of Canastota.
98 N. Y. 4903;
Nelson v. Village of Canisteo, 100 N. Y. 80, 2
N. E. 473; Ehrgott v. Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y.
273; Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S.
540.

The amount demanded in the complaint on
account of the injury to this horse was $3,000,
and the court instructed the jury that they
could not, in awarding damages, go beyond
that sum, with interest.
The defendant,s
counsel excepted to this in so far as it author
ized interest,
and requested
the court to
charge that the jury could not allow interest
in the action.
The court declined to so
charge, and the defendant,s counsel excepted.
The jury afterwards came into court, and an
nounced that they had found a verdict for the
plaintiff for $3,000 and interest.
The court
then said:
“You must compute the interest
if you give interest. You will have to render
your verdict in dollars and cents." This di
with, and the verdict
rection was complied
as entered included interest from the date
of the injury, which result has been modiiied
by the general term by striking out the inter
est awarded prior to the date of the presenta
tion of the claim to the city, which was held
to be a prerequisite to the maintenance of the
action.
The fair construction of the charge
is that the jury could include in the damages
interest upon the sum found to represent the
diminished value of the horse in consequence
of the injury, and not that the plaintilI was
entitled to interest as matter of right. The
exception,
therefore,
presents
the question
whether, in an action to recover damages to
property by reason of negligence on the part
of the defendant, it is within the power of
the jury, in the excl.cise of discretion, to in
clude in their award of damages interest on
the sum found to represent the diminished
value of the property in consequence of the
injury from the time that the cause of action
accrued.
When interest may be allowed as
part of the damagres, in actions of this char
acter, is a question which, in the present
state of the law, is involved in much confu
sion and uncertainty,
and in regard to which
the decisions of the courts are not harmoni
ous.
It is perhaps impossible to formulate
a general rule embracing every possible case.
The tendency of courts in modern times has
been to extend the right to recover interest
far beyond the limits within
on demand
which that right was originally conﬁned.
What seemed to be the demands of justice
did not permit the principle to remain sta
tionary, and hence it has been for years in'a
This, in some
state of constant evolution.
measure, accounts for inany of the apparently
contradictory views to be found in the ad
judged cases. There are certain fundamental
principles. however, established by the deci
sions In this state, which, when properly ap
plied. will aid in the solution of the question.
There is, of course. a manifest distinction,
always to be observed,
between
actions
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as assault and battery, slander, libel, seduc
tion, false imprisonment,
There is an
etc.
other class in which the law gives interest on
the loss as part of the damages, such as tro
ver, trespass, replevin, etc.; and still
third
class in which interest cannot be recovered
as of right, but maybe allowed in the discre
tion of the jury, according to the circumstan
ces of the case.
This action belongs to the
latter class, and, as we have construed the
charge as a direction that the jury might, in
their discretion, allow interest on the dimin
ished value of the horse,
was not erroneous.
Our attention has been called to the case
of Sayre v. State, 123 N. Y. 291, 25 N. E. 163,
and
is urged, upon the authority of that
case, that interest cannot be allowed in any
case for the recovery of unliquidated dam
ages arising from negligence.
We think that
the case, when correctly understood, does not
sustain the contention, but, in effect, holds
party appealed
the contrary. In that case
from the decision of the board of claims up
on an award in his own favor, and the only
was whether, upon the evidence
question
and ﬁndings, the claimant had been allowed
all the damages that he was entitled to, and
this court not only afﬁrmed his right to all
the damages that the board had awarded
him, but increased the award from $3,000 to
The claim was based upon the negli
$8,136.
gent act of the state in overﬂowing the lands
of the claimant, from which the damages
claimed resulted.
The board of claims al
lowed no interest, nor did this court.
In add
ing to the award a sum of over $5,000, this
court acted, in some sense, as a court of
original jurisdiction, and in making up the
sum which was to constitute the ﬁnal award
refused to allow an item of interest claim
Now,
ed.
is admitted that
court or jury,
charged
with the duty of making up the
amount of damages in such cases, may refuse
to allow interest, and that is precisely what
this court did, and nothing more, and there
fore the case is in harmony with the rule
above stated, and with the cases from which
we have deduced it. It is far from holding
case, the jury,
is error when, in such
that
or the original court, after considering all the
bearing upon the
facts and circumstances
1os, allows interest, in the exercise of discre
tion, as part of the indemnity to which the
party is entitled.
It simply recognized the
rule that interest in such cases was not a
matter of right, but of sound discretion, and
held that the claimant was fully indemniﬁed
for his loss without adding interest.
It is
true that the learned judge who gave the
opinion cited the cases arising upon contract
in which
has been held that interest is not
allowable, and remarked that he found no
case justifying an allowance of interest.
That
was probably an inadvertence, but the deci
sion refusing interest was right, though the
reasons may have been based upon
princi
ple applicable to another class of actions. It

it

sounding in tort and actions upon contract.
the latter class of actions there is not
much diﬂiculty in ascertaining the rule as to
interest until we come to unliquidated de
mands.
The rule in such cases has quite re
cently been examined in this court, and prin
guide in
ciples stated that will furnish
White v. Miller, 78 N. Y. 393.
most cases.
We are concerned now only with the rule
applicable in actions of tort. The right to
interest, as a part of the damages, in actions
of trover and trespass de bonis asportatis,
& Wm.
was given ﬁrst in England by St.
IV. The recovery was not, however, allow
ed by that statute as matter of right, but in
The earlier cases
the discretion of the jury.
in this state followed the rule thus establish
the jury, in
ed in England, and permitted
their discretion, to allow interest in such
Johns. 446; Hyde
cases. Beals v. Guernsey,
v. Stone,
Wend. 354; Bissell v. Hopkins,
Cow. 53; Rowley v. Gibbs, 14 Johns. 385.
The principle that the right to interest in
such cases was in the discretion of the jury,
was, however, gradually abandoned, and now
the rule is that the plaintiff is entitled to in
terest on the value of the property converted
or lost to the owner by a trespass as matter
of law. The reason given for this rule is
part of a com
that interest is as necessary
plete indemnity to the owner of the property
as the value itself, and in ﬁxing the damages
is not any more in the discretion of the jury
than the value.
Andrews v. Durant, 18 N.
Y. 406; McCormick v. Railroad Co., 49 N. Y.
315; Turnpike Co. v. City of Buffalo, 58 N.
Y. 630; Parrott v. Ice Co., 40 N. Y. 369.
It
ls diﬂicult to perceive any sound distinction
between
case where the defendant converts
or carries away the plaintiffs horse and
case where, through negligence on his part,
the horse is injured so as to be valueless.
There is no reason apparent for
different
rule of damages in the one case than in the
other.
In an early case in this state the
principle was recognized that interest might
be allowed, by way of damages, upon the
sum lost by the plaintiff in consequence of
defendant’s negligence.
Thomas v. Weed, 14
Johns. 255.
We think the rule
now set
tied in this state that, where the value of
property is diminished by an injury wrong
fully inﬂicted, the jury may, in their discre
tion, give interest on the amount by which
the value is diminished from the time of the
in ury.
That is the rule laid down in the
ientary books and sustained by the ad
dged cases.
Sedg. Dam. (8th Ed.)
317, 320; Walrath v. Redﬂeld, 18 N. Y. 457,
462; Malrs v. Association, 89 N. Y. 498; Dur
yee v. Mayor, etc., 06 N. Y. 477, 499; Home
Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 11 Hun, 182,
188; Moore v. Railroad Co., 126 N. Y. 671, 27
N. E. 791; Railroad Co. v. Ziemer, 124 Pa.
St. 560, 17 Atl. 187.
There is
class of actions sounding in tort,
in which interest is not allowable at all, such
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must be remembered that the court was not
reviewing any question decided below in re
gard to interest, but seeking to make up
for itself a new award from the items of the
claim appearing in the record. and whatever
was said by way of argument, and as the
reason for throwing out an item of interest
on a sum claimed to have been expended in
restoring or reclaiming the land, cannot be
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considered as the judgment of the court on
the question now under consideration.
That
question
was not noticed in the argument,
and was not involved in the case, except1 per
haps, as a matter of discretion.
For these
reasons the judgment should be afﬁrmed.
All
concur, except EARL, C. J., and FINCH and
GRAY, JJ., dissenting.
Judgment uﬂirmed.
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Virginia.
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Appeal from decree of circuit court of
Scott county rendered March 27, 1890, in a
suit wherein T. P. Tligg, A. Mt.Bradley,
and H. Fugn te, survivingparlncrs of them
selves and James C. Green way, deceased,
partners doing business in the ﬁrm name
Tiigg. Fugate & Co., were complainants,
and H. B. Clay, Jr., and W. D. Kenner,
partners in the ﬁrm name of H. B. Clay.
Jr., & Co., were defendants. The decree
being adverse to the complainants, they
appealed.
Opinion states the case.
llaul. ,l‘rigz, ior appellants.
Holdmap
& Ewing and J..l.A. Powell, ior appcllees.

LACY,

J.

The suit is a ioreign attach
brought to attach ihe
propertysituated within thejurisdiciion of
thecourt belonging to non-residentdefend
ants, and to subject the same to the satis
ment

‘

in equity,

The
faction of the debt of the plaintiffs.
case is brieﬂy 8s iollows: The appellants,
a ﬁrm of lumber merchants resident at
Abingdon,in Virginia, made a contract by
which they agreed to buy, at a stated
price, lumber of agreed dimensions from
the appellees, a ﬁrm of lumber getters,
resident at Bogersville, in the state of
‘Tennessee;
the lumber to be delivered at
Clinchport, in Scott county, in Virginia.
from 500.000 feet to 703,000 feet thereof;
and the plaintiffs agreed to accept the
drafts of the said appeliees to the amount
of $3,000. And on the 28th day of Novem
ber, 1888, the date of the contract, the ap
pellee H. B. (‘lay, Jr., of the said ﬁrm. rep
resented to the appellants that 300.000 to
400,000 feet were already cut and dry or
drying: and that the residuemccessary to
compensate for the $3,000 in drafts to be
accepted at 60 days, should he delivered
at the maturity of the
at Clinchport
drafts.
The drafts were all made in the
ﬁrst week in December, l8r‘8, a few days
after the contract was made, which was
on the 28th day of November, as has been
The lumber was not delivered,—
stated.
not a ioot of it,—and the drafts were neg
lected and allowed to fall upon the hands
of the plaintiffs, when the lumber had not
yet been delivered, and the drafts had
been paid. So the plaintiffs, as had been
agreed between the parliesin case the said
contingency should arise that the drafts
should have tp be paid beiore the lumber
in sufﬁcient quantity had arrived, draft
ed back upon the defendants for the money
thus paid out; but this action was treated
with derision by the appellee, and the
Upon the hearing. the
draft dishonored.
circuit court decreed in favor of the plain
tiffs for the $3.000 paid on the draft and
the costs of protest, etc., and referred it
to a commission to ascertain what dam
ages the plaintiffs had sustained.
It was
proved that the defendants had absolute
ly refused to fulﬁll the contract upon the
ground that the lumber had been priced
too low by them, and also refused to re
fund the money paid them under the con
tract. The plaintiffs proved that they
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merchants, and, as was
were lumber
known to the defendants. purchased the
lumber ior sale: and they proved that
they had actually placed this lumber. to
their customers at aproﬁt which amounted to $1,000, but which they were made to
lose by the wrongful act and fraudulent

,

conduct of the defendants; and the commissioner reported that the said plaintiffs
were entitled to this sum of actual dam
ages incurred by them. estimating
the
proﬁts on the maximum amount of the‘.
lumber to be delivered under the con tract.
But the defendants excepted to this re
port, " because the damage allowed is ex
cessive, and not supported by law; be
had based his
cause the commissioner
damages on supposed proﬁts. instead’
of the market value of the lumber at the
places of delivery. " The circuit court by
its decree of March 27, 1890, sustained
these exceptions, and held that the plain
tiffs were entitled to no speciﬁcdamages
ior the non-periormance of the contract
set out in the plaintiffs‘ bill, and rested
the matter where it had been placed by.
the former decree, which decreed in favor
of the plaintiffs ior the amount paid on
the said drafts.
From this decree the up
peal is here. The idea of the circuit court
was that the general rule applied which
ﬁxed the difference between the market‘
price at the place of delivery and the contract price agreed to be paid. Upon the
principle that the buyer could supply him
self in the market overt, and when he had
been compensated ior the excess in the
cost, over and above what his cost would
have been under the contract, he had
nothing more to complain of. But this
case does not come within that principle,
(1) because there is no market at that‘
place from which, or in which, the plain
tiffs could supply their need; (2) because
there is no other market practically near
enough to purchase the lumber and add
transportation to the market price; (3)
relying on the
because
the plaintiffs,
promises and good faith of their bargain
crs, us they had a right to do, when tlwy
had themselves fully compiled on their
part by paying the purchase money there
ior, bad contracted to sell this lumber at .a
proﬁt, which proﬁt is the basis on which
the commissioner assessed his damages.
In a case like this, with such circumstan
ces as we have here, the case where there
had been a contract to resell them at an
agreed price, and when ihere is no market
to afiord a surer test, the price at which
they were bargained to a purchaser affords
the best and indeed very satisfac tory evi
dence of their value. This was a purchase
in that marks-t,and there was no more ior
sale. In acasc of such actual sale, why
should the court go into conjecture as to
what the goods were there worth? And
again, if lumber could have been purchased
and brought there at a lower price, there
is not only no proof of it, but we have sat
isfactory proof to the contrary, because
the defendants had the lumber, and were
by their solemn con tract under the highest;
obligations to deliver it: to say nothing
of the requirement of common honesty.
when they had agreed to do it, and had
collected the purchase price. And yet they
preferred to break their contract, and dis

'l_
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honored their bank obligation, rather
than deliver this lumber at the agreed
price, which they declared had been bar
gained at too low a price. In Wood,s
Mayne on Damages. § 22, it is said: "But,
if they [the goods] cannot be purchased ior
want of a market, they must be estimated
in some other way. ii there had been a
contract to resell them, the price at which
such contract was made will be evidence
In the American and En
' of their value."
of Law it is said:
‘glislm Encyclopmdia
“
Where there is no market at the place oi
delivery,the price of thegoods in the near
est market, with the cost of transporta
tion added, determines their value. " Ice
(lo. v. Webster, 68 Me. 463; Griﬁin v. (‘ol
ver, 16 N. Y. 489.
In the case of Colin v.
lass-Works, 108 Pa. St. 220, it is said:
‘
Upon the breach of a contract to furnish
goods, when similar goods cannot be pur
chased in the market, the measure of dam
ages is the actual loss sustained by the
"
purchaser by reason of the non-delivery.
A distinction is drawn in some of the cases
between a resale made. at an advance sub
sequent to a contract of purchase and a
resale made at an advance beiore the con
tract of purchase, which was known to
Carpenter v.
the seller of the goods.
Bank, 119 Ill. 354, 10 N. E. Rep. 18. ’l‘his is
rather a ianciiul distinction. It is not in
accord with the ordinary usages oi trade
that a dealer. :1. man buying to sell again,
should disclose his dealings with the sn me
goods ata proﬁt to his vendor. But, if
there were any sound principle upon which
this could rest, ii the seller could he sup
posed to enter into his contract upon the
v
basis of a resale in which he had no inter
est, still, in this case, it is reasonable to
, suppose that a lmnbergetterselling 700.000
feet of lumber to adealer in lumber should
know (1) that it was ior a resale, (2) that
this resale was to be on a proﬁt, and (3)
that heshould know that his vendee would
be damaged to the amount of his proﬁt. if
But
the vendor should prove iaithless.
the true basis of the general rule is that
when there is a market, the vendee cannot
be damaged. except in the difference be
tween what the lumber did actually cost
‘
him and what he had purchased it at from
the seller to him. But this rule can have,
upon reason, no application whatever to
a case where there is no market, (1) be
cause the disappointed purchaser cannot
buy in that market when there is no mar
ket to buy in, and (2) because the market
price cannot be ascertained when there is
no market.
Under the circumstances of this case, the
ascertained the true and
commissioner
just amount of the damages. It has been
oiten held that proﬁts which are the direct
and immediate fruits of the contract are
recovern.ble. There are many cases in
which the proﬁt to be made by the bar
gain is the only thing purchased, and in
such cases the amount oi such proﬁtis
strictly the measure oi damages. Wood,s
Mayne, llam. p. 82. It has been held that,
when the defendant refused to allow the
contracts to be executed, the jury should
allow thepiaintifh as much as the con
tract wonld haw: beneﬁted them,—proﬁts
or advantages which are the direct and
immediate fruits of the contract, entered
LAw DAM.—13
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into between the parties, are part and par
cel oi the contract itself, entering into and
constituting a portion of itscvery element,
something stipulated ior, and the right to
the enjoyment oi which is just as clear and
plain as to the fulﬁllment of any other
stipulation. They are presumed to have
and delib
been taken into consideration
erated upon helore thecontract was made.

‘

and formed, perhaps, the only inducement
lithe inducement to
to the arrangement.
the plaintiffs to buy this lumber, they be
ing lumber dealers, and trading inlumber,
was not the proﬁts they were to make by
a resale, what was their inducement?
And if the sellers did not understand and
contemplate this resale on a proﬁt, whatv
contemplation
on the subject can be rea
sonably ascribed to them? See Masterton
v. Mayor. etc.,? Hiil,62: Morrison v.Lorc
joy, 6 Minn.3l9, iGil.224;) Fox v. Harding,
7(‘ush. 516; Deviin v. A-layor.etc.,(i3 N. Y.S:
McAndrews v. Tippett, 39 N. J. Law, 105;
Kendall Bank Note Co. v. Commissioners oi
the Sinking Fund.79 Va.563: Bell v. Reyn
oi the
olds. 78 Ala. 5il. An examination
cases will show that the courts have been
endeavoring to establish rules by the ap
plication oi which a party will be compen
sated ior the loss sustained by the breach
of contract; in other words. ior the bene
‘iits and gain he would have realized from
its pcrlormance. and nothing more. It is
sometimes said that the proﬁt that would
have been derived from periormnnce can
not be recovered; but this is only true oi
such as are contingent upon some other
operation.‘ Proﬁts which certainly would
hav been realized but ior the defendant’s
It is not an un
def ult are recoverable.
certainty ns to the value of the beneﬁt or
gain to be derived from periormance, but
or contingency whether
an uncertainty
such gain or beneﬁt can be derived at all.
It is sometimes said that specuiatlvedam
because
be recovered
the
ages cannot
amount is uncertain. but such remarks
will generally be found applicable to such
damages as it is uncertain whether sus
tained at all from the breach. Sometimes
the claim is rejected as being too remote.
This is another mode of saying that it is
uncertain whether such damages resulted
irom the
necessarily and immediately
breach complained of. The general rule is“
that all damages resulting necessarily and
immediately and directly irom the breach
are recoverable, and not those that are
contingent and uncertain.
The latter de
scription embraces, as 1 think, such only
as are not the certain result oi the breach,
and does not embrace such as are the cer
tain result of the breach, but uncertain in
amount,ior which the plaintiff will be fully
compensated by recovering the value of
his bargain.
He ought not to have more,
and I think he is not precluded from re
covering this by any inﬁrmity in the law
Wakeman v.
in ascertaining the amount.
.\IanufnctnrlugCo., 101 N. Y. 20.1. 4 N. E.
Rep. 264; Taylor v. Bradley, 4 A. b. Dec.
In this
303; Bell v. Reynolds, 78 Ala. 511.
was
..ase the report oi the commissioner
upon the correct principle, and 1ii(‘clI,c1liiZ
Court erred in sustaining the defendants’
exception to the said report: l‘or said ex
ceptions should have been overruled, and
the connnissiouer’s report conﬁrmed. The
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decree of the circuit court appealed from
ame
here is thereiore erroneous, and the
will he reversed and annulled, and this
court will render such decree as the said

circuit court ought to have rendered.

HINTON, J.,

dissen ts.

LEWIS, P., (dissenting.) In this case I
dissent from the opinion of the court and
am ior afﬁrming the decree of the circuit
court The case is narrowed down by the
exception to the commissioner,s report to
the simplequestion of the measure 01 dam
ages. The rule adopted by this court is,
in my opinion, not only unjust, but con
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trary to the lonz4settled rule which gov
ernsin such cases. Here the measure oi
damages is held to be the loss sustained
by the appellants by reason of their ina
bility, on account of the default of the ap
pellees,to fuliill certain contracts made by
them for the sale and delivery of lumber
to other parties. But those contracts
were cullateral to the contract between
the parties

to this

appeal, and

point of time, subsequent thereto.

were. in

They

could not, thereiore, have been in the con
templation oi the parties when the con
tract was made, the breach of which
the subject of this controversy.
Decree reversed.

ii
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SVHOFFMAN

v.

CHAMBERLAIN.

Atl. 150, 40 N. J. Eq. 668.)
Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.
(5

November

Term,

1885.

On appeal from a decree of the chancellor,
whose opinion is reported in Chamberlain v.
Hoffman, 38 N. J. Eq. 40.
P. S. Scovel, for appellant.
C. A. Bergen, for respondent.

‘

\

REED, J. Sarah Chamberlain, the com
plainant below, together with one Amelia B.
Ellis, sold to Mary W. Miller, now Hoffman,
certain household furniture for the sum of
A part of the property sold belonged
$1.800.
to Mrs. Chamberlain, and a part to Mrs. El
lis. It was paid for in the following manner:
$500 in cash were paid to Mrs. Ellis, and to
her were given, also, two notes of $150 each,
and one note of $100; to Mrs. Chamberlain
were given nine $100 notes.
All of Mrs. El
lis’ notes are paid.
Three of the Chamber
lain notes are paid, leaving still unpaid six
of the notes given to her. At the time these
notes were given a chattel mortgage was exe
cuted to Mrs. Chamberlain, to secure all
these notes, to the amount of $1,300.
Mrs.
Chamberlain ﬂied her bill to foreclose this
mortgage.
The defense to it is that ome of
the articles sold did not belong to either Mrs.
Ellis or Mrs. Chamberlain. All the articles
to which title is alleged to have failed Yere
sold as the property of Mrs. Ellis, an all
Only
the notes given to her have been paid.
the remaining six notes given to Mrs. ham
berlain are outstanding, and it is as s curity
for the payment of these that the chattel
mortgage is being foreclosed.
if this trans
action is to be treated as involving two sales,
with a distinct consideration for each, then
'
.there is no defense to the present suit.
The failure of title to Mrs. Ellis’ goods
could not affect the consideration paid to
Mrs. Chamberlain under a distinct contract...
Upon a consideration of all the circumstan
ces surrounding the sale, I think the affair
was understood to be a single transaction, in
which all these household goods were sold
for a single price. The two ladies who sold
were relatives. and had been intimately con
They desired to sell all
nected in business.
the furniture in the house to one person.
The values which they ﬁxed to the separate
articles were for the purpose of determining
their separate interests in the consideration.
The notes were made in part to one and in
part to the other vendor, for the purpose of
convenience. The chattel mortgage was giv
en to secure all the notes, without regard to
whom they were payable.
So far as the pur
r.haser felt concerned in the affair, all she
wished was to get all the furniture as it
stood in the house.
She was not concerned
iii the proportion of interest in the entire
stock, so long as she got the title to it all.
The price was agreed upon, not in view of
any part, but of the whole lot. The consid
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.eration was single, in which both vendors
were jointly concerned, and both vendors
were equally responsible for any defect in
the title to the goods sold for which this con
sideration passed.
In what articles was there a failure of
title? It is claimed that title failed to a por
tion of the goods which Mrs. Ellis had
bought of a Mr. Hutchins, and which Mr.
Hutchins recovered of Mrs. Chamberlain by
an action of replevin. It appears, however,
that the replevin suit against Mrs. Chamber
lain was undefended;
no notice having been
given to Mrs. Ellis or Mrs. Hoffman of the
.\,or does the evi
pendeucy of the action.
dence in this cause show that Mrs. Ellis had
no title to those articles.
I think that she
had, and that the transaction by which she
got possession of the articles was a sale, and
not a bailment; and, although she had not
paid for them, she could and did pass a title
to Mrs. Chamberlain upon which she couldQ
have successfully stood in a defense to the
replevin suit.
The remaining articles in
which there was an alleged failure of title
were the three Baltimore heaters.
As to
these, it appears that they belonged to the
landlord of Mrs. Ellis. Although she put one
in the rented premises, the arrangement by
which this was done contemplated
that it
should remain there after the termination of
her lease.
The other two were placed in the
house by the landlord.
In respect to these
heaters, neither of the vendors to Mrs. Cham
berlain had title, and there should be a de
duction from the amount due upon the six
outstanding notes for this failure of title.
The question then arises, what is the prop
er measure of the deduction to be allowed?
Perhaps no feature relating to the sale of
chattels has been so little and so unsatisfac
torily discussed and determined in previous
adjudications as this. It seems to be the
settled doctrine in the English courts that,
where there is a failnre of title to all the
chattels sold, the purchaser can treat the
transaction as presenting an instance of an
entire failure of consideration, and may sue
for the money paid.
Eichholz v. Bannister,
17 C. B. (N. S.) 708.
There is, however, no
case decided in their courts that holds that
the right of a purchaser is limited to a recov
ery of this sum in an action brought, not for
the money paid, but for a breach of the war
ranty of title. The rule is entirely settled
that for a breach of a covenant for title to
real property the measure of dam,l4_’es is the
consideration paid, and the interest upon
such s,um.
This rule, early settled in the
English courts, is the rule in this and many
other states.
This rule has also been adopted
in many states in this country as eounlly ap
plicable to breaches of the warranty of title
The following cases
to personal property.
display the extent to which this rule has here
Noel v. Wheatly, 30 Miss.
been adopted:
181; \Vare v. “,eathnall,
413;
2 .\Ic(‘0rd.
Wood v. Wood, 1 Metc. (liy.) 512; (Jritteuden
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1 Head, 311; Ellis v. Gosney, 7 J . J.
Marsh. 111; Arthur v. Moss, 1 Or. 193; Goss
v. Dysant, 31 Tex. 186.
A perusal of the opinions in these cases,
and the reasons given for the adoption of this
rule in the sale of chattels, is not calculated
to vindicate the wisdom of the rule.
The
doctrine, so far as it is applicable to breaches
of the covenants in real conveyances, rests
upon grounds which appertain to the charac
ter of real estate.
The reason for the adop
tion of this rule in this class of actions is set
forth at length by Kent, in the leading case
of Slants v. Ten Eyck,.3 Gaines, Cas. 111.
The rule is an exception to the general prin
ciple which underlies the measure of dam
ages for breaches of contract; namely, the
This latter rule
standard of compensation.
applies to actions for breaches of warranties
of quality in the sale of chattels to its full
extent.
In what respect the loss resulting
from a breach of the warranty of title differs
from that resulting from a breach of the war
ranty of quality in dealing with personal
property is diﬂicult to conceive.
Outside of
the vice of extending an exception to a gen
eral rule in any event, there appears to be
no reason why the rule of recovery should
not be uniform in actions upon both kinds
of warranties.
Nor do the cases in which
the exceptional
rule applicable to damages
for breaches of real covenants has been ex
tended to warranties of title to chattels. in
my judgment, present any reason for such
prejudicial action. In nearly all of these
cases the question arose in states when and
where slavery prevailed, and was in respect
to breaches of a warranty of title to slaves.
The reason stated in many of the cases for
the adoption of the rule was the precarious
and ﬂuctuating character of that kind of
property. In other cases the court is con
tent with the citation of the early case of
Armstrong v. Percy, 5 Wend. 536, as the au
thority for the rule. 8
In regard to the latter case. it may be remarked that the rule is drawn from a remark‘
of the judge who delivered the opinion in
that case, in a single sentence, unsupported
And this remark
by authority or reason.
was made in the face of the result in the pre
vious case of Blasdale v. Babcock. 1 Johns.
of the
517. in which there was'a recovery
value of a horse, and costs, upon a warranty
of title. The matter actually decided in the
case of Armstrong v. Percy was that. where
an action had been brought against the pur
chaser by the real owner, who was not the
vendor, the purchaser could recover from the
v. Posey,
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vendor the money paid, besides the costs of
the suit which he was obliged to defend.
There was no suggestion that the rule con
trolling, in this respect, an action for breach
of this kind of warranty, differed from the
rule in actions upon other kinds of warran
ties. The cases cited-namely, Curtis v. Han
nay, 3 Esp. 82; Caswell v. Coare, 1 Taunt.
566; Lewis v. Peake, 7 Taunt. 153-—were all
actions for breach of warranty of quality,
and the measure of damages in these cases
was shown to have been dependent upon the
pleadings. In the ﬁrst two of these cases no
special damages were set out in the declara
tion, and there was nothing but the amount
of the consideration to show what was lost,
so that was ruled to be the measure of dam
ages.
In the last case, the claim for dam
ages having been broader, it was permitted
to the plaintiﬂ? to recover. in addition to this,
the costs of a suit against him by his vendee,
to whom he had sold with a imilar war
.
ranty.
There is nothing in the matters decided i
the case of Armstrong v. Percy which ﬁxes,
as a rule, that for the present kind of war
ranties the measure of damages is limited to
the consideration paid, and interest.
The
rule, I think, in all actions of this kind, is
compensation.
Where no special damages
are set forth, the measure of the loss is the
value of the property purchased; and, where
there is no evidence of value but the consid
eration pald, that will be taken as the stand
ard of value.I Where there is a failure of
title to a part; or an inferior title only is sold.
the loss is the difference between the prop
rty as conveyed and its value had the title
,
been as warranted.
In support of the view that this general
rule, applicable to damages, appertains to ac
tions upon breaches of warranties of title to
chattels, are the cases of Grose v. Heunes
sey, 13 Allen, 389; Rowland v. Shelton. 25
Ala. 217; and the text of Mr. Sedgwick, on
Measure of Damages, 294. 4 My opinion is
that there should be a deduction, in this case.
of the difference between the value of the
entire lot of chattels sold and the value of
The only evi
the lot without the heaters.
dence of the value of the entire lot is what
it was sold for, namely, $1,800. The evidence
in regard to the value of the heaters ﬁxes
Adopting these
their value at about $200.
values. there should be a deduction for the
latter sum from the notes, as of the date of
the sale, leaving due $100 and interest.
The decree should be reversed.
Decree unanimously reversed.
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Supreme Court

FURNITURE
CALL.

336,

123

of Indiana.

Ind.

CO. v.

HAS

502.)

May

1,

1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Elkhart coun
ty; Jmuss D. Osson.sn, Judge.
Action by the Berkey & Gay Furniture
Company against Milo S. Hascall. Judg
ment was rendered ior defendant, and
plaintiff appealed.
J. M. Vanﬂeet, W. H. Vesey, and C. W.
Miller, for appellant.
H. 1). Wilson and W.
J. Du vie, ior appellee.

OLDS, J. This was an action by iheap
pellant against the appellee to recorer a
balance of $374.62iorgoods sold and deliv
cred. The answer is in three paragraphs,
setting upacounter-claim. It is alleged in
the ﬁrst paragraph that on August 26,
1881, the appellee had just completed his
hotel. with 50 rooms, and was in need of
new furniture thereior, without which he
could not carry on his business, as appe lant well knew; that on said day, for the
purpose of furnishing said hotel in all its
parts with suitable furniture, the appel
lant agreed with him to furnish said fur
niture and every part thereof complete,
and setitup in propershape and condition
in his hotel rooms, ready for use, by Sep
tember 15. 1881; that said rooms were ir
regular and different in size, dimensions.
and construction, and for the purpose of
making said furniture suitable ior said
rooms, appellant measured said rooms,
and a list of goods was agreed upon, and
at the foot thereof appellant executed a
memorandum in writing as follows: “ We
agree to put these goods all in good order,
(set up in hotel, without charge, except
freight and enrtage,)castored, with brack
et wood-wheels on all beds. All bureaus and
washstands to have good wood-wheels
on rubber castors.
Goods to be ready the
Any goods not accord15th of September.
ing to order, or not sa tisfactory, may be
returned free of charge. Goshen, Aug. 26th,
1851.
ileum.:v & GAY Fun.\,t,runs ()o.. ’1‘.
M. .\IOI§ELI-1Y.”‘ The paragraph then al
leges that he was ready, able, and willing
to comply with his part of said contract.
but that appellant, with full knowledge of
all the facts, violated said agreement, in
this, to-wit: it failed to deliver any of
said goods prior to September 30. 1881,
whereby he lost the daily use of 29 rooms,
of the rental value of $2 per day for each
room from September 15th to September
30th; that appellant failed to deliver said
goods prior to ., inuary 18, 15042, except as
omplaint; that said fur
set iorth in t"
niture was , I imsed to be delivered in
sets and suitsioi‘.speciﬁc rooms and places,
as set iorth in said ioregoing memoran
dum, but the articles so delivered were not
in sets or suits, but in disjointed and mis
matched pieces, and were not and could
not be properly set up or useduntil all
were delivered; by reason ofwhich he lost
the daily rental value and use of 20 of said
rooms, worth to defendant $2 each per
day from October 1, 1881, to January 18,
1>.i*l2,inclusive; that because of such failure
he was compelled to turn away, and did
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turn away, 20 persons each day, who de
sired to become guests at said hotel,
whereby the income and proﬁts of said

hotel business were diminished $50 per
day. The second paragraph of the coun
ter-claim alleges that on the 26th day of
August, 1881, he had just completed his
hotel, at a cost of $40.00(); that it con
tained 40 rooms
(besides dining-room,
kitchen, etc.,) suitable ior the entertain
ment of guests; that it was then operated
and run by him in the business of hotel
kecping, and was so operated for the next
two years; that the rental value of said
hotel, when furnished, was $5,500 per year;
that on said 26th day of August, 1881, he
was in great need of furniture to supply
and furnish B0 of the aioresaid guest
rooms in said hotel, which rooms were
then unfurnished and empty,in which con
dition they were of no rental value to de
fendant, all of which appellant well knew;
that to supply and furnish said rooms and
hotel as aioresaid,appellant promised and
agreed with him to deliver and set up, in
good order and condition, the furniture
mentioned in its complaint by the15th day
of September, 1881, according to written
speciﬁcations and agreement, (copied into
ﬁrst paragraph above;) that appellant
failed and refused to deliver said goods
until January 18, 1882, during which time,
from September 15.1881, to January 18,
1882, he was deprived of the use and rental
value of said hotel, and the several rooms
therein, which use and rental was of the
value of $2,000. The third paragraph of
. the counter-claim
alleges allthe matters
contained in the other two paragraphs,
showing a little more minutely the rooms
for which the different articles of furniture
were designed. A reply in general denial
. was ﬁled to the answer.
The cause was submitted to a jury for
trial, and the jury returned a special ver
dict in the words and ﬁgures following:
“Special Verdict. '(1) We, the jury, ﬁnd
that the plaintiff contracted with the de
\ fendant, on the 26th day of August, 1881,
to sell and deliver to defendant the several
items of property mentioned in plaintiffs
complaint, at and for the price of each ar
ticle as stated in plaintiff,s complaint, and
was to deliver the same and set the same
up in defendant,s hotel in Goshen, Ind.,
and have the same ready for use in defend
ant’s hotel, known as ‘ Hotel Hascall,’ by
or on the 15th day of September, 1881;
that plaintiff, at the time of making such
contract, knew the purpose ior which said
furniture was to be used.
(2) Plaintiff
failed and neglected to deliver any of said
furniture until the 30th day of September,
1881. and thereupon and thereafter, until
the 18th day of January, 1882 plaintiff de
livered said furniture at the times, and in
the speciﬁc articles, as severally set forth
by the plaintiff in the complaint herein.
(3) Deiendantpaid plaintiff the sums cred
ited to defendant in plaintiffs complaint,
and returned to plaintiff the items of fur
niture, as stated in plaintiff,s complaint,
to the amount of $121.85, thus leaving un
paid of the purchase price of said furniture
the sum of $374.62, March, 1882, as stated
by the plaintiff. (4) We further ﬁnd that
defendant, at and just prior to the milk
ing of said contract, had reconstructed
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and built his hotel building in the city of
Goshen, Ind.. at a cost of $40,000, and de
fend ant was proprietor and manager there
of, and had. within said hotel thirty (30)
rooms that were unfurnished, and when
so unfurnished were of no use or value to
the defendant ; that all said rooms remained
vacant, and of no use or value to de
fendant, from the 15th day of September,
1%l, to the 30th day of September, 1881,
on account and by reason of the failure of
plaintiff to comply with its agreement
aforesaid; that twenty-three (23) of said
rooms remained vacant. and of no use to
defendant, from the 30th day of Septem
ber, 1881, until the 19th day of October,
of plaintiff to
1881, because of the failure
comply with said contract; that seven (7)
of said rooms remained vacant and of no
use from the 19th day of October, 1881, to
the 5th day of November, 1881, because of
the failure of plaintiff to complynvith said
contract; thatfrom the 5th day of Novem
ber, lS81, until December 15, 1881, six (6)
rooms of said hotel remained vacant, and
of no use to defendant, because of the non
fuliillmentof said contract bytbe plaintiff;
that the use of each one of said rooms to
the defendant was nothing, when unfur
nished. (5) We further ﬁnd that the rent
al value and use of each of said rooms,
when furnished with the furniture desig
nated ior same in said contract, would
have been to the defendant 75-100 dollars
per day during‘ said time. (6) If, upon the
foregoing facts. the law be with the plain
tiff, then we ﬁnd for the plaintiff; but, if
the law be with the defendant, then we
ﬁnd ior the defendant. JonN A. S.\t1,ra,
moved for
Foreman." The appellant
judgment on the special verdict, which
motion was overruled, and an exception
reserved. The appellee moved ior judg
ment on the special verdict, and the court
sustained said motion, to which the ap
pellant excepted. Fi,nal judgment was then
entered in favor of appellee ior $554.63,
and costs.
Appellant ﬁled a motion ior new trial,
which was overruled, and exceptions re
served. The appellant assigns as error:
(1) That the court erred in overruling ap
pellant,s motion ior judgment in its favor
upon the special verdict.
(2) That the
court erred in sustaining appellee,s mo
tion ior judgment in hisfavor on the spe
cial verdict.
(3) That the court erred in
overruling appellan t’s motion ior a new tri
al. It is'contended that, under the facts
iound, the appellee is only entitled to com
pensatory or general damages, and not ior
the special damages set up as a counter
claim.
We think the facts found in the special
verdict entitled the appellee to recover the
special damages claimed. In Vickery v.
McCormick, 117 Ind. 594-597, 20 N. E. Rep.
“The general rule is
495, the court says:
that a party who fails to comply with his
contract to furnish goods is liable for the
value of the goods in the open market at
But, when similar
the time of the failure.
goods cannot be purchased in the market,
the measure of damages is the actual loss
sustained by the purchaserin not receiving"
the goods according to the contract.
See llahm v. Deig,23 N. E. Rcp.141, and au
thorities there cited. In Hadley v. Baxen
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dale, 9 Exch. 3-ll, Sedg. Lead. Cas. 126-136,
the court states what we deem to be the
true rule governing the assessment of dam
ages in such cases as this. In that case it
“
is said:
Where two parties have made a.
contract, which one of them has broken,
the damages which the other party ought
to receive in respect to such breach of con
tract should be such as may fairly and
reasonably be considered either arising
naturally—I. e., according to the usual
course of things——from such breach of con
tract itself, or such as may reasonably be
supposed to have been in the contempla
tion of both parties at the time they made
the contract as the probable result of the
breach of it.” The facts found by the jury
show that the appellee, at and just prior
to August 26, 1881, had reconstructed and
built his hotel building in the city of Go
shen, Ind., at a cost of $40,000, and that
appellee was proprietor and manager there
of, and had within said hotel 30 rooms
that were unfurnished, and when so an
furnished were of no use or value to the
appellee; that upon said day he contract
ed with the appellant to sell and deliver to
him the several items of property men
tioned in the appellant,s complaint, which
consisted of the necessary furniture to fur
nish said rooms, at and for the price of
each article as stated in the complaint,
and agreed to deliverthe same and set the
same up in appellee’s hotel, and have the
same ready for use in said hotel by or on
the 15th day of September, 1881; that the
appellant, at the time of the making of said
contract, knew the purpose for which said
furniture was to be used. The contract
was to furnish the furniture for 30 rooms
in an hotel, and setit up in the rooms, and
have it ready for use and occupancy by a
day named. From thesefacts it necessari
ly follows, as a conclusion, that the party
contracting to furnish thesame knew that
the rooms were valueless as. hotel apart
ments when unfurnished; that the furni
ture was necessary to enable the purchaser
to use and occupy the same, and operate
his hotel; and that the appellee would be
deprived of the use of such rooms ior such
purpose until itcomplied with its contract.
The facts iound further show that the ap
pellant commenced furnishing the furni
ture soon after the date when it was all to
have been furnished and put up inthe rooms,
furnishing part atone time and part at an
other. The facts show the appellee had
reconstructed and rebuilta valuable hotel,
and was operating; it himself, and the
damages naturally resulting
from the
breach of the contract, according to the
facts found, were what “‘he rooms would
' furnished ac
have been worth to ap
,. .f‘4.an they
cording to the contrr ﬁx
Q
'-‘Turing the
were worth to him ur -‘‘e\\.\’,\
delay in complving w. “\ D; contract. Ap
pellee built thé‘ house ior a particular pur
pose, and was having it furnished ior such
purpose. He was not bound to rent out
the rooms for another purpose, even if he
could have done so. If there had been a
breach and a total failure of the appellant
to have furnished the whole or any part
of the furniture, and the appellee had been
notiﬁed that he was not intending to fur
nish it, then the appellant would have been
liable ior the difference in value of the fur
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nlturc between its price in the open war
kct and the contract price, as “'( ll as the
loss of the use of the rooms ior the time
necessary to have procured the furniture
elsewhere; but in this case the appellant

furnished the furniture, and appellee ac
cepted it, so that the damage was the loss
sustained byreasonofthedelay.
Wethink
the loss of the use of the rooms as they
were to be furnished might fairly be con
sidered to have been contemplated by the
parties at the time of the making of the
con tract. In Richardson
v. L‘hynoweth,
Wis. 656, it was held that a defendant
failing to deliver an article, knowing the
purpose for which it was purchased, was
. liable ior the proﬁts the purchaser would
ha ve made. See 1 Sedg. Dam. (7th Ed.)
Field, Darn. § 250; City of Terre
218—239;
Haute v. Hudnut,1l2 Ind. 542, 13 N. E. Rep.
686.

it is contended that the facts iound do
not state the damages correctly; that, if
the plaintiff is entitled to recover, the
amount he is entitled to recover would be
the difference between the rental value of
and furnished.
the rooms, unfurnished
This objection we do not think available
ior a reversal of the judgment. When spe
ciai dmnages of this character are recover
able, it is the damage the party himself has
sustained that heis entitled to recover. If
A. purchase grain of B., and at thetimeA.
has a previous contract to sell and deliver
grain to C., and A. purchases the grain of
B. with a view of ﬁlling his previous con
tract with C.. and C. is advised of that fact,
and the contract is such that on failure
to deliver B. becomes liable to A. ior the
proﬁt he would have made, thedamage re
coverable is the proﬁt A. would
have
made; and that amount might be deter
mined byaﬂnding of the facts showingthe
amount A. was to pay B. ior the grain, and
the amount he would have received from
So,in this case, the amount
C. ior thesa'me.
of damage that the appellee was entitled

to recover was the
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in value to
difference
the appellee in the rooms, furnished and
unfurnished, for the time they remained.
unfurnished by reason of appellant,s fail
ure to furnish the furniture; and that
amount is determined by ﬁnding what
the rooms were worth to the appcllce un
furnished, and what they were worth fur
nished, ior the time he was deprived of the
use of them ior the purpose for which they
were to be used. The jury has iound as‘
facts that the use of the rooms unfurnished
was worth nothing to the appellee during
that time, and furnished they would have
been worth 75 cents per day, and the num
ber of days each room was unfurnished
from the date appellant contracted to set
up the furniturein the rooms is also stated
and found in the verdict, and the gross
amount may be determined by a merecom
putation. The facts iound in the special
verdict entitle the appellee to a judgment
for the amount of the damages found to
have been sustained by him. Fussion v.
Lnndrey (this term) 24 N. E. 96. The facts
found cover all the issues in the case, and
is all that is required by a special ver
éhat
ct.
It is further contended that the court
erred in not sustaining the motion ior new
trial, forthe reason that the judgment ren
dered upon the verdict is in excess of the
amount found due the appeilee by the ver
dict, but this question is not presented by
the record. If the judgment does not iol
low the verdict, or is not such a judgment
as the party was entitled to have rendered
upon the verdict, to present any question
as to the amount oriorm of the judgment,
it was necessary to make a motion to
modify the judgment, and properly reserve
exceptions in case the motion was over
ruled. It iollows, thereiore, from the con
clusion we have reached, that there is no
error in the record ior which the judgment
udgment aﬂirmed,
should be reversed.
‘
with costs.
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BEEMAN
(23 N.

Court

E.

of Appeals
sfon.

v.

BANTA.

887, 118 N.

Y.

538.)

of New York, Second Divi
Feb. 25, 1890.

Appeal from supreme court, general
term, iourth department.
Action by Marcus M. Beeman against
There was a verdict and
George.A.Banta.
judgment for plaintiff, which was afﬁrmed
by the general term, and defendant again
appeals.
Rhodes, Coons & Higgins and John H.
Baldwin & Ken
Parsons, for appellant.
nedy, for respondent.

PARKER,J. The recoveryin this action
was ior damages claimed to have been sus
tained because of a breach of an express
warranty on the part of the defendant to
so construct a freezer ior the plaintiff as
that chickens could be kept therein in per
The. jury have iound the
fect condition.
making oithe warranty,its breach. and the
amount of damages resulting therefrom.
The general term have afﬁrmed these ﬁnd
ings, and. as there is some evidence to sup
port each proposition, we have butto con
sider the exceptions taken. The appellant
excepted to the charge of thecourt respect
ing the measure of damages. Upon the
trial he insisted, and still urges, that the
proper measure of damages is the cost of
so changing the freezer as to obviate the
defect, and make it coniorm to the war
ranty. And Milk Pan Co. v. Remington,
109 N. Y. H3, 16 N. E. Rep. 48. is cited in
That decision
support of such contention.
was not intended to, nor does it, modify
the rule as recognized and eniorced in Pas
singer v. Thorburn, 34 N. Y. 634: White v.
Milier,7l N.Y.l33; Wakeman v.Manufact
uring Co., 10l N. Y. 205, 4 N. E. Rep. 264;
Reed v. .\icConnell,101 N.Y. 276.4 N. E. Rep.
In that case the
718; and kindred cases.
of the court demonstrates—
argument
F1‘rst, thatim proper evidence was received;
and, second, that the ﬁnding of the referee
was without evidence to support it. No
other proposition was decided, and the
discussion is not applicable to the facts be
fore us. The plaintiff was largely engaged
in preparing poultry ior market. which he
Beiore
had either raised or purchased.
mceﬂng the defendant. he had attempted
to keep chickens for the early spring mar
ket in a freezer or cooler which he had con,
structed for the purpose. The attempt was
unsuccessful, and resulted in a loss. The
jury have iound, in effect, that the defend
ant, with knowledge of this intention of
the plaintiff to at once make use of it in
of chickens
the freezing and preservation
ior the May market iollowing, expressly
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represented and warranted that for affout
$500 he would construct a freezer which
should keep them in perfect condition ior
such market: that he failed to keep his
contract in such respect, resulting in a loss
to the plaintiff of many hundred pounds of
chickens. Thecourtcharged the jury that,
if they should ﬁnd for the plaintiff, he was
entitled to recover as one of the elements
of damage the difference between the value
of the refrigerator as constructed, and its
value as it would have beenif made accord
ing to contract.
The correctness of this
instruction does not admit of questioning.
Had the defendant made no use of the
freezer, such rule would have embraced all
the damages recoverable. But he did make
use of it. and such use as was contem
plated by the contract of the parties. The
result was the total loss of hundreds of
pounds of chickens. The fact that the de
fendant well knew the use to which the
freezer was to be immediately put, and his
representation and warranty that it would
keep chickens in perfect condition, burden
him with the damage sustained because of
his failure to make good the warranty.
Upon that question the court instructed
the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to
recover the value of the chickens, less cost
of getting them to market, including freight
The
and fees of commission merchant.
question of value was left to the jury, but
they were permitted to consider the evi
dence tending to show that frozen chickens
were worth 40 centsa pound in the market
during the month of May. Such instruc
The object
tion we consider authorized.
of the freezer was to preserve chickens ior
the May market. The expense of construc
tion and trouble,as well as expense of op
eration, was incurred and undertaken in
order to secure the enhanced prices of the
month of May. It was the extra proﬁt
which the plaintiff was contracting to se
cure, and, in so far as the proﬁts contem
plated by the parties can be proven, they
may be considered. Gains prevented’ as
well as losses sustained. are proper ele
ments ofdamage. Wakeman v. Manufactur
ing Co., 101 N. Y. 205, 4 N. E. Rep. 264. We
have carefully examined the other excep
tions to the charge as made, and to the
refusals to charge as requested, and also
the exceptions taken to the admissibility
of testimony. but ﬁnd no errorjustifying
The insistence of the appel
a reversal.
lant that the judgment be reversed, be
cause against the weight of evidence, may
have been entitled to some consideration
by the general term, but it cannot be re
garded here. The iudgment should he of
ﬁrmed. All co.ncnr, except FOLLETT, C.
‘J., and VANN. J., not sitting.
Judgment affirmed.
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and use of his ground; and that he was
damaged thereby in the sum of $150. And
he asked judgment for that amount. and
srnuv v. mass.
costs of suit. The trial resulted in a ver
dict in favor of thedefendnnts and against
,(25 Pac. sse’ B87, 45 Kan. 334.)
the plaintiffs for the sum of $90. and judg
Feb. 7, 1891.
Supreme Court of Kansas.
ment was rendered accordingly; and the
plaintiffs. as plaintiffs in error. bring the
Error from distnct court, Cowley coun
case to this court for review.
ty; M. G. Tuocr, Judge.
It appears from the evidence that the
facts of the case are substantially as fol
Smnuei Dalton and Samuel J. Day. ior
lows: The plaintiffs, G. B. Shaw & Co.,
plaintiffs in error. S. E. Fink, ior defend
were dealers in ﬂaxseed at Cambridge, in
ants in error.
said Cowley county.
Smith went to their
VALENTINE, J. This was an action place of business about April 20. 1886, and
brought beiore a justice of the peace of found Joseph Fraiey, their agent. in
charge. Shaw & Co. did not have any ﬂax
Cowley county on January 31. 1887, by G.
seed on hand. but they were about to or
B. Shaw & Co. against Yates Smith and
James W. M(‘Clellen. ior the recovery of der some. Smith told Fraley to order
eight bushels for him, for the purpose of
$12. and interest’ upon the following in
sowing it and raising a crop. Fraley told
strument in writing, to-wit: “Cambridge’
Smith that they would furnish the ﬂax
April 30. 1886. On or before the ﬁrst day
substantially as
seed upon the conditions
of October. .l$86’ we promise to pay to the
set iorth in the foregoing instrument.
order of G. B. Shaw & Co., at their ofﬁce
Afterwards the ﬂaxseed arrived. and Fra
in Cambridge. twelve dollars, ior value re
Smith then. on
iey gave notice to Smith.
ceived. with interest after maturity. at the
April 30. 1886. went to Cambridge and re
rate of ten per cent. per annum until paid.
This note is lgiven in part consideration of ceived thesced.about8 bushels in amount,
inclosed in sacks. from Fraley’ and took
the sale to Y. Smith of eight bushels ﬂax
it home and sowed it upon about 12 acres
seed, by said G. B. Shaw & 0o.; and; as a
further consideration thereior, we agree to of ground. The seed appeared to be good,
and Fraley and Smith believed it to be
plant 14 acres with said seed. to cultivate.
good, but in fact it was not good, and it
harvest. and clean the same in proper and
did not germinate; and Smith lost all his
careful manner. and deliver to G. B. Show
time and labor in procuring it. and in pre
& Co. at (‘ambridge. Kansas. on or before
paring the ground for sowing it. and in
the 1st day of 1)ecember, 1886, the whole
sowing it. and he got no crop, and lost
crop raised therefrom. at a price men
the use of his ground.
And upon these
tioned below. per bushel of 56 lbs., ior
facts the jury iound in favor of the defend
pure and prlmeﬁaxsced; ﬁaxseed not pure
and prime to beinspected and graded sub-‘ ants and against the plaintiffs, and as
ject to the rules of the St.Louiﬂ .\.fen.hmn;g’€r 'QI'se‘ssed the defendants’ damalzes at $90, as
aioresaid.
The only questions now in
Exchange.
And should we sell or trade,
volved in the case are as iollows:
or attempt to offer to sell or trade. such
(1)
Under the contract between the parties.
crop to any other person or persons than
and under the circumstances of the case,
said G. B. Shaw & Co., or order. then the
was there any such implied warranty on
note hereto attached shall immediately
the part of Shaw &Co0 respecting thesuﬁi
become due and payable; and the said G.
ciency of the ﬁaxseed ior the purposes of
B. Shaw &.Co., or their assigns. are here
sowing it and raising a crop’ that the
by authorized to enter any building or
plaintiffs may be defeated in their action
premises without any legal process what
on the aforesaid written instrument?
ever’ and seize and retuove such crop
(2)
if so’ then under such contract and war
whatsoever (and in whosesoever posses
sion the same may be found), and to pay ranty and circumstances, may the de
me the balance on demand, after the
fendants. Smith and Mc(‘lellen. or rather
Smith, recoverdamages ior Smith’s losses,
amount due upon said note has been de
necessarily occasioned by reason of the
ducted. together with all costs and ex
of the ﬁaxsced? (3) And,
pense incurred. where seizure is necessary;
worthlessness
if so. then what is the measure of Smith‘s
price to bepuid per bushel. on basis of pure.
damages?
The maxim of the common
to be 35 cents less than St. Louis market
law, ca veat emptor. is the general rule ap
price on day of delivery. YA’l‘l4‘.s SMITH.
JAm.:s W. Mt..Ci.I0;t.Lr;.\,.” Afterwards the plicable to purchasers and sales of person
al property so far as the quality of the
case was taken on appeal to the district
court. where the case was tried before the property is concerned: and, under such
court and a jury. with the result hereafter
maxim’ the buyer. in the absence of fraud.
’l‘he plaintiffs’ bill of particulars
purchases at his own risk, unless the seller
stated.
gives him an express warranty, or unless,
simply set up the ioregoing instrument.
and asked judgment thereon for $12, and
from the circumstances of the sale, a we rranty may be implied. 1n the present case
interest at the rate of 10 per cent. per an
no express warranty was given’ and the
num from October 1, 1886. The defend
question then arises, was there any im
ants’ amended answer thereto and cross
plied warranty? At the time when the
pctition alleged that the ﬂaxseed ior which
the instrument sued on was given was
contract for the purchase and sale of the
purchased by Smith,ior the purpose of
ﬂaxseed was entered into, such seed was
sowing it and raising a crop; that it was
not present so that it could be inspected
warranted by the plaintiffs to be good,
by the purchaser. and, when it arrived
but that it was worthless;
that he
and was delivered to him, the defect in
the seed was not apparent, and was prob
(Smith) sowed it. but that it (lid not ger
minate; and that he lost his time, labor,
ably not discoverable by any ordinary
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means of inspection, and it was not dis
.covered until after it was sowed, and when
it failed to germinate. When the original
contract for the purchase and sale of the
ﬂaxseed was made, the ﬁaxseed was pur
chased and sold ior the particular pur
l- pose, known to both
the buyer and the
seller, of sowing it in a ﬁeld, and of rais
ing a crop from it; and thereiore this pur
pose was a part of the contract, and demanded that the seed should be suﬂicient
for such purpose. It, in effect, constitut
ed a warranty on the part of the seller
that the seed should be the kind of seed
had in contemplation by both the parties
when the contract was made. The pur
chaser had to rely upon the seller,s fur
nishing to him the kind O! seed agreed up
on, and the seller,in efiect,amced that the
seed furnished should be the kind of seed
agreed upon. The entire contract when
made was executory. and it was to be ex
ecuted and periormed afterwards. and to
be periormed in parts and at difierent
times. The seller was ﬁrst to furnish the
se‘_ud, and he did so in about 10 days after
thecontract was made, and of course the
seed was to be a kind of seed that would
grow. The purchaser was afterwards to
sow it and to raise a crop, and afterwards
the purchaser was to sell, and the seller
/was to buy, the crop, upon certain terms
I and conditions expressed in the contract.
VVe think there was an implied warranty
on the part of the seller that the seed

/
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should be sufﬂcient for the purpose for
which it was bought and sold. Wolcott
v. Mount, 36 N. J. Law, 262. 38 N. J. Law.
496; Van Wyck v. Allen, 69 N. Y.61; White
v. Mlller,7 Hun. 427, 71 N. Y. 118: Whit
aker v. McCormick, 6 Mo. App. 114. We
also think that the purchaser may re
cover damages from the seller for all the
losses necessarily sustained by the pur
chaser, by reason of the worthiessuess of
the ﬂaxseed furnished by the seller. See
the authorities abow: cited. and also the
following: Passinger v. ’l‘horburn, 34 N.
Y. 634; Flick v. Wetnerbce, 20 Wis. 392;
Ferris v. (.‘omstock, 33 Conn. 513; Randall
v. Raper, El., Bl. & El. 84. And it is not
claimed that the purchaser in the pres
ent case recovered for more than the fore
going losses. The claim is that the pur
chaser had no right to recover at all, and
that the seller had the right to recover on
the instrument sued on. No Other ques
tions are presented. We think no materi
al error was committed in the case, and
the judgment of the court below will he
aﬂirmed.
All the justices concurring.

PER CURIAM. It is understood that
the same questions of law and fact are in
volved in the case of G. B. Shaw & Co. v.
T. L. Jones. !rom Cowley district court,
that are involved in the case of Shaw v.
Smith, just decided, and the judgment of
the court below in this case will be ai
ﬂrmed upon the authority of that case.
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more than one hundred additional shares of
the stock of said company shall be issued
(29 N. E. 760, 130 N. Y. 372.)
until the said payment be made and stock
without the consent of the said
delivered
Court of Appeals of New York, Second Divi
Barnes, and that
o much of said one hun
sion. Jan. 20,.1892.
dred shares as shall be issued shall be trans
Appeal from supreme court, general term,
ferred to the said Barnes, if we do not ex
ﬁrst department.
ercise our option of paying said twenty-sev
Action by Oliver W. Barnes against George
en thousand ﬁve hundred dollars, and deliver
ing said two thousand shares on the fai.lure
H. Brown, and James Seiigman, Jesse Selig
man. and David Seligman, as executors of
of the said amendments to become a law
Joseph Seligman.
The general term dismiss
at the present session. And we further agree
ed the complaint as to the executors, and re
thatno contract for the construction of the
railway of the company shall be entered into
versed the referee,s decision, which awarded
only nominal damages against Brown._ Plain
without the consent of the said Barnes until
Aﬂlrmed as to the
tiff and Brown appeal.
the said money shall be paid and the stock
executors, and reversed as to Brown.
delivered.
In witness whereof we have here
The other facts fully appear in the follow
unto set our hands and seals this twenty
ing statement by Bradley, J.:
sixth day of March, in the year one thousand
George 11.
eight hundred and seventy-two.
The action was brought to recover dam
ages for the alleged breach of contract of
Brown. [L. S.l Joseph Seligman.
[L. S.]"
\Vhen, in 1882, this action was commenced,
which the following is a copy, to-wit: “Oli
Joseph Seligmau had died, and executors of
ver \V. Barnes having, by instruments hear
his will were joined as defendants
with
ing even date herewith, assigned and trans
Brown. The alleged default was in the fail I
ferred to us, George H. Brown and Joseph
Seligman, all claims and demands against the ure or refusal to deliver to the plaintiff the
2,000 shares of the stock of the railway com
New York City (‘entral Underground Rail
pany, as Brown and Seligman
way Company. and his title to certain sub
had under
scriptions to the capital stock of said com
taken by the contract.
The plaintiff sought
pany, and also any interest he may have in ‘ to recover $200,000
and interest.
The ref
eree found that the stock had no value, and
a certain alleged contract
made with the
directed judgment against Brown for nomi
said company by Francis P. Byrne, and hav
ing also transferred sixty shares of stock in nal or six cents damages; and as to the dc
Now, we, George H. Brown
fendants (executors) the referee directed judg
said company:
Judgments
ment of dismissal of complaint.
and .io...spit Scligman, do hereby, in consid
The general term
eration of the premises and of one dollar to were entered accordingly.
aiiirmed the latter, and reversed the judg
us paid by the said Oliver W. Barnes, agree
ment for nominal damages, and as to the de
that we will, upon certain amendments to the
fendant Brown granted a new trial.
charter of the said New York City Central
l.,n(lcl‘gro(nul
Itailway (‘ompany. now pend
Edward C. James and Ira Leo Bamherger.
ing before the legislature of the state of New
for plaintiff.
Hamilton Odell and DJoim E.
York. becoming a low, pay. or cause to be
Parsons, for defendants.
paid. to the said Oliver W. Barnes. his rcp
rc1-‘entatives and assigns, the sum of twen
BRADLIGY, J., (after stating the facts.)
ty-seven ilmusand ﬁve hundred dollars in cur
The main controversy has relation to the
rency of the.United States, being the amount
rule or measure of damages applicable to the
of certain advances made and services ren
breach of the contract upon which this ac
dered by the said Barnes to the said railway
company; and also that we will cause to be tion was fonnded. While the plaintiff claim‘:
that damages cannot be less than $2I)0.000
delivered
to the said Barnes or his assigns
and interest, it is insisted on the part of the
at the time of the payment of the said mon
defense that they were only nominal.
ey two thousand shares of the capital stock
Before
proceeding to the consideration
of the ques
of the said railway company, which said
tion in that respect, reference may properly
stock is to be full-paid stock. And we fur
be made to the facts out of which the al
ther agree with the said Oliver W. Barnes,
leged claim arose.
The New York City Cen
his representatives and assigns, that, in the
tral Underground Railway Company was or
event of the said amendments not becoming
. 1l law at
ganized under an act incorporating it, and
the present session of the legislature,
authorizing the company to construct and
we will either cause said money to be paid,
operate an underground
railway in the city
and said two thousand shares of stock deliv
of New York, passed in 1868, and amended
ered to the said Barnes or his assigns, or
in 1869.
The authorized capital stock of the
have reassigned to the said Barnes or his as
company was $10,000,000.
signs the claims. demands. and rights so as
At the time the
contract of March 26, 1872. was made, the
signed to us, and transfer‘ to him or his as
plaintiff was president of the company.
He
signs the said sixty shares of stock so trans
then had some claims against it, and only
ferred to us the next day after the close
of the present session of the legislature of
117 shares of capital stock had been issued,
By the trans
of which he held 63 shares.
New York. And we further agree that not
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60 shares to Brown and Seligman,
took the control of the organization of
The amendments to the char
the company.
ter then pending in the legislature did not
it was op
become a law. and consequently
tional with them to either retain their pur
chase and pay, or surrender what they had
received, and put an end to the contract.
They, however, concluded to treat it as ef
fectual, and assumed the undertaking to per
form. and afterwards did pay to the plain
tiff the $27,500, and did deliver to the plain
tiff certiﬁcates of 2,000 shares of the capital
stock of the company.
This was apparently
full performance, but in fact was not, be
cause that so delivered was not paid stock;
and when this was discovered by the plaintiff
he offered to return the certiﬁcates, and de
manded such as he was entitled to.
Further
performance was refused, and this action fol
lowed. The only question as against the
and
defendant Brown was one of damages;
the referee found that at the time when he
and Seligman undertook to deliver the stock
to plaintiff it had no actual or market value.
and determined that he was entitled to re
The stock cer
.cover nominal damages only.
tainly had no market value.
None was in
the market.
This ﬁnding and conclusion
were challenged by the plaintiff,s exceptions
By reference to the condition of the company,
it is seen that the total amount of money re
ceived by it on account of subscriptions to its
stock was $5,700, and that was received in
1869 and 1871.
The other credits to the cap
ital stock account were in demand loans and
special services rendered the company.
The
various efforts prior to 1872 were unsucces
fully made to raise money for the purpose of
construction of the railway, and the reason
why the bonds of the company could not be
negotiated
was that it had been unable to
to its capital stock to
obtain subscriptions
The land and conse
pay for right of way.
quential damages incident to the construction
of the railway were estimated at 5,000,000;
for
by the company
and the expenditures
work done towards construction and for land
and land damages did not exceed $4,000.
The indebtedness of the company was about
This was, in general terms. the
$350,000.
situation of the company when the contract
of March 26, 1872, was made; and it was
known as well to Brown and Seilgman as
to the plaintiff. Whatever of value they took
by the contract was in the franchise of the
company, and was dependent upon the use
which could be made of it by way of the
construction and operation of an underground
railway.
While the futility of the enter
prise tended to show that it never had any
actual value, there evidently was hope and
expectation of success entertained by Brown
and Seiigman'when they elected to retain the
beneﬁt of the contract, and it is in that view
insisted by the plaintiff that the stock then
had a value which to him may at that time
have been available, although later it turn

fer of the
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ed out to have had none, and therefore he
lost whatever he may have realized by its
conversion, if it had in due time been deliv
ered to him.
There is apparently some force
in this suggestion, but ‘it is entirely specula
tive, assuming
that the stock then in fact
had no actual value as well as no market
value.
There was some conﬂict in the ex
pert evidence upon the subject, founded up
While that
on the situation of the company.
was that the
on the part of the defendants
stock had no value, that of the witnesses
called by the piaintiff was to the effect that
it was, as the situation then appeared, worth
It may be observed that the plaintiff
par.
held the stock represented by the certiﬁcates
so delivered to him until about September 1,
1874, upon the assumption that it was full
paid stock, before his discovery that it was
otherwise.
The ﬁnding of the referee that the stock
had neither
actual nor market value was
supported by evidence, and for the purposes
of this review must be deemed conclusive.
But it is insisted by the learned counsel for
.‘
the plaintiff.that the plaintiff should nevertheless have recovered the $200,000 and in
terest upon it because he was entitled to the
stock or to a sum which it would cost to
As a general rule, the damages
obtain it.
which a party is entitled to recover against
another for breach of contract are such as
will indemnify him for the loss he has suf
fered by the default; and it is with a view
to that result that the rules for ascertaining
and awarding damages have been adopted.
The purpose of the rule in that respect is to
leave the party in no worse, and place him
in no better, condition
than he would have
been if the act or default complained of had
It was with a
had not been committed.
view to such measure of relief, and the
it, that
of a rule to accomplish
adoption
the doctrine which gave the highest market
value up to the time of the trial as the
measure of damages for conversion of proper
ty of ﬂuctuating value, as held in ‘.\iarkhnm
v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235. and some prior cases,
was overruled in Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y.
211, and the market value for a reasonable
time within which to replace the property
was adopted as furnishing the guide to the
proper measure of damages and the more sat
isfactory means of indemnity. In that case
pursuant to an arrangement
the defendants,
with the plaintiff, had purchased stocks to
hold and carry, subject to his order. so long
The defend
as he kept his margin good.
ants disposed of the stock in violation of the
agreement;
and the court there held sub
stantially that an amount suﬁicient to indem
nify a party injured for the loss naturally,
reasonably,
and proximately resulting from
of, and which a proper
the act complained
degree of prudence on the part of the com
plainant would not have averted. is the prop
er measure of recovery when punitive dam
ages are not allowable; and that “the ad
__../
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vnnce in the market price of the stock from
contract is made in reference to special cir
the time of the sale up to a reasonable time
cumstances affecting the measure of compen
sation, such circumstances
may be treated as
to replace it after the plaintiff received no
within the contemplation of the parties, and
tice of the sale would afford a complete
indemnity." The principle upon which the
constitute a basis for the assessment of dam
determination of BaIker v. Drake rested was ages. Booth v. Mill Co., 60 N. Y. 487. They
come within the meaning of special damages,
that the measure of the plaintiffs damages
was governed by the opportunity which was
and must be the subject of allegation in
pleading to entitle the party to make proof
afforded by the market for him within a
reasonable time to replace the stock or the
of them, unless objection in that respect be
refusal of the defendant to do so. 66 N. Y.
waived. In the present case, no facts of
518; Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368.
And in special character relating to damages were
Wright v. Bank. 110 N. Y. 237. 18 N. E.
alleged,
by the
nor were any established
79, the same rule was held in like manner
evidence further than the mere fact that the
applicable where stock fully paid for by the
stock of the company had no market value.
If, notwithstanding that fact, the stock may
owner is, through the honest mistake of the
piedgee, converted by him, and he refuses
have had an actual value a different question
to replace it. Thereupon the owner may do would have been presented; for the plaintiﬂ.I
so within a reasonable time, and the highest
could not be subjected to loss, nor could the
market price within that time is the proper
defendant be permitted to proﬁt, by the fact
This is the recognized
that the stock had no market value at the
measure of damages.
rule in this state, and it is applicable alike stipulated time for delivery. Then other
by the market
means than those afforded
to actions upon contract as in tort.
In the present case there was no market would be resorted to under the contract. as
to resort to for the plaintiff to supply him
within the contemplation of the parties to
self with the stock, nor any market value to ascertain the amount requisite to full indem
The rule nity to the plaintiff.
Sternfels v. Clark. 2
furnish the measure of damages.
Hun, 122, 70 N. Y. 608.
There may be cases
applied in the cases last cited was not, there
in which damages have no support in market
fore, in that.sense applicable to the situa
values, where the value is peculiar to the
how
A4subscription,
tion in the case at bar.
party entitled to performance, and relief will
ever, to 2,0(l) shares of the capital stock of
Scattergood v. Wood,
the railway company, and payment of the
be given accordingly.
full amount to the company, would have 14 Hun’ 269. 79 N. Y. 263; Parsons v. Sut
produced the stock, and it may be assumed
ton, 66 N. Y. 92.
And when the remedy at
or im
is inadequate
that it could not otherwise have been pro
law for compensation
It is upon that ground that the practicable, it may be found in equity by
cured.
de
plaintiff insists that the liability of
way of speciﬁc performance.
Pom. Eq. Jur.
the
fendant ls measured by that amount. Thi
Those are supposed cases to which
§ 1401.
would have been so if the agreement of the, principles of law adapt remedies when
Brown and Seiigmau had been to pay the they arise.
But in the case at bar the stock
plaintiff $200,000 in the stock of the company.
not only had no market value; it also had no
Then their indebtedness or liability would actual value.
Nor does it appear that it
not have been controlled by the value of the
would have been of any value to the plain
stock, but would have been ﬁxed by the con
tiff, or of any substantial beneﬁt to him, for
tract; but when the speciﬁc quantum of the any purpose{ if he had received it. The de
stock was made the considerntionin that re
fendant Brown, and his associate. Scligman,
sale to.thcm,
on
spect for the plaintiffs
did not, by the contract, undertake to do
their failure to deliver it he was entitled in anything to give any future value to the
damages to the equivalent of that which they
Thus we have the
stock of the company.
had undertaken to render.
In the absence -‘simple case of a contract to deliver a cer
in an action for
of special circumstances,
tiﬁcate for a certain quantity of capital stock
conversion of personal property, as well as
then having no existence. and when due and
one for failure to deliver it in performance
The claim that,
thereafter having no value.
of a contract, where consideration has been because the creation or issue of this worth
at the less stock would cost its par value, the plain
received. the value of the property
time of such conversion or default, with in
tiff is entitled to recover that sum. does not
terest,
is the
measure
of compensation.
seem to have the support of any well-deﬁned
Ormshy v. Mining Co., 56 N. Y. 623; Parsons principle of law. But it is said that. with
v. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92.
No special circum
knowledge of the situation. Brown and his
stances were alleged in the complaint to take
associate absolutely agreed to deliver the
this case out of the general rule.
Nor was stock, and therefore they were bound to pay
there any ﬂuctuation in the value of the stock
the amount requisite to accomplish it with
succeeding
the time for its delivery. under
out regard to the value of the stock, or of
the contract to qualify the application of such
its beneﬁcial use to the plaintiff.
In an ac
rule.
tion at law to recover dmnages for bl,eﬁ(h
The damages which a party ordinarily may
of contract, the question of damages is one
of indemnity; and in that respect the reme
recover for breach of contract are those which
n:uurnlly ﬂow from the default; and, if the ' dy founded upon this contract does not differ
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the plaintiff, upon a state of facts em
braced in an hypothetical question, called up
on the witnesses
to state the value of the
This was the time
stock in January, 1873.
when, by the issue tendered in the complaint
and taken by the answer, the value of the
stock was by the pleadings brought in ques
tion; and it may be observed that the as
sumed facts upon which the answers of the
witnesses
were predicated were the same,
and no different at that time than they were
on the day when the contract matured.
that,
These views lead to the conclusion
Brown, the judgment
as to the defendant
directed by the referee should be sustained.
But, as the order granting an additional al
lowance of costs to that defendant may be
deemed to have been reversed at general
I term, that disposition
of the order is aﬂirm
ed, and the costs recovered
treated as re
accordingly. The contract was the
duced
joint undertaking of Brown and Seligman.
The latter having died before the action
was commenced, his personal representatives
were joined as defendants with Brown. The
‘ complaint
was as to those executors dismiss
ed by the referee. upon the ground that facts
sufﬁcient to constitute a cause of action
against them were not alleged.
Their tes
tator having only the relation of joint con
tractor with Brown, his death placed the
primary liability upon the latter, unless he
was unable to pay or insolvent.
Upon that
fact the liability of those personal repre
sentatives to the plaintiff upon the contract
was dependent, and that fact was essential
to the cause of action against them.
Grant
them to pay to ‘the company $200,000, the en
v. Shurter, 1 Wend. 148; Trustees v. Law
tire value of its performance
to the plain
rence, 11 Paige, 80, 2 Denio, 577; Pope v.
tiff was in the stock which they undertook
Cole, 55 N. Y. 124, and cases there cited;
to deliver to him, and this was the only ben
Hauck v. Craighead, 67 N. Y. 432.
eﬁt he was entitled to take under that pro
It was
not alleged.
This defect was available by
vision of the contract.
The value of the
objection
which was taken at the trial.
stock or its pecuniary
equivalent was the
Code, § 499.
measure of his injury by the default; and,
as it had no value, the plaintiff was award
It does not appear on what ground the
motion to amend the complaint was denied.
ed complete indemnity by the conclusion of
The plaintiff was not entitled to it as mat
the referee that he was entitled to recover
nominal damages only.
ter of right; and the discretionary power of
the referee exercised in denying the amend
There was no error in the ruling of the
ment is not the subject of review here. The
referee. by which evidence of value of the
judgment in favor of the defendants, Selig
stock was received.
The complaint alleg
man, as modiﬁed by the general term, should‘
ed that on January 22. 1873, when the plain
tiff accepted the certiﬁcate before mentioned
be aﬂirmed; and the order reversing the judg
ment, and granting a new trial as against
‘ of stock in performance of the contract, the
Brown, should be reversed. and
stock of the company was worth and salable
defendant
in the market at its full par or face value,
the judgment entered upon the report of the
and demanded judgment for that amount and
referee (after deducting therefrom the amount
This was
of the additional allowance of costs) aﬂlrmed.
interest from January %, 1873.
All concur.
the situation of the complaint when the evi
Judgment accordingly.
dence upon the question of value was given;
from that upon any other contract for default in the delivery of property which a
party has unquaiiﬂedly undertaken to deliv
In Dana v.
er for a consideration received.
Fiedler, 12 N. Y. 40, the measure of dam
ages for failure to deliver madder pursuant
was founded upon the market
to contract
The ques
value at the time of the default.
of evi
tion there arose upon the exclusion
and which
in character,
dence speculative
for that reason was held inadmissible upon
Nor does Scat
the question of such value.
tcrgood v. Wood have any essential applica
In that
tion in principle to the case at bar.
case there was an element of exemplary dam
ages against the defendant, who had willful
ly deprived the plaintiff of the use of a test
machine designed by him for a special pur
pose. in consequence of which he was put
another for
to the expense of constructing
Of this intended use the desuch purpose.
fendant was advised when he appropriated
and withheld the machine from the plaintiff.
The recovery of the expense of constructing
the second one as damage for the detention
of the other was sustained, although, by rcason (as it turned out) of its insufﬁciency,
the value of the latter was much less than
In the present case the action is
such cost.
founded solely upon the failure to deliver to
the plaintiff the stock without any supported
claim of special circumstances for any dam
ages other than such as ﬂow naturally and
reasonably from such default of Brown and
Seligman.
While the performance of their
contract in that respect may have required
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ALLEN

(49 N.

W.

v.

MOHN.

52, 86 Mich.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

328.)

June

5, 1891.

Error to circuit court, Branch county;
Nom P. Lovr’mnss, Judge.
W. H.Lock
1". A. Lyon, ior appellant.
erhy, for appellee.
GRANT, J.
Plaintiff and defendant
made a contract. by which plaintiff agreed
to sell to defendant certain real estate.
The contract was made in .\,oromher, lssli.
In September, 1890, defendant iniormed
plaintiff that he could not go on with the
contract, refused
to pay the interest
P which was then due. and said that he
would give up the contract. While the tes
timony is not clear as to the circum
stances under which plaintiff took posses
sion of the land, it appears to he conced
,ed by both parties that defendant aban
doned the premlses, and plain tiff there
upon took possession. The contract con
tained the following clause: “It is mutu
ally agreed between the parties that the
said party of the second part shall have
possession of said premises on and after
date hereof, and he shall keep the same in
as good condition as they are at the date
hereof, until the said sum shall be paid as
aioresaid: and, if said party of the second
part shall fall to periorm this con tract.
or any part of the same. said party of the
ﬁrst part shall, immediately after such fail
ure, have a right to declare thesame void,
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and retain whatever may have been paid
on such contract, and all improvements
that may have been made on said prem
ises. and may consider and treat the party
of the second part as his tenant holding
over without permission. and may take
immediate possession of the premises, and
part there
remove the party of the second
from.“ Upon the abandonment of the
contract and of the premises by defend
ant plaintiff had his choice of three reme
dies: (1) Bill ior speciﬁc periormance; (2)
suit at law to recover the purchase price;
and (3) a repossession of the premises
and a suit to recover damagesiorabreach
of the contract. The latter remedy is sup
ported by theiollowing authorities: Rail
road v. l€vans,6 Gray, 25; Griswold v.Sn
bin, 51 N. H. 170: Meason v. Kaine.67 Pu.
SL126, 63 Pa. St. 335; Porter v. Travis,
Wasson v. Palmer, 17 Neb.
40 Ind. 556;
330, 22 N. W. Rep. 773.
In such case the
measure of damages is the difference be
tween the contract price and the value
of the land at the time of abandonment
and re-entry, less what has been paid.
This rule is just, and places vendor and
vendee upon a footing of equality hnd
mutuality. In order to deprive the ven
dor of this remedy it must either be ex
cluded by the terms of the contract, or
In this
waived by his acts and conduct.
does not exclude it, nor
case the contract
has the plaintiff waived it. The circuit
court was in error in directing a verdict
ior the defendant. Judgment is reversed,
with costs, and a new trial ordered. Theother justices concurred.
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HOGAN

(35 Pac.

399,

v.

RESPECTING SALES OF LAND.

KYLE.

7 Wash.

forfeit

5053.)

Court of Vi,ashington.
Jan. 6, 1894.
Appeal from superior court, King county;
Mason Irwin. Judge.
Action by F. V. Hogan against George F.
Kyle for breach of contract to buy real
estate.
From a judgment for plaintiff, de
fendant appeals.
Reversed.
Preston, Albertson & Donworth, for appel
lant. H. B. Slauson, for respondent.

Supreme

DUNBAR, C. J. On the 27th day of Feb
ruary, 1890, respondent and appellant entered
into a written contract wherein respondent
a;1reed to sell the appellant certain real estate
for the sum of $2,500, one-third of which was
paid at the time of the execution of the con
tract; appellant to pay the balance of the pm
chase price in two equal installments. the iirst
of which was to be paid on the 27th day of‘
May, 1890, and the second on the 27th day
Time was expressly made
of August, 1890.
The appellant
the éssence of the contract.
paid no part of the purchase price, except the
sum which was paid at the time the con
It does.not appear that
tract was executed.
defendant entered into possession of the
property,
or exercised any control over it.
On November 14, 1892, suit was commenced
by the respondent to recover a money judg
ment against the appellant for the amount
of the two unpaid installments, with in
The complaint simply alleged the
terest.
making of the contract, failure to pay, the
ownership of the property, and the tender
of a good and suﬂicient deed prior to the
A demurrer
commencement
of the action.
was interposed
to the complaint on the
ground that it did not state facts suffieiem
to constitute a cause of action.
The demurrer was overruled,
and the defendant
answered, alleging possession in the re
spondent,
but denying his power to give
good title.
Alieging that respondent
had
never demanded of appellant the contract
price of the land at any time priorto Novem
ber 14, 1802, the date of the commencement of
the action, and never tendered to appellant
any deed or conveyance purporting to con
vey said land until said 1-ith day of Novem
ber, 1892, and never at any time conveyed
said premises;
that. long prior to said last
named date, appellant had informed and
notiiied respondent that he did not have or
claim any further interest in said property.
and that he would not pay any further in
stallment provided for by said contract, and
that the plaintiff did not, up to said Novem
ber 1-i, 1892, assert any further right to the
balance of said contract price, nor dissent
to nor deny said claim of defendant that he
was no longer bound by said contract; and
that lung prior to said last-named date the
plaintiff had exercised said option reserved
to him under said contract. and had elected
to rescind said contract, and to retain as a

.

'

the ﬁrst payment
that had been
to him by the defendant thereunder,
aforesaid. At the outset of the trial, ap
.
pellant objected to the introdu'tion of any
in behalf of the piaintiff on the
testimony
ground that no cause of action was stated
in the complaint
This objection was over
ruled. At the conclusion
of respondent,s
appellant moved for a nonsuit,
testimony,
Thereupon,
which motion was overruled.
he rested upon his motion, and did not offer
any testimony; and the judge instructed the
jury to bring in a verdict against the appel
lant for the balance of the contract price.
with interest; which being done, judgment
was entered thereon, from which judgment
appellant has appealed.
At the commence
ment of the action the appellant moved to
have the case transferred to the equity mien
The demur
dar, which motion was denied.
rer and the motion for a nonsuit raised sub
stantially the same questions.
The judgment in this case will have to be
reversed, in any event, for under its terms the
respondent
recovers the full purchase price,
and is allowed to retain the land which rep
In this case
resented the purchase price.
these are dependent obligations upon which
When the ﬁrst in
the respondent is suing.
stallment became due, he could have recov
ered the amount then due as upon an inde
pendent contract; but having elected to wait
until the last installment became due, and
upon the payment of which defendant would
be entitled to a deed, the obligations become
They all relate back to the con
dependent.
tract, and respondent cannot sustain an action
for either installment without proof of per
formance or readiness to perform on his part.
Mt.Croskey v. Ladd, (Cal) 31 Pac. 558, and
In that case the court said:
cases cited.
‘
“There is but one single cause of action,
The defendant, if he ‘I
one and indivisible.
would maintain his deed, must pay all; and
0 the plaintiff, if he would recover, must show
such a pcrformance on his part as would en
title him to all the unpaid consideration." It‘
is not enough that the deed was tendered
at any particular time, but the tender must
be kept good so that it may be taken into con
sideration in the entry of the judgment.\—'
Plaintiff here simply shows that the tender
had been made prior to the commencement
of the action, and it is therefore insuﬁicient
excepting on the theory that the judgment
could be rendered independently
of the per
formance of his part of the cont"act by the
vendor, which would result in allowing the
vendor to keep both the money and the land.
On that proposition we quote from Warvelle
on Vendors,
(page 961:)
“There are cases,
both in England and the United States,
where, on the vendee,s default, the vendor,
having offered to perform, has been permit
i ted to recover as damages the whole purchase
price.
The injustice of such a measure, how
ever, is apparent on its face, for it gives the
vendor his land, as well as its value, and is
made

,
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ing the complaint amended so as to incorpor
ate the allegations of tender sought to be set
up in the reply, the action must equally fail,
for the complaint, on its face, shows such
delay on the part of the respondent in bring
ing his action that, unexplained,
amounts
to
waiver of respondent,s rights under the
contract, and an acceptance of the forfeiture.
“The court of chancery was at one time in
clined to neglect all consideration of time in
the speciﬁc performance of contracts
for
sale, not only as an original ingredient in/v
them, but as affecting them by way of
es.
But
is now clearly established that the
lay of either party in not performing its
terms on his part, or in not prosecuting his
right to the interference of the court by the
institution of an action, or, lastly, in not dili

is

§

gently prosecuting his action, when instituted,
may constitute such laches as will disentitle
him to the aid of the court, and so amount,
for the purpose of speciﬁc performance, to
an abandonment,
on his part, of the con
tract." Fry, Spec. Perf.
1070.
“The doc
trine of the court thus established, therefore,
is that laches on the part of the plaintiff,
(whether vendor or purchaser) either in exe
cuting his part of the contract, or in apply
ing to the court, will debar him from relief.
‘A party cannot call upon a coiu,t of equity
for speciﬁc performance,’ said Lord Alvanley,
M. R., (it) ‘unless he has shown himself ready,
desirous, prompt, and eager.’
Or, house the
language of Lord Cranworth, ‘Speciﬁc per
formance
reiief which this court will not
give, unless in cases where the parties seek
ing
come promptly, as soon as the nature
of the case will pcrmit.", Id. 1072. To the
same effect, Pom. Cont. §408, and cases cited.
It is true that a few of the states. notably
Ohio, hold that the laches must fall outside
of the statutes of limitation, but the great
weight of authority, as we have been able to
gather it from the cases, is to the contrary;
and relief has been refused on the principle
that acquiescence for an unreaonable length
of time after the party was in
situation to
enforce his right, under the full knowledge
of the facts, was evidence of a waiver or
abandonment
of right, and what shall be
deemed a reasonable time must be determined
from the circumstances
Six
of Ithe case.
months, in some cases, might be as unreason
It must be borne
able as six years in others.
in mind that a distinction is made, in the dis
cussion of the cases, between the cases where
time is made the essence of the contract, and
where it is not; and the conclusion deduced
from the authorities
that where time is
made the essence of the contract the appar
ent delay or omission of duty must be ex
plained, or the relief will not be granted.
In this case time was made the essence of
the contract, by express terms.
The com
plaint shows that there was no attempt to en
force the claim until two years and three
months after the contract matured, and males
no explanation whatever for the delay.
Nor
§

a
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correct rule in either
such cases is that the
the fruits of his bar
compensation for any
reason of its noncon
damages are, in such
circumstances,
must be alleged and proven,
like any other fact in the case.
Under one
set of circumstances,
the measure of dam
ages might be one thing, and under other cir
cumstances the measure might be governed
by an entirely different rule.
The land may
have deteriorated in value, and his damages
might have increased in
would be great, or
value, and the damages would be nominal.
As is well argued by the appellant in this
case, so far as the complaint reveals, the land
may be worth as much or more than
was
when the agreement was executed; and the
respondent, having received an advance pay
ment, which is forfeited, may actually be
beneﬁted.
The cases cited in Warvelie fully
sustain the announcement in the text, both as
to the unfairness of allowing the vendor to
retain the land and the money, and as to the
measure of damages.
In Railroad Co. v..
Evans,
Gray, 25,
was held that, in an
action at law by the vendor to recover dam
ages for the breach of a contract for the sale
of land, the measure of damages is not the
contract price, but the difference between
‘ that price and the price for which the land
' could
have been sold at the time of the
breach.
Under this rule, which seems to us
to be an equitable one, and one which is
by many courts, the complaint is
adopted
plainly deﬁcient.
The case last above cited
also holds that
vendor may enforce in equi
ty the speciﬁc performance of a written con
tract for the sale of land.
In fact, the prevailing modern authority is that in
casei‘
of this kind the vendor can either sue at law
for damages, or resort to equity for speciﬁci
performance.
Mr. Pomcroy, in his work on
(‘‘n1I.l,il(,t3, (page 6,) bases his adherence to this
doctrine on .the ground of mutuality. The
remedy which is enjoyed by one party to
contract must be enjoyed by the other, and
as an example he gives the simplest form of
contract for the sale of land, when the vendor
agrees to convey, and the purchaser merely
promises to pay
certain sum as the price.
Since the latter may, by a salt at equity, ct su
pel the execution and delivery of the deed,
the former may also, by a similar suit, en
force the undertaking of the vendee, although
the substantial part of his relief is the re
covery of money.
"A suit in equity against
the vendee, to compel a speciﬁc execution of
a contract of sale, while in effect an actidn
for the purchase money, has nevertheless always been sustained as a part of the appro
priate and acknowledged jurisdiction of such
court, although the vendor has in most cases
another remedy by an action at law upon the
agreement."
Warv. Vend. pp. 779, 780, and
cases cited.
So that, considering it either
as a legal or equitable action, and consider

it

not now regarded as
country." The rule in
right to
vendor has
gain, and is entitled to
loss he may suffer by
summatlon.
What his
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are the averments of the complaint strength
ened by the proofs, for the proofs show that
no demand, of any kind whatever, had been
made, on the part of respondent, until the
day the suit was brought.
The respondent
should not be allowed to speculate in values,
so f..r a this contract is concerned; to wait
and see whether the value of the land would
enhance or depreciate before he made his
election either to enforce the performance
or accept the forfeiture.
We think the pro
vision of this contract, that, “if the said
party of the second part, his heirs, adminis
trators, or assigns, shall fall to pay the full
amount of either of the above-speciﬁed
in
stallments and interest when the same shall
become due, as above speciﬁed, the said party
of the ﬁrst part shall have the right, at their
option, to rescind and cancel this agreement,
and in case of such rescission and cancellation
all rights of the said party of the second part,
his heirs and assigns, shall be terminated,
and all payments heretofore
made on this
contract shall be forfeited," fairly construed,
guaranties to the respondent a right which

it

must exercise at the maturity of the,con.
tract,—the time when he would have a right
and, as he did not pro
to make the election;
ceed to enforce the contract. the appellant had
a right to presume that, inasmuch as he had
taken no afﬁrmative action, by tendering the
deed, he had elected the remedy which was
consistent with silence, namely, the accept
ance of the forfeiture; and, considering
the
rapid changes in value of the real estate in
this country, we think an unexplained delay
of two and a quarter years ought to prevent
.the respondent from asserting his claim in a
court of equity.
The complaint, therefore, being insufficient,
either at law or equity, appellant,s demurrer
should have been sustained.
This conclusion
renders unnecessary the discussion of the oth
er errors assigned.
For the reasons given,
the judgment will be reversed, with instruc
tions to sustain appellant,s demurrer to the
complaint.

STILES, HOIT, SCOTT,

JJ.,

‘I

concur.

and

ANDERS,
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loss to the vendor from the default
of the vendee, and it may be that the
‘
jury, upon proof of the second sale, would
ﬁnd the damages to be the difference between
v
the two bids and the expense of the second
sale; but the question would be purely one of
damages, and they would not be shut up to
thatamount. McCombs v. McKennan. 2 Watts
& S. 216. In order to make the vendee liable
in asmmpsit for such difference and expense,
in case of his default, it should be made a
condition of the sale that in such case the
properly should be resold, and the vendee held
to pay such difference and expense.
Adams
. v. .\lcMillan, 7 Port. (Ala.) 73, was a case of
real estate sold at auction. and afterwards re
sold on default by the vendee.
The declara
I tion contained a count like the special count
. here.
The court held that where a declara
1 tionv does not aver, as part of the contract of
sale, a condition that the land shall be re
sold in case of such default. but only al
leges the difference in price of the two sales.
and as a consequence of the vendee’s breach
of his contract a liability on his part to par
that difference, being framed on the supposi
tion that the diffcrence is recoverable as on a
contract, and not as unliquidated damages,
the declaration will be bad on demurrer.
Robinson v. Garth, 6 Ala. 204. The plaintiff
that the mode of declaring here
contends
used is proper, because the sale was judicial.
and in such sales the defaulting vendee is lia
ble for the deﬁciency on resale, whether the
terms of sale so provide or not.
An admin
istrator’s sale, however, under our statutes, is
not a judicial sale, as was decided by Judge
STORY in Smith v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 414. 420.
It has been held in Alabama that purchasers at
oﬂicial sales who make default are liable by
implied contract for the deﬁcit on resale.
Lamkin v. ()rawl,ord, 8 Ala. 153; Hutton v.
Williams, 35 Ala. 503,513. We do not ﬁnd
the doctrine recognized elsewhere, (2 Freem.
Ex’ns, 2d Ed., § 313;) nor. in our opinion,
can an administrator’s sale be regarded as an
oﬂicial sale. In some states the defaulting
purchaser is liable for “the deﬁciency arising
on resale" by statute.
Alexander v. Herring,
The
54 Ga. 200.
We have no such statute.
subject of the sale under which the question
here arises was real estate, the title to which
could not pass to the purchaser without deed.
Whether, if the subject had beenv goods and
chattels, the same mode of declaring would
have been bad, is a question on which we ex
Demurrer. regarded as a
press no opinion.
demurrer to the special count, sustained.
t
the

1889.

On demurrer to the declara
Assumpsit.
tion.
Edwin D. Mt.Guinness and John Doran.
for plaintiff.
Edward D. Bassett, for de
fendant.

DURFEE, C. J. The declaration sets forth
that at an administrator’s sale at auction, held
February 28, A. D. 1885, by William \V.
Nichols, administrator de bonis non on the
estate of John Charlton, deceased, all the
right, title, and interest of the decedent in
certain land described was struck off to the
defendant
for $3,100 bid by him, said sum
being the highest bid therefor; that the defendant paid $150 down as earnest money;
that afterwards, at a time appointed, the ad
ministrator was ready with his deed to con
vey the land in pursuance of the sale, but the
defendant refused to accept it’ and pay over
the residue of said $33,100; that subsequently,
on May 26, A. D. 1885, the property was
again put up at auction by said administra
tor, and struck oﬂ! to William H. Washburn
for $2,150, the highest bid therefor, and con
veyed to him for that sum. The declaration
then proceeds as follows, to-wit: “And the
plaintiff avers that on the 21st day of Novem
ber, 1887, he was appointed administrator
de bonis non of the estate of John Charl
ton, deceased, in the place and stead of said
Nichols, removed, whereby the defendant
became liable and promised
to pay to the
plaintiff the difference between said sum of
$3,100 and the costs of said second auction
sale, viz., $40.17, and the sum of $2,150,
amounting to the sum of $990.17." The
declaration also contains the common money
count.
The defendant has demurred to the
declaration generally, but both parties have
treated the demurrer as if it were simply a de
murrerto the special count. We will so treat
it. The question’ as it has been argued to us,
is whether the count is good as a count upon
a promise to beimplied from the facts alleged.
We think not. The contract which the de
fendant entered into when he made his bid
was a contract to pay the price bid by him for
the premises upon receiving a deed thereof,
and, if on tender of the deed he refused
to complete
the payment, he committed a
breach of said contract, and laid himself
liable to an action upon it for damages.
In such action the measure of damage is
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v.

PHELPS.

(40 N. Y.~o4-.7-

Court of Appeals of New York.

'9

q

March,

1869.

Action for speciﬁc performance of a con
tract to convey land, or in the alternative,
damages for the breach.
The plaintiff had
judgment below for damages, and defend
ant appeals.

John H. Reynolds, for appellant.
Hand, for respondents.

Samuel

MASON, J. There has never seemed to
me to have been any very good foundation
for the rule, which excused a party from the
performance of his contract, to sell and con
vey lands, because he had not the title which
he had agreed to convey.
There seems to
have been considerable diversity of opinion
'
in the courts as to the grounds upon which
the rule itself is based.
In England, the rule seems to have been
sustained upon the ground of an implied
outstanding of the parties, that the parties
must have contemplated
the diﬂiculties at
tendant upon the conveyance.
In the lead
ing case on this subject, of Flureau v. Thorn

hill, 2 W. Bl. 1078, Blackstone, J., said:
“These contracts are merely upon condition,
frequently expressed, but always implied,
that the vendor has a good title."
While in this country the rule is based up
on the analogy between this class of cases
and actions for breach of covenant of war
ranty of title. Baldwin v. Munn, 2 Wend.
399; Peters v. Mclieon, 4 Denio, 546. The
rule of damages, in an action for a breach
of covenant of warranty of title, is settled to
be the consideration paid, and the interest;
and yet this is an arbitrary rule, and works
great injustice many times; and the courts
met with the greatest embarrassment in set
tling it. These diﬂicultles were considered,
and well expressed, in the leading case in
this state, of Staats v. Ten Eyck,s Ex,rs, 3
(‘aines, 115, in which the court said: "To
ﬁnd a rule of damages, in a case like this, is
a work of diﬂiculty; none will be entirely
free from objection, or will not, at times,
work injustice.
“To refund the consideration, even with the
interest, may be a very inadequate compen
sation, when the property is greatly enhan
ced in value, and when the money might
have been laid out to equal advantage else
where.
Yet to make this increased value the
criterion, where there has been no fraud,
may also be attended with injustice, if not
ruin.
"A piece of land is bought solely for the
purpose of agriculture, and by some unfore
seen turn of fortune, it becomes the site of
a populous city: after which an eviction
takes place. Every one must perceive the
injustice of calling on a bona ﬁde vendor to
refund its value, and that few fortunes could
Who for the sake of one
bear the demand.

hundred pounds would assume the hazard
of repaying as many thousands, to which
value the property might rise, by causes
by either party, and which in
unforeseen
crease in worth wou.ld confer no right on the
grantor to demand a further sum of the
grantee?" There is still another class of
cases where the rule of simply refunding
and the interest oper
the purchase-money
ates with great hardship and injustice upon
the purchaser.
A. purchases of B. a city lot
for the purpose of building himself a dwell
ing or buildings upon it, and takes from B.
a full covenant deed of the premises, cove
nanting to assure, warrant and defend the
title. The buildings are constructed at the
cost of thousands of dollars, and then B. is
evicted by a paramount title ascertained to
be in some one else. The recovery of the
money and six years’ interest is not a very
just or reasonable return in damages for the
law to give to one who holds a covenant to
make good and defend the title.
The reasons assigned for this rule in ac
tions for a breach of covenant oi.‘ warranty
of title can scarcely apply to these prelimi
nary contracts to sell and convey'title at a
future time. In the latter case the vendee
knows he has not got the title, and that per
haps he may never get it; and if he will go
on and make expenditures under such cir
cumstances it is his own fault; and besides,
these preliminary contracts to convey gen
erally have but a short time to run, and
there is seldom any such opportunity for the
growth of towns, or a large increase in the
value of the property as there is in these
covenants in deeds, which run with the land
through all time.
The supreme court of the United States
has refused
to yield its sanction to this
rule when applied to contracts for the sale
of lands, and aﬂirms the doctrine that the
reason of the rule as to contracts for the sale
of goods and chattels applies with equal
force to these executory contracts for the
sale of lands. Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109.
That rule is where a party sustains a loss by
reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far
as money can do it, to be placed in the same
situation with respect to damages as if the
contract had been performed.
Robinson v.
Harman, 1 Exch. 850. This case of Hopkins
v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109, is cited with approba
tion in some of the American cases, and the
rule there laid down aﬂirmed.
These views are not presented to induce
the court to overrule or repudiate
the ad
judged cases in our own courts upon this
subject.
They reach back over a period of
more than forty years, and have been too
long sanctioned to‘ be now repudiated.
I have referred to this matter simply as
furnishing an argument against in any de
gree extending the rule, and as a reason for
limiting it strictly where the already ad
judged cases in our own courts have placed
it. It becomes important in this connection
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what that limit is. The general
rule certainly is that where the vendor has
the title and for any reason refuses to con
voy it, as required by the contract, he shall
respond in law for the damages in which he
shall make good to the plaintiff, whom he
has lost by his bargain not being lived up to.
This gives the vendee the difference between
the contract price and the value at the time
of the breach, as proﬁts ‘or advantages which
are the direct and immediate fruits of the
contract. Griﬁin v. Coiver, 16 N. Y. 489;
Durkee v. Mott, 8 Barb. 423; Underhill v.
Gas-light Co., 31 How. 37; Masterson v.
..\iayor, etc., of Brooklyn, 7 Hill, 61, 69.
\Vhere however the vendor contracts to sell
land convey in good faith, believing he has
good title, and afterward discovers his title
is defective, and for that reason without any
fraud on his part, refuses to fulﬁll his con
tract, he is only liable to nominal damages
for a breach of his contract. Baldwin v.
Mann. 2 Wend. 309; Peters v. .\icKeon, 4
Denio, .346; Conger v. Weaver, 20 N. Y. 140.
,1‘he rule is otherwise however where a par
ty contracts to sell lands which he knows at
the time he has not the power to sell and
convey;
and if he violates his contract in
the latter case, he should be held to make
good to the vendee the loss of his bargain,
and it does not excuse the vendor, that he
may have acted in good faith and believed,
when he entered into the contract, that he
should be able to procure a good title for his
purchaser. 2 Par. Cont. 503, 504, 505; Hop
kins v. Grazebrook, 6 Barn. & C. 31; Driggs
to inquire
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v. Dwight, 17 Wend. 74; Bush v. Cole, 28 N.
261; Lock v. Furze, L. R. 1 C. P. 441;
Robinson v. Harman, 1 Exch. 849; Hill v.
Hobart, 16 Me. 164; Fletcher v. Button, 6
Barb. 650; Trull v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115;
Hopkins v. Lee, 6 Wheat. 109; Burwell v.
Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535; White v. Madison, 26
N. Y. 124; Lewis v. Lee, 15 Ind. 499; Dean
v. Raseler, 1 Hilt. 420; Bitner v. Brough, 11
Pa. St. 127; McNair v. Crompton, 35 Pa. St.
23; Wilson v. Spencer, 11 Leigh, 261; Gra
ham v. Hackwith, 1 A. K. Marsh. 429; Dart,
Vendors, 447. This rule, applied to the case
at bar,§*'s,ta.ins the judgment of the supreme

Y.

court.
The defendant must be held personally lia
ble on this contract. It is essentially his
contract.
In order to exempt the contract
ing party from personal liability, he must so
contract as to bind those he claims to repre
sent. Moss v. Livingston, 4 N. Y. 208; De
witt v. Walton, 9 N. Y. 571; Bay v. Gunn, 1
Denio, 108; Bush v. Cole, supra.
The fact that the party describes himself
as trustee, without stating for whom, does
not relieve him from personal liability, or
change the effect of his engagement.
Taft
v. Brewster, 9 Johns. 334; White v. Skinner,
307; Dewitt v. Walton, supra;
13 Johns.
Bush v. Cole, supra. These views lead to the
aﬂirmance of the judgment.

GROVER, WOODRUFF, JAMES,
.\iUil.RAY, JJ., concurred with MASON,
DANIELS, J.,
and were for aﬂirmance.
| sents.

and

J.,

dis
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BROOKS

(8 South.

Supreme Court

v.

BLACK.

332, 68 .\Iiss.

of Mississippi.

161.)

Nov.

10,

1890.

from chancery court, Noxubee
county; ’1‘. B. GRAHA.\i, Chancellor.
G. A. Evans and Brame & .'iIe.v:mder,ior
appellant.
Bogle & Bogle, ior appellee.
Appeal

COOPER, J. This is a proceeding by
attachment in chancery by the appellee,
Black, against his remote vendor, Brooks,
to recover damages ior the breach oi war
ranty of title to certain lands. In 1869,
Brooks conveyed the la d, with covenants
of warranty, to one Sp cer. the consider
ation being the sum of $6,296. Spencer exe
cuted a deedpf trust, with power of sale,
to one Smith, to secure the payment of a
debt oi.$400 to Graham, Black & (Jo. In
September, 1878, the debt secured being un
paid, the land was sold. as provided by
the trust-deed, and at such sale Black, the
appcliee. became the purchaser. at the
price of $1,000. After his purchase, Black
conveyed to .\irs. Spencer an undivided
one.half interest in the land. Afterwards,
the heirs at law of Mrs. Caroline Daves
and Mrs. Nellson recovered in ejectment
from Black and Mrs.Spencer the undivided
one-hall interest in the land, claiming un
der title parnmount to that of Brooks.
Brooks was not notiﬁed oi the pendency
of this action of eiectment. Black, by the
result of that suit, having lost the one
half of his half interest in the land, (the
one.iourth of the whole,) seeks by the
present proceeding to recover from Brooks
paid him
one-fourth oi the consideration
by Spencer, and interest thereon, and the
costs of defending the action oi eiectment
against the heirs of Daves & Neilson, in
cluding attorney,s fees. The chancellor
iound as facts that the title of the heirs of
Mrs. Daves and Mrs. Neiison was para
mount to that of Brooks; that the value
of the land at the time ofeviction was
$6,000; and that Black. in good faith, and
in discharge of a legal duty, had defended
the action oi ejectment, and in so doing
had expended in court costs the sum of
$249.91, and the further sum of $200 ior at
torney’s fees, which were reasonable. Up
on these iacts, he decreed that Brooks
should pay to Black the sum of $1,500, the
same being the actual value oi the land
lost by Black, and less than one-iourth oi
the purchase price paid to Brooks by
Spencer, with interest at 6 per cent. from
January 1, 1888, the date oi Black’s evic
tion,and also the said sums oi $249.91 and
fees,
$200, the court costs and attorney,s
with interest thereon from the commence
ment oi this suit. Brooks appeals and as
signs ior error (1) that the court should
have not made any decree against him,
because the facts proved show that the
debt secured by the deed of trust from
Spencer to Smith, trustee. had been paid
at and beiore the sale under said deed; (2)
that the measure oi damages should be the
one-iourth oi the purchase price paid by
Black, and not the one-iourth oi the value
oi the land at the time of eviction, nor the
one-iourth oi purchase money received by
Brooks; (3) the court should not have al
lowed the court costs expended in defend
ing the action oi ejectment; (4) the court

should not have allowed attorney,s fee
paid in defending said action.
it is sufﬁcient to say, in reference to the
ﬁrst assignment of error, that the facts do
not support appellant’s contention.
The second assignment of error presents
an interesting question which has never
beiore been considered b_v this court. and,
so far as our researches have led, has not
often arisen in other states. That ques
,
tion is, what is the measure of damages,in
a suit by an evicted vendee, upon the cov
enant oi warranty of a remote vendor,
running with land? May he recover the
purchase price received by the remote ven
Kdor, or is be limited by the consideration
he himself has paid? It is supposed by
Counsel ior theappellantthatthesum paid
by the evicted party¢—the value of the land
at the time of his purchase—is ﬁxed as the
measure of damages in this state by the
case of White v. Presly, 54 Miss. 313.
But
the question was not raised by the record
in that case; and although CnAum’ns, J.,
yin delivering
the opinion of the court, de
iclares that the sum paid by theevicted par
ty, with interest, the same being less than
ithe sum received by the remote vendor, is
‘a correct measure of damages, the decla
'
ation does not thereby become decisive.
\ In that case, Huntington had sold
land
the title had
' to one Jones, from whom
passed under execution sale to Pressly.
Presslylost the land by reason of title par
amount to that oi Huntington, and sued
Huntington’sadministrator'on the cove
nants oi warranty, and recovered in the
court below the sum he had paid at exe
cution sale’ and interest thereon, the same
being less than Huntington had received.
The administrator appealed. He, as ap
pellant, could not assign as error the fact
that damages less than should have been
awarded had been given; nor could the
appellee raise the point here, that the judg
ment he sought to maintain should have
been for a greater sum. The observation
of thejudge was not upon any question
sought to be raised, or which could have
been decided, and thereiore is not the de
cision oi the court. Among the ﬁrst cases
in which the liability of a vendor to his
vendee for breach of the warranty for
quiet possession was considered were
Staats v. Il‘en Eyrk, 3 Caines, 112, and
Pitcher v. Livingston, 4 Johns. 1. It was
contended for the plaintiffs in these cases
1 that the covenant was one of indemnity,
and thereiore that the measure of damages
should be the value of the land at thetime
oi the breach. In Staats v. Ten Eyck, re
covery was sought ior the appreciation in
the value of the land above the price paid
by natural causes, and in Pitcher v. Liv
ingston to recover abo ve the purchase price
the value of permanent improvements put
upon the land by the vendee.
The argu
ment ior the plaintiffs was rested upon
the rule of damages in breaches of person
ai covenants in other instances, but the
court rejected the contention, and adopt
ed, by anulogy, the measure of damages
applied in the common-law action oi war
rantia chartee. and in suits ior the breach
of the covenant of scisin, viz., the value
of the land,determinable by the price paid
the vendor: and, since the vendee was
liable to the real owner ior mesne proﬁts,
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he was also en titled to interest on the pur
chase money for the time for which such
mesne proﬁts might be recovered against

V
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that the plaintiff could not recover onthe
warrant.v oi a remote vendor more than

he had himself paid to his immediate ven
dor, and in support oi this declaration cites“
him. The measure of damages established
in these cases has been so generally adopt
the iollowing cases : Booker v. Bell’s Ex’rs,
ed in other states as to have become al
3 Bibi), 175; Kelly v. Dutch Church, 2 Hill,
116; Bennet v. Jenkins, 13 Johns. 51; Han
most universal, and it would be superﬂuous
to cite authorities in its support. It has
son v. Buckner, 4 Dana, 253; Wyman v.
Baliard,12 Mass. 304; Stewart v. Drake, 9
been announced as the rule in this state.
Phipps v. Tnrplcy, 31 Miss. 433.
We refer
N. J. Law, 142; Wilson v. Forbes, 2 Dev. 39;
to the cases above not ior the purpose of
Pitcher v. Livingston,4 Johns. 1. We have
announcing the rule which applies as be
examined these cases,and ﬁnd all of them,
tween vendor and vendee, for that is too
except Kelly v. Dutch Church, to be suits
well settled to admit of controversy, and
by the immediate vendee, or his heirs at
law, against the immediate vendor, or his
is conceded by counsel ior appellant; we
Kelly v. Dutch
note them to show that the suggestion
personal representative.
now made that the covenant is one of in
Church was a suit by the asslgnee oi the
demnity was rejected by the court in the
lessee against the lessors oi his asslgnor.
earliest cases.
In a certain sense,all“cov
The trial court had awarded, as damages,
enants" are ior indemnity; but the sense
the rent reserved in the lease; thus, as it
in which the word is now used, in argu
seems to us, making the sum paid to the
ment of counsel’ that redress is to be af
lessors. and not that paid for the assign
iorded to the extent, and within the limit,
ment, the measure of damages. But the
of the actual loss sustained by the vendee,
facts are not very clearly stated, and the
in an action against his immediate vendor,
case cannot be held to decide anything up
it may be conﬁdently asserted, is against
on the point. The question seems to have
the overwhelming
current of authority.
been more fully examined upon principle
In these cases, at least, the decisions are in the cases of Williams v. Beeman. 2 Dev.
practically uniiorm that, regardless of the -I83; Mette v. Dow,9 Lea, 93, and Lowrance
value of the land at the time of eviction,
v. Robertson, 10 S. C. 8, than in any oth
the recovery is measured by the value of ers. In Williams v. Beeman, the majority of
the land at the time of the conveyance,
the court thought that the remote vendee
‘which value is conclusively ﬁxed by the
was suing to recover his own damages,
and not those of the ﬁrst vendee, and
(price paid by the vendee or received by the
vendor.
Another proposition may be therefore should be restricted to the act
conﬁdently
stated as supported by an
ual damages he had sustained.
In Mette
equally uniiorm current oi authority, that
v. Dow, the court compared the covenant
the covenant for quiet enjoyment
to a penal bond, the recovery on which
runs
with the land, and passes to all subse
would be limited to the actual damages
quent owners claiming in the chain of
sustained by the party suing. The die
senting opinion of Burnn, J., in Williams
title. The purchaser oi land gets, by oper
ation oi law, not only the land, but also
v. Beeman, is, in our opinion, a complete
the covenant oi the ﬁrst vendor, and that
reply to this position.
His says: “ The
as well where the covenant is byits words
value at the timeof the sale by the ﬁrst
to the vendee only, as where it is with
Itought
vendorls themeasureprescribed.
him and his assigns. When we come how
to operate both ways. If the vendor be
ever to theprecise question now presented,
not liable ior more, he ought not to be for
which is whether,a remote vendee may, less. I understand it to beadmitted that,
recover from the remote vendor the pur-’ if his immediate vendee be evicted, he is
chase money paid by the ﬁrst vendee, or isl still liable ior that. I do not see why he
limited to the amount paid by himself to . should not be equally so to the assignee as
his vendee. we ﬁnd direct conﬂict in the. his vendee.
Does the assignment change
It runs with the land, and
decisions. and, so far as we have iound the5 his covenant?
cases, they are nearly equal in number on
he who buys the land buys the covenant.
each side.
In North Carolina, (Williams He gets the whole of it. But it is said that
Beeman,
v.
2
Dev. 483,) Minnesota,
the assignor in such case cannot recover
25 Minn.
from the ﬁrst vendor more than the evict- I
544),)
(.\Ioore v. Frankenﬁeld,
Tennessee, (Mctte v. Dow, 9 Lea. 93;
ed vendee gave for the land, because this .
is all the assiguor would be obliged to pay 5
Whitzman v. Hirsh, 87 Tenn. 513, 11 S. W.
the assignee, and thereiorehe has complete
Rep. 421,) and Maryland, (Crisﬁeld v.
indemnity.
Storr, 36 \Id. 129,) it is held that such re
This is changing the rule es I
sentially.
It puts it upon the amount of.
mote vendee can only recover what he
the loss, not the price paid. It would "
has paid to his own vendor. On the other
seem to me that whoever buys land with
hand, it is held in South Carolina, (Low
a covenant adhering to it takes it with all
rance v. Robertson. 10 S. C. 8,) Iowa,
the advantages it conferred on his as
(Mischke v. Baughn, 52 Iowa, 528, 3 N. W.
signor.
It is so in personal contracts, ior
Rep. .3-f3,) and Kentucky. (Dougherty
v.
Duvall,9 B. Mon. 57,) that such vendee
we do not inquire what the assignee of
a bond gave ior it. The obligor must pay
may recover theiull consideration received
by the defendant, the remote vendor.
him the whole.”
This argument seems to
us uuanswerabie.
It at least never has
Williams v. Beeman was decided by a di
been answered in any case we have seen
vided court, Rnrrm, J., dissenting, and
When it is conceded that, by his covenant,
Mette v. Dow (followed by Whitzman v.
a vendor binds himself to return the pur- ,
i-iirsh) overruled Hopkins v. Lane, 9 Yerg.
chase price he receives in the contingency
79. In. Crisﬁeld v. Storr, 36 \Id.129, the
of a failure of the title conveyed, and that
court declares that it had carefully exam
this obligation is assigned, by operation
ined many authorities upon the point, and
mav succeed to the
that the decided weight oi authority was I/oi law, to
\
wluiever

/
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title, it would seem to iollow, as a corol
lary, that the recovery, by whomsoevzr
had, ought; to be equal to the obligation.
But. under the rule announced in Mary
land. Minnesota, Tennessee, and North Car
olina. the obligation of the covenantor is
variable, and dependent upon transactions
with which he is not connected. In these
states, a man selling an estate to A. ior
$5.000 would be liable to pay A. that sum
ii he should be evicted. But it A. sells the
same land to B. ior $500. the liability oi
the ﬁrst vendor is reduced to that sum,
and thus B., the purchaser irom A., gets
less than the obligation A. held. But if
B. sells to C. ior$5,000, the original obliga
tion revives, and theabsurdityispresented
oi B.’s tailing to get,and thereioreto have,
what A. owned, and still transierring to C.
that which he never had. The rule an
nounced in Kentucky, Iowa. and South
Carolina is not only commended by its
justice, and by analogy to other wsli-set
tied principles, but possesses the advan
tage oi stability and uniformity. As we
have said, it is quite generally held that,
by the covenant ior quiet enjoyment, the
grantor binds himseli to pay, in event oi
iailure oi title, the then value oi the land,
value is determined

by the price

¢which
paid. Appreciation by natural causes. or
by improvements put upon.the property
by the vendec, does not enlarge his liabil
ity; nor is it decreased by depreciation in
By legal intend
value irom any cause.
ment the obligation is as though the cov
ennntor should say to the covenantee:
"You, or the person succeeding to the
title iconvey,shall hold the land, or ii you
cannot, by reason oi title in another, the
money I have received shall be restored in
lieu oi the land." We are unable to per
ceive any principle upon which this obliga
tion shall be diminished because oi the
of which it may be
price. in consideration
assigned.

We thereiore conclude that; the

obligation oi the covenantor is the same
to the assignee that it was to the cove

"

nantee, and. being such, is governed by the
same measure of damages.
The third and iourth assignments oi er
ror present the question whether taxed
costs and attorney,s lees in excess oi the
purchase price, and interest thereon, may
We are
be recovered on the covenant.
unable to discover any just principle upon
which costs, whether taxed or otherwise,
have been allowed to piaintiffs over and
above the purchase price received by the

WE
and interest thereon.
covenantor.
readily perceive the justice of the rule by
which the value oi the land at the time of
the sale by him is accepted as the measure
oi the liability of the covenantor, and also
that the price paid shall be taken as con
clusive evidence oi that value. We also
appreciate theiairness oi allowing interest
on the purchase money as compensation
to the covenantee ior so long a time as he
has been held liable to theownerior mesne
proﬁts.
But why costs in excess oi the
purchase money and interest have ever been
allowed we cannot conjecture. In 4 Kent,
Comm. p. 476, it is said: “The measure of
damages on a total iailure oi title, even on
the covenant oi warranty, is the value o!
the land at the execution oi the deed; and
the evidence of that value is the consider
ation money. with interest and costs. ”
How costs, which are uncertain in amount.
varying with reference to the character oi
the suit, the number oi witnesses, and the
nature of the issues presented in a pro
ceeding, could ever have been supposed to
furnish any light upon t.he past value of
lands, passes our comprehension. . lint so
it is that. by practically an unbroken cur
rent oi authority, the rule has been estab
lished that they may be recovered in ad
dition to the purchase price and inter
Ruwle, Cov. c. 9; Suth. Dam. 302; 4
est.
Amer. & Eng. Enc. Law, 566. Believing
that the rule allowing: any costs should
never have been established, we decline to
extend it beyond the limits oi the taxed
Attorney,s ices have
costs oi the case.
been allowed in some states, and disal
lowed in others. The conﬁict in these de
cisions will bc iound in the cases cited by
the text writers, and the Encyclopedia,
above referred to. Constrained by author
ity to allow the taxed costs, we return to
correct principles at the ﬁrst point at
which we may do so, and hold that the
attorney’s ices paid by the covenantee are
not recoverable on the covenant oi the
grantor. In this cause, the court allowed
the deiendant an attorney,s ice which,
added to tho taxed costs and other dam
ages, exceeded the value oi the land at the
time of the sale. and interest thereon, and
taxed costs. But, since the court also
erred in ﬁxing the value oi the land at $6,
000, its value at the time of eviction, in
stead oi $6.296, the price paid to the de
iendant, both errors must be corrected to
make a proper result. The decree is re
v
versed, and decree here.
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POPOSKEY
W.

v.

MUNKWITZ.

(3 Wia. 322.)
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
March 1, 1887.
Appeal from circuit court, Milwaukee coun
(32 N.

35,

W.

The action is by a lessee against his lessor
for failure of the latter to give the lessee
possession of the leased premises according
to the covenants in the lease.
Under date of
October 22, 1884, the parties executed an in
denture of lease in and by which the de
fendant leased to the plaintiff his store, No.
411 Broadway,
in the city of Milwaukee,
from November 15, 1884, to May 1, 1890, at
a yearly renttherein reserved, and therein
that, on paying such rent, and
covenanted
performing the conditions contained in such
lease ‘to be performed by him, the plaintiff
should have the quiet and peaceful posses
sion of the leased premises during such terin.
The defendant was unable to give the plain
tiff the possession of the leased store because he had theretofore leased the same to
Wilde & Uhlig for three years, commencing
May 1, 1883, and Uhlig was lawfully in pos
session thereof under such lease when the
plaintiffs term under his lease commenced,
and so continued in possession
thereafter.

The plaintiff paid the defendant rent until
lJecember 1, 1884, at the execution of the
lease, being $41.07, as stipulated in the lease,
and performed all his covenants therein con
tained.
The plaintiff also put some goods in
the store with the consent of the defendant,
but.was required by Uhlig to take them
away. This involved an expenditure by the
plaintiff of $14.40. It is averred in the com
plaint that, for 12 years before the making
of the lease ﬁrst above mentioned, the plain
tiff had carried on, in the city of Milwau
kee, and for the last ﬁve years in the vicinity
of the leased store, a wholesale and retail
business in pictures, picture-frames, and ar
tist’s materials, and in manufacturing pic
ture-frames, and had a very large and lucra
tive custom and patronage
established
in
said business;
that be leased the store No.
411 Broadway for the purpose of carrying on
and continuing the same business therein, of
which the defendant had notice; that’such
store was especially well located, and adapt
ed to the requirements of plaintiff,s said
that, relying upon having posses
business;
sion of the leased store at the stipulated time
in which to carry on his business, he pur
chased a large stock of goods adapted to the
holiday trade, in December, which is the
most proﬁtable trade during the year; and
that he lost this trade by reason of his fail
ure to obtain possession of the store.
Also
that, upon the refusal of the defendant to
give him possession of the store, the plain
tiff diligently endeavored, but without suc
cess, to obtain another store, suited to the re
quirements of his business,and that the rent
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al value of the leased store for the term of
the lease is at least $22,000 more than the rent
thereof reserved in the lease.
The closing
paragraph of the complaint is as follows:
"That, by reason of the premises, plaintiff,s
said business has been broken up and de
stroyed, and his trade and custom gone, and
his stock of goods purchased to carry on his
business

at said

store so leased

has become

greatly depreciated and destroyed in value,
and plaintiff has lost the proﬁts which he
would and could have made in continuing
and carrying on his aforesaid business at
said leased premises since said ﬁfteenth day
of November, 1884, had said leased premises
been surrendered and delivered up to him as
agreed by defendant, and his said leasehold
interest in said premises been lost and de
stroyed, to the damage of plaintiff in the sum
of ﬁve thousand dollars." Judgment for $5,
000 and costs is demanded.
The answer de
nies in detail each of the above averments,
except that the defendant owned the store
No. 411 Broadway, and executed
a lease
thereof to the plaintiff as alleged in the com
plaint.
The controversy on the trial was conﬁned
to the question of damages.
The plaintiff
offered testimony forthe purpose of proving
the special damages stated in the complaint,
but the salne was rejected, and the judge
held that the measure of the plaintiffs dam
ages is the difference between the rent re
served in the lease and the actual rental
value of the store, together with the expense
of removing the plaintiff,s goods (before men
tioned) from the store after the term of the
lease commenced, and conﬁned the testimo
ny to those elements of damages.
Only a
single question was submitted to the jury,
which is as follows: “What was the actual
value per annum of the premises 411 Broad
way, Milwaukee, described in the lease from
defendant to plaintiff, from and after No
vember 15, 1884?" The jury answered $1,
200.
The rent reserved in the lease until
May 1, 1987, is $1,000, and $1,200 thereafter.
On April 5, 1886, the court gave judgment
for the plaintiff for $272.14 damages, and for
costs of suit.
It is recited in the order for
judgment that the plaintiff admitted he went
into possession of the leased store March 1,
1886.
It is understood that the judgment is
made up of $200 per annum (being the ex
cess in the value of the rent as found by the
jury, over and above the rent stipulated in
the lease) from November 15, 1884, to \Iarcu
1, 1886, and the item of $14.40 above men
tioned.
The item of $41.67 paid defendant
on account of rent was disallowed for die
reason (as stated by the court) that the lease
by operation of law,
to plaintiff “assigned,
the premises during Uhllg,s term to Mr. Po
poskey, and he has the right to recover the
rent from Mr. Uhlig." The plaintiff appeals
from the judgment.
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Dey & Friend, for appellant. Jenkins,
Winkler, Fish &. Smith, for respondent.

LYON, J. This action was brought to re
cover damages for the failure of the defend
ant to put the plaintiff in possession of the
store No. 411 Broadway, Milwaukee, leased
by the former to the latter, at the time stipu
of
lated in the lease as the commencement
the term. It is substantially an action for a
breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment
.ontained in the lease. 1 Tayl. Landl. & Ten.
309.
This appeal presents for determina
ion the question, what is the true rule of
amages for a breach of that covenant in
hat case, in view of the facts proved and of
fered to be proved therein? The rule is un
doubtedly the same as in an action for a
breach of covenants for title in an absolute
conveyance;
that is to say, had the plaintiff
purchased the store No. 411 Broadway of the
convey
efendant,
and taken an absolute
ance thereof, instead of a lease for ﬁve or
more years, under the same circumstances
which existed when the lease was executed,
the measure of his damages for a breach of
the covenants for title in such conveyance
would be the same that it is for a breach of
the covenant for quiet enjoyment in the
lease.
3 Suth. Dam. 147; Blossom v. Knox,
Indeed, the covenant for quiet
3 Pin. 262.
enjoyment is one of the covenants for title in
Rawle, Cov. 17. It is also
a conveyance.
said to be "an assurance consequent upon a
defective title." Id. 125.
The general rule of damages which ob
tains in England and many of our sister
states for a breach of covenant for title was
ﬁrst authoritatively laid down in 1775, in the
pleas of Fiureau v.
case of the common
Thornhill, 2 W. Bl. 1078.
The defendant
.covenanted to sell the plaintiff a rent for a
term of years issuing out of leasehold prem
ises, but, without fault on his part, the derendant was unable to make good title there
to.
The plaintiff claimed damages for the
loss of his bargain, but it was held that he
was not entitled thereto.
De Grey, C. J.,
said: “Upon a contract for a purchase, if the
title proves bad, and the vendor is (without
fraud) incapable of making a good one, I do
not think the purchaser can be entitled to
any damages for the fancied goodness of the
bargain which he supposes he has lost."
Blackstone, J., said: “These contracts are
merely upon condition, frequently expressed,
but always implied, that the vendor has a
good title."
The rule oif the above case
has been much considered in both England
and this country; and while its scope has
been more clearly deﬁned, and its applica
tion somewhat limited by later adjudica
tions, the rule itself. as applied to cases in
which the vendor honestly believed he had a
good title, but the title failed for some de
fect not known to him, and of which he was

not chargeable with notice, is now ﬁrmly es
tablished in the jurisprudence of England by
the judgment of the house of lords in Bain
v. Fothergill, L. R. 7 Eng. & Ir. App. 158.
As already observed, the rule prevails in sev
eral of the United States, including this
state, uvnder the limitations just men oned, of
(good faith and excusable ignorance of the
Indeed, these
vendor of defects in his title.
are scarcely limitations, but rather an inter
qualiﬁcation
pretation of the
“without
fraud," in the opinion by De Grey, C. J., in
the principal case. The rule as it now stands
has been applied in this state in Rich v.
Johnson, 2 Pin. 88; Blossom v. Knox, 3 Pin.
262; Nichol v. Alexander, 28 Wis. 118; Mes
ser v. Oestreich, 52 Wis. 684, 10 N. W. 6, and
in other cases.

Under this or any other rule, the piaintift
is entitled to recover the consideration paid
Hence,
by him on account of the purchase.
in the present case, whatever may be the
of damages. the plaintiff should
measure
have recovered the amount he advanced for
rent, and interest thereon.
The reason giv-/
en by the circuit judge for excluding this
amount from the plaintiffs recovery, towit,
that he could recover the rent from Uhlig,
the tenant under the paramount lease, is con
ceived to be unsound.
The plaintitt did not
purchase a term subject to the lease of Uh
lig, but an absolute term; and while he
might, perhaps, have treated his lease as an
assignment of the rents accruing under the
prior lease, and collected the same from Uh
lig, there is no rule of law which compels
Indeed, had he done so, it pos
him to do so.
sibly might have operated as a waiver of
any claim for damages for the breach of the
covenant sued upon.
The limitations of the rule of Fiureau v.
Thornhill, or rather the exceptions thereto,
are well stated in 3 Suth. Dam. 149, as fol
lows: I “Where a lessor knows, or is charge
able with notice, of such defect of his title
that he cannot assure to his lessee quiet en
joyment for the term which such lessor as
sumes to grant;1where he refuses, in viola
tion of his agreement, to give a lease, or pos
session pursuant to a lease, having the ability
to fulﬁll, as well as where the lessor evicts
his tenant,—he is chargeable with full dam
ages for compensation,
and the doctrine of
Flureau v. Thornhili has no application. On
this general proposition the authorities agree.
In such cases the difference between the rent
to be paid and the actual value of the prem
ises at the time of the breach for the unex
pired term is considered
the natural and
proximate damages.
Where the lessee is de
prived of the possession and enjoyment un
der such circumstances, the lessor is either
guilty of intentional wrong, or he has made
the lease, and assumed the obligation to as
sure the lessee’s quiet enjoyment, with a
culpable ignorance of defects in his title. or
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on the chance of afterwards acquiring one.
In neither case has he any claim to favorable
consideration; and he is not excused, on the
doctrine of Flurean v. Thornhill, from mak
ing good any loss which the lessee may suf
fer from being deprived of the demised prem
ises for the whole or any part of the stipu
lated term."
This quotation doubtless con
tains a correct statement
of the law acted
upon in all the states, as well in those which
have adopted the rule in Flureau v. Thorn
hill as in those which have not.
We are clear that this case comes within
When the defendant leased
the exceptions.
the store to the plaintiff, he knew that there
was a valid paramount lease upon the prem
ises, executed by himself to Wilde & Uhlig,
having 17 or 18 months to run after the com
There is
mencement of the plaintiff,s term.
no claim that the former lessees had for
Indeed, the defendant aft
feited their lease.
erwards made an unsuccessful attempt to
evict them by legal proceedings for an al
leged breach of the covenants of their lease,
occurring after the execution of the plaintiff,s
lease.
But it was held there was no breach.
Munkwitz v. Uhlig, 64 “us. 380, 25 N. W.
424.
These proceedings
are in evidence.
Hence the defendant knew, when be leased
the store to the plaintiff, of a defect in his
title which prevented him from assuring to
the plaintiff the quiet enjoyment of the leas
He thus entered into the con
ed premises.
tract on the chance of being able afterwards
to avoid, in some way, his lease to Wilde &
vL'hlig. but having no legal cause for avoiding
it. These facts deprive him of the protec
tion of the rule in Flureau v. Thornhill, and
bring the lease within the rule above quoted
from Sutherland. In other words, the case
is thus brought within the general rule
v’ which prevails in actions for breaches of con
tracts, that the plaintiff shall recover the loss
he has proximately sustained by reason of
the breach.
But, in order to determine what elements
of loss come within the general rule, it is
necessary to apply other rules of law to the
particular case. In the present case (per
haps in most cases) the rules laid down in
the leading case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9
Exch. 341, 26 Eng. Law & Eq. 398, which
have many times been approved by this court,
are suﬂlcient. Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas
light Co., 15 Wis. 318; Hibbard v. W. U.
Tel. Co., 33 Wis. 558; Candce v. W. U. Tel.
Co., 34 Wis. 471; Walsh v. Chicago,
M. &
St. P. R. Co., 42 Wis. 30; Hammer v. Schoenfelder, 47 Wis. 455, 2 N. W. 1129; Brown v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 54 Wis. 342, 11
N. W. 356, 911; Cockburn v. Ashland Lum
ber Co., 54 Wis. 619, 12 N. W. 49; McNa
mara v. Qlintonville, 62 Wis. 207, 22 N. W.
472; Thomas, B. & W. Manufg Co. v. Wa
bash, St. L. & P. R. Co., 62 Wis. 642, 22
N. W. 827; see, also. Richardson v. Chyno
See, also, a very learned
weth, 26 Wis. 656.
1'

.
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and elaborate note on the rule in the princi
pal case, in which a great number of cases
are cited and discussed, in 1 Sedgw. Dam.
218-23-i.
These rules can best be stated by
a Quotation from the opinion in the principal
case by Alderson, B. He says: “Where two
parties have made a contract which one of
them has broken, the damages which the
other party ought to receive in respect of
such breach of contract should be such as
may fairly and reasonably be considered ei
ther arising naturally, i. e., according to the
usual course of things, from such breach of
contract itself, or such as may reasonably
be supposed to have been in the contempla
tion of both parties, at the time they made
the contract, as the probable result of the
breach of it.
Now. if the special circum
stances under which the contract was actual
ly made were communicated by the plaintiffs
to the defendants, and thus known to both
parties, the damages resulting from the
breach of such a contract, which they would
reasonably contemplate, would be the amount
of injury which would ordinarily follow from
a breach of contract under these special cir
cumstances
so known and communicated.
But, on the other hand, if these special cir
cumstances
were wholly unknown to the
party breaking the contract, he, at the most,
could only be supposed to have had in his
contemplation the amount of injury which
would arise generally, and in the great mul
titude of cases, not affected by any special
circumstances from such a breach of con
tract. For, had the special circumstances
been known, the parties might have specially
provided for the breach of contract by spe
cial terms as to the damages in that case,
and of this advantage it would be very un
just to deprive them."
Another rule having its foundation in nat
ural justice should here be stated.
In any
case of a breach of contract the party in
jured should use reasonable diligence, and
effort, to reduce to a
make all reasonable
minimum the damages resulting from such
breach.
The necessary expenses incurred by
him in so doing may be recovered in an ac
tion for such breach.
This rule was early
laid down by this court in Bradley v. Den
ton, 3 Wis. 55?, and has been followed since.
For a full statement of the rule, and refer
ences to numerous adjudications sustaining
it, see 1 Suth. Dam. 148.
Under this rule,
when the plaintiff was informed that the de
fendant could not give him possession of the
store as he had covenanted
to do, (which
information was received by the plaintiff No
vember 7th, being eight days before the com
mencement of his term,) it became his duty
to use all reasonable efforts to procure an
other suitable place in which to carry on his
if the damages which otherwise
business
would result from the breach of the defend
ant’s covenant would be thereby diminished.
We do not think, however, the plaintiff could
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be lawfully required to take another store
out of the vicinity in which he was doing
business when he took the lease from the de
By removing to a remote part of the
fendant.
city, he might, and probably would, to some
at least, have lost the good-will of
extentl
his business, which it is alleged he had car
ried on successfully for a series of years in
the vicinity of the store No. 411 Broadway.
Neither was he required to take another
store not reasonably well adapted to his busi
ness.

From the foregoing rules, and the partial
application of them already suggested, we
think the following propositions are estab
lished: (1) The plaintiff is entitled to recov
er the sum he paid as rent when the lease
was executed, and interest thereon; and also
the necessary expense of removing some of
his goods to the store, with defendant,s con
sent, and taking them therefrom after he
failed to get possession of the store.
(2) If
the defendant did not know, when he exe
cuted the lease, the purposes for which the
plaintiff hired the store, or the uses to which
he intended to put it, the measure of the
plaintiffs damages for breach of the cove
nant for quiet enjoyment (in addition to the
special damages just mentioned)
would be
that adopted by the trial judge; that is, th
difference between the rent reserved in the
lease and the actual rental value of the store,
without regard to what it is used for, which
the jury found to be $200 per annum.
All
these are natural and proximate damages re
sulting from the breach.
(3) If the defend
ant, then, knew that the plaintiff was carry
ing on the business stated in the complaint,
and hired the store No. 411 Broadway for
the purpose of continuing the same business
therein, and if, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, the plaintiff might have procured
another store, reasonably well adapted to his
business and in the same vicinity, that is, in
a location in which he could have preserved
and retained substantially the good-will of
his former business, the rule of damages, in
addition to the special items ﬁrst above men
‘tioned, will be the difference between the rent
.reserved in the lease and the actual rental
value of the leased store for the purpose of
In such
\,carrying on such business therein.
the actual rental value would ordinarily
e measured by the amount of rent the plain
Ease
tiff would be compelled to pay for another
store equally well adapted to his business.
if he could obtain another store for the same
rent he was to pay the defendant, or less, of
course he would suffer no general damages
for the defendant,s breach of covenant, and
his recovery in that behalf would be con
ﬁned to nominal damages, in addition to the
If,
special damages ﬁrst above mentioned.
however, the expenses of removing to an
other store would have been greater than
they would have been in removing to the
store No. 411 Broadway, such excess would

also be a proper item of damages.
(4) If
the plaintiff could reasonably have procured
another suitable store for his business, he
cannot recover for damages to his business,
because by leasing, and continuing his busi
ness in, such other store, he might have
avoided such damages.
(5) But knowing that
the plaintiff hired the store for the purpose

of continuing his former business therein, (if
he did know it,) and having e.vecuted'the
lease with knowledge that he could not put
the plaintiil.I in possession of the store at the
stipulated time because of his prior outstand
ing lease, the defendant took the risk of the
plaintiff being able to procure another suit
able store for his business, the inability of
the latter to do so would render the defend
ant liable for the damages resulting to plain
tiff,s busines by reason of the breach of
This is plainly
covenant complained of.
within the rule of Hadley v. Baxendaie, su
pra, because, under such circumstances. the
parties may fairly be considered to have con
templated that the breach of covenant would
necessarily destroy or greatly impair the
value of plaintiff,s business.
It should be
that, if the plaintiff recovers for
observed
damages to his business, he cannot also re
cover the value of his lease under the above
second or third proposition, because such
value is necessarily a factor in estimating
the damages to the business. Smith v. Wan
derlich, '0 Ill. 426, (433.)
He may, however,
in that case, recover the special damages
in the ﬁrst proposition, for these
mentioned
are not such factors.
It follows that the testimony which was of
fered by the plaintiff to show that the de
fendant knew, when he executed the lease to
the plaintiff, that the latter was carrying on
the business before mentioned in the same
vicinity, and took the lease of the store for
the purpose and with the intention of contin
uing such business therein, and that he was
unable, in the exercise of due diligence, to
ﬂnd another store suitable for his business, .
was competent, and should have been re
Further, after the plaintiff makes a
ceived.
prima facie case entitling him to recover for
damages to his business, proof should be re
ceived, under the pleadings, to show the
value of such business.
We agree with with Mr. Justice Paine. in‘
Shepard v. Gas-light Co., 15 Wis. 318, that
to ascertain the value of a business an in
vquiry as to the proﬁts thereof is necessary.
Probable “value" and “net proﬁts" are con
vertible terms as applied to a business. Yet
the law in many cases gives damages for
of contracts, based on pro,spective
breache
proﬁts, when they are fairly withini the con
templation of the parties, are not t
remote
and conjectural. and are susceptib
of being
ascertained with reasonable ce . ainty.
If
the plaintiff shows himself en
tied to re
cover for damages to his busin Qss, the char
acter, extent, and value of
established
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business when the lease was executed, and
before, will furnish a guide to the jury in as
sessing the prospectlve and probable value
thereof, had the plaintiff been permitted to
transfer it to the store No. 411 Broadway.
Carried on in the immediate vicinity of the
old stand, and by the same person, presum
ably the business would have been equally
This presumption may be re
prosperous.
butted by proof of facts and circumstances
tending to show that the business would
probably have been less remunerative had it
been so continued.
.It was said in argument that no case can be
found which gives damages .for the loss of
anticipated proﬁts, because a landlord fails
to give possession at the time agreed upon.
This is scarcely a correct statement.
The
case of Ward v. Smith, 11 Price, 19, cited
by Mr. Justice Paine in Shepard v. Gas-light
Co., supra, seems to be just such a case.
It
is conceded that if the plaintiff had not a
business already built up and established in
the same vicinity, which, with its good-will,
could have been transferred to the store No.
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Broadway, there would be no basis upon
which to estimate the prospective value of
the business which the plaintiff would have
done there had he obtained possession, and

411

carried on the business therein.
In such case,
proﬁts would probably be too conjectural and
uncertain to be the basis of a recovery.
Some of the cases refer to this distinction.
In Chapman v. Kirby, 49 Ill. 211, the court,
in speaking of the case of Green v. Williams,
45 Ill. 206, say:
“In that case the lessee had
not entered upon the term, had not built up
or established a business, and had not suf
fered such a loss. There was not in that
case any basis upon which to determine
whether there ever would be any proﬁts, or
upon which to estimate them."
In the pres
ent case the offer was to prove facts which
would have shown a suﬂicient basis to de‘
termine whether there would be proﬁts, and
upon which they might be estimated.
For the errors above indicated, the judg
ment of the circuit court must be reversed,
and the cause will be remanded for a new

trial.

.
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Appeal from court of common pleas, New
Haven county; DI.I.\lIl\‘G, Judge.
Action by Louis (John against Samuel L.
Norton, for damages for breach of contract
to deliver possession of premises leased to
Defend
Judgment for plaintiff.
plaintiff.
ant appeals.
G. A. Fay,

ior appellant.

R. S. Pickett,

forappellee.

CARPENTER, J. On the 18th day of Au
gust,1885, the defendant leased to the plaintiff
a store and dwelling-house, for one year from
the 1st day of S. pte.uber, with the privilege
of renewing the lease for three years, at a
monthly rent of $50, payable in advance.
The defendant
One month,s rent was paid.
It
failed to put the plaintiff in possession.
appears that when the lease was executed the
property was in the possession of one Alex
ander. under a prior lease, with the right to
Ile
hold the same until February 1. 1890.
In an
refused to surrender the possession.
the plaintiff
action to recover damages
claimed to recover the sum of $80, amount
paid to clerks for release from contracts, and
the sum of $586.35, amount paid merchants
to take back goods bought, and for deprecia
The defendant objected
tion on the goods.
to the introduction of all evidence upon either
of these claims. Theeourt admitted the evi
dence, and allowed both items as damages.
Assuming that the plaintiff is correct in
his claim that these were, or might have been,
‘ legitimate items of damage, still we think the
testimony was objectionable, unless it further
appeared that the sums paid were reasonable,
and that the obligation to pay was entered
faith. The mere fact that the
A linto in good
.
paid them is not of itself suﬂicient
jplaintiff
to establish either proposition; and it does
not appear that there was any other evidence
tending to establish them, or either of them.
If the clerks employed by the plaintiff had
sustained
no damage, or damage to a less
amount, or if the plaintiff was under no legal
obligation to pay, then the payment was un
reasonable.
The same is true of the money
If these clerks Were
paid to the merchants.
hired after he know of the lease to Ale\,..inder,

it can hardly be claimed that the plaintiff
How that was, we are
acted in good faith.
It appears that he had full knowl
not told.
edge of that lease on the 23d of August; and
it is consistent with every fact found that all
the clerks were subsequently hired. So. too,
with respect to the purchase of the goods.
Four days after the plaintiff had actual
knowledge that Alexander could legally re
tain the possession, August 27th, he wrote
the defendant as follows: “As I am now sit
uated,
am on the fence, it being high time
for me to buy goods, and 1 don‘t know what
to do about it." On the same day he doubt

I

less received the defendant,s letter inform
ing him that the prior lease had a year and
The evidence is
ﬁve months longer to run.
strong, if not conclusive. that he purchased
If so, in no event has
his goods after that.
he any legal or moral claim on the defendant.
But the great question is, what is the rule
of damages in cases like this ‘? Before consid
ering that question we will brieﬂy notice an
other claim that the defendant sets up, and
that is, that it was the duty of the plaintiff,
at his own expense, to take measures to gain
Whatever may
possession of the property.
be the rule when a stranger wrongfully takes
and holds possession. the principle contended
for can have no application where a person
holding rightfully under the lessor retains the
Nor are we prepared to sanction
possession.
the claim that in this case the defendant is
We can
only liable for nominal damages.
hardly say that a landlord who knows, or who
has the means of knowing, that his property
with an outstanding lease,
is incumbered
which may prevent his giving possession,
acts in good faith in leasing unconditionally
We come back then to the ques
to another.
tion, what is the rule of damages?
In Had
ley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch.341, the rule is laid
down thus: “Where two parties have made
a contract which one of them has broken,the
damages which the other party ought to re
eive in respect of such breach of contract
hould be either such as may, fairly and rea
sonably, be considered as arising naturally—
that is, according to the usual course of
hings-from such breach of contract itself,
r such as may reasonably be supposed to
ave been in the contemplation of both par
ies at the time they made the contract, as
he probable result of the breach of it."
This rule has been criticised somewhat, as
not being sullicienlly deﬁnite; but we appre
hend that any diliiculty of that sort has nec
essarily arisen from the dilliculty in applying
the rule in given cases. It is not an easy
matter, in many cases, to detegmine whether
a given result is the natural consequence of
a breach of a contract, or whether it arose
from a matter which may reasonably be sup
when the
posed to have been contemplated
Offentimes
parties entered into the contract.
it is aquestion on which men,s minds may
well differ. In that case the plaintiff was the
owner of a steam-mill. He sent the parts of
a broken shaft by the defendant. a carrier. to
a mechanic, to serve as a model for making
a new one.
The carrier did not deliver the
article within a reasonable time, by reason of
which the plaintiff,s mill stood still several
In an action to recover damages the
days.
defendant pleaded by paying £25 into court.
The case went to trial, and the plaintiff had
a verdict for £25 more.
A rule to show cause
was argued, and the court promulgated the
In that case it was
rule we have quoted.
contended that the loss of proﬁts was the di
rect and natural consequence of the defend
The court did not accept that
ant’s neglect.
view, but placed its decision on somewhat
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different grounds. The court says: “Now,
if the special circumstances under which the
contract was actually made were communi
cated by the plaintiff to the defendant, and
thus known to both parties, the damages re
sulting from the breach of such a contract
which they would reasonably contemplate
would be the amount of injury which would
ordinarily follow from a breach of contract
under these special circumstances, so known
But, on the other hand,
and communicated.
if those special circumstances were wholly
unknown to the party breaking the contract,
he, at the must, could only be supposed to
have had in his contemplation the amount of
injury which would arise generally, and, in
the great multitude of cases, not affected by
any special circumstances from such a breach
of contract; for, had the special circumstances
been known, the parties might have especially
provided for the breach of contract by special
terms as to the damages in that case, and of
this advantage it would be very unjust to de
prive them." Thus the loss was attributed
to the failure of the plaintiff to inform the
of the special circumstances, by
defendant
reason of which he contributed to the loss;
for, if the defendant had been fully informed,
it may be assumed that there would have been
a prompt delivery, and consequently no un
necessary loss, and because he was not so in
formed the court held that he was not liable
for special damages.
The essence of the rule
seems to be that the defendant must, in some
measure, have contemplated
the injury for
which damages are claimed. If it was the
direct and natural result of the breach of
contract itself, he did contemplate it; but if
the injury did not ﬂow naturally from the
breach, but the breach combined with special
circumstances to produce it, then the defend
ant did not contemplate it, and consequently
is not liable, unless he had knowledge of the
There may, however,
special circumstances.
be cases, growing out of the present methods
of business, in which a promise may be im
plied, from the nature of the transaction, or
the character.of the business in which the
party is engaged, to be prompt, and to use
the utmost diligence in the periormance of
the duty undertaken.
In such cases the law
will not require the party to be specially in
formed, but will deem him to have contem
plated the importance of the business, and
hold him responsible accordingly.
Apply these principles to this case. The
store was hired for a clothing store.
That
seems to be all that the defendant knew
about it. He did not request the plaintiff to
hire clerks and purchase goods, nor was he
advised that the plaintiff woulddo so. While
he may have
that the plaintiff
supposed
would make suitable preparations to oc
cupy the store, yet he could not know what
preparations were necessary.
He may have
n.eded no clerks, or they may have been pre
viously engaged, and the necessary goods
may have been thcn in his possession.
As a
matter of law, it cannot be said that the de
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fendant contemplated that the plaintiff would
hire clerks and purchase goods under such
circumstances as to incur heavy liabilities in
case of failure for any cause.
In no proper
sense. therefore, was the defendant a party
to those arrangements, had no interest there
in, and had no right to interfere; conse
quently he cannot be held responsible. Again,
if these liabilities were incurred after the
plaintiff knew that it was doubtful whether
he could have the store, as they probably
were, then, as suggested in, a former part of
this opinion, they were incurred in bad faith,
and he assumed the entire risk.
The En
glish rule, then, as we understand it, will not
justify the measure of damages applied by
the court below. The rule we have been
considering prevails generally in this country.
Closely allied to it is anotherprinciple, which
has some application to this case, and that is,
that proﬁts which are in their nature doubt
ful or uncertain cannot be recovered as dam
But this principle does
ages in such cases.
not exclude proﬁts as such, but only those of
a contingent nature.
If they are deﬁnite and
certain, and are lost by reason of the defend
ant’s breach of his contract, they are in some
cases recoverable.
An instance of this is the
1 case of Booth v. Rolling-Mill Co., 60 N. Y.
v
487.
The plaintiff had contracted to deliver
to a railroad company 400 steel-capped
rails
at a given price. The defendant engaged
with the plaintiff to manufacture them, but
failed to do so. The plaintiff was allowed to
recover the proﬁts he would have made had
he been able to deliver the rails.
If a loss of
i proﬁts may thus be compensated,
we see no
reason why a direct loss of money may not
In either event, however,
i be compensated.
the loss must be certain, not only as to its
nature and extent, but also as to the cause
which produced it, and must be capable of
In Grilﬁn v.
being deﬁnitely ascertained.
Colver, 16 N. Y. 489, the rule is thus stated:
“The broad, general rule in such cases is
that the party injured is entitled to recover
all his damages, including gains prevented as
well as losses sustained, and this rule is sub
ject to but two conditions: The damages
. must
be such as may fairly be supposed to
‘
have entered into the contemplation of the
parties when they made the contract,—that
is, must be such as might naturally be ex
pected to follow its violation; and they must
be certain, both in their nature and in re
spect to the cause from which they proceed.”
Here we may concede that the loss sustained
was sulliciently deﬁnite and certain as to the
amount, but not so as to the cause from
. which it proceeded.
As we have already seen,
it is not probable that the violation of the
l contract caused these losses; but, on the other
hand, the plaintiff himself needlessly sub
jected himself to them.
In an Illinois case cited bythe plaintiff,
(Green v. Williams. 45 Ill. 206,) it was held
that necessary losses sustained might be re
covered.
The plaintiﬁ’s case will hardly
stand that test.
The failure is twofold,—in
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respect to the necessity for hiring clerks, and
strictly to those cases coming wholly and ex
purchasing goods, in the ﬁrst instance, and
actly within it. In both those cases the cir
also in respect to the payment of the sums
cumstances are enumerated
which will take
There is no ﬁnding, and the facts do
cases out of the operation of the rule.
paid.
They
not sufﬁciently indicate, that there was any
are so numerous as to well nigh abrogate the
rule itself. In l.lngland the rule has been re
necessity for either.
Thus far we have assumed that the dam
pudiated, and such actions are placed upon
the same footing with other actions on con
ages recoverable in this case are the same as
in ordinary cases of breaches of contract.
tracts. Williams v. Burrell, 1 Man., G. & S.
402; Lock v. l:‘urze, 19 C. B. (N. S.) 96.
The defendant, however, contends that the
rule in actions on covenants in lenses, ex
In this state the rule has not been adopted,
. press or implied; is that, where the plaintit‘f
and we are not disposed to adopt it.
We
has paid no rent or other expense, only
think it better to discard the rule, so as to be
in it position to determine all such cases upon
nominal damages can be recovered.
Such a
the general principles applicable to other con
rule once prevailed. It was adopted in anal
tracts.
In that way we think we shall be
ogy to actions on covenants in deeds of real
estate, and it now prevails to a limited ex
the better prepared to do justice in each case
as it arises.
tent in the state of New York. Conger v.
Weaver, 20 N. Y. 140. In that case DENIO,
We suppose the correct rule to he that the
not regarding the rule with favor, with
plaintiff is entitled to recover the rent paid,
apparent reluctance considered that it was .\ and the ditference between the rent agreed
too ﬁrmly established
in that state to be dis
to be paid and the value of the term, together
turbed. In Mack v. Patchin, 42 N. Y. 167, ‘. with such special damages as the circmn
b‘.\itTII, J., says: “But this rule has not beeni
stances may show him to be entitled to.
,l‘rull v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115. The theory
very satisfactory to the courts in this countr_v,
and it has been relaxed or modiﬁed
more
upon which the court below assessed dam
or less, to meet the injustice done to les
ages being inconsistent with these prin
sees in particular cases."
In Pumpelly v. ciples, the judgment must be reveised,and a
Phelps, 40 N. Y. 59, it is declared that the
new trial ordered.
The other judges con
rule should not be extended, but limited
curred.

J.,
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Franklin Steele, .lr., for damages for breach
of contract. Judgment was rendered for de
fendant, and plaintiff appeals. Afflrmed.
George R. Robinson, for appellant.
chel, Cohen & Shaw, for respondent.

Kit

MITCHELL, J. The following condensed
statement of the facts will be suﬂicient for
In 1881, the
the purposes of this appeal:
defendant, being the owner of the.premises
described in the complaint, executed a lease
(in which his wife joined) to plaintiff for
the term of 10 years at an agreed annual
rent. This lease contained a covenant that
if the lessee should desire to continue the
lease for another 10 years he should have
the privilege of doing so in the manner fol
lowing. Not less than three months before
the expiration of the original term the lessee
should give to the lessors notice in writing
of his election to continue the lease for an ad
ditional term, and in such notice name and
appoint an appraiser on his part.
There
upon the lessors should appoint an appraiser
on their part, and notify the lessee of such
appointment.
The two apprais:.rs thus ap
pointed
were to appoint a third, and the
three so chosen were to appraise the leased
premises at their then fair market value.
"and thereupon, without any further’ act,
this lease shall thereupon be extended for
the further term of ten years.
upon the
same terms and conditions as before, except
that the annual rent for such second term
shall be such sum as is equal to six per
centum
of such appraised valuation." In
plaintiff scasonably
1891
gave defendant
written notice of his election to continue to
lease for a second term, and in such notice
nominated
an appraiser on his part to ap
praise the property for the purpose of ﬁxing
the amount of the rent for the additional
term.
On receipt of this notice defendant
sent plaintiff a written communication,
by
which. in order to avoid the necessity of ap
pointing appraisers, he proposed to ﬁx the
rent for the extended term at 6 per cent. on
the then present assessed valuation of the
property,
$31,000.
Immediately on receipt
of this proposition the plaintiff wrote to de
fendant, notifying him of his acceptance of
it. The fact was, although unknown to
plaintiff, that soon after the execution of the
lease in 1881 the defendant
had conveyed
the premises, through the medium of a third
party, to his wife, from whom he had no au-v
thority to make or accept the proposition re
ferred to, and shortly afterwards she .wrote
plaintiff, notifying him that she declined to
be bound by the act of her husband, and sug
LAw DAM.-15

225

gesting that, if they could not agree on the
amount of the rent, they should resort to an
appraisal of the property in accordance with
the terms of the lease.
Plaintiff having re
fused to accede to the proposition,
Mrs.
Steele brought an action against him to re
cover possession of the property, in which
the court decided that the notice served on
her husband
was sufﬁcient to bind Mrs.
Steele, but that she was not bound by the
proposition made by him ﬁxing the rent,
and in accordance with the stipulation of the
parties to the action the court gave Mrs.
Steele further time in which to appoint an
appraiser on her part, which she did.
The
two thus appointed by her and the present
plaintiff, respectively,
selected a third, and
the three appraised the market value of the
premises at $35,000, on which basis the rent
for the second term was ﬁxed at $2,100 per
annum, at which rate the plaintiff has since
paid, whereas the rent, according to the
proposition of the defendant and accepted
by plaintiff, would have been only $1,914 per
annum.
This action was brought to recover
damages for defendant,s breach of his con
tract ﬁxing the rent on the basis of the as
sessed value of the property.
No evidence was
introduced as to the actual rental value of the
premises, and, the ejectment
suit between‘
plaintiff and Mrs. Steele being res inter alios
acta, nothing done or determined in that ac
tion is evidence against the defendant
on
that question.
The plaintiff contends that this is in the
nature of an action for the breach of the
covenant in the lease for the quiet enjoyment
of the leased premises; that plaintiff had a
right to purchase his right of possession
from the true owner, and that his damages
are what it cost him to secure this right.
over and above the rent agreed on between
him and defendant.
The rule as to the
to be in
measure of damages attempted
Plain
voked has no application to the case.
tiffs quiet enjoyment under the lease has
not been disturbed.
He has secured a sec
ond term on the exact terms upon which he
was entitled to it under the terms of the
What he complains of is that, if de
lease.
fendant had been able to perform and had
performed a certain other contract, he would
have obtained the extension on better terms
than he was entitled to under the original
lease.
He was not compelled to take a
second term at all, still less to take it at a
rent greater than the actual rental value of
Therefore the measure of his
the premises.
damages, if he is entitled to any, is the loss
of his bargain, viz. the difference between
the rent agreed in the accepted proposition of
the defendant and the actual market rental
value of the premises at the time this agree
Therefore, assuming that
ment was made.
the proposition of the defendant and the ac
ceptance of it by plaintiff constituted a bind
ing contract, still the plaintiff was at most
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under the evidence, to nominal
and a new trial will not be grantdamages;
ed for a failure to assess nominal damages
Where no question of permanent right is in4
Harris v. Kerr, 37 Minn. 537, 35 N.
volved.
W. 379; Hill. New Trials, p. 572. This renonly entitled,

ders

K

to consider any of the
Judg
discussed by counsel.

it unnecessary

other questions
ment atﬂrmed.

GILFILLAN,
sickness;

O.

J.,

absent,

took no part.
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30,

1894.

Appeal from superior court, Douglas coun
ty; Charles Smith, Judge.
against
Action by Fred G. Summerﬁeid
the Western Union Telegraph Company for
damages ‘for delay in transmitting a mes
Judgment for plaintiff.
sage.
Defendant
appeals. Reversed.
The other facts fully appear in the follow
ing statement by WINSLOW, J.:
Action for damages for delay in the deliv
ery of a telegram.
Plaintiﬂ! resided on a
farm about 10 miles from the village of Iron
River, Wis. His mother lived at Lisbon, N.
D., with plaintiffs brother J. W. Summer
tleld.
Defendant had an ofﬁce at each of
these places.
October 23, 1892, J. W. Sum
meriieid left at defendant,s office at Lisbon
a message addressed to plaintiff, care of Burt
Clark, Iron River, reading as follows:
"Mother is dying. Come immediately.
J.
W. Summerlieid." The fees for the transmis
sion of the message were paid, but the evi
dence tended to show that the message was
negligently delayed, and was not delivered
to Clark until October 28, 1892, and plaintltt
did not receive it until after noon of that day.
Piaintiifs mother died on the 26th day of
October.
Plaintiff claimed that he would
have gone to his mother’s bedside had he re
ceived the telegram in due time, and that,
by reason of his failing to receive the mes
sage until after his mother‘s death, he was
deeply “mortiﬁed,
grieved, hurt, and shock
ed, and suffered intense anguish of body and
mind, and was thereby thrown into a state
.of nervous excitement and tremor. which ren
dered him sick, and impaired his health and
strength, and that he still suffers from the
effect of the same." Upon the trial, objection
was made to the reception of any evidence
under the complaint, because it did not state
facts suﬂlclent to constitute a cause of ac
tion, wlhlch objection was overruled, and ex
.ception was taken.
The court charged the jury, among other
things, as follows: “If you ﬁnd that the
message, in the exercise of ordinary dili
gence, considering all the circumstances
of
the case, was unreasonably delayed,
and
that, if it had been delivered with reasonable
promptness, the plaintiﬂf could and would
thereto,
have responded
and reached
his
mother before her death, and that plaintiff
.suffered mental pain from a sense of disap
pointment, sorrow, chagrin, or grief at being
.deprived of being at his mother,s deathbed,
your verdict should be for the piaintiff in
such sum as will fairly compensate him for
his mental suffering and damages, if any, to
his nervous system, caused by the shock of
such mental suffering."
A verdict for the
piaintiff for $652.50 was rendered, and, from
judgment thereon, defendant appealed.

Mental anguish alone, caused by the negli
failure of a telegraph
company
to
promptly transmit and deliver a message,
will not sustain an action for damages by the
Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227.
addressee.
230; Bovee v. Danville, 53 Vt. 183, 190;
Canning v. Wllllamstown, 1 Cush. 451, 452;
Paine v. Railway Co., 45 Iowa, 569, 573, 574;
City of Salina v. Trosper, 27 Kan. 5-l4, 564;
Keyes v. Railway Co., 36 Minn. 290, 293, 30
N. W. 888; Clinton v. Laning, 61 Mich. 355,
361, 28 N. W. 125; Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.
S. 22, 26, 9 Sup. Ct. 696; Ewing v. Railway
Co., (Pa. Sup. 1892,) 23 Atl. 340; Railway
Co. v. McGinnis, 46 Kan. 109, 113, 26 Pac.
453; Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Gas.
gent

222,

225.

Mcllugh,

Lyons & McIntosh, for respond

ent.

“Mental anguish and suffering occasioned
by the failure to deliver a telegraph message
are proper elements of damage in an action
against the telegraph company by the person
injured, and constitute grounds for recovery,
though no pecuniary loss is shown." Tele
graph Co. v. Newhouse, (Ind. App.) 33 N. E.
800;
Suth. Dam. 260, 645; 37 Cent. Law
J. 61; Womack v. Telegraph Co., (Tex. Civ.
App.) 22 S. W. 417; Bell v. Railway Co., L.
it. 26 Ir. 428; Railroad Co. v. Griﬁin, (Tenn.)
Beasley v. Telegraph Co., 39
22 S. W. 737;
Fed. 181; Telegraph Co. v. Stratemeier, (Ind.
App.) 32 N. E. 871; So Relle v. Telegraph Co.,
55 Tex. 310; Young v. Telegraph Co., 107 N.
C. 370, 11 S. E. 1044; Reese v. Telegraph Co.,
123 Ind. 294, 24 N. E. 163; Telegraph Co. v.
Henderson, 89 Ala. 510, 7 South. 419; Wads
worth v. Telegraph Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S.
W. 574; Chapman v. Telegraph Co., (Ky.) 13
S. W. 880; Stuart v. Telegraph Co., 66 Tex.
580, 18 S. W. 351; Willson v. Railroad Co.,

I

(Wash)

32

Pac.
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WINSLOW. J., (after stating the facts.)
The exact question presented by the instruc
tion of the court to the jury is whether men
tal anguish alone, resulting from the negli
gent nondelivery of a telegram, constitutes
an independent basis for damages.
At com
mon law it was well settled that mere in
jury to the feelings or affections did not con
stitute an independent basis for the recov
cry of damages. Cooley, Torts, 271; Wood’s
Mayne, Dam. (1st Amer. Ed.) §
note 1.
It is true that damages for mental suffering
have been generally allowed by the courts in
certain classes of cases. These classes are
well stated by Cooper, J., in his learned
opinion in the case of Telegraph Co. v. Rog
ers, (Miss.) 9 South. 823, as follows: “(1)
Where, by the merely negligent act of the
defendant, physical injury has been sustain
ed; and in this class of cases they are com
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and the reason given for their
allowance is that the one cannot be separat
ed from the other.
(2) In actions for breach
of the contract of marriage.
(3) In cases of
willful wrong, especially those affecting the
reputation, personal seliberty, character.
curity, or domestic relations of the injured
party." To this latter class belong the ac
tions of malicious prosecution, slander and
pensatory,

libel, and seduction, and they contain an ele
Subject to the possible ex
ment of malice.
in the second and third
ccptions contained
of the above classes, it is not believed that
no well-con
there was any case,—certainly
sidered case.—prior to the year 1881, which
held that mental anguish alone constituted
a sufiicient basis for the recovery of dam
In that year, however, the supreme
ages.
court of Texas, in So Belle v. Telegraph Co.,
55 Tex. 308, decided that mental suffering
alone, caused by failure to deliver such a
telegram as the one in the present case, was
suﬂlcient basis for damages. The principle
of this case has been followed with some va
riations, by the same court, in many cases
since that decision,
and its reasoning has
been substantially adopted by the courts of
last resort in the states of Indiana. Ken
tucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Ala
bama, in cases which are cited in the briefs
of counsel. On the other hand, the doctrine
has been vigorously denied by the highest
courts in the states of Georgia Florida, Mis
sissippi, Missouri, Kansas, and Dakota, and
by practically the unanimous current of au
thority in the federal courts. All of these
cases will be preserved in the report of this
case, and the citations need not be repeated
here. The question is substantially a new
one in this state, and we are at liberty to
adopt that rule which best commends itself
to reason and justice. It is true that it has
been held by this court, in \Valsh v. Railway
Co., 42 Wis. 32; that, in an action upon
breach of a contract of carriage, damages
for mere mental dis
were not recoverable
tress; but, as we regard this action as being
in the nature of a tort action, founded upon
a .neglect.of the duty which the telegraph
company owed to the plaintiff to deliver the
telegram seasonably, that decision is not con
trolling in this case. The reasoning in favor
of the recovery of such damages is, in brief,
that a wrong has been committed by defend
ant which has resulted in injury to the plain
tiff as grievous as any bodily injury could be,
and that the plaintiff should have a remedy
On the other hand,/the argument
therefor.
is that such a doctrine is an innovation upon
long-established
princi
and well-understood
ples of law; that the diﬂlculty of estimating
the proper pecuniary compensation
for men
tal distress is so great, its elements so vague,
shadowy, and easily simulated, and the new
ﬁeld of litigation thus opened up so vast,
that the courts should not establish such a
rule. Regarding. as we do, the Texas rule
as a clear innovation upon the law as it

previously existed, we shall decline to follow
it, and shall adopt the other view, namely,
that for mental distress alone, in such a case
s the present,

damages

are not

recoverable)
The subject has been so fully and ably dis
cussed in opinions very recently delivered
that no very extended discussion will be at
here.
We refer specially to the
tempted
opinions in Telegraph Co. v. Rogers, (Miss)
9 South. 823; Council v. Telegraph Co., (Mo.
Sup.) ‘22 S. W. 345; Telegraph Co. v. Wood,
See, also, Judge Lurton,s dis
57 Fed. 471.
enting opinion in Wadsworth v. Telegraph
Co., 86 Tenn. 695, 8 S. W. 574. In the last
named opinion the following very apt re
marks are made: "The reason why an inde
pendent action for such damages cannot and
ought not to be sustained is found in the re
moteness of such damages, and in the meta
physical character of such an injury, consid
ered apart from physical pain.
Such injuries
are generally more sentimental than substan
tial. Depending largely on physical and
the suffering of one un
nervous conditions,
would
der prccisely the same circumstances
Vague
be no test of the suffering of another.
and shadowy, there is no possible standard
by which such an injury can be justly com
pensated, or even approximately measured.
Easily simulated and impossible to disprove,
it falls within all of the objections to specu
lative damages, which are universally ex- -v
eluded because of their uncertain character."
Another consideration which is, perhaps, of '
equal importance, consists in the great ﬁeld
for litigation which would be opened by the
logical appiicatidn of such a rule of dam
ages.

If

a

jury

must

measure

the

mental

suffering occasioned by the failure to deliv
er this telegram, must they not also measure
the vexation and grief arising from a fail
ure to receive an invitation to a ball or a
Thanksgiving dinner? Must not the morti
ﬁcation and chagrin caused by the public use
of opprobrious language be assuaged by mon
ey damages.? Must not every wrongful act
which causes pain or grief or vexation to an
in dollars and. cents?
other be measured
Surely, a court should be slow to open so
vast a ﬁeld as this without cogent and over
For ourselves we see no
powering reasens.
We adopt the language of
such reasons.
Gantt, P. J., in Council v. Telegraph Co., su
pra: “We prefer to travel yct awhile super
If, in the evolution of society
antiquas vias.
and the law, this innovation should be deem
ed necessary, the leglslnture can be safely
trusted to introduce it, with those limitations
and safeguards which will be absolutely nec
essary, judging from the variety of cases that
have sprung up since the promulgation of the
Texas case."
It was argued that under chapter 171,
Laws 1885, (Saab. & B. Ann. St. § 1770b.)
damages for injuries to feelings alone might
This law provides that tele
be recovered.
graph companies shall be liable for all dam
ages occasioned by failure or negligence of
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their operators, servants, or employee in re
ceiving, copying, transmitting, or delivering
We cannot regard
dispatches or messages.
this statute as creating, or intended to create,
of damage.
in any way, new elements
Whether its purpose was to obviate the diffi
culties which were held fatal to a recovery
in the case of Cundee v. Telegraph Co., 34
Wis. 471, or to effect some other object. is
which now arises; but it
not a question
seems clear to us that, had a radical change
in the law relating to the kinds of suffering
which should furnish a ground of damages
the act would have ex
been contemplated,
pressed thnt intention in some unmistakable
way. We see nothing in the law to indicate
such intention.
Finally, it is said that verdicts for injuries

229

to the feelings alone have been sustained in
this court, and the following cases are cited.
Wightman v. Railway Co., 73 Wis. 169, 40
N. W. 689; Crnker v. Railway Co., 36 Wis.
657; Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450,21 N. W.
Without reviewing these cases in de
527.
tail, it is suﬂicient to say that there was in.
all of them the element of injury or discom
fort to the person, resulting either from actu
al or threatened force, and they cannot be
relied upon as precedents for the allowance
of damages for mental sufferings alone.
It follows from these views that the instruc
Judgment
tion excepted to was erroneous.
reversed, and action remanded
for a new

trial.

CASSODAY, J.,

.

dissents.

MEN
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CAHILL
(30

v.

MURPHY.

Pac.

(No.14,047.)

195, 94 Cal.

Supreme Court of California.

29.)

March

26, 1892.

Department 2.
decision.
Commissioners’
Appeal from superior court, Humboldt coun
ty; G. W. Hunter, Judge.
Action by Mary Cahill against Daniel Mur
phy for slander. From a judgment for plain
tiff, and from an order denying his motion
Aﬂirm
for a new trial, defendant appeals.
ed.

Frank McGowan, for appellant.
Weaver, for respondent.

.

J. H.

G.

FITZGERALD, C. This is an action for
The complaint alleges, in sub
slander.
stance, that on or about the 21st day of Sep
1889,
tember,
and for a long time prior
thereto, plaintiff, with her children, occupied
certain rooms in an hotel of which the de
fendant was owner and proprietor; that one
of these rooms was situated on the ground
floor of the hotel, and used by her for the
purpose of carrying on and conducting a gen
that on said
eral merchandising business;
date, the soot in the chimney
last-mentioned
leading from the mom used as a store be
came ignited, causing an alarm of ﬁre to be
given; and it is further alleged, upon in
formation and belief, that the ﬁre was com
municated to the soot in the chimney from a
The
ﬁre in the stove situated in said store.
slanderous words, out of which this action
arose, are alleged to have been falsely and
maliciously spoken by the defendant of and
concerning the plaintiff, and are laid as fol
lows: “This is twice you [the plaintiff mean
ing] have tried to burn us [the said hotel
meaning] out to get your fourteen hundred
dollars insurance.
But I will report you
[the said plaintiff meaning] to the insurance
company to-morrow morning, and have your
insurance taken away from you." It is fur
ther alleged that the defendant, by the use
of these words, intended to convey the mean
ing that the plaintlff willfully and malicious
ly communicated the ﬁre to the soot in said
chiinney, and that by so doing she was
guilty of an attempt to commit the crime of
arson. and that they were so understood by
those in whose presence they were uttered,
to the damage of plaintiff,s character and
business in the sum of $10,000.
A demurrer
was interposed to the complaint, which, upon
the grounds stated, was properly overruled.
Defendant thereupon answered, speciﬁcally
denying the material allegations of the com
plaint, and, upon the issues thus joined,
plaintiff had verdict and judgment for $1,200.
The only error complained of, which we
deem it necessary to consider, relates to the
ruling of the court upon defendant,s objec
tion to the following question propounded to
plaintiff on her examination in chief as a
witness, and after she had testiﬁed, without

objection, that she had “a family of four
children."
“Question. How many of them
are dependent upon you for support?"
(Ob
jected to on the ground that the question ‘is
incompetent and immaterial.’ The objection
was overruled by the court, and defendant
Answer. Three are dependent up
excepted.)
It is claimed that the
on me at present"
effect and purpose of this testimony was to
arouse the sympathies and sentimental feel
ings of the jury, to the prejudice of defend
ant’s case, by the introduction of an element
that did not belong to it, and which the jury
could not properly consider in the assess
In Rhodes v. Naglee, 66
ment of damages.
Cal. 681, 6 Pac. 863, the ruling of the court
below permitting the piaintiff, against de
fendant,s objection, to prove that he was a
married man, and had a family, was held
not to be erroneous.
And in Dixon v. Allen,
09 Cal. 527, 11 Pac. 179, the mother of the
plaintiff was allowed to testify as to the
number of her children, their ages, and the
The rule laid down
death of her husband.
by this court in those cases rests upon the
principle (although not stated) that, as men
tal suffering entitled the plaintiff to compen
sation in cases of this character, such suffer
ing may be increased, and the damages con
.
sequently enhanced, by the fact that the
members of the plaintiff,s family would suf
fer by reason of the disgrace visited upon
It was there
her by the slanderous charge.
fore competent in this case, on the question
of damages, to prove the number and ages
of plaintiff,s children; but that they were
dependent on her for support was irrelevant,
and not within the issues raised by the
pleadings; therefore erroneous.
But was it
such a material error as would justify a re
versal? The rule in this state is well set
tled that injury will be presumed from er
ror unless the record aﬂirmatively shows to
the contrary.
It was competent, as we have
stated, for the plaintiff to prove the number
and ages of her children, and, if it appeared
from the evidence that they were minors,
the presumption would be that they were
naturally and legally dependent on her.for
The effect, therefore, of such evi
support.
dence would be the same as if proven by
direct testimony.
The evidence upon which
the verdict was founded shows that the slan
derous words charged were spoken wantonly
and maliciously.
The plaintiff was there
fore entitled to recover of the defendant ex
emplary or punitive damages, and the assess
ment of such damages wa almost entirely
in the discretion of the jury. In view, there
fore, of the enormity of the charge. and the
situation of the parties, the plaintiff being a
defenseless woman’ coupled with the amount
of damages awarded by the jury as com
pared with the sum sued for, we are satisﬁed
that the jury was not inﬂuenced by this evi
case.
dence prejudielaily to the defendant,s
The verdict might well have been for a much
larger sum, and yet not obnoxious to the ob

MENTAL SUFFERING.
TEMPLE,

C.; FOOTE, C.

PER CURIAMI For the reasons given in
the foregoin"g opinion the judgment and or
der are aﬂirmed.
Hearing in bank denied.

¢~N

we so advise.

We concur:

~41

jection that it was excessive.
In this case
we think the evidence immaterial, and its ad
mission by the court a mere technical error.
People v. Fick, 89 Cal. 144, 26 Pac. 759. The
judgmevt and order should be aﬂirmed, and
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BECK

(20 s.
Supreme

Court

w.

v.
209,

oownnn.
111

Mo. 506.)

of Missouri. Division No.

2.

Sept. 20, 1892.

Appeal from circuit court, Lewis county;
Benjamin E. Turner, Judge.
Action by Jennie Beck, by her next friend,
Oliver Beck, Sr., against Elijah Dowell, ex
ecutor.
From a judgment for plaintiff, de
fendant appeals.
Aﬁirmed.
Blair & Marchand and M. .\lcKeag. for ap
Clay & Ray, F. L. Schoﬁeld, and J.
0. Anderson, for respondent.
pellant.

GANTT, P. J. This cause was appealed
from the circuit court of Lewis county to the
St. Louis court of appeals.
That court, in
an opinion by Judge Rombauer, affirmed the
judgment of the circuit court, (40 Mo. App.
71;) but Judge Biggs being of the opinion
that the conclusion reached by the majority,
that evidence of the ﬁnancial condition of the
plaintiff, in an action when the evidence will
justify the jury in awarding exemplary or
punitive damages, was admissible, is in con
ﬂict with and opposed to two decisions of this
court, to wit, Overholt v. Vieths, 93 Mo. 422,
6 S. W. 74, and Stephens v. Railroad Co., 96
Mo. 207, 9 S. W. 589, the cause was, under
the constitution,
certiﬁed to this court.
1. When the cause was heard in the court
of appeals. the instructions were not in the
record.

No efforts were made to supply them

in that court, and that court rightly proceed
ed on the assumption that the trial court had
correctly declared the law to the jury. Since
the case has reached this court, a certiﬁed
copy of the instructions has been ﬂied with
the record.
The propriety of considering
these declarations of law by this court, under
suggests itself at once.
these circumstances,
While this court obtains jurisdiction to “re
hear and determine a cause so certiﬁed to
us by either of the appellate courts, as in
cases of jurisdiction obtained
by ordinary
appellate process,"
there is nothing in the
(,onstltntlo1l that justiﬁes parties in assuming
that we will or can take cognizance of mat
tors not in the record.
When a record is de
ﬁcient in any material respect, the practice
is uniform that the party desiring the absent
record should suggest the diminution, and
apply for a writ of certiorarl, or ﬁle stipula
tions in this court, supplying the record.
In
this case nothing of the kind has been done,
but from the brief of the appellant. we take
it he assumes that these instructions are
properly before us.
There is no hardship in
requiring parties to govern themselves
by
the rules of procedure,
established
for the
disposition of causes.
For the purposes of
this appeal, these instructions are no part of

the record, and the cause will be determined
on the presumption that the trial court cor
Parties must pur
rectly instructed the jury.

sue legal methods in perfecting their tran
scripts, and in the proper courts, and in prop
er seasons.
2. The point in this record, then, is that
upon which the court of appeals divided.
is
evidence of the ﬁnancial condition of the
piaintiﬁ? admissible in an action for damages,
when there are circumstances
of oppression
or malice?
That exemplary damages may he
recovered in actions for trespass or personal
torts accompanied by circumstances of malice
or oppression is no longer open to question
in this state. Buckley v. Knapp, 48 Mo. 152.
Nor is it controverted
that it is perfectly
competent to show the ﬁnancial ability of the
defendant in such a case. The case of Ste
phens v. Railroad Co., 96 Mo. 214, 9 S. W.
589, was an action for compensatory
dam
ages alone, and the learned judge who wrote
the opinion expressly says:
“There is noth
ing in the case to justify the giving of ex
emplary damages, and the damages should
be conﬁned to compensation
for the injuries
sustained."
The case of Overholt v. Vieths.
93 Mo. 422, 6 S. W. 74, had no element in it
justifying exemplary damages, and this court
held that it was not improper to exclude evi
dence of the mother,s ﬁnancial condition in
a suit for the death of her child which had
been drowned in a pond, “in view of the fact
that she had been allowed to state her condi
tion in life, and that she did her own house
work and had no servant." We do not think
either of these cases can be considered as de
cisive of the point in this case. Exemplary
damages are allowed. not only to compensate
but to punish the offender.
the sufferer,
Franz v. Hliterbrand, 45 Mp. 121; Callahan
v. Caffarata, 39 Mo. 137.
The evidence in
this case tended to show that the plaintiff
was a girl about 16 years old; that her fa
ther was a tenant of defendant; that on the
day she was shot by defendant her father
and his sons were trying to water a cow in a
lot of the defendant; that a diﬂiculty ensued,
—a general ﬁght; that she,was standing in
when the de
the lot looking on, unarmed,
fendant turned upon her, and shot her through
In other words, the defendant,
the thigh.
with a deadly weapon, shot an unarmed girl
without lawful provocation.
We think there
was ample evidence from which the jury
could ﬁnd willful, wanton injury. In 1 Suth.
"In actions for torts,
Dam. p. 745, it is said:
the damages for which cannot be measured
by a legal standard, all the facts constituting
and accompanying
the wrong should be prov
ed;. and though there be a legal standard
for the principal wrong, if aggravations exist
1 they may be proved to enhance damages; and
every case of personal tort must necessarily
facts.
‘go to the jury on its special
These
embrace the res gestze and the age, sex, and
this, whether the mse
status of the parties:
only, or also for
be one for compensation
exemplary damages, when they are allowed."
In Bump v. Betts. 23 Wend. 85, the supreme
court of New York, on a question of excess
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as one to a person so ituated." In Reed v.
ive damages, pointed to the fact that the de
fendant had the command of great wealth, Davis, 4 Pick. 215, the supreme court of
in an action for trespass in
and that the plaintiff was a poor man. In Massachusetts,
McNamara v. King, 7 Iii. 432, in an action forcibly evicting plaintiff from his home,
says: “One of the defendants
for assault and battery, the court permitted
stated to a
witness, in answer to his inquiry whether he
the plaintiff to show he was a poor man with
thought the plaintiff could not make him suf
a large family. The supreme court of Illi
fer, that ‘the plaintiff had been to jail, and
nois, in afﬁrming that ruling, said: “We are
also of the opinion that the circuit court de
sworn out, and was not able to do anything.‘
Now, that circumstance was to be taken into
cided correctly in admitting the evidence and
giving the instruction. [In actions of this
by the jury.
consideration
There is nothing
kind. the condition in life and circumstances
more abhorrent
to the feelings of the sub
jects of a free government than oppressing
of the parties are peculiarly the proper sub
jects for the consideration of the jury in es
the poor and distressed under the forms and
color, but really in violation, of the law." “It
timating the damages.
Their pecuniary cir
may be inquired into. I It may
cumstances
is found that the dwelling house was small,
but the damages are not to be graduated by
be readily supposed that the consequences of
a severe personal injury would be more dis
the size of the building.
The plaintiff also
astrous to a person destitute of pecuniary was poor. He had seen better days, but had
resources, and dependent wholly on his man
been reduced in his circumstances.
He was
thought not to be able to do anything in vin
ual exertions for the support of himself and
family, than to an individual differently situ
dication of his rights at the law." In Dailey
ated in life. The effect of the injury might v. Houston, 58 Mo. 361, this court said: "It is
be to deprive him and his family of the com
next insisted that the court improperly told
forts and necessaries of life. It is proper .the jury that, in the estimation of damages,
they might take into consideration
that the jury should be inﬂuenced by the pe
the ‘con
’
cuniary resources of the defendant.
The dition in life of plaintiffs, and their pursuits
more aiﬂuent, the more able he is to remuner
vand nature of their business.’
There is no
ate the party he has wantonly injured." In doubt but that, in estimating damages in
Grable v. Margrave, 4 Ill. 372, in an action such cases, the jury may properly take into
for seduction, the trial court admitted evi
consideration
the pecuniary condition of the
parties, their position in society, and all other
dence to show piaintiff was a poor man. The
tending to show the vindictive
supreme court, on appeal, said: “The court
circumstances
ness, or atrocity or want of atrocity, in the
therefore decided correctly in admitting evi
transaction,
dence showing the pecuniary condition of the
and which tend to characterize
plaintiff.
This evidence does not go to the
the assault." This decision of Judge Vories
jury for the purpose of exciting their preju
It has
was concurred in by all the judges.
never, to our knowledge and so far as we can
dices in favor of the plaintiff because he is
ascertain,
a poor man, but to enable them to understand
been questioned, denied, or criti
fully the effect of the injury upon him, and to cised.
It is in harmony, as we have seen,
give him such damages as his peculiar condi
with the decisions of other courts of great
tion in life and circumstances entitle him to ability. It is in harmony with the tendency
In Galther v. Blowers, 11 Md. 536, of the courts to place before the triers of
receive."
facts, whether court or jury, every fact that
in an action for assault and battery, the trial
court having admitted evidence for the plain
will aid them in arriving at a correct verdict.
tiff, with a view of increasing his damages,
It is evident in this case its effect was not to
There is noth
that he was a laboring man and had a wife
create prejudice or passion.
ing that smacks of either in the verdict.
and children to support, the supreme court,
Ac
cordingly we aﬂlrm the judgment of the
after quoting the language of McNamara v.
King, 7 Ill. 432, says: “This is good sense,
court of appeals, as indicated by the opinion
and is sustained by the decisions in most of
of the majority of the judges of that court,
An injury done to a person not on this as well as all other points ruled in the
the states.
case, and it will be so certiﬁed to that court.
dependent on manual labor for the support
of himself and family is in no wise as great
All concur.
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HAYNER

v.

COWDEN.

(27 Ohio St. 292.)

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Error

to district court,

c. Term,

1875.

iami county.

James Murray, J. T Janvier, and H. G.
Conover 8:
for plaintiff
a error.
Craighead and Morris & Son, for defendant
in error.
Sellers,

WRIGHT, J. The slander alleged in the
petition consists in falsely charging plaintiff,
a minister of the gospel, with drunkenness.
It is also averred that the words were spok
en of and concerning him in his ministerial
profession and pastoral ofﬁce. The demurrer
admits all that is averred, and thus this
question is raised: Are words which charge
a minister of the gospel with drunkenness,
when spoken of him in his profession or call
ing, actionable per se? We answer that they
are. We understand the rule to be, that
words spoken of a person tending to injure
him in his oﬁlce, profession or trade are thus
actionable.
1 Starkie,
Sland. 9; Townsh.
Sland. & L. 5 182; 2 Add. Torts, 957 (section
2, c. 17, Edition of 1876 of this book, has a
large collection of authorities on the sub
ject); 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 102; Foulger v. New
comb, L. R. 2 Exch. 327; Demarest v. Har
ing, 6 Cow. 76.
Calling a clergyman a drunkard was held
actionable in McMillan v. Birch, 1 Binney,
176; Chaddock v. Briggs' 113 Mass. 251.
Such words are actionable because they
tend to deprive him of the emoluments which
pertain to his profession, and may prevent
his obtaining employment.
It is not, as
counsel seem
to suppose, that giving a
clergyman this right of action is because his
ofﬁce is higher than that of his fellow men.
It is a right which belongs to all who have
professions or cailings, and in this clergy
men are not different from others.

This principle is entirely different from
that upon which proceeded the cases of Ho1
lingsworth v. Shaw. 19 Ohio St. 430; Dial v.
Holter, 6 Ohio St. 228; Alfele v. Wright, 17
Ohio St. 238. In all these, the words im
puted a criminal offense, and did not relate
to profession or calling.
Upon the trial of the case, it was insisted
by defendant that the words were not spo
ken of the plaintiff in his character as a min
ister. The court fairly left this to the jury,
and

said

if

they

were

not so spoken,

they

would ﬁnd for defendant.
The jury ﬁnd this
issue for the plaintiff, and in the face of
that ﬁnding, it is impossible for us, sitting
as a court of error. to say that they were not
spoken of the plaintiff in his character or
capacity as a clergyman. if they were as

we have seen, they are actionable.
In the cases cited by defendant—Lumly v.
Allday, 1 Tyrw. 217; Brayne v. Cooper, 5
Mees. & W. 249; Ayre v. Craven, 2 Adol. &

E. 2; Buck v. Henly, 31 Me. 558; Redway v.
Gray, 31 Vt. 292; Van Tapel v. Capron, 1
Denio, %0—it was held that the words spo
ken did not touch the plaintiffs in their va
But to charge
rious trades or employments.
a minister with drunkenness does have such
an effect. Congregations would not employ
clergymen with intemperate habits, and the
development of such a vice would be cause
for speedy removal from oﬂlce. When the
question is reduced to a mere matter of dol
lars and cents, the purity, the integrity, theuprightness of a minister’s life is his capital
in this world,s business.
Against the objection made, plaintiff o8er
ed evidence of the wealth of the defendant,.
and in the charge the court said this evi
dence might be considered
in. connection
of exemplary damages.
with the question
We see no error in the admission of the evi
dence or the charge of the court upon the
subject.
That punitive or exemplary dam
ages in a proper case may be given is not an
In Roberts v. Ma
open question in Ohio.
son, 10 Ohio St. 277; Smith v. Pittsburg, Ft.
W. & C. Ry. Co., 23 Ohio St. 10, the court
allowed the jury to consider the wealth of
defendant in connection with the question of
punitive damages. If, then, punishment bean object of a verdict, a small sum would)
not be felt by a defendant of large wealth.
The vengeance of the law would scarcely beappreciated,
and he could afford to pay and
slander still. There are cases which put
the admission of the evidence upon this
ground. Alpin v. Morten, 21 Ohio St. 536, in
timates that the reason is to enable the jury
to determine how much plaintiff has been
injured. This case collects the authorities
on both sides of the question,
to which
might be added McBride v. Laughlin, 5
Watts, 375: Wagoner v. Richmond, Wright,
173; Sexton v. Todd, Id. 320; 2 Greenl. Ev.
249; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 199, note 6; Horsley
v. Brooks, 20 Iowa, 115; Buckley v. Knapp,
48 Mo. 153. We see no error in the admis
sion of the evidence, or the charge of the
court on the subject.
There are some other questions raised by
counsel, to which.we brieﬂy allude:
The defendant a ed the court to charge
the jury:
“If they nd that the words
spoken by the defenda.
of and concerning
the plaintiff were untru
and that the de
fendant has not reasonab
cause to believe
them to be true, yet, if . ey are satisﬁed‘
from the evidence that
did be
lieve them to be true, thewxefendant
suc
state of facts
would not warrant a verdic.‘ for punitive or
exemplary damages, but fo compensatory
damages
only." With whi(h request the
court refused to comply, br..l, on the con
trary, charged the jury thattsuch was not
the law, to which the defendant then and
there excepted.
..
We do not understand the [law of slander
to be, that it is a defense that the slanderer
believed his words to be trule, when he had
I

t
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no grounds for so believing. Belief must
have
Take
a foundation in something.
away the foundation, and what can be left?
The charge seems to us a soiecism. Belief
can only be claimed as a defense, or in mit
igation, where it is based upon such facts or
per
reasons as would incline a reasonable
son so to believe.
Inasmuch as this charge
was asked in reference to exemplary dam
ages, and there was evidence tending to
show that the words had been spoken under
indicating wantonness
circumstances
and
recklessness,
the charge was properly re.
fused.
It appears to be seriously argued that in a
minister of the gospel a single act of intox
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ication is not a fault, and therefore a charge
of that kind cannot be injurious. We can
hardly assent to this proposition. In a re
ligious teacher one offense of the kind must
be considered a grave departure from pro
priety and duty; and to say that the act has
been committed is calculated to impair use
fuiness.
As to the question of excessive damages:
The verdict was large; still we do not think
defendant can complain, in view of all the
circumstances of the case.
Judgment aﬂlrmed.
SCOTT, C. J., and WHITMAN and JOHN
SON, JJ., concurred.
DAY, J., dissented.
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Exceptions from Bennington county court;
Powrms, Judge.
Trespass for an assault and battery, com
mitted on one Goldsmith, brought by Gold
smith’s administrator against Moses Joy, Jr.
Defendant did not deny that he made the as
sault. It appeared, however, that at the
time. and just before, hot words had passed
between the parties. and defendant claimed
that he committed the wrong under the in
iiuence of the passion induced by the insult
ing and unjustiﬂable language of plaintiff,s
intestate, and that this fact should be con
sidered by the jury in reduction both of the
Defendant
actual and exemplary damages.
was the superintendent and general manager
of the construction of a system of water
works in the city of Bennington, and in that
capacity had in his employ about 100 men,
mostly or all foreigners. It was in reference
to the treatment of these men by defendant
that the Intestate used the alleged insulting
language. He was suffering from Bright’s
disease at the time of the affray, and subse
quently died of it. It was claimed that his
death was materially hastened by the as
sault.
'
The court instructed the jury to award
plaintiff actual damages at any rate, no mat
ter what the provocation which led to the
assault might have been. Upon the subject
of exemplary damages the charge was as fol
lows: “Now, then, as to the other question
of damages.
In actions of this kind under
the laws of this state, the jury is permitted
(not compelled, but permitted) in their dis
cretion to allow to the plaintiff, in addition
to the ordinary compensatory damages, such
damages as in their judgment the character
of the assault requires, in order that their
verdict may serve as a terror to evil-doers.
This is called ‘exemplary damages,’—dam
ages that are awarded by way of example; a
verdict that the community can look upon as
the wise judgment of the jury, exercised in
a case where it will be calculated to restrain
I have
attacks of this kind in the future.
said, gentlemen, that the allowance of the
damages is permitted to the jury. They are
not awarded in any case unless the trespass
—unless the assault and battery—was of
such a wanton, malicious, or aggravated
character as leads the jury to think that an
ought to be made of the case.
example
Oftentimes an assault is committed by one
man upon another under such circumstances
that the jury can see honestly that there was
no malice; that there was no wantonness;
that there were no high-handed acts that
would justify the awarding of more than
On the other hand,
compensatory damages.
many cases exist where the attack is of a
wanton character, where it is inexcusable,
where it is of a high-handed nature, and the

.

jury, looking at all the facts in the case,
wisely say that the public are entitled to have
an example made in the particular case, in
order that in the future not only the defend
ant himself, but that other persons who get
into affrays, shall be restrained from making
these high-handed, inexcusable, and wanton
attacks upon another. So that, gentlemen,
this question, then, is one that addresses it
self to your wise discretion. Do you think,
in view of what is shown here, that this at
tack was of such a characteras warrants you
in awarding exemplary damages? If you do,
then the amount of these damages rests
wholly in your wise discretion. Whether it
shall be a small sum or a large sum, you are
to judge of; but in any event, gentlemen, if
you award damages of this nature, you are
to do it because you think that this assault
upon Mr. Goldsmith was. under the circum
stances, wholly inexcusable and wanton on
the part of the defendant. Now, then, in
respect to that question, mere words made
use of by one person to another are no legal
excuse whatever for the inﬂiction of personal
It makes no difference how vio
violence.
lent the language used may be, no man has
the right to use personal violence upon an
other when he is induced to simply by the
use of words.
That is no defense to the ac
tion. But when you come to the question of
whether a particular case is one thatdeserves
the awarding of exemplary damages, then
you are to consider all the circumstances in
the case: the provocation, if any, that the
defendant had; and everything that is calcu
lated on the one hand to aggravate his act,
and on the other hand to palliate his act, is
to be considered.
As I have already said on
the main question of compensatory damages,
there is no defense here whatever. No mat
ter what was said, no matter how much
provocation the defendant had, he is bound
to answer for the compensatory damages, at
As to exemplary damages, in
any event.
the exercise of a wise discretiorl you will not
allow them unless you are satisﬁed that the
act of the defendant was high-handed, wan
ton, and inexcusable. and in determining that
question you are to take into view all the
provocation that he had. Now, then, gentle
men, if the provocation was slight, it is quite
different, and it should have less weight in
determining the question whether you shall
award exemplary damages than it would
Then,
have if the provocation was great.
again, you may look at the parties them
If Goldsmith was a feeble old man,
selves.
in poor health, and physically unable to com
pete with the defendant in a personal en
counter, and the defendant without any
provocation that you in your judgment say
warrants an assault,—a violent assault,—if
he then makes an assault that is altogether
undue, uncalled for, in view of the special
circumstances existing, why, then, it would
be a case that the jury might award exem
The law takes notice of the
piary damages.
hot passions that people fall into when they

-/
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Hurl. & N. 275; 2 Add. Torts. § 1393, recog
In this country, 2
nizes the same rule.
- Greenl. Ev. § 93, states the rule that a provoca
tion by the plaintiff may be thus shown, if so
recent as to induce a presumption that vio
under the immediate
lence was committed
inﬂuence of the passion thus wrongfully ex
cited by the plaintiff. The earlier cases com
monly cited in support of this rule are Cush
man v. Ryan, 1 Story, 100; Avery v. Ray. 1
Mass. 12; Lee v.Woolsey, 19 Johns. 319; and
Maynard v. Beardsley, 7 Wend. 560. The su
has generally
preme court of Massachusetts
recognized the doctrine that immediate prov
ocation may mitigate actual damages of this
kind. Mowry v. Smith, 9 Allen, 67; Tyson
v. Booth, 100 Mass. 258; and Boniuo v. Cale
donio, 144 Mass. 299, 11 N. E. Rep. 98.
It
is also said in 2 Sedg. Dam. (7th Ed.) 521,
note: “If, making due allowance for the in
ﬁrmities of human temper, the defendant has
reasonable excuse for the violation of pub
iic order, then there is no foundation for ex
of this kind, would draw away very far from
emplary dmuages, and the plaintiﬂ‘ can claim
the moorings of good citizenship and good
only compensation. It is merely the corollary
behavior, and then an example would be de
of this that where there is a reasonable ex
manded, if one inﬂicted an assault; upon an
cuse for the defendant, arising from the prov
other." Verdict and judgment for plaintiff.
ocation or fault of the plaintiff. but not sufﬁ
cient entirely to justify the act done, there
l'Exceptions by defendant.
can be no exemplary damages, and the cir
Martin & Archibald, J. L. Martin, and J.
cumstances of mitigation must be applied to
C. Baker, for plaintiff.
Batchelder Sc Bates
the actual damages.
If it were not so. the
and W. B. Sheldon, for defendant.
plaintiff would get full compensation
for
The rule
damages occasioned by himself.
TYLER. J. The courtinstructed the jury ought to be and is practically mutual. Malice
that there was no defense to the claim for
and provocation in the defendant are pun
actual or compensatory damages; that words
ished by inﬂicting damages .exceeding the
were no legal excuse for the inﬂiction of per
measure of compensation, and in the plaintiff
sonal violence; thut, no matter how great the
by giving him less than that measure."
In
provocation, the defendant was bound in any
Burke v. Melvin. 45 Conn. 243, PARK. C. J..
event to answer ior these damages.
It is a held that the whole transaction should go to
general and wholesome rule of law that when
the jury.
"They could not ascertain what
ever by an act which he could have avoided,
amount of damage the plaintiff was entitled
and which cannot be justiﬁed in law, a per
to receive by considering a part of the trans
son inilicts an immediate injury by force, he
action. They must look at the whole of it.
is legally answerable in damages to the party
They must ascertain how far the plaintiff
The question whether provocative
injured.
was in fault, if in fault at all, and how far
words may be given in evidence under the
the defendant, and give damages accordingly.
general issue to reduce actual damages in an
The difference between a provoked and an
action of trespass for an assault and battery
unprovoked assault is obvious. The latter
has undergone wide discussion.
The English
would deserve punishment beyond the actual
cases lay down the general rule that provoca
damage, while the damage in the other case
tion may mitigate damages.
’l‘he case of
would be attributable, in a great measure, to
Fraser v. Berkeley, 7 Car. & P. 621, is often
the misconduct of the plaintiff himself."
In
referred to, in which I.ord ABINGER held that
Bartram v. Stone, 31 Conn. 159, it was held
evidence might be given to show that the
that in an action for assault and battery the
plaintiff in some degree brought the thing up
defendant might prove, in mitigation of dam
on himself; “that it would be an unwise law
ages, that the plaintiff, immediately beiore
if it did not make allowance for human in
the assault, charged him with a crime, and
iirmities; and, if a person commit violence at
that his assault upon the plaintiff‘ was oc
a time when he is smarting underimmediate
casioned by “sudden heat," produced by the
provocation, that is nmtter of mitigation."
plaiutiff’s false accusation. See, also, Rich
TINDAL, C. J., in Perkins v. Vaughan, 5
ardson
v. Hine, 42 Conn. 206. In Kiil? v.
Scott, N. R. 881, said: “I think it will be
Youmans, 86 N. Y. 324, the plaintiff was
found that the result of the cases is that the
upon defendant's premises for the purpose
matter cannot be given in evidence where it
of committing a trespass, and the defend
amounts to a defense, but that, where it does
ant assaulted him to prevent the act, and
not amount to a defense, it may be given in
the only question was whether he used un
mitigation of damages." Linford v L0ke, 3
J., said: “It
1_)A.\,FUR,l‘}l,
necessary force.
are engaged in disputes, not by way of mak
ing a complete defense to an action for dam
ages, but by way of raising a doubt; in the
minds of the jury respecting the awarding
of exemplary damages.
And in determining
that question the jury are justiﬁed in looking
at the parties as they stand beiore them.
Take an ignorant class of men that we have
in every community,— men who have by
their education and bringing up had less op
portunities to come within the circle of good
order and of good behavior,—the jury might
well say that as to that class of men, if they
fall into disputes and come to blows, there
would be less occasion for setting an ex
ample than there would be if the parties oc
cupied a higher and more prominent position
in society.
The inﬂuence of an example in a
case of this kind oftentimes depends quite
largely upon the character of the parties in
volved. You can cast about you in your
mind’s eye, in the community, and pick out
men who, if they should fall into an affray

_
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siill remains that

OF DAMAGES.

the plaintiff provoked the
trespass; was himself guilty of the act which
led to the disturbance of thepublic peace. Al
though this provocation fails to justify the de
fendant, it may be relied upon by him in miti
gation even of compensatory damages. This
doctrine is as old as the action of trespass,
* * * and is correlativeto the rule which
permits circumstances of aggravation, such
as time and place of an assault, or insulting

the rule in Morely v. Dunbar that it might go
But
to reduce all compensatory damages.
in Fenelon v. Butts, 53 Wis. 344, 10 N. W.
Rep. 501, and in Corcoran v. Harran, 55
Wis. 120, 12 N. W. Rep. 468, it was clearly
held that personal abuse of the assailant by
the party assaulted may be considerrd in

and contumely, to increase them." In Robi
son v. Rupert, 23 Pa. St. 523, the same rule
is adopted, the court saying" “Where there
is a reasonable excuse for th. defendant aris
ing from the provocation or fault of the plain
tiff, but not sufﬁcient entirely to justify the
act done. there can be no exemplary damages,
and the circumstances of mitigation must be
In Ireland
applied to the actual damages."
v. Elliott, 5 Iowa, 478, the court said: “The
furthest that the law has gone, and the fur
thest that it can go, while attempting to
maintain a rule, is to permit the high provoca
tion of language to be shown as a palliation
for the acts and results of anger; that is, in
legal phrase, to be shown in mitigation of

circumstances of provocation is liable for the
actual damages which result from such as
sault. In Donnelly v. Harris, 41 Ill. 126,
the court instructed the jury that words
spoken might be considered in mitigation of
WALKER, C. ., in delivering the
damages.
if the supreme court, remarked:
opinion
“Had this modiﬁcation been limited to ex
emplary damages, it would have been correct,
but it may well have been understood by the
jury as applying to actual damages. and they
would thus have been misled. To allow them
the effect to mitigate actual damages would
be virtually to allow them to be used as a de
fense.
To say they constitute no defense.
and then to say they may mitigate all but
nominal damages, would, we think, he do
ing by indirection what has been prohibited
from being done directly. To give to words
this eifect would be to abrog.ate, in effect,
rules of
one of the most ﬁrmly established
See, also, Ogden v. Claycomb, 52
the law."
111. 366.
In Gizler v. Witzel, 82 Ill. 322, the
court said, in reference to the charge of the
court below: "The third instruction tells the
jury, among other things, that the plaintiff,
in order to recover, should have been guilty
of no provocation.
This is error. It is whol
ly immaterial what language he may have
used, so far as the right to maintain an ac
tion is concerned, and even if he went be
yond words and committed a technical assault,
the acts of the defendant must still be limit
In Norris
ed to a reasonable self-defense."
v. Casel, 90 Ind. 143, this precise question
was not raised, but the court said, in refer
ence to the instructions of the court below,
that the ﬁrst part of the charge, that the
provocation by mere words, however gross
and abusive, cannot justify an assault, was
correct, and that a person who makes such
words a pretext for committing an assault
commits thereby not only a mere wrong, but
a crime, and the person so assaulted is not
deprived of the right of reasonable self de
fense, even though he used the insulting
language to provoke the assault against which
he defends himself; but, whatever may have
been his purpose in using the abusive lan
guage, it cannot be made an excuse for the
assault. Johnson v. McKee, 27 Mich. 471,
was a case very similar to the one at bar, and
was given to the jury under like instructions.
The supreme court said: ‘‘In regard to prov
ocation, the court charges, in effect, that if
plaintiff provoked defendant, and the as
sault was the result of that provocation, he
could recover nothing beyond his actual dam

words, or other circumstances of indignity

damages."

In Thrall v. Knapp,

17

Iowa,

“
The clear distinction
468. the court said:
is this:
Contemporaneous provocations of
words or acts are admissible, but previous
provocutions are not. And the testis whether
* * *
‘the blood has had time to cool.’
The law affords a redress for every injury.
If the plaintiff slandered defendant’s daugh
ters, it would entirely accord with his natural
feeling to chastise him; but the policy of the
law is against his right to do so, especially
It affords a peace
after time for reﬂection.
On the other hand, the law so
ful remedy.
completely disfavors violence, and so jealous
ly guards alike individual rights and the pub
lic peace, that, ‘if a man gives another a
cuff on the ear, though it costs him nothing,
no, not so much as a little diachylon, yet he
shall have his action.’ Per Lord HOLT,

Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 955." The
reasoning of the court seems to make against
his rule that provocations such as happen
at the time of the assault may be received in
evidence to reduce the amount of the plain
tiff’s recovery.
In Morely v. Dunbar, 24 Wis. 183, DIXON,
., held “that, notwithstanding
what
C.
was said in Bil-chard v. Booth, 4 Wis. 75,
circumstances of provocation attending the
transaction, or so recent as to constitute a
part of the res gestw, though not sufﬁcient
entirely to justify the act done, may consti
tute an excuse that may mitigate the actual
and, where
the provocation is
damages;
great and calculated to excite strong feelings
of resentment, may reduce them toa sum
which is merely nominal."
But in Wilson
v. Young, 31 Wis. 574, it was held bya ma
jority of the court that provocation could go
to reduce compensatory damages only so far
as these should be given for injury to the feel
ings; DIXON, C. J., however, adhering to

J

mitigation of punitory, but' not of actual
which mclude those allowed for
damages,
mental and bodily suffering; thata man com
mencing an assault and battery under such

J
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and outlays, and would be precluded
ag
from claiming any damages for injured feel
In other words, he
ings or mental anxiety.
would be cut oil.’ from all the aggravated
damages allowed in cases of willful injury,
called ‘exemplary
and sometimes
loosely
As there is no case in which a
damages.’
party who is damaged, and is allowed to re
cover anything substantial, cannot recover
his actual damages, the rule laid down by the
court was certainly quite liberal enough, and
if any one could complain it was not the de
The court said in Prentiss v.
fendant."
Shaw, 56 Me. 436: “We understand that
rule to be this: A party shall recover as a
pecuniary recompense the amount of money
which shall be a remuneration, as near as
may be, for the actual, tangible, and immedi
ate result, injury, or conseqnenceof the tres
* * * If
pass to his person or property.
the assault was illegal and unjustiﬁed, why
is not the plaintiff in such case entitled to
the beneﬁt of the general rule, before stated.
that a party guilty of an illegal trespass on
another’s person or property must pay all
the damages to such person or property, di
rectly and actually resulting from the illegal
act? * * * Where the trespass or injury
is upon personal or real property, it would
be a novelty to hear a claim for reduction of
the actual injury based on the ground of
If, instead of the
provocation by words.
owner’s arm, the assailant had broken his
horse’s leg, * * * must not the defend
ant be held to pay the full value of the horse
thus rendered useless?" The learned judge
admits that the law has sanctioned, by a
long series of decisions, the admission of evi
.dence tending to show, on one side, aggra
vation, and on the other mitigation of the
‘ damages claimed, but he holds the law to be
j that mitigant circumstances can only be set
v
against exemplary damages, and cannot be
used to reduce the actual damages directly
resulting from the defendant’s unlawful act.
In a learned article on “Damages in Actions
ex Delicto," 3 Amer. Jur. 287, it issaid: "If
the law awards damages for an injury, it
would seem absurd (even without resorting
to the deﬁnition of damages) to say that they
shall be for a part only of the injury."
“It
is a reasonable and a legal principle that the
.compensation should be equivalent to the in
jury. There may be some occasional depart
ures from this principle, but I think it will
be found safest to adhere to it in all cases
proper for a legal indemniﬁcation in the
shape of damages." Jacobs v. Hoover, 9
Minn. 204, (Gil. 189;) Cushman v. Waddell,
Baldw. 57;t and McBride v. Mt.l.aughlin, 5
Watts’ 375,~are strong authorities in sup
port of the rule that provocative language
used by the plaintiff at the time of the bat
.tery should be given in evidence only in miti
gation of exemplary damages, and that un

tFed. Cas. No.
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less the plaintiff has given the defendant a
provocation amounting in law to a justiﬁca
tion he is entitled to receive compensation
for the actual injury sustained.
If provocative words may mitigate, it fol
lows that they may reduce the damages to a
mere nominal sum, and thus practically jus
tify an assault and battery. But why, under
this rule, may they not fully justify? If, in
one case. the provocation is so great_that the
jury may award only nominal damages, why,
in another, in which the provocation is far
greater, should they not be permitted to ac
quit the defendant, and thus overturn the well
settled rule of law that words cannot justify
an assault. On the other hand, if words cannot
justify they should not mitigate. A defend
ant should not be heard to saythat the plain
tiff was ﬁrst in the wrong by abusing him
with insulting words, and therefore, though
he struck and injured the plaintiff, he was
only partly in the wrong, and should pay
If the right
only part of the actual damages.
of the plaintiff to recover actual damages
were in any degree dependent on the defend
ant’s intent, then the plaintiff,s provocation
to the defendant to commit the assault upon
him would be legitimate evidence bearing
Even
upon that question; but it is not.
lunaties and idiots are liable for actual dam
ages done by them to the property or person
of another, and certainly a person in the full
of his faculties should be held
possession
liable for his actual injuries to another, un
less done in self-defense. or under reasonable
apprehension that the plaintiff was about to
do him bodily harm.
The law is that a per
son is liable in an action of trespass for an
assault and battery, although the plaintiff
made the ﬁrst assault, if the defendant used
more force than was necessary for his pro
i tection, and the symmetry of the law is better
preserved
by holding that the defendant,s
liability for actual damages begins with the
beginning of his own wrongful act. It is
certainly in accordance with what this court
held in Howland v. Day, 56 Vt. 318, that
“the law abhors the use of force either for
\
attack or defense, and never permits its use
unnecessarily." Exemplary damages are not
recoverable as matter of right, but as was
stated by WHEELER, J., in Earl v. Tupper’
45 Vt. 275, they are given to stamp the con
demnation of the jury upon the acts of the
defendant on account of their malicious or
Boardman v. Gold
oppressive character.
smith. 48 Vt. 403, and cases cited; Mayne,
Dam. 58-65; Voltz v. Blackmar, 64 N. Y. 440.
The instructions to the jury upon this branch
of the case were in substantial accordance
I
with the law as above stated.
As exemplary
damages were awardable in the discretion of
the jury. the charge was also correct that the
inﬂuence of an example in a case ofthis kind
depended on the character and standing of
the parties involved.
We ﬁnd no error in the
charge, and the judgment is aﬂirmed.
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Bupreme Court of Indiana.

February

21, 1889.

Appeal from circuit court, Clinton county;
Joseph G. Suit, Speoial Judge.
Action by James B. Snyder against the
Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway
Company,
for personal injuries. Judgment
for plaintiﬂ?, and defendant appeals.
S. O. Bayless and W. H. Russell, for ap
pellant. T. H. Palmer, W. F. Palmer, B. K.
Higinbotham, and M. Bristow, for appellee.

ELLIOTT,

C. J. The appellee was a pas
on one of the appellant’s trains,
which, by the falling of a bridge, was pre
cipitated into White river, and the appellee
severely injured.
Dr. Bowles, an expert witness called by
the appellant, gave an opinion as to the na
ture and extent of the injury sustained by
the appellee, and on cross-examination it was
developed that his testimony was in part
based on statements made to him by the ap
Waiving all questions of practice,
.l»ellee.
and deciding the appellant,s motion to strike
1
wut as if it were properly restricted to the
lalieged incompetent part of the testimony,
have no hesitation in deciding that the
‘we
trial court did right in overruling the motion.
\
\As we have often decided, the physical or
gans of a human being cannot be inspected
by the eyes of a surgeon, and the statements
of the sufferer must, of necessity, be taken
by the surgeon.
It is not possible for any
surgeon, by a mere external examination, to
always discover the character of an injury,
and properly describe or treat an injured
man; and for this reason, if for no other,
the statements of the injured person descrip
tive of present pains or symptons are always
although narratives of past oc
competent,
currences
are inadmissible. On this point
our own decisions are harmonious, and they
are right upon principle, and are well sup
ported by authority.
Railroad Co. v. New
ell, 104 Ind. 264, 3 N. E. 836; Railway Co. v.
Falvey, 104 Ind. 409, 3 N. E. 389, and 4 N.
E. 908; Railway Co. v. Wood, .113 Ind. 544,
14 N. E. 572, and 16 N. E. 197; Board v. Leg
gett. 115 Ind. 544, 18 N. E. 53; Hatch v. Ful
ler, 131 Mass. 574: Railroad Co. v. Johns, 36
Kan. 769, 14 Pac. 237; Quaife v. Railroad
Co0 48 Wis. 513, 4 N. W. 658.
From these
decisions we shall not depart.
The fact that the appellee was suffering
from Bright,s disease at the time he was in
jured does not impair his right of recovery.
The rule is this: “Where a disease caused
by the injury supervenes, as well as where
the disease exists at the time of the injury,
and is aggravated by it, the plaintiff is enti
damages." Rail
tled to full compensatory
road Co. v. Hecht, 115 Ind. 443, 17 N. E. 297;
Railway Co. v. Wood, supra; Railroad Co.
senger

or nanacas.
v. Pitzer, 109 Ind. 179, 6 N. E. 310, and 10
N. E. 70; Railroad Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346;
Ehrgott v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 264; Jucker v.
Railroad Co., 52 Wis. 150, 8 N. W. 862; Rail
way Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597, 7 Sup. Ct.
113 Pa.
Railway Co. v. Rosenzweig,
1286;
St. 519, 6 Atl. 5-15; Railway Co. v. Leslie, 57
Tex.
The rule we have stated is thus expressed
“Though the
in one of our best text-books:
plaintiﬂf be aﬂiicted with a disease or weak
ness which has a tendency to aggravate the
injury, the defendant,s negligence will still
2 Shear.
be held to be the proximate cause."
& R. Neg. (4th Ed.) § 742.
The instructions clearly and properly state
the law on this subject.
The court did not err in instructing the
jury as to the degree of care required of the
appellant; at least, not as against the ap
pellant. The rule is well settled that car
riers are bound to use the highest practicable
degree of care to secure the safety of passen
gers.

There was no evidence of contributory neg
on the part of the appellee, and the
court might well have refused any instruc
tion at all upon that point.
Where a passen
ger is in his proper place in the car, and
makes no exposure of his person to danger.
there can be no question of contributory neg
ligence.
Decisions like that of Railway Co
v. Greene, 106 Ind. 279, 6 N. E. 603, in cases
of persons injured at a railroad crossing,
are not applicable to such a case as the one
at our bar.
The law is, as the jury were
told, that carriers of passengers
are liable
Any negligence
for the slightest negligence.
on their part is actionable.
Railroad Co. v.
Rainbolt, 99 Ind. 551.
The law will not tolerate any negligence on
the part of carriers, although they are not
insurers of the safety of their passengers.
The burden of overcoming the presumption
of negligence arising from evidence of the
occurrence
of an accident and injury to a
passenger is upon the carrier.
Packet Co.
v. McCooi. 83 Ind. 392; Railroad Co. v. Buck,
91; Ind. 346; Railroad Co. v. .\‘ewell, supra;
Railroad Co. v. Rainbolt. supra; Anderson v.
Scholey, 114 Ind. 553. 17 N. E. 125.
In Railroad Co. v. Pedigo, 108 Ind. 481, S
N. E. 627, the rule was applied in a case
growing out of the same occurrence as that
in which the appellee was injured.
The
twenty-second instruction asked by the ap
pellant, and refused. reads thus: “The court
further instructs you that by ‘negligence,’
when used in these instructions, is meant
either the failure to do what a reasonable
person would ordinarily have done under the
circumstances of the situation, or doing what
such person would not have done under the
existing circumstances."
This instruction
It is not proper in
was properly refused.
such a case as this to deﬁne negligence as it
In a case of
is deﬁned in this instruction.
this character, the omission to exercise the
ligence

MITIGATION
highest degree of practicable care constitutes
negligence, but in other cases the failure to
exercise ordinary care constitutes negligence.
Counsel are greatly in error in asserting, as
they do, that the instruction correctly fur
nishes the standard for the government of
the jury.
The appellant was, as we have
substantially said, bound to do more than
prudent men would ordinarily do,v since it
was bound to use a very high degree of care.
The duty of a railroad company engaged in
carrying passengers is not always discharged
by purchasing from reputable manufacturers
the iron rods or other iron-work used in the
construction of its bridges.
The duty of the
company is not discharged by trusting, with
out inspecting and testing, to the reputation
of the manufacturers, and the external ap
of such materials. The law re
pearance
quires that before the lives of passengers
are trusted to the safety of its bridges, the
company shall carefully and skillfully test
LAW DAM.-16
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and inspect the materials it uses in such
structures. This duty of inspection does not
end when the materials are put in place, but
continues during their use; for the company
is bound to test them, from time to time, to
ascertain whether they are being impaired
by use or exposure to the elements.
Manser
v. Railway Co., 3 Law ’1‘. (N. S.) 585; Rail
road Co. v. Suggs, 62 Tex. 323; Stokes v.
Railway Co., 2 Fost. & F. 691; Robinson
v. Railroad Co., 9 Fed. 877; Richardson v.
Railroad Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 486, L. R. 1 C.
P. Div. 342; Ingalis v. Bills, 9 Metc. 1; Frink
v. Potter, 17 Ill. 406; Bremner v. Williams,
1 Car. & P. 414; Hegeman v. Railroad Corp.,
13 N. Y. 9; Alden v. Railway Co., 26 N. Y.
102.

The decision in the case 0i.’ Railroad Co. v.
65 Ind. 527, is not in conﬂict with this
doctrine, for in that case an inspection was

Bwd,

made.

Judgment aﬂirmed.
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alleged, or that said ﬁrm expended the
sum alleged, or any sum, for clearing
(16 s. v. 516, 105 M0. 154.)
away débris, or that said ﬁrm had a lease
Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.. 'as alleged, or had paid rental as alleged,
or lost the use of said store-room, or that
June
11591.
the pretended unexpired term oi said lease
Appeal from St. Louis circuit court;
was of the value alleged, or any value, or
Amos M. TH..\Ysii, Judge.
that said ﬂrm expended the sum alleged,
This is an action ior damages caused by
or any sum, in recovering, handling. DreL
the negligent pulling down of a brick wall. serving, or removingsaid chattels, or that
upon the building in which piaintiffs‘stock
the plaintiffs were damaged in the sum of
of goods was stored in the city of St.
three thousand dollars. or any other sum,
Louis on November 17. 1877. The petition
And defendant asks to be
as alicg,c(i.
"
in this case was passed upon by this court
hence dismissed with his costs.
in this cause in 82 Mo. 150, and held good
The iollowing is a concise statement of
The answer is as iollows:
on demurrer.
the facts disclosed by the record which
“ Defendant,
ior answer to the petition of raise the questions now presented to this
Thomas E. Dillon, Martha Jessel, and Jo
to.wit: The
court ior determination,
Denies that
plaintiffs as copartners occupied, with a
seph Jessei. piainti!fs—I"irst.
Joseph Jessei, as husband of said Martha
stock of general merchandise, the ﬁrst
Jessel, is a necessary or proper party to ' ﬂoor of a three.story building numbered
this action, and says objection to him as 110 North Fourth street,in the city of St.
testator,
the defendant,s
‘a party herein will at all times be made. . Louis. and
Second. Denies that said Martha Jessei
Charles L. Hunt,0wned a ﬁve-story build
ing immediately adjoining it on the south.
and said Thomas E. Dillon were partners,
as alleged, and denies ‘said alleged ﬁrm or
On the night of the 13th day of November,
ﬁre, and
1877, the Hunt buildingcanght
said plaintiffs, or either of them, was or
were owners of or in possession of any of
all the interior combustible portions of it
burned, which left the north wall and a
the goods, wares, or chattels in the petipartition wail running east and west
tion mentioned, at the place mentioned,
standing, but in a very dangerous condi
or engaged in the business alleged. or that
tion, and liable at any time to fall over
said chattels were of the value alleged, or
upon the building occupied by plaintiffs.
of any value. Third. Defendant admits
Plaintiffs‘ stock of goods was consider
that Charles L. Hunt was the ownerof the
ably damaged by the iire and water on the
building and lot in the petition described,
day or two
night of November 13th.
but denies the same was adjoining any
store-room or building occupied by plain
after the ﬁre, chief of the fire department
tiffs. Fourth. Defendant admits a ﬁre,
Sexton. notiﬁed Hunt that the standing
walls were dangerous, and that he would
which defendant says was accidental’ and
have to remove them. After this notice.
occurred in his absence. and w as beyond
Hunt knowingly permitted others to go
control beiore it was discovered, did occur, and his building was in great part
upon his premises for the purpose of ta
ing the walls down, and while these per
destroyed thereby, but defendant denies
sons were so engaged, on the 17th of No
defendant knew.as aiieged,said walls and
vember, they negligently threw portions
chimneys left standing were in unsafe, in
secure,and dangerous‘ condition, or a nnlof the north wall mentioned above over
upon the building occupied by plaintiffs,
sauce. or liable to fall, as alleged, and de
by means whereof the latter building was
nies that it was defendant,s duty to abate
crushed, and the plaintiffs’ stock of goods
the same. Fifth. Defendant denies he was
damaged still more. This action is ior
in possession of said premises, walls, or
chimneys, as aileged,or had full or any
the recovery of the latter damage. Plain
control or direction of the same, and he
tiffs had several policies under which their
denies he allowed or permitted, either
stock of goods was insured against dam
knowingly, negligently. or in any way, age by ﬁre and water. After the ﬁre on
certain or any persons or person to enter
the 13th, and beiore the fall of the wall on
upon said premises ior the purpose alleged,
the l7th, the loss under these policies, ex
cepting one, resulting from ﬁre, were ad
or any purpose, or that their action injusted, and the policies canceled; and after
ured to defendant,s beneﬁt. Sixth. De
fendant denies that any person or persons
the fall of the wail,nnd beiore the institu
negligen tlyorunskillfully pushed or threw
tion of the suit, plaintiffs settled with the
or caused said walls, or portions there- company which issued the remaining pol
of, to fall, as alleged. or that the same
icy iora portion oi the losses occurring
There was evidence to sus
did so fnll,or that said house was crushed
thereunder.
tain the allcgations of the petition. Mr.
and destroyed, or the chattels contained
therein were covered with the débris.
Hunt died after the suit was brought. One
Seventh. Defendant denies heelther knew
of the principal issues at the trial was
or had good reason to know that said
whether or not Hunt authorized or per
person or any persons either undertook
mitted the parties who negligently threw
to tear down said walls. or intend
the walls down to go upon his premises
ed to adopt or did adopt the method
ior the purpose of taking them down; and
alleged in the petition, or that defend
during the progress of the trial Fred C.
ant neglected his duty as alleged, or Ziebig was permitted to testify, over the
objections and exceptions of plaintiffs.
permitted the work to he proceeded with
that he, as the agent of Mr. Hunt, had
as alleged. Eighth. Defendant denies any
made no arrangement with anybody ior
portions of said goods were mutilated
taking down the walls: that he did not
or otherwise injured either in the sum
at the time know the walls were be
as alleged or any other sum, or that ﬁxt
ing taken down, or that anybody had
ures were damaged as alleged or in sum

DILLON’
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been‘workingon them. John W. Munson,
‘another witness ior defendant, was also
permitted to testify.. over the objections
and exceptions of plaintiffs, to the effect
that he had a conversation with Mr. Hunt
about the walls after the notice from the
chief of the lire.department, and that he
had told Mr. Hunt not to do anything
with the walls at all that would affect his
.(Hunt,s) or the insurance companies‘ in
terest: that he told Hunt not to do any‘
thing with the pulling down of the walls
Walter C; Butler, another
until later.
witness on behalf of defendant, was per
mitted to testify, over the objections and
exceptions of the plaintiffs, to the effect that
the plaintiffs had $6.000 insurance on their
stock of goods, and that the plaintiff Dil
ion made claim to him orally for damages
under the policies. The court also admit
ted in evidence, over plaintiffs‘ objections
and exceptions,a written or printed claim
made by plaintiff Dillon to one of the in
surance companles for loss on plaintiffs’
stock of goods. This. with Butler,s state
ment and other evidence, tended to show
that plaintiffs had received some compen
sation irom the insurance companies un
der their policies for damages resulting
from the fall of the walls. Upon this last
point the courtgave theiollowing instruc
"
tion on hehaif of thedefendant:
(2) The
jury are instructed, if they ﬁnd from the
evidencethat the plaintiffs, under the name
‘of T. E. Dillon. had insured the stock of
goodsinjured by the falling of the walls of
I-Iunt’s building. and claimed and collect
ed irom the insurance companies. or any
of them, damages to such stock caused by
the falling of the walls as a result of the
ﬁre. then the jury are authorized and di
rected to deduct from the gross damage,
if any, which the jury may believe plain
tiffs have sustained in consequence of the
falling of the wall. the amount oi such
damages as plaintlifs are shown to have
collected from said insurance companies
"
Aft
occasioned by the falling of the wall.
er the jury had been out some time, con
sidering of their verdict. they sent to the
court the following written communica
tion: “To the Honorable Judge of the
Circuit Court, Room No. 5: The instructions of the court seem to have blended
the damage suit with the insurance.
We
wish to know if the parties having re
ceived insurance bars them out from dam
age from other parties. Please give us the
law upon this subject." Whereupon the
court, over the objection and exceptions
of the plaintiffs, gave to thejury the ioilowing additional instruction: " if the in
rors believe that after the walls fell the
plaintiffs claimed damages from the insur
ance companies that were occasioned by
the falling of the walls oi the Hunt build
ing, as well as ior damages caused by wa
ter, and thattheinsurancecompanies paid
plaintiffs ior any part or portion of the
damages so occasioned by the failing oi
the walls. as well as for damages occa
sioned by water, then, in estimating plain
tiffs damages in this case, you should de
duct whatever damages occasioned by the
falling of the walls he has already received
from the insurance companies. In other
words, the court instructs you that plain
titi is not entitled torecoverdamages from

or
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the defendant occasioned by the falling of
the walls that have already been paid by
the insurance companies. At the same time
the court instructs you that, ii any part of
plaintiff,s damages occasioned by the fall
of the walls has not been paid, he is en,
titled to recover in this action such part
as has not been paid, whatever you may
ﬁnd such amount to be; providing. under
the other instructions, you ﬁnd that de
fendant is liable in this action for the acts
of the persons who took down the wall."
The jury thereupon returned a verdict ior
defendant. Plaintiffs ﬁled their motion for
a new triai,saving the several points men
tioned above, which being overruled, they
ﬁled their bill of exceptions, and after
wards broughtthe case here by writ of er
ror.
C. P. & J. D. Johnson, for plaintiffs in
error. Noble 4‘. Orrlck, for defendant in
error.

J., (after statinglhe facts as
W hen this cause was here on the
iormer appeal, this court aﬂirmed the
judgment of the St. Louis court of ap
peals in reversing the judgment of the
St. Louis circuit court. Without repeat
ing at length the grounds upon which
the court of appeals held plaintiffs would
be .entitled to recover, it is suiiicient to
state that it was then held and sup
ported by the authorities that, where
a proprietor undertakes to do that upon
his land which is in its nature danger
ous to ad_ioininz proprietors, he must
use reasonable care to work no trespass
upon their possession,and it is immaterial
in such a case whether the work be done
by the proprietor or by an independent
contractor. Dillon v. Hunt, 11 Mo. App.
246.
So .on the trial of thiscause thecourt
‘
instructed the jury that if plaintiffs’ goods
were destroyed by the falling ofa brick
I wall then standing on the adjoining lot
1 of Charles L. Hunt, the present defendant,s
testator; that said wall was caused to
fall upon the store-room in which plain
tiffs’ goods were by and through the neg
ligence of certain persons who went upon
said premises ior the purpose of taking
. down said wall by and with the knowl
‘
edge and consent of said Hunt; and that
, said Hunt then and there had the custody
and control of the premises upon which
said wall stood,—then plaintiffs were enti
tled to recover of said Hunt’:-i estate. vIt
l will be seen at once that one of the most
\
re
' material facts necessary to plaintiffs,
covery was the privity of Hunt with the
parties who were pulling down the wall,
and plaintifis offered the direct evidence of
Mr. Sexton,thechlefof theﬁredepartment,
0 tending to show his ofﬁcial notice to Mr.
DHunt of the dangerous condition of the
wall, and directing him to have it taken
down, and of Mr. Fruin of .\Ir. Hunt,s de
sire to have him bid on the work of re
moving the wall, and his recollections of
the men who did the work. Un the part
of the defendant the court permitted Fred
Ziehig to testhy that he was Hunt’s agent
for the collecting of the rents, etc., of this
building, and that he (Ziebigi made no
contract with anybody to remove the
wall, and that he did not know the walls
were being taken down. To this evidence
GANTT, P.

above.)
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plaintiffs objected at the time. and saved
their exceptions. It was clearly incompe
tent. It was wholly irrelevant whether
Ziebig knew anything about the matter.
it was shown
Mr. Hunt was the owner.
beyond a peradventnre that he was in the
city the day after the ﬂre; talked with
Sexton in the immediate view oi the wall;
was notiﬁed then by Sexton at the time
to have it removed on account of its dan
ger. ln Hunt,s absence. notice to Ziehig

might under some circumstances have be
come notice to Hunt; but notice to Hunt
need never have become notice to Zie
big, as under the facts it was wholly
immaterial whether Ziehig had notice.
Again, the court, over the objection of
plaintiffs, permitted Manson. theinsurance
agent, to testify that he told Hunt not to
This conversation,
pull down the wall.
"
as to plaintiffs, was “res fnteralios acta.
It had nothing to do with plaintiffs’
rights, nor could it in theleast affect Hunt’s
responsibility.
The admission of this evi
dence of Zielﬂg nnd “unson. tending to
show want of notice in Hunt’ was clearly
erroneous.
But the most serious error committed
on the trial was the giving of the second
instruction on behalf of defendant, set
forth in full in the statement; of this cause,
and the subsequent instruction reiterating
the same idea given by the court of its
own motion. That instruction permitted
the jury, in assessing plaintiffs‘ damages,
to reduce the same by the amount of any
insurance money they might believe from
the evidence plaintiffs had received for
losses occasioned by the falling of the wall
on their goods. If plaintiffs’ goods were
damaged by the negligence of Hunt or his
employes, it was no concern of theirs that
piaintiffa were insured, and all the evi
dence of this insurance was irrelevant and
incompetent, and the instructions allow
ing this insurance as mitigating the dam
Few
ages of plaintitfs were erroneous.

propositions have

been so universally ac
Sutherland
and settled as this.
on Damages lays down the rule asioiiows:
“There can be no abatement of damages
on the principle of partial compensation
received for the injury. whereit comes from
a collateral source, wholly independent of
the defendant, and is as to him res inter
allos acta. A man who was working ior
a salary was injured on a railroad by the
The fact that
negligence of the carrier.
the employer did not stop the salary
of the injured party during the time
he was disabled was held not available
to the defendant sued for such injury
in mitigation. Nor will proof of money
paid to the injured party by an insur
er or other third person, by reason of
the loss or injury, be admissible to reduce
damages in favor of the party by whose
fault such injury was done. The payment
of such moneys not being procured by the
defendant, and they not having been
either paid or received to satisfy in whole
or in part his liability, he can derive no
in mitigation of
advantage
therefrom
damages ior which he is liable. As has
been said by another, to permit a reduc
.tion of damages on such a ground would
be to allow a wrong-doer to pay nothing,
and take all the beneﬁt of a policy of “ in
1
surance without paying the premium.
Suth. Dam. (1882,) p. 242. And he is sus
Cun
tained by the iollowingauthorities’
ningham v. Railroad Co., 102 Ind. 478, 1
E. Rep. 800; Weber v. Railway Co.. 35 N‘
J. Law, 412: Connecticut Mut. Life lns.Co.
v. New York 8: N. H. R. Co., 25 Conn. 265;
Hayward v. (.‘ain,l05 Mass. 2l3; Briggs v.
Railroad Co., 72 N. Y. 26; Insurance Co. v.
Bosher, 39 Me. 255. and many other cases.
That these errors contributed largely to
0
the verdict for the defendant is almost
self-evident; and. to the end that they
may be remedied in another trial, the judg
ment is reversed and the cause remanded.
All concur.
cepted
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WRIGHT

V.

BANK OF THE METROP
OLIS.

(18 N. E. 79, 110 N. Y. 237.)

Court of Appeals of New York.

October 2,

1888.

Appeal from supreme court, general term,
Fourth department.
About the 7th of January, 1878, one Henry
C. Elliott received from his correspondent in
Rome, N. Y., (B. Huntington Wright,) his
check for $2,000, payable to the order of El
liott, with a request from Wright that he
(Elliott) would meet some drafts Wright
would draw on him. and obtain payment
from the check. He accordingly honored the
drafts, and, having indorsed the check, pro
It was
cured its discount by the defendant.
not paid when presented. and Elliott being
unable to learn the reason, went to Rome to
He then learn
see the drawer of the check.
ed that the drawer had made a general as
signment for the beneiit of his creditors, and
stated his inability to do anything for Elli
ott. Finally, Elliott succeeded in obtaining
a number of shares of stock in dit1’erent rail
road companies, as collateral security to the
check then lying protested in the hands of
the defendant.
The history of the interview
resulting in the procuring of the stock by
Elliott as given on the trial is contradictory,
but the verdict of the jury shows that they
believed that which was given on the part
of the plaintiff. From the evidence thus
given it appears that the stock was in reality
the stock of Benjamin H. Wright, the fa
ther of B. Huntington Wright, and that it was
delivered by him to Elliott voluntarily, and
for the purpose of being used as a collateral
to his own note at six months, which was
to be used to take up the check; but the
stock was not to be sold for six months, as
it was then selling in market much below
what the father thought the stock was really
worth. The stock was owned by Mr. Wright,
as he said, for an investment, and he had no
idea of selling it; _but he allowed Elliott to
take it because he felt sorry for his situa
tion, and wanted to help him, as far as be
reasonably could, out of the diﬂiculty he
was in. Elliott took the stock and went to
New York, and had a talk with the cashier
and vice-president of the defendant. who re
served their decision as to whether they
would take the note and the tock.
Subse
quently, and on the 17th of January, the
cashier wrote that the stock being non-divi
dend paying, and the note six months paper,
it would be impossible to get it through the
board; and he suggested it would be much
better to obtain Mr. Wright,s consent to sell
the stock, and to make his (Elliott,s) account
good in that way. Elliott inclosed this note
to Mr. Wright in a letter addressed to “B.
H. Wright;" and in response, and on the 22
day of January. Benjamin H. Wright, the
owner of the stock, wrote Mr. Rogers, the
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cashier of defendant, refusing to sell the
stock, or to permit of its being sold.
Mr.
Rogers had never seen either of the Messrs.
Wright, and did not know there were two;
and subsequently, and about the 29th of Jan
uary, Eliiott told him that Mr. Wright au
thorized the sale of the stocks, and they
were immediately sold, less commission for
$2,261.50.
On the part of the piaintiff it was
claimed that Mr. Wright. the true owner of
the stocks, never gave any such authority to
sell them, and that he was unaware that
they had been sold until May 9, 1878. Feb
ruary 14, 1881, the stock reached the high
est price, down to the day of trial, selling on
that day for $18,003.
This action was com
menced October 7, 1879.
Mr. Wright, the
owner of the stock, was about seventy-six
years of age in Hay, 1878, and in the latter
part of that year went south, and returned
early in the year 1879. On the 9th of May,
1878, he made a demand upon the defendant
for the stocks, and tendered to it the amount
of the check and interest. being something
over $2,000.
The cashier stated the stocks
had been sold by the authority of the owner
thereof, as be supposed, given through Mr.
Elliott, and refused to deliver them or their
value.
The original plaintiff died since the
ﬁrst trial of the case, and the present one
was duly substituted. The court charged the
jury that if they found for the plaintiff he
was entitled to recover the highest price at
which the stocks could have been sold in the
market between the date of their actual con
version and a reasonable time thereafter, and
that the jury should ﬁx the reasonable time,
not arbitrarily or through sympathy or prej
udice; but they were to say what, under all
would be a reasonable
the circumstances,
time within which to commence this action,
and also, it may be, reasonable diligence in
prosecuting it; because if the action were
commenced in fact within a reasonable time
after the conversion of the stock. and had
been prosecuted
with reasonable diligence
since, then the piaintiff was entitled to re
cover the highest market price that the stock
reached between the date of the conversion
and the time of the trial, less the amount of
the check and interest, and with interest on
the balance.
This charge was duly excepted
to.
The jury found a verdict for $3,391.25.
There is no evidence which shows when the
Upon the rendi
stock reached that value.
tion of the verdict both parties moved to set
it aside, the plaintiii’ on the ground that he
was entitled, under the charge, to the high
est value of the stock down to the trial, and
the defendant on the ground that the dam
ages were excessive and contrary to evi
The court granted the motion of the
dence.
piaintiﬂf,
and set the verdict aside on the
ground stated, and denied the motion of the
defendant.
The defendant appealed to the
general term from both of such orders. That
court reversed the order setting aside the
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verdict, and ordered judgment thereon, and
afﬁrmed the order made on defendant,s mo
Judg
tion, refusing to set aside the verdict.
ment was then entered upon the verdict of
the jury, and from that judgment both sides
appeal to this court. and they also appeal
from the orders of the general term upon
which the judgment was entered.
v

W. E. Scripture, for plaintiff.

Joseph H.

Choate and John Delahunty, for defendant.

PECKHAM, J., (after stating the facts as
above.) This case comes before us in a
As both par
somewhat peculiar condition.
ties appeal from the same judgment, which
is for a sum of money only, it would seem
as if there ought not to be much difﬁculty in
obtaining its reversal.
It i obvious, how
ever, that a mere reversal would do neither
party any good, as the case would .then go
down for a new trial, leaving the important
legal question in the case not passed upon
by this court. This, we think, would be an
injustice to both sides. The case is here, and
the main question is in regard to the rule
of damages. and we think it ought to be de
cided. By this charge the case was left to
the jury to give the highest price the stock
could have been sold for, intermediate its
conversion and the day of trial, provided the
jury thought, under all the circumstances,
that the action had been commenced within
a reasonable
time after the conversion, and
dili
had been prosecuted .with reasonable
gence since. Authority for this rule is claim
ed under Romaine v. Van Allen, 26 N. Y. 309,
and several other cases of a somewhat sim
ilar nature, referred to therein. Markham v.
Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235, followed the rule laid
down in Romaine v. Van Allen. In these
two cases a recovery was permitted which
gave the plaintiff the highest price of the
stock between the conversion and the trial.
In the Markham Case the plaintiff had not
paid for the stocks, but was having them
carried for him by his broker (the defend
Yet this fact was not re
ant) on a margin.
garded as making any difference in the rule
of damages, and the case was thought to be
controlled by that of Romaine.
In this state
of the rule the case of Matthews v. Coe, 49
N. Y. 57—62, came before the court. .The pre
cise question was not therein involved; but
the court, per Church, 0. J., took occasion to
intimate that it was not entirely satisﬁed
with the correctness of the rule in any case
not special and exceptional
in its circum
stances;
and the learned judge added that
they did not regard the rule as so ﬁrmly set
tled by authority as to be beyond the reach
of review whenever an occasion should ren
der it necessary.
One phase of the question
again came before this court, and in proper
form, in Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211, where
the plaintiff had paid but a small percentage
on the value of the stock, and his broker,

was carrying me same on a
the plaintiff had recovered in
the court below, as damages for the unau
thorized sale of the stock, the highest price
between the time of conversion and the time
of trial. The rule was applied to substan
tially the same facts as in Markham v. Jau
don, supra, and that case was cited as au
thority for the decision of the court below.
This court, however, reversed the judgment
and disapproved
the rule of damages which
had been applied.
The opinion was written
by that very able and learned judge, Rapal
lo, and all the cases pertaining to the subject
were reviewed by him, and in such a master
ly manner as to leave nothing further for
us to do in that direction. We think the rea
soning of the opinion calls for a reversal of
this judgment. In the course of his opinion
the judge said that the rule of damages, as
laid down by the trial court, following the
case of Markham v. Jaudon, had “been rec
ognized and adopted in several late adjudica
tions in this state in actions for the conver
sion of property of ﬂuctuating value; but
its soundness as a general rule, applicable
to all cases of conversion of such property,
has been seriously questioned, and is denied
in various adjudications in this and other
states."
The rule was not regarded as one
of those settled principles in the law as to
the measure of damages, to which the max
im stare decisis
should
be applied.
The
principle upon which the case was decided
rested upon the fundamental theory that in
all cases of the conversion of property (ex
cept where punitive damages are allowed)
the rule to be adopted should be one which
affords the plaintiff a just indemnity for the
by the sale of the
loss he has sustained
stock; and, in cases where a loss of proﬁts
is claimed, it should be, when awarded at
all, an amount sufﬁcient to indemnify the
party injured for the loss which is the nat
ural, reasonabie, and proximate result of the
wrongful act compiained of, and which a
proper degree of prudence on the part of the
complainant would not have averted. The
ruie thus stated, in the language of Judge
Rapallo, he proceeds to apply to the facts
of the case before him. In stating what in
his view would be a proper indemnity to the. .
injured party in such a case, the learned‘
judge commenced his statement with the
fact that the plaintiff did not hold the stocks
for investment;
and he added that. if they
had been paid for and owned by the plain
tiff, different considerations would arise, but
it must be borne in mind that we are treat-.
ing of a speculation carried on with the cap
ital of the broker, and not of the customer.
If the broker has violated his contract or‘
disposed of the stock without authority, the
customer
is entitled to recover such dam
ages as wonld naturally be sustained in re
storing himself to the position of .which he
has been deprived.
He certainly has no
the defendant,
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right to be placed in a better position than
he would be in if the wrong had not been
done.
The whole reasoning of the opinion
is still based upon the question as to what
damages would naturally be sustained by
the plaintiff in restoring himself to the posi
tion he had been in; or in other words, in re
purchasing the stock. It is assumed in the
opinion that the sale by the defendant was
.illegal and a conversion, and that plaintiff
had a right to disaﬂirm the sale, and to re
If
to replace the stock.
quire defendants
they failed, then the learned judge says the
fpiaintiffs remedy was to do it himself, and
,to charge the defendants with the loss nec.
0essarily sustained by him in doing so.
Is not this equally the duty of a plaintiff
who owns the whole of the stock that has
been wrongfully sold? I mean, of course, to
exclude all question of punitive damages
resting on bad faith. In the- one case the
plaintiff has a valid contract with the broker
to hold the stock. and the broker violates it
and sells the stock. The duty of the broker
is toreplace it at once, upon the demand of
the plaintiff. In case he does not, it is the
duty.of the plaintiff to repurchase it. Why
.hould. not the same duty rest upon a plain
tiff who has paid in full for his stock, and
has deposited it with another conditionally?
QThe broker who purchased it on a margin
for the plaintiff violates his contract and his
duty when he wrongfully sells the stock,
just as much as lfthe whole purchase price
.had been paid by the plaintiff.. His duty is
in each case to replace the stock upon de
.mand, and, in case he fall so to do, then the
duty of theplaintiff springs up, and he
.should repurchase the stock himself. This
gdutyit seems to me is founded upon the
.genera.l duty which one owes to another who
converts

his property

under

an honest

mis

,take, to render the resulting damage as
light as it may be reasonably within his
power to do. It is well said by Earl, J., in
‘Parsons v. Sutton, 66 N. Y. 92, that "the
.party. who suffers from a breach of contract
must so act as to make his damages as
small as he reasonably can. He must not
by inattention, want of care, or inexcusable
negligence permit his damage to grow, and
then charge it all to the other party. The
law gives him all the redress he should have
1by indemnifying him for the damage which
he necessarily sustains." See, also, Dillon
.v. Anderson, l3 N. Y. 231; Hogle v. Railroad
Co., 28 Hun, 363,—the latter case being an
action of tort. In such a case as this. wheth
.er the action sounds in tort or is based al
together upon contract. the rule of damages
is the same. Per Denio, C. J., in Scott v.
Rogers, 31 N. Y. 676; and per Rapallo, J.,
in Baker v. Drake, supra. The rule of dam
ages as laid down in Baker v. Drake, in
cases where the stock was purchased by the
broker on a margin for plaintiff, and where
the matter was evidently a speculation,
has
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been aﬂirmed in the later cases in this court.
See Gruman v.- Smith, 81 N. Y. 25;Colt v.
Owens, 90 N. Y. 368. In both cases the duty
of the plaintiff to repurchase the stock with
in a reasonable time is stated. I think the
duty exists in the same degree where the
plaintiff had paid in full for the stock. and
In Baker
was the absolute owner thereof.
v. Drake the learned judge did not assume
to declare in a case where the pledgor was
the absolute owner of the stock, and it was
wrongfully sold, the measure of damages
must be as laid down in the Romaine Case.
He was endeavoring to distinguish the cases,
and to show that there was a difference be
tween the case of one who is engaged in a
speculation
with what is substantially the
money of another and the case of an abso
lute owner of stock which is sold wrongful
ly by the pledges. And he said that at least
the former ought not to be allowed such a
rule of damages. It can be seen, however,
that the judge was not satisﬁed with the
rule in the Romaine Case, even as applied to
the facts therein stated.
In his opinion he
makes use of this language:
“ln. a case
.where the loss of probable proﬁts is claim
ed as an element of damage, if it be ever
allowable to mulct a defendant for such a
conjectural loss, its amount is a question
of fact, and a ﬁnding in regard to it should
be based upon some evidence."
In order to
.refuse to the plaintiff in that case, however,
the damages claimed, it was necessary to
overrule the .Markham Case, which was
done. Now, so far as the duty to repurchase
the stock is concerned, I see no difference in
the two cases. There is no material distinc
tion in the fact of ownership of the whole
stock, which should place the plaintiff out
side of any liability to repurchase after no
the of sale. and should render the defend
ant continuously liable for any higher price
to which the stock might rise after con
version and before trial.
As the same lia
bility on the part of defendant exists in
each case to replace the stock, and as he is
technically a wrong-doer in both cases, but
in one no more than in the other, he should
respond in the same measure of. damages
in both cases; and that measure is the
.
amoimt which, in the language of Rapallo, J.,
is the natural, reasonable. and proximate re-v
suit of the wrongful act complained of, and.
which a proper degree of prudence on the‘
part of the plaintiff would not have avert
ed.
The loss of a sale of the stock at th
highest price down to trial would seem t
be a less natural and proximate
result o
the wrongful act of the defendant in selling
it when plaintiff had the stock for an invest
ment, than when he had it for a speculation;
for the intent to keep it as an investment is
at war with any intent to sell it at any
price, even the highest.
But. in both cases
the qualiﬁcation attaches that the loss shall
only be such as a proiier degree of prudence
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presume
on the part of the complainant would not
in favor of an investor that he
have averted, and a proper degree of pru
would have held his stock during all of a
period of possible depression,
dence on the part of the complainant con
and would
sists in repurchasing the stock after notice
have realized upon it when it reached theQ
highest ﬁgure, is to indulge in a presump
of its sale, and within a reasonable time.
If the stock then sells for less than the de tion which, it is safe to say, would not be
fendant sold it for, of course the complain
based on fact once in a hundred times.
To
ant has not been injured, for the difference formulate a legal liability based upon such
in the two prices inures to his beneﬁt. If it presumption I think is wholly unjust in such
sells for more, that difference the defendant . a case as the present.
Justice and fair deal
ing are both more apt to be promoted by ad
should pay.
It is said that as he had already paid for hering to the rule which imposes the duty
the stock once, it is unreasonable to ask the
upon the plaintiif to make his loss as light
owner to go in the market and repurchase it.
as possible, notwithstanding the unauthor
In ized act of the defendant, assuming, of
do not see the force of this distinction.
the case of the stock held on margin, the
course, in all cases, that there was good faith
plaintiff has paid his margin once to the on the part of the appellant. It is the nat
broker, and so it may be said that it is un
ural and proximate loss which the plaintiff;
reasonable to ask him to pay it over again
is to be indemniﬁed for, and that cannot be
in the purchase of the stock.
Neither state
said to extend to the highest price before
ment, it seems to me, furnishes any reason
trial, but only to the highest price reached
for holding a defendant liable to the rule
within a reasonable time after the plaintiff
of damages stated in this record.
The de
has learned of the conversion of his stock
fendant,s liability rests upon the ground that
within which he could go in the market and
repurchase it.
he has converted, though/in good faith, and
What is a reasonable time .
under a mistake as to his rights, the prop
when the facts are undisputed, and different
erty of the plaintiff. /The defendant is, there
inferences cannot reasonably be drawn from
fore, liable to respond in damages for the
the same facts. is a question of law.
See
value.
But the duty of the plaintiff to make
Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368; Hedges v. Rail
the damage as light as he reasonably may
road Co., 49 N. Y. 228.
rests upon him in both cases; for there is no
We think_that beyond all controversy in
more .legal wrong done by the defendant in
this case, and taking all the facts into con
selling the stock which the plaintiff has fully sideration, this reasonable time had expired
paid for than there is in selling the stock by July 1, 1878, following the 9th of May of
The highest price which the
which he has agreed to hold on a margin,
the same year.
and which agreement he violates by selling
stock reached during that period was $2,795,
it.
All that can be said is that there i a and, as it is not certain on what day the
plaintiff might have purchased, We think it
difference in amount, as in one case the plain
tiif’s margin has gone, while in the other fair to give him the highest price it reached
the whole price of the stock has been sacri
in that time.
From this should be deducted
ﬁced.
But there is no such difference in the the amount of the check and interest to the
legal nature of the two transactions as
day when the stock was sold, as then it is
presumed the defendant paid the check with
should leave the duty resting upon the plain
In all this discus
till‘ in the one case to repurchase the stock,
the proceeds of the sale.
and in the other case should wholly absolve sion as to the rule of damages we have as
him therefrom. A rule which requires a re
sumed that the defendant acted in good faith,
purchase ot the stock in a reasonable time in an honest mistake as to its right to sell
does away with all questions as to the high
the stock. and that it was not a case for
of the
punitive damages.
est price before the commencement
A careful perusal of the
suit, or whether it was commenced in a rea
whole case leads us to this conclusion. It is
sonable time, or prosecuted with reasonable
not needful to state the evidence, but we can
diligence; and leaves out of view any ques
not see any question in the case showing
bad faith, or indeed any reason for its exist
tion as to the presumption that plaintiff
would have kept his stock down to the time ence. The fact is uncontradlcted that the
when it sold at the highest mark before the defendant sold the stock upon what its oﬂi
day of trial and would then have sold it,
oers supposed was the authority of the owner
The opin
thereof given to them by Elliott.
even though he had owned it for an invest
ion delivered by the learned judge at gen
Such a presumption is not only of
ment.
quite a shadowy and vague nature, but is
eral term, while agreeing with the principle
of this opinion as to the rule of damages in
also, as it would seem, entirely inconsistent
with the fact that he was holding the stock this case, usta,ined the verdict of the jury
If kept for an invest upon the theory that, if the plaintiff had gone
as an investment.
ment, it would have been kept down to the
into the market within a reasonable time,
day of trial; and the price at that time there
and purchased an equivalent of the stocks
might be some degree of propriety in award
he would have paid the price
converted,
ing, under certain circumstances. if it were
which he recovered by the verdict. . This left
higher than when it was converted.
the jury the right to ﬁx what was a reason
But to
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able time, and then assume there was evi
In truth there
dence to support the verdict.
was no evidence which showed_the value of
the stock to have been anything like the
amount of the verdict, for the evidence show
ed it was generally very much less, and
sometimes very much more. But ﬁxing what
is a reasonable time ourselves, it is seen that
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the stock within that time was never of any
such value.
The judgment should he revers
ed, and a new trial granted, with costs to
abide the event.

EARL, FINCH, and GRAY, JJ., concur.
RUGER, C. J., and ANDREWS and DAN
FORTH, JJ., dissent. v
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